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This thesis is a study of the international conflict over the sharing of
the waters of the River Ganges: its origins, conduct and consequences.
In Part I the proximate cause of the conflict - the Farakka Barrage
Project - is investigated; some uncertainties about the project's
technical rationale and misrepresentations about support for the project
are investigated. A history of the political dispute which accompanied
the construction and operation of the barrage is presented in Part II.
Periods when the conflict might have been resolved are identified and
examined and the governmental strategies underlying the events are
inferred. An assessment is made, in Part III, of the physical
consequences for Bangladesh of operation of the Farakka Barrage during
the dry seasons of 1976 and 1977« It is concluded that Bangladesh
suffered serious economic disruption as a result of the reduced flows
in the River Ganges. Part IV is an analysis of the major engineering
projects which India and Bangladesh have proposed as means of
increasing the dry season flow in the Ganges, and, therefore, removing
the conflict of interest at the centre of the dispute. The analysis
shows that the projects are not simply technical responses to the
water shortage but they embody wider political objectives of the two
nations. A comparison, in Part V, with water disputes elsewhere casts
an unfavourable light on India's conduct of this conflict.
I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that the
work contained within it is my own.
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A note on river names
For simplicity, international usage and spelling have been adopted
for the main rivers in South Asia. Thus, the GANGES has been
referred to by that name throughout, even though it is known as the
GANGA in India, and the PADMA or PUDDAH in Bangladesh. The BRAHMAPUTRA
is only known by that name in the plains of Assam; in Tibet it is
the TSANGPO, and in Bangladesh the JAMUNA.
Similar problems arise with most rivers in South Asia. Names are
localised and often repeated for different rivers (thus the Bhagirathi
in West Bengal is sometimes known as the Ganga, and one of the
Himalayan sources of the Ganga is called the Bhagirathi). The
HOOGHLY was the HUGLI in the C19th. This century it has generally
been the HOOGHLY, but most recently has come to be known again as
the HUGLI. Although the latter spelling is nearest to the phonetic,










Cubic feet per second. This is the unit of
instantaneous river flow most widely known and
used in South Asia. It has therefore been used
in this thesis. (For conversion factors to
metric SI units, see the following table.)
Cubic metres per second. The correct SI symbol
would be m^/s, but water engineers sometimes use
this formulation.
The volume of water in a river flowing past a
particular point in a given time.
The outgoing, seaward flowing, falling tide.
The incoming, rising tide (also sometimes known
as the flow tide).
The volume of water flowing in a river (see also
discharge).
The spill of the Ganges into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly








The lower, or people's house of the Indian
parliament.
Million acre-feet. A measure of volume used for
reservoirs.
The rights over a river of the river bank owner,
extended by analogy to the rights of a nation
to utilise the waters of a river flowing through
its territory.
A river stage is the height or level of the water
surface.
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A note on units
The principal units used in this thesis are shown below, with their
















0.028 q cubic metres (m7)
1.233 x 10 cubic metres (m )
Volume of flow
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis tells a complicated story. It is the story of an
international dispute, of the engineering project which gave rise
to that dispute, and of several engineering proposals intended to
resolve the conflict. It is an investigation into the politics and
technology of the sharing of the River Ganges.
For more than 350 million people living in the basins of the rivers
Ganges and Brahmaputra, the water in those rivers is a major resource.
Equitable and full utilisation of the water for irrigation, power
generation and flood control could increase the prosperity of the
region significantly. One reason why the resource has not been
developed is .that there has been disagreement over the sharing of
the river and the direction development should take. This thesis
is an attempt to understand that disagreement.
The Ganges Basin
The River Ganges is the largest and most sacred river of India. It
drains the Southern Himalayas and flows across the North Indian plain
to fall into the Bay of Bengal after a course of about 1,600 miles
(2,500 km) (see Figure 1). The Ganges Basin includes more than a
quarter of India, almost all of Nepal, the Western areas of
Bangladesh and parts of China. At its junction with the sea, the
river has created a delta. The apex of this delta falls on the
India-Bangladesh border. At this point the first of a series of
spill channels, or distributaries, branches off the main river.
This is the River Bhagirathi-Hooghly on which Calcutta is situated.
In Bangladesh only one major channel, the Gorai River, branches off
before the Ganges joins the Brahmaputra.
The fundamental problem of land and water development in the Ganges
Basin arises from the highly seasonal nature of the flow in the
Ganges. Not only does Sk% of the rainfall in the Ganges plain occur
between June and September, but 80% of the annual flow of the Ganges
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Figure 1: South Asia - major rivers
xiv
also passes through the plain in the four months from July to October
(1).
The significance of the Farakka Barrage Project
At Farakka, close to the apex of the Ganges delta, the Government of
India has constructed a barrage (2) with the object of diverting a
proportion of the flow of the Ganges down the Bhagirathi-Hooghly. It
was this project which provoked dispute between Pakistan and India.
The increased flow in the River Hooghly was intended, by the Government
of India, to 'flush' siltation from the lower reaches of the river.
These lower, estuarine reaches provide access from the Port of
Calcutta to the sea and siltation of the river was hampering the
trade of the port.
The Government of Pakistan anticipated that the flow in the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly would be increased at the expense of the flow in
the main channel of the Ganges. Pakistan expected that only a
reduced quantity of water would flow on into East Bengal, an
insufficient quantity for the maintenance of the agriculture, ecology
and economy of the province.
Thus, the Farakka Barrage Project gave rise to disagreement, dispute
and eventually discussion about the sharing of the waters of the
River Ganges.
Outline of events
The Indian Government announced that it was constructing the Farakka
Barrage in 1961, and the project was completed in 1975i but anxiety
about the decline of the River Hooghly can be traced back to the
middle of the Nineteenth Centry. From 1853 until 1952, a series of
inquiries and investigations were made into the condition of the
River Hooghly. Simultaneously the concept of 'flushing' the Hooghly
with water from the Ganges was being discussed and it was this
method which the Indian Government chose in 1961.
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The construction of the Farakka Barrage was accompanied by frequent
protests from the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan argued that there
was not enough water to meet the needs of both countries. When,
however, at the end of the 1971 independence struggle, the Government
of Bangladesh took power that government accepted that India's
project was a fait accompli. Nevertheless, negotiations to share
the waters of the Ganges did not progress far. In 1975 only a brief,
temporary understanding, unsatisfactory for both sides, could be
reached. On the basis of that understanding, a small fraction of
the flow of the Ganges was diverted by the Farakka Barrage for forty
days in April and May 1975-
Later in the year, however, the Government of Bangladesh changed three
times, and in 1976 and 1977 the right of India to divert water from
the Ganges was vociferously contested by Bangladesh. This period of
open dispute reached a climax when Bangladesh raised India's
'unilateral diversion' of the Ganges in the United Nations, in 1976.
But the following year the two governments reached agreement on the
sharing of the Ganges. This 1977 agreement was a considerable advance
upon the 1975 understanding: it covered a five year period, rather
than one of only forty days. Nevertheless it was also a relatively
short term agreement and it was founded upon an arrangement for
continuing discussions intended to lead to a long term treaty for the
augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganges.
Augmentation of the Ganges
During the discussions between India and Bangladesh, the focus of
the negotiations gradually moved from the division, or sharing, of
the existing dry season flow of the Ganges, to consideration of
increasing the flow so that there might be more water to be shared
between the two countries.
The 1977 agreement resolved the immediate question of sharing the
existing flow, leaving the negotiations to concentrate upon the
long term issue of augmentation. By the middle of 1980, these
negotiations were continuing, each government having proposed a
scheme by which the Ganges flow might be increased. The Indian
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Government had proposed building a canal from the Brahmjputra to the
Ganges to carry surplus Brahmaputra waters into the Ganges Basin.
The government of Bangladesh had argued that such inter-basin
transfer was unnecessary, the dry season demand for water within
the Ganges Basin could be met by storing the flood waters in Himalayan
reservoirs and releasing the stored water as needed during the dry
season.
Conflicts of interest
The principal conflict in the Ganges dispute is over the dry season
flow of the Ganges. The seasonal fluctuation in the flow leaves
water scarce for the months from January to May. In this period,
India's rising needs for water to flush the Hooghly and for irrigation
are in conflict with East Bengal's demand for water to maintain the
ecology of the Ganges delta and to promote irrigation, industry and
navigation.
India, as the upper riparian state, had the power to implement
projects which would provide for her needs. East Pakistan and its
successor Bangladesh suffered the consequences of Indian decisions
but had only limited power to influence them. The dispute over the
sharing of the Ganges is about the attempts by Pakistan and
Bangladesh to influence Indian policy.
Out of the first conflict, over the division of the Ganges, has
arisen a second, about the alternative ways of augmenting the flow
of the Ganges and of developing both the Ganges and Brahmaputra.
Some research has suggested that cooperative, multinational
development of the two rivers is more likely to maximise overall
benefits than policies of independent national development (3)-
Whether or not this is the case, it has been assumed throughout this
thesis that equitable utilisation of the waters is desirable.
In brief outline, these are the events, and the conflicts of interest,
with which this thesis is concerned. The questions that the thesis
seeks to answer are outlined in the following section.
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Questions
A number of questions were posed at the start of this study, others
arose during the course of research. These questions have provided
lines of enq\iiry, shaping and directing the research. They include:
a) Who initiated .the Farakka Barrage Project and with
what motives?
What alternatives were available?
b) What influenced the responses of the Pakistan and
Bangladesh Governments?
V/ere opportunities for a cooperative settlement of
the dispute overlooked? If so, why?
c) Why are India and Bangladesh proposing different
means for increasing the dry season flow of the Ganges?
d) How does this dispute compare with other water sharing
disputes?
e) What can this case study tell us about the role played
by technical experts, and the use made of expertise,
in international political disputes about technological
innovation and resource sharing?
Theoretical concerns
The subject of this thesis does not fall easily within any one
academic discipline. Engineering and politics are the primary
disciplines into which the study ventures, but it could not sensibly
be confined to them. Inevitably, it also makes incursions into
history and international relations. Therefore it touches upon a
wide range of theoretical issues.
The primary intention of the thesis is to provide a documented,
descriptive response to the questions outlined above, and not to
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make a weighty contribution to theoretical debate. However, two
features of the events under investigation merit consideration within
a more general context. The first is the interaction between
technical expertise and politics, and the second is the analysis
of governmental decision making.
Politics and expertise .
Governmental decisions about the sharing of the Ganges have taken
place amidst a series of controversies about technical questions.
In this section, the main features of some of these controversies are
outlined and some of the concepts which will be used to explore the
interaction between expertise and politics are introduced.
From at least the middle of the last century until the present, the
consequences of human intervention in the hydrology of the Ganges
Basin havabeen the subject of often heated disagreement. Scientists
and engineers have played authoritative roles in this conflict but
it has taken place in the context of, and has been influenced by,
the political aspirations of different communities.
Four principal technical debates can be identified in the history
of the sharing of the Ganges:
o From the middle of the Nineteenth Century until the
middle of the Twentieth, there was disagreement about
the condition of the River Hooghly. Expert opinion
was divided on the question of whether or not the
river was progressively deteriorating as a result
of siltation. On this question turned the fate of
Calcutta Port: if the deterioration of the channel
providing access to the port was temporary or cyclical,
then it need cause only inconvenience; if, however,
the deterioration proved to be progressive, then the
future prosperity of the port would be in danger.
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o Running parallel with this controversy was a
discussion of the methods by which the Hooghly's
deterioration might be halted or reversed. The
discussion evolved into conflict, in the 1950s
and 1960s, over the efficacy of India's preferred
remedy of 'flushing' the Hooghly with additional
water from the Ganges. Some experts thought
the diversion water from the Ganges would improve
the channel of the lower Hooghly, others disagreed.
This is the second technical dispute to be
documented in this thesis.
o The third concerns the consequences of diversion
or withdrawal of water from the Ganges for areas
dependent on the Ganges for water. This technical
dispute is a central issue in the political conflict
between India and Pakistan and India and Bangladesh
over the division of the Ganges. We shall see that
the Government of India, and experts in its employ,
considered that the withdrawals of water at Farakka
would not have and did not have important effects
upon the economy and ecology of downstream areas.
The Governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh and their
experts were and are of the opposite opinion.
o The fourth principal technical controversy is one
which commenced in the first half of the 1970s and
which is, at the time of writing, only in its early
stages. It is a debate amongst experts about the best
way to increase the dry season flow of the River Ganges.
The common factor linking these four disputes is that they concern
questions requiring governmental decisions informed by an assessment
both of political aspects, that is the aspirations of communities or
nations, and of technical aspects, the opinions of those thought to
be expert in the matter. Such disputes within national boundaries
have frequently been studied. This research has a small claim to
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originality because it is one of the first investigations of technical
controversies occurring within a larger international political
conflict. One object of the thesis will be to compare the experience
of national technical disputes with these international examples.
From a study of two North American controversies, Nelkin (k) has
suggested six propositions which may be of general applicability:
(i) Developers seek expertise to legitimise their plans
and they use their command of technical knowledge
to justify their autonomy.
(ii) While expert advice can help to clarify technical
constraints, it is also likely to increase conflicts.
(iii) The extent to which technical advice is accepted
depends less on its validity and the competence of
the expert, than on the extent to which it
reinforces existing positions.
(iv) Those opposing a decision need not muster equal
evidence.
(v) Conflict among experts reduces their political
impact.
(vi) The role of experts appears to be similar
regardless of whether they are hard or soft
scientists.
We shall see in this thesis that many of these propositions apply to
the technical disputes associated with the sharing of the Ganges.
The confirmation which this case study provides for these points,
will be discussed in Chapter 16.
Two concepts in the relationship between expertise and political
decisions should be introduced at this point. These are the idea
of technical ambiguity or uncertainty, and the concept (mentioned by
Nelkin, in (i) above) that experts and science are used to legitimize
specific courses of action.
Mazur, in his 'Disputes between experts' (5)i has drawn attention
to the importance of ambiguity:
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'Even with perfect communication, and eschewing
rhetorical devices... experts may disagree on ambiguous
observations and assessments which cannot be resolved
by available objective means.' (6)
The phrase 'technical ambiguity' will be used in this thesis to
describe circumstances in which the same body of data can be used
to support two or more explanations of a phenomenon. It will be seen
that- an ambiguity of this type played an important part in the second
of the technical controversies enumerated earlier, over the usefulness
of diversions from the Ganges. More general uncertainties about the
value of, or 'weight' to be given to, technical assessments or
estimates arise in each of the other technical controversies.
Turning to the second concept, regarding the use of science to
authorise political action, Ezrahi has written:
'The capacity of science to authorise and certify facts
and pictures of reality [ is ] a potent source of political
influence.' (7)
He was writing about America. The circumstances of South Asia are
hardly the same but the increasing dominance of Western values and
Westward oriented governments grants scientific and technical
expertise a similar legitimizing role. Throughout the narrative of
this thesis examples will be found of this use of expertise.
Dickson locates the power of science to authorise techical choices
in the 'apparently neutral interpretative scheme of positivist
science' (8). The authority of scientific expertise rests on the
supposed neutrality, objectivity and rationality of science. We
shall see (particularly in Part IV of this thesis), however, that
technical data and technical choices are frequently not neutral, they
contain political aspirations clothed in technical language.
For the same reasons that scientific expertise is used to legitimize
essentially political choices, science can also provide a language
for preliminary political contacts between hostile nations. This
depoliticising role of science or expertise will be seen in the
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willingness of the governments of South Asia to instigate 'technical'
discussions, and a corresponding reluctance to enter into negotiations
defined as political. The pitfalls associated with this use of
technical negotiation in lieu of political negotiation may be obvious.
Although the technical language may depoliticise, and hence partially
defuse, the negotiations, at the same time any claim to objectivity
may be compromised and, more important, crucial political questions
may -be overlooked. We shall see that these pitfalls do occur in
practice.
To summarise, two key concepts about the relation between political
choice and technical expertise have been introduced. The first,
technical ambiguity, is the idea that there are areas of understanding
where two explanations may appear to offer equally valid
interpretations of a phenomenon. The second concept relates to the
implicit objectivity of science. This confers upon technical experts
the power to authenticate political decisions and also the ability
to depoliticise decisions or negotiation.
Decision making
At the outset of this study, I hoped that it would be possible to
investigate some of the governmental decisions associated with the
sharing of the Ganges, notably the Indian decision to build the
Farakka Barrage, using the three models of decision making suggested
by Allison in his Essence of Decision (9)- In practice it has not
been possible to accumulate the wealth of detail necessary for such
an analysis. As a minimum, an Allisonian analysis requires
participant's accounts from several vantage points within the
government bureaucracy. The events under consideration here are too
recent, and the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi bureaucrats too
reticent, for adequate accounts to be available. Nevertheless, at
various moments during the research Allison's models provided useful
guidance. Therefore, a brief outline of his three models, and some
criticism of them, is presented in the following paragraphs.
Allison labelled his three models: I Rational Actor, II Organisational
Process and III Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics. The essence
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of the first model, which he asserted was the classical model, is an
assumption that governments are monolithic and rational in their
responses to the strategic problems they face. As alternatives to
this oversimplification, Allison suggested models II and III. The
Organisational Process model he summarised as follows:
'At any given time, a government consists of existing
organisations, each with a fixed set of standard operating
procedures'and programs. The behaviour of these
organisations - and consequently of the government -
relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore,
primarily determined by routines established in these
organisations prior to that instance.' (10)
In a subsequent joint article, with Halperin, Allison has combined
this model with model III (11). With its emphasis on routine, model
II could provide only partial explanations of change. The third,
preferred, model is described by Allison in these terms:
'In contrast with model I, [ this model] sees no unitary
actor but rather many actors as players - players who
focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse
intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms
of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather
according to various conceptions of national, organisational
■ and personal goals; players who make government decisions
not by a single rational choice but by the pulling and
hauling that is politics.' (12)
Freedman (13) has criticised Allison's conception of decision making
on three grounds. First, Freedman argues, the sharp distinction
between model I and model III (the remaining alternatives) can only
be maintained if a false dichotomy between logic and politics is
accepted:
'Particular policy judgements that stem from any given
bureaucratic perspective ought not to be dismissed a.
priori as being merely the product of a political
interest, and therefore in some way 'non-rational'.' (1^)
Secondly, Freedman disagrees with Allison's view that the Bureaucratic
Politics model is the only model able to identify and examine internal
political factors. This view, says Freedman, 'is unjustified and
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depends on a narrow view of polities' (15)- Finally, Freedman argues
that model III reflects the concerns of former bureaucratic
practitioners by 'concentrating attention on the immediate, fragmentary
bureaucratic battles rather than the underlying power structure' (16).
From this critique it can be seen that models I and III are not
distinct and incompatible alternatives, but two ends of a continuum
(17)- Allison's approach suggests lines of enquiry for investigating
the bureaucratic constituent of a decision; there may be other
constituents, such as the structure of state power, which the approach
overlooks.
In this thesis, Allison's method is used overtly only in Chapter Seven,
where a congruence is noted between Allison's models and the
explanations of a participant. However, during the study, the three
models were kept in mind when questioning participants.
Although it was not possible to use the bureaucratic politics approach
in the analysis of decision making, one aspect of the relation between
different issues in an international dispute did emerge in the course
of discussions with participants. This is not a rigorous theoretical
contribution, more a useful pointer toward areas for future research
on this case study. The aspect which arose was an indication of what
I have called 'missed opportunities'.
Missed opportunities
For much of the period of dispute over the sharing of the Ganges,
relations between the nations concerned have been either unfriendly,
overtly hostile, or even on several occasions characterised by war.
For most of this time, the hostility cannot be attributed solely, or
even primarily, to the existence of dispute over the Ganges. That
dispute was generally a minor concern within a range of disagreements.
During periods of 'cold war' or war, the Ganges conflict was a
subsidiary issue, the conduct of which was generally tied to the
state of diplomatic relations. Progress toward an agreed sharing
of the Ganges was unlikely, and did not take place, during such spells
of hostility. Occasionally, however, there were interludes of
cordiality. It was during these interludes when progress might have
been possible. Other causes of disagreement were quiescent and
diplomatic contact during these interludes was often fruitful. The
predominant irritants were set aside leaving the sharing of the
Ganges at or near the centre of the stage.
These interludes I have called 'windows' in the relations between
the states in dispute. One concern of this thesis (particularly
Part II) has been to identify such windows and investigate why,
despite propitious circumstances, progress toward an agreed sharing
of the Ganges did not take place.
The state of relations between two nations is a difficult concept to
define with precision. So, too, is the idea of interludes, or
windows, of cordiality. As a rough guide, a window has been defined
as a period when circumstances appear to be or to have been auspicious
for a settlement of the Ganges dispute. Even in those interludes,
progress in that dispute is not independent of other factors. It is
however slightly less determined by other matters.
In Part II, a number of windows are identified and briefly explored.
I have not managed conclusively to identify the obstacles which stood
in the way of progress during these spells, but I have focussed
attention on periods which would, I think, repay more detailed
investigation.
The law of international rivers
Whilst this thesis does not focus on the legal aspects of the Ganges
conflict, some knowledge of the different positions states have held
to be the 'law' is helpful in understanding the strategies the parties
have followed in this dispute. The main principles relating to the
sharing of international rivers have been categorised as follows:
(i) Absolute territorial sovereignty: a state may
dispose freely of the waters flowing or located in
its territory without concern for the damage which
such acts may cause to another state;
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(ii) Absolute territorial integrity: a state has the right
to demand the natural flow of water from another state;
(iii) Positivistic theory: where no binding agreement exists,
a state is free to utilize water in accordance with
(i). This -is the principle frequently upheld by
upper riparian states;
(iv) Jusnaturalistic theory: even where binding agreements
do not exist, a state is entitled to receive from an
upper riparian state an amount of water corresponding
to historical oracquired rights. This principle is
often followed by lower riparian states;
(v) Equitable utilisation theory: each basin state is
entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international
drainage basin. This principle of joint cooperation
was evolved in detail by the International Law
Association. (18)
In Part II the different legal stances adopted by the parties at
different phases in the dispute will be identified. In Chapter 16
the conduct of this conflict will be compared with the conduct of
contemporary river disputes elsewhere, as indicated by the consensus
on the relevant principles of international law.
Methods of investigation
Having outlined and introduced the theoretical concerns of this thesis,
I turn to a description of the methods of investigation which have
been used in the study.
The research of current affairs cannot readily be made systematic.
The topic of this research is of importance to the governments of
two countries. Research of such a topic cannot be independent of
the topic itself. The governments concerned are aware that comment
upon the dispute - particularly comment which may appear to bear the
imprimatur of scientific expertise or of an established university -
may have some influence on the dispute itself. Information and
comment are not, in these circumstances free; they are resources to
be used. In consequence, publications are classified and sometimes
suppressed altogether, other written material is subject to conscious
and unconscious bias, and the researcher may find he or she is the
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subject of unwelcome attention. These circumstances do not permit
a very sophisticated methodology: -vigilant cross-checking and
sceptical questioning constitute the mainstays of the research.
Four sets of data have been used in this investigation: (i) interviews
with participants, (ii) academic and technical articles, (iii)
newspaper reports, and(iv) government reports and documents. Each
of these sources has traps for the unwary. I have attempted as far
as possible to circumvent them.
Participants were defined as senior government officials, politicians,
academics and advisers involved in the events under consideration.
Participant interviews were conducted as discussions structured by
a list of topics to be covered and general questions to be explored.
Long-hand notes were taken during interviews and a typed record
prepared within 2b hours. Three principal categories of information
were sought in these discussions:
(1) Oral accounts of the progress made and obstacles
encountered in the negotiations over the sharing of
the waters, and of the reasons for particular
government decisions and policies.
(2) The participant's perspective on these events.
(3) Factual data about physical conditions and
engineering proposals, and the participant's guidance
on publications to be consulted for such information.
Only rarely were participants willing and able to give oral accounts
of events. They were either reticent about sensitive areas of
government policy or else ignorant of the main course of events (for
example, crucial phases in the negotiations took place at heads of
state level, advisors and officials could not be expected to know
what occurred in those phases). All but the most outspoken
participants also steered discussion away from questions of politics,
particularly when international policy might have been influenced by
national policy.
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Factual data obtained from interviews, and particularly quantitative
data, WW2. considered to be unreliable unless supported by other,
preferably published, sources. Generally the trust accorded to
information obtained from interviews depended upon the extent to
which occasional cross references tallied with previously obtained
information. Academic and technical articles and government reports
have been used wherever possible to provide detailed factual accounts
and-quantitative data. In most cases these sources have accorded with
other references. The author's or government's perspective is usually
less overt than in an interview with a participant; however such
'bias' can generally be identified in any comment upon events or
interpretation of information.
A large number of newspaper reports have been consulted in newspaper
libraries and cuttings libraries in London and in South Asia. These
reports have proved to be very useful in constructing an account of
the progress of the negotiations. When sifting a large number of
reports, it is possible to select the more reliable correspondents,
newspapers and newspaper informants. Inevitably, journalists are
the recipients of much government propaganda and the picture is
further complicated by the 'news values' which a journalist uses to
select what is printed. Nevertheless, the processes of cross-checking,
searching for plausible detail, and noting the reliability of the
writer, the time lapse between event and publication, and the source
used by the journalist, appear to select reliable information.
The conclusions of this study might have had greater strength if
access had been granted to the large quantity of documentation held
by each government, from cabinet minutes through to unpublished
technical reports. It is one of the frustrations of current affairs
research that such information is rarely available.
With assistance from officials and others sympathetic to this study,
I have been able to obtain a number of unpublished official documents.
These form the basic documentation for Parts III and IV of this
thesis. Other important documents have remained inaccessible.
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The inaccessibility of some information relevant to the study could
cast doubt upon the validity of this thesis and its conclusions.
Where I am aware that information is seriously incomplete, I shall
call attention to this lack. And, in the concluding chapter,
Chapter 16, the importance of this inaccessibility will be discussed.
I shall argue that the non-availability of some documents and
information does not seriously detract from the strength of my
conclusions.
Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into four parts and a concluding discussion.
Part I, containing Chapters One to Four, presents an account of the
circumstances which led to the decision to build the Farakka Barrage
Project. This part corresponds to the questions labelled a) above;
that is, it is a response to the general question: why was the
Farakka Barrage built?
Part II, Chapters Five to Nine, is a chronological account of the
dispute which was initiated by the Farakka Barrage Project. It
provides a history of the Ganges water sharing dispute. The distinct
phases and different issues involved in this conflict are identified,
and the opportunities for settlement which may have been missed are
explored.
Part III, Chapters Ten to Thirteen, is an attempt to quantify and
assess the physical consequences of the operation of the Farakka
Barrage in 1976 and 1977« During a tempestuous period of political
dispute, large diversions were made from the Ganges into the Hooghly.
At the time, the two governments involved, India and Bangladesh,
assessed the consequences of the diversions very differently:
Bangladesh claimed that its economy was seriously damaged, India said
the effect was insignificant. These chapters set out the claims of
the two governments and compare them with the best available
.measurements of what happened.
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Part IV, Chapters Fourteen and Fifteen, presents a description and ,
comparison of the alternative projects that have been suggested for
the resolution of the Ganges water sharing dispute. This conflict is
over the shortage of dry season water. The projects described are
intended to increase the amount of water available in the period of
scarcity and hence remove the source of the dispute.
Finally, Part V.contains a chapter of conclusions. There is a
discussion of the theoretical concerns introduced above, and
comparisons of the Ganges water sharing dispute with water sharing
disputes within India and elsewhere in the world.
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A DIVERSION
'On April 8 i960 representatives of foreign
shipping companies publicly expressed the
view that if the deterioration continued for




The decision to build the Farakka Barrage provoked a dispute between
India and, at first, Pakistan, subsequently Bangladesh. This
dispute set the .stage and chose the cast for the subsequent
discussions on the development of the Ganges. If the origins of the
dispute are to be understood, the reasons for the construction of
the barrage must be investigated.
This part of the thesis is about the Farakka Barrage Project, its
history, the alternatives to it, and the immediate circumstances
leading to its construction.
The first chapter is entitled 'The problem of the Hooghly'. The
problem with which it is concerned is the increasing difficulty of
navigating the River Hooghly which forms the approach to the Port
of.Calcutta. The solution of this problem, according to documents
published by the Government of India, is the primary function of
the "Farakka Barrage. The chapter charts the development of
understanding of the siltation of the Hooghly and investigates some
of the technical controversies associated with this development.
The second chapter chronicles the rise of the idea of diverting
water from the Ganges to counter the Hooghly's deterioration. It
shows that the man generally cited as the originator of the idea
was concerned with a different problem and a different solution.
In Chapter Three some alternative ways of providing adequate access
to Calcutta Port are described, and also the reasons why they were
rejected by the Indian Government. In addition, some opposition to
the Farakka Project is documented, and a technical ambiguity which
casts some light upon that opposition is identified.
The fourth and last chapter in this part describes the immediate
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political and economic circumstances influencing the Indian
Government's decision to sanction the Farakka Project.
Since the primary function of the project is the improvement of the
River Hooghly an introductory description of that river is required.
It is followed by an explanation of the main details and functions
of the Farakka Barrage Project.
The River Hooghly
The River Hooghly is the tidal reach of a combined river, the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly. From its junction with the Ganges to Nabadwip,
the river is known as the Bhagirathi. From Nabadwip to the sea the
river is tidal and is known as the Hooghly (see map, Figure 1.1).
The Bhagirathi is the principal river in a group of three spill
channels known as the Nadia Rivers.
The Bhagirathi-Hooghly is a complex river. It is on the one hand, a
spill channel for the floods of the River Ganges, getting no water
from that source for some 275 days each year; on the other hand, it
is a large tidal estuary fed by silt-laden rivers draining about 8,700
square miles of catchment to the West of the river. (Figure 1.2
shows the hydrographs for some of the main tributaries of the Hooghly.)
The weight of geological and historical evidence suggests that the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly was once the main channel through which the waters
of the Ganges flowed to the sea (1).
The Hooghly is not uniformly shallow, but navigation is obstructed
by a series of bars or shifting sands shown here in Figure 1.3.
The Farakka Barrage Project
The Farakka Barrage Project consists of two barrages, one at Farakka
and a much smaller one across the Bhagirathi at Jangipur, and a 26
mile long feeder canal (see map, Figure 1.4). The barrage at
Farakka is the world's longest (2) with a length between abutments
of nearly 1.4 miles. The purpose of the barrage is to raise the
level of the Ganges so that water can be diverted under the force of
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gravity, via the feeder canal, into the Bhagirathi and thence into
the Hooghly. The feeder canal is.constructed to carry a volume of
up to bO,000 cubic feet per second (cusecs). The barrage at
Jangipur controls the spill from the Ganges during the monsoon
season and also prevents water flowing out of the feeder canal and
back into the Ganges.
The .structure of the Farakka Barrage is supported by a 7 ft thick
concrete raft which rests on the sand bed of the river. The flow
and level in the Ganges can be controlled by the operation of the
barrage's 108, 60 ft wide steel gates. Navigation locks were designed
for both ends of the feeder canal but they have not yet been
constructed.
Although the primary purpose of the Farakka Barrage Project is the
rejuvenation of the Hooghly, the project also brings a number of
secondary benefits. These are as follows:
(1) Communications. The barrage provides a rail and
road bridge at a strategically useful point for
crossing the Ganges.
(2) Drainage. The main controllable cause of floods
in West Bengal is thought by the government to be
the reduced carrying capacity of the Bhagirathi-
Hooghly. This capacity will be increased by the
project.
(3) Salinity. In the years between 1936 and 1959» the
salinity of the water at the main Hooghly intake for
Calcutta's water supply rose from bOO to Z,b60 parts per
million. The project is intended to reduce this salinity.
(b) Inland navigation. The project includes provision
for navigation between Calcutta and the Ganges for
ships of up to 6 ft draught.
3
FIGURE 1.1 The Bhagirathi-Eooghly River system and the Nddia Rivers.
Source:Joglekar et ah "Hydraulic Model Investigations of the
River Hooghly."
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The operating schedule of the project, that is the size and timing of
diversions from the Ganges, has been the subject of some confusion
and even dispute. The question is, how much water is needed to
'flush' the Hooghly during the months when Ganges water is scarce?
It is in these months that the sharing of the water is most
contentious.
Table 1.1 shows.two proposed operating schedules for the project.
These schedules show that in 1961 and 1976 the Indian Government
envisaged that the Hooghly would require reduced quantities of water
during the period of scarcity. However, we shall see in Part II,
that the Indian Government have generally stated in their negotiations
with Pakistan and Bangladesh that ^+0,000 cusecs, that is the full
capacity of the feeder canal, is required throughout the year.
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1 January to 15 March ko to 20 ko
15 March to 15 May up to 20 20
15 May to 20 June 20 to ko
20 June to J>0 June ^0 to 60 20
July to September 60 to 1*f0
October to November 80 to ko ko
December ko J
Source: (a) India. Lok Sabha Secretariat, Public Accounts
Committee 196th Report, The Farakka Barrage
Project, New Delhi, 1976" p 114.
This column includes both the diversion through
the feeder canal and the natural freshets
overflowing into the Bhagirathi during the
flood season.
(b) India. Ministry of Irrigation and Power,





From 1853, if not before, Governments of India have been anxious
about the apparent deterioration of the River Hooghly. On the banks
of the Hooghly lie the docks, wharfs and jetties of the Port of
Calcutta. For much of the last century that port has been India's
busiest, providing access for international trade primarily to and
from Europe. Ships docking in Calcutta have to travel 125 miles up
the Hooghly from the sea. The apparent deterioration of this
channel gave rise to the understandable anxiety that trade between
India and Europe could become more expensive, or Calcutta Port
itself become unusable. As we shall see, it was to halt or reverse
this deterioration that the Farakka Barrage was built.
In 1853? "the Government of Bengal, acting in response to a
representation from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, set up a Hooghly
Commission to enquire into the difficulty of navigating the river.
Numerous further investigations were made into this problem in the
106 years between 185^ and 1960/61, when the decision to build the
Farakka Barrage was taken. The purpose of this first chapter is to
document the conclusions reached by these investigations, and to
follow the debate and disagreement which frequently attended the
analysis of the River Hooghly.
In a pamphlet distributed by Indian Embassies and at the United
Nations in 1976, the Government of India argued that the deterioration
of the Hooghiy was a subject of expert unanimity:
'For more than a century it. has been recognised that
the only means of saving the Port of Calcutta from
choking up with silt and eventual destruction is the
construction of a barrage across the Ganga near Farakka,
located about ^fOO km'North of Calcutta. In the last
century five commissions, ten foreign and numerous
- Indian experts looked into the problem and concluded
that the only solution was to increase and regulate
headwater supplies by constructing a barrage on the
Ganga.' (1)
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The Indian Government is not telling the whole story. It will be
shown in this chapter that the various experts and committees which
examined the question found difficulty in establishing the nature
and extent of the deterioration of the river. Some doubted that any
progressive deterioration was taking place. There was no unanimity;
the characteristic feature of investigations into the deterioration
of the Ilooghly was uncertainty. It is true that many of the experts
recommended a particular solution, building a barrage to divert
water. However, the experts did not agree on the existence of the
problem this barrage was to solve.
The faltering steps which these enquiries took toward agreement on
the problem of the Hooghly are described in this chapter. It is
concerned with the period from 1853 to 1952, when the last
governmental committee of inquiry reported on the problem. The
narrative returns to this question in Chapter Three, which describes
further examinations of the Hooghly made at the time the Farakka
Project was sanctioned.
INVESTIGATIONS PRIOR TO INDIAN INDEPENDENCE
1855, The Hooghly Commission
The first governmental inquiry into the deterioration of the River
Hooghly ended in disagreement. In 1853» the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce drew the attention of government to the difficulty of
navigating the Hooghly, and, as a result, a three person Hooghly
Commission was appointed to investigate the matter. At the end of
their investigation, two of the three found it:
'very difficult to understand how a river like the
Hooghly can do otherwise than deteriorate, however
gradual or slow that process may be.' (2)
Accordingly they recommended that consideration should be given to
the establishment of an alternative port. The third member of the
commission differed from his colleagues on the question of
deterioration. He wrote:
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'I find nothing to lead us to anticipate any future
deterioration beyond such as may arise from a
temporary shallowing of some of the difficult channels
while a change is going on near it...'
It appears that no action was taken on this report. But ten years
later further deterioration of the channel was noted:
'It was reported in London that the trade of Europe
with Bengal was in danger of immediate and prolonged
suspension.'
This led the government to institute another enquiry, which was
undertaken by the Superintending Engineer for the Department of
Public Works in Bengal, Hugh Leonard. He had this to say:
'Whether the Hooghly is deteriorating as a navigable
channel has long been a disputed question...Now one
conclusion may be safely drawn from this difference
of opinion, that is, that the fact of there being
grounds for such a difference proves that the
deterioration cannot be very great.' (5)
Nevertheless, Leonard's analysis led him to conclude that the river
'must deteriorate, however slowly' (6).
In between these two official enquiries a paper was published in
the Institution, of Civil Engineers' Proceedings comparing the Hooghly
with the nearby River Matla (7)« At that time the Matla was
being considered as an alternative- navigable route to, or an
alternative site for a port. The author of the paper, J A Longridge,
concluded:
'One [river] is dangerous and difficult, whilst the
other is safe and convenient for navigation.' (8)
In his view the Matla was the more suitable river because it did not
have any fresh water supply. Longridge thought his comparison was:
'conclusive as to the value of tidal water alone as
compared with fresh water and tidal scour combined.' (9)
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He begged to differ from the majority report of the 1853-5^
commission which had stated that the navigability of the Hooghly
might be improved by increasing the flow of water from the Ganges.
It is clear that neither the importance nor the nature of the Hooghly
problem were the subject of consensus at this time. In 186^+ a
private company did establish a competing port, Port Canning on the
River Matla, but by 1870, 'the Hooghly channels after all had not
deteriorated as apprehended and trade showed no tendency to go to
Port Canning' (10).
1903, Vernon Harcourt and the Port Commissioners
The next serious consideration of the problem came from L F Vernon
Harcourt, who had made his name with a 2 volume work, Harbours and
docks, published in 1895- The following year he prepared a 'Report
on the River Hugli' for the Commissioners of the Port of Calcutta,
and in 1905 he came back to the problem with a substantial paper in
the Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers (11). This
paper does not, 7^ years later, appear contentious, but at the time
it received sharp rebuttals from Port Commission officials.
Vernon Harcourt concluded that the depth of the Hooghly was gradually
reducing. Nevertheless , he was not pessimistic:
'After the most careful consideration, the Author has
come to the conclusion that there is no feature in the
condition of the Hooghly which renders it incapable
of a moderate amount of improvement...' (12)
Vernon Harcourt considered the various suggestions which had been
made for improving the river and chose river 'training', to
concentrate the currents of the ebb and flow tides into a single
channel (13).
Though Vernon Harcourt's conclusion of gradual deterioration can
hardly be described as alarmist, it brought forth a sharp attack
from two Port Commission officials. At this time it was evidently
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the Commission's policy to deny any suggestion that the Hooghly was
deteriorating. The Commissioners pursued this policy as vociferously
and singlemindedly as their successors were, later, to pursue its
opposite.
As part of the discussion of Vernon Harcourt's paper, comments were
published in the Proceedings from two Port Commission officials,
F Palmer and E W Petley. Palmer wrote that he:
'considered that the paper was calculated to give
shipowners a feeling of uneasiness, which was as
unnecessary as it was erroneous, regarding the safety
of navigating the River Hooghly...Throughout the paper
there was a running suggestion of deterioration in the
navigable condition of the river, and therefore [ Palmer]
felt it was very important to the Commissioners of the
Port of Calcutta that this idea should be immediately
and definitely refuted.' (1^)
Palmer also quoted the minority report of the Commission to
the effect that there had been no general deterioration of the river
and commented that 'fifty years further experience has only shown
the extreme accuracy of [these] conclusions' (15)« In various later
publications, the Government of India, acting on behalf of the Port
Commissioners, have used the majority report of the 1053-5^ Commission
to equally good but opposite effect.
In the second comment from a Port Commission employee, E W Petley
made a rather different point:
'the mere study of annual charts, which seemed to have been
[Vernon Harcourt's] method of arriving at his deductions,
could be of little real value, either to himself or to
those responsible for the conservancy of a river of this
description. Only an intimate, daily, and extended
experience of what was going on in the bed of the Hooghly
could possibly give an engineer a practical idea of the
difficulties he would have to contend with in attempting
to control the waters of this river.' (16)
Petley contributed a graph showing how the depths over the Hooghly
bars had changed between 1889 and 190^. From this, Petley concluded
that the depths had 'unquestionably improved'.
1 b
Another reader of Vernon Harcourt's paper, J Wyness, also of
Calcutta - though, apparently, not an employee of the Port
Commission - interpreted the paper very differently:
'no notice seemed to have been taken in the paper of
the fact, well known in Bengal, that the channel of the
Bhagirathi was deteriorating.1 (17)
This brief, but well-documented, example of controversy amongst
experts will be discussed, with other examples, in Chapter 16. At
this point in the narrative it is sufficient to note the strength
of feeling of the Port Commission employees, indicated by their use
of intemperate language, and the fact that the Port Commission was
anxious to demonstrate the health of the Hooghly.
1916, The Stevenson-Moore Committee
The next available report on the Hooghly is one produced by a
committee constituted by the Government of Bengal and chaired by
Sir Charles Stevenson-Moore (18). The committee, which sat between
1916 and 1919, was asked to advise on the systematic observation of
the Nadia Rivers (the Bhagirathi, Mathabanga and Jalahgi) and to
suggest action to improve their condition as feeders of the Hooghly
(19).
Though the conclusions of this committee and the reports of others
are now used to bolster the consensus■view that the Hooghly is and
was deteriorating and that its problem was the shortage of headwaters,
the committee's terms of reference essentially prejudged the nature
of the Hooghly's problem. Almost despite their brief, the committee
did comment on the 'alleged deterioration' of the Hooghly:
'The process of deterioration, however, if indeed any
deterioration has taken place, appears to have been very
gradual and the fact that even with the evidence available
it is difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion proves
that the conditions cannot now be very materially worse
than in the past.' (20)
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However, the report goes on to say:
'It is obvious that if the beds of the head-water rivers
continue to rise more than those of the Ganga and the
lower Hooghly, the result will be the obstruction of
the freshets and the-restriction of the action of the
tide wave. Any further deterioration of the head-waters
would accordingly be a matter of extreme gravity, and
it is imperative that steps should be taken to ensure
a flow of water through the upper reaches sufficient
. to keep open the channels, but not such as to result
in excessive deposits of silts of a heavier quality
in the lower Hooghly.' (21)
The committee cautioned that improvements could be overdone causing
increased silting in the lower Hooghly and deterioration in the
Ganges downstream from the Bhagirathi-Hooghly offtake. It recommended
dredging and river training in the Nadia rivers and some restriction
on the building of embankments along the Hooghly. Significantly,
the committee's members apportioned some of the blame for the
deterioration of the Nadia Rivers, and hence of the Hooghly, to the
construction of irrigation canals in the upper reaches of the Ganges,
which, they considered, abstracted ZCf/o of the low discharge of the
river.
1939-^7, Investigations by Oag and Webster
Twenty years later, a Deputy River Surveyor working for the
Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta, T M Oag, was asked to update
the Stevenson-Moore Committee's report, particularly the observations
on the state of the river. Oag noted:
'The current popular belief, as manifested by articles
which have apjpeared in the press at frequent intervals
from the pens of public men, appears to be that, as a
result of the alleged deterioration of the Nadia Rivers
the river Hooghly itself has deteriorated and Calcutta,
therefore, cannot continue to maintain its importance
as one of the principal distributing centres of trade.' (22)
Contrary to this popular belief - or, would it be more accurate to
describe it as the anxiety of British commercial and shipping
interests? - Oag found:
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'It is definitely established that the navigability of
the river has improved during the last hundred years
and, while in more recent years improvement must, be
attributed largely to the Commissioners' dredging policy,
the capacity of the river and tidal conditions show no
indications of general deterioration.' (23)
But Oag did recommend immediate adoption of measures to control the
supply of water into the Hooghly from the Ganges:
'I have endeavoured to show that it is essential to
obtain control over the feed water entering the
Hooghly not only to provide a supply during the dry
season but to regulate its flow so as to obviate
excessive and spasmodic discharge volumes during the
freshets and, that experiments by models, should be
carried out to obtain some indication of the degree of
control that is necessary...' (,2b)
Prior to independence, only one more report of significance was
prepared. This was by the then Chief Engineer (Special) of the
Port Commissioners, Mr A Webster. Like his various predecessors
Webster surveyed the records of the river and drew his own
conclusions:
'(a) the tidal conditions at Calcutta have not shown
•
any marked changes during the past century, and while
there is no evidence of progressive deterioration
in the river generally, below Calcutta, there are
indications of a rise in bed levels between Sankrail and
Poojali.
'(b) There have been periodical fluctuations in the
navigable channels, but there is usually a relationship
between these variations and the seasonal tidal changes,
as well as the freshet discharges.
'(c) The fresh water supply through the Nadia Rivers
has apparently decreased especially during the dry
season, but there are insufficient records available
to determine the extent of this reduction.' (25)
Whilst he could not find evidence of deterioration of the Hooghly,
Webster emphasised the importance of the river's headwater supply.
In his opinion the river was 'dependent for its existence' on the
fresh water supplied by the Ganges through the Nadia Rivers (26).
Webster was not constrained by his failure to find proof that the
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Hooghly was deteriorating. He noted the lack of evidence and then
continued by re-stating his belief that if_ the river was deteriorating,
it must be the result of a reduction in the spill from the Ganges:
'The position today is, that there is practically no
dry weather flow from the Ganges into the Bhagirathi
or any of the other spill rivers in the Nadia group,
but in the absence of systematic records it is not
possible to state definitely that progressive
■ deterioration of these feeder channels is going on.
'No apology is made however, for re-emphasising the
need to take all possible steps to improve the Headwater
supply of the Hooghly, otherwise it will be useless
considering schemes for the development of the port of
Calcutta, which, as has already been pointed out, is
dependent for its existence upon the maintenance of an
efficient waterway between the Docks and the Sea.' (27)
There seems to have been a general belief, amongst even the experts
concerned with the problem, that, by some fairly simple mechanism,
additional fresh water from the Ganges could 'flush' out the slit
which was creating the obstacles to navigation. The rise of this
belief is documented in the following chapter.
These seven reports contain many valuable observations on the
mechanisms of the river system. The quotations given here do not
do justice to the full reports. Nevertheless, it was not until after
India had freed herself of colonial ties that adequate investigations
of the Hooghly problem and particularly of the function of the
headwater 'freshets' in the Hooghly regime were published.
INVESTIGATIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE
In May 19^7 > three months prior to independence, discussions were
held between the government Central Water and Inland Navigation
Commission (CWINC, later the Central Water and Power Commission,
CWPC) and the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta 'on the question
of the construction of a model of the Hooghly, as affecting
navigation at the Port of Calcutta...' (28). By 1950, a 1=2000
scale model of the Hooghly had been built and proved, and a 1:300
scale model of the port was under preparation at the CWINC Research
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Station at Poona. In the annual technical reports of the Research
Station for the early fifties, several papers were published
describing experiments on different aspects of the Hooghly problem
and its solution (29).
1992? The Man Singh Committee
In 1952, a review of these experiments was made by a committee of
experts constituted by the Indian Government under the chairmanship
of Shri Man Singh (30). This committee summarised the considerable
literature and noted that "it was only in the comparatively recent
reports that notice was taken of the lack or absence of reliable
hydrological data" (31).
The committee was composed of eminent Indian experts in the field
of hydraulics, and its terms of reference did not prejudge the issue.
In addition to being asked to review the CWPC's hydraulic model
experiments, the committee was to:
'assess the effects of the Damed&r Valley Corporation
and the Ganga Barrage scheme on the regime of the
River Hooghly;[ and] to make recommendations on the
steps necessary to improve the regime of the River
Hooghly, particularly within the port limits.' (32)
The Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) was supervising the multi¬
purpose development of some of the Hooghly's Western tributaries,
and there were fears that this interference would cause
deterioration of the Hooghly. The Ganga Barrage scheme became the
Farakka Barrage Project.
The committee was able to muster evidence of the Hooghly's
deterioration. They provided figures showing that the volume of
the river below low water in the stretch between Nabadwip and
Calcutta had steadily diminished:
YEAR 1924 193^-5 19^+ 1951
VOLUME
(yd"5 x 1,000) 90 87 76 67 (33)
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However, the committee noted that the signs of deterioration were
less pronounced lower down the river ,(3^) , and the evidence they
found of systematic change in the spill from the Ganges (reproduced
here as Figure 1.1) cannot be regarded as conclusive. Nevertheless,
the committee did conclude: 'it is clear that the entire river
system shows trends of deterioration...' (35).
The committee's explanation of the mechanism of deterioration is
summarised in this paragraph:
'As the flood current in the upper reaches is of
shorter duration than the ebb, it is, therefore, stronger
and brings with it material in suspension, which tends
to deposit in the channel in the region of slacker water.
The ebb current being less strong is unable to scour out
the material being deposited. There is ample evidence
in Bengal of this phenomenon having caused the
deterioration and death of several tidal rivers. In order
that the channel may be kept permanently open, the ebb
current must be reinforced by upland discharge so that
all the material brought up by the tide is carried back
by the ebb. With diminishing upland supplies and the
tidal influences as they operate the river must
deteriorate. If this were allowed to happen, the
consequences will be disastrous.' (36)
Although the committee had definite opinions on that mechanism, it
noted that the hydraulic modelling of the process was not without
uncertainty and complications. Tidal effects without silt can be
well modelled, but when there is silt, there is also the problem of
coagulation of colloidal particles when salt water is met. This
complication, the committee noted, is a 'difficult problem' to
introduce into a hydraulic model. The influence of this difficulty
can be traced, through a 1962 report prepared for the Pakistan
Government by two American engineers, to the belief of some Pakistan
and Bangladesh politicians and engineers that the Farakka Project
was not technically sound. We shall see, in Chapter Three, that
the importance of salt water in the siltation mechanism of the
Hooghly may have been underrated by the Man Singh Committee.
The dams built by the DVC on the Damodar River were discounted by
the committee as a cause of the Hooghly's deterioration. However,
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the committee's report noted that any substantial reduction in the
flow of the upper tributaries of the Bhagirathi would be:
'bound to have an adverse effect [on the Hooghly]...If
this source of supply cannot be conserved, the loss must
be made up from some other sources. The Ganga is the
only alternative source.' (37)
In its conclusions, the committee commented upon the deficiency of
hydrological evidence of deterioration, but it was nevertheless
convinced of the existence and causes of deterioration:
'...it is clear that the entire river system shows signs
of deterioration, on account of lack of perennial upland
discharge as also to the play of natural tidal forces.
Natural restoration of dry weather flow of upland water
is definitely impossible. It has not been possible to
establish the existence of deteriorative trends by
analysis of hydrological data because they do not exist
for the upper reaches and are not sufficient in the
lower reaches of the river.1 (38)
The report of the Man Singh Expert Committee was the last systematic
investigation into the Hooghly problem to be published by the
Government of India. The Committee's analysis of the problem appears
to be the diagnosis for which the Farakka Barrage Project was chosen
as remedy.
Definitive description of the deterioration
The definitive statement of the problem is, however, given in
Preservation of the Port of Calcutta (39) 1 the Indian Government's
official (that is, limited circulation) report on the Farakka
Project. In this, new evidence is presented to corroborate the
assertion that the Bhagirathi-Hooghly is deteriorating, and thus to
justify the project. This new evidence can be summarised as follows:
1. The 'bulge' of the freshet discharge curve of Kalna,
defined as the ratio of the number of days when the
discharge is greater than 100,000 cusecs to the number
of days when the discharge is above ^0,000 cusecs, has
decreased from 0.9 in 1936 to 0.5 in 1956 (^-0). This
reduction indicates a change in the substained
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high discharge of water flowing from the Ganges
into the Bhagirathi.
2. Regular measurements of cross-sectional areas of the
Hooghly show a progressive reduction in its capacity,
varying between per year in the upper reaches to
O.y/o per year lower down (41).
3- Despite intensive dredging, the depths over the river's
bars have substantially decreased, as is shown in the
following table:











The description of the processes of siltation given in Preservation
of the Port of Calcutta is essentially the same as the Man Singh
Committee's description (quoted earlier). In addition to the
difficulties for navigation of the Hooghly, the former report noted
two further consequences of deterioration; increases in the intensity
and frequency of bore tides and in the salinity of Calcutta's water
supply.
These two secondary consequences of the siltation of the Hooghly
are well-substantiated and clearly significant. Tidal bores caused
damage to jetties and ships moored in the river and, because they
occurred during spring tides which would otherwise be used for
moving ships up river, they increased the congestion of shipping.
Calcutta's water supply comes from the Hooghly. By 1936, the
salinity of this water was sometimes above the potable limit, and
by 1959, salinities of almost ten times this limit had been recorded
(43).
Preservation of the Port of Calcutta provided the evidence for the
deterioration of the Hooghly, the description of the processes of
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siltation, and an explanation of the consequences of deterioration,
on which the decision to build the Farakka Barrage Project had been
taken. This was the explanation, as supplied to officials of the
Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan, of the problem
which the project was intended to overcome.
CONCLUSIONS
In retrospect, two aspects of these enquiries attract attention.
Firstly, we have seen in this chapter that the characteristic
feature of investigations into the decline of the Hooghly is not,
as the Indian Government claims, unanimity; it is uncertainty.
Secondly, it has also been shown that, despite this uncertainty,
several of the investigators were predisposed to recommend preventive
action to avoid the possibility of deterioration.
Of the three major governmental committees of enquiry, in 185^,
1916 and 1952; only the last concluded unanimously that there
was clear evidence of deterioration. The Hooghly Commission of 185^
was divided on the issue and, in 1916, the Stevenson-Moore Committee
noted the difficulty of arriving at a 'definite conclusion'.
Individual experts who examined the matter arrived at no greater
certainty. There was, as Oag noted in 19391 a 'popular belief' that
the Hooghly was deteriorating, but, as he and Webster reiterated,
the evidence was inadequate to establish this belief. The heated
debate which arose in response to Vernon Harcourt's 1905 analysis
clearly indicated both the importance of the question of deterioration
and the sensitivity of the Calcutta Port Commissioners. It did not,
however, resolve the matter.
Turning to the second conclusion of this chapter, it might
reasonably be expected that a recommendation for action to halt
deterioration would only be made by investigators who had found
clear evidence that deterioration was taking place. This was not
always the case. Apparently inconsistent recommendations were made
by Oag, Webster, and the Stevenson-Moore Committee.
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The Stevenson-Moore Committee was, as we have seen, uncertain that
deterioration was taking place. Such uncertainty notwithstanding,
it recommended 'that steps should be taken to ensure a flow of water
through the upper reaches sufficient to keep open the channels...'
(M+) . This apparent inconsistency is explained by the terms
of reference of the Committee. The Government of Bengal had asked
it to suggest action to improve the rivers 'feeding' the Hooghly
with water from,the Ganges. In this case, the Government of Bengal
had prejudged the issue. Even should the anxiety about the river
prove unfounded, the state government still wanted a recommendation
for action.
Oag, the river surveyor who, in 19391 was asked to review and bring
up to date the report of the Stevenson-Moore Committee, came to
similar somewhat inconsistent conclusions. He decided that the
navigability of the river had improved over the previous century,
but he also thought it 'essential to obtain control over the feed
water entering the Hooghly...' (V?)-
The Chief Engineer of the Port Commissioners, Webster, found no
evidence of progressive and general deterioration of the river but
he did find indications of decreasing fresh water supply to the
Hooghly. He too identified a 'need to take all possible steps to
improve the Headwater supply of the Hooghly...' (^6). Webster
seems to have recognised the inconsistency of this recommendation.
He prefaces it with a phrase indicating embarassment: 'No apology
is made however, for re-emphasising the need to take all possible
steps... '
In none of these three reports is there evidence proving, to the
satisfaction of their authors, the deterioration of the Hooghly.
Nevertheless, each report recommends that measures should be taken
to stop this deterioration. In each case pre-emptive measures were
proposed. The level of anxiety, in the commercial community and
in the Government of Bengal, was such that action was generally
thought desirable to stave off the possibility that the river might
deteriorate.
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It was not any action which these three inquiries suggested.
Oag, Webster and the Stevenson-Moore Committee all recommended
action to control the headwaters of the Hooghly. In Chapter Two




AN IDEA AND ITS PROPONENTS
This chapter provides a history of the concept on which the Farakka
Barrage Project is based. It is a history which differs in at
least one significant respect from the Indian Government's account.
According to the Government of India, the idea of diverting water
from the Ganges to overcome the deterioration of the Hooghly was
the suggestion of a British military engineer Lieutenant Colonel
(later Sir) Arthur Cotton in 1853- Cotton did propose diversion of
water from the Ganges into the Hooghly, but he suggested it as a
solution to a different problem. He was concerned with inland
navigation on the upper reaches of the Hooghly (the River Bhagirathi)
not with the deterioration of the estuary of the Hooghly.
The Indian Government have repeatedly used Cotton's role to
legitimate the Farakka Barrage Project; as, for example, in this
account:
'The Ganga Barrage is not a new Project. That, owing to
the change in the course of the main stream of the Ganga -
as stated above, at one time the Ganga found its way
into the sea through the Bhagirathi-Hooghly - the
Calcutta Port had begun to suffer from insufficiency of
headwaters was observed over a century ago. To arrest
this deterioration, Sir Arthur Cotton, an eminent
Engineer, suggested as far back as 1853) that a barrage
at Rajmahal, with a canal from the Ganga to the Bhagirathi
should be constructed to supply fresh water to the Hooghly.
Unfortunately, this suggestion was not followed up owing
to an inadequate appreciation of the dangers of the
situation.' (1)
The Indian Government's history of the Farakka Barrage is selected
to establish the unanimity of the experts who investigated the
Hooghly and the continuity of support for the project from colonial
times to the present. Chapter One showed that the experts were
hot unanimous. In this chapter we shall see that the colonial
Government of India did not decide to support the project; and it
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was not until 1958 that support for the project began to crystallize
within the central government of independent India.
Support for the idea of a Ganges Barrage only came after a prolonged
campaign of parliamentary pressure. In 1952 the Man Singh Expert
Committee concluded that the project was both necessary and urgent
but it was apparently not this report which convinced the central
government ministries of the importance of the project. The records
of the Indian parliament show that in the mid-fifties the Government
of India thought the Farakka Barrage should be the responsibility
of the state in which the project would be located and to which most
benefits would accrue, West Bengal. It was only in 1958 and 1959>
after a sustained campaign of questioning by MPs for West Bengal,
that the Ministries of Irrigation and Power and Transport reluctantly
conceded that the Farakka Barrage Project might be of national
importance and therefore a central government responsibility.
Cotton's ideas
Cotton is best known for his work as Chief Engineer of Madras, where
he was responsible for irrigation works which brought prosperity to
a considerable population. He seems to have learnt some of his
construction techniques from the methods used in the construction
of the Grand Anicut, a huge weir built across the River Cauveri in
about AD 200 (2).
Cotton made two separate suggestions for building a weir across the
Ganges. The first was published in 185^ in a book dedicated to
popularising the view that water transport would be more appropriate
for India than the then expanding railways (3)« Cotton thought that
a system of inland water communications would enable India to provide
England with cheap agricultural produce (4). It was in this context
that he proposed:
'Perhaps the greatest improvement that could be made in
communications in all India, in comparison of its cost,
would be the construction of a weir across the Ganges
below the head of the Bhugirutty, to turn the whole
stream into that river in the dry season. This weir would
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keep the Bhugirutty navigable throughout the year, and
effect an immense traffic.' (5)
Cotton's book elicited an official response from the Government of
India's Consulting Engineer, Colonel Baker. Baker told the Governor
General, Marquis Dalhousie, that although Cotton's plans were
'eminently deserving of attention', he, Baker, did 'not attach much
importance to the suggestions Cotton has offered for the improvement
of the Ganges' (6).
Whilst defending his scheme against Baker's criticisms, Cotton
elaborated on a feature he thought Baker had overlooked. Cotton
intended that reservoirs should be constructed in the upper reaches
of the Ganges, Jamuna, Chambal and other rivers. These reservoirs
would store water to increase the dry season flow of the Ganges.
Without that extra water, wrote Cotton, 'the mischief arising from
the Ganges weir would be really incalculable' (7)- In this
passage, Cotton was anticipating that river navigation would become
difficult lower down the Ganges if large diversions were made at a
Ganges weir (such problems did arise in 1976 and 1977, see Part III).
He was also anticipating the solution to those difficulties now
proposed by Bangladesh (see Chapter 15)-
Cotton devised a second scheme in 1858. He was in Calcutta to advise
on the development of the Cuttack Rivers (in Orissa), when the
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal sent a request to the Department of
Public Works for whom Cotton was working:
'that, if Colonel Cotton's duties should permit, he may
be allowed to proceed under the directions of the
Lieutenant Governor to the heads of the Nuddea Rivers and
to Rajmehal, to examine the Ganges at those places, and
assist by his advice in elucidating the much discussed and
deeply interesting question whether anything can be done
to facilitate the navigation of the Nuddea Rivers during
the v/hole year, and whether it may not be possible to
provide irrigation for such parts of the Kishnaghur and
Jessore districts as are now liable to suffer from drought
as well as from excessive inundation...' (8)
Cotton visited the areas and, on his return, wrote a memorandum
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which proposed a canal from Rajmahal to Calcutta (Cotton's two
schemes are shown in Figure 2.1). . He thought a weir could be built
at Rajmahal to divert water into this canal but, this time, he was
proposing to divert a much smaller quantity of water. The canal
he proposed would have had a capacity of about 7,500 cusecs (9)*
This is only one fifth of the capacity of the canal built as part
of the Farakka Barrage Project. Considered from another angle,
this diversion capacity represents only 18$ of the minimum recorded
flow of the Ganges (^2,000 cusecs), whereas the canal built has a
capacity to divert 95% of that flow.
In both proposals, Cotton was devising schemes to provide navigation
in the Nuddea (Nadia) Rivers, the upper reaches of the Bhagirathi-
Hooghly. There is no indication in the works q\aoted that he was
concerned with the lower reaches of the river system. The problem
of the Hooghly and the problem of Calcutta Port were, as far as he
was concerned, the seasonally restricted and circuitous navigation
between Calcutta and the Ganges. He was not concerned with the
navigation between Calcutta Port and the sea. So far was he
unconcerned about the deterioration of the lower river that he
proposed to dam the Bhagirathi in the process of constructing the
navigation and irrigation canal which he thought would supplant it
(10).
It is clear that Cotton's proposals were not precursors of the
Farakka Barrage Project. In addition, Cotton was aware of the
consequences for downstream areas of diverting water from the Ganges
into the Bhagirathi. We shall see in later chapters that these
downstream effects were underrated by the Indian Government and
played an important role in the dispute over the Farakka Project.
1865 - 19j+7, Recommendations for a Ganges Barrage
In 1865, Leonard mentioned 'two rather impractical suggestions' for
improving the Hooghly. One was to admit more fresh water from the
Ganges, the other to shut off Ganges water completely. He concluded:
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FIGURE 2.1 Sketch Map of Cotton's two proposals forimproving navigation between Calcutta and the Ganges.
'A weir across the Ganges is really the only practicable
plan which has not been tried, and that is too great
and too difficult to work to be undertaken without much
more probability of success and much greater results
than we are at present in a position to promist.' ('11)
In 1919, the Stevenson-Moore Committee recommended action to maintain
the Hooghly's headwater supply from the Ganges. It thought this
could be done, however, by dredging the channels where the Nadia
Rivers diverged from the Ganges (12).
In the 1930s, another eminent British engineer, Sir William Wilcocks,
revived the idea of a Ganges Barrage (13)- He intended the barrage
to provide primarily irrigation, but he thought it could also prevent
siltation in the Hooghly. The Chief Engineer of Bengal rejected the
proposal as impractical and too costly (14).
Webster's investigation of 1946 (15) was the first to provide a
substantial recommendation for a Ganges barrage. Webster's
recommendation is worth quoting at length because it shows he was
aware of the complexity of the problem and that he thought only quite
a small diversion from the Ganges would be required:
'It is understood that the Government of Bengal have
under consideration at least three schemes which may
have far reaching effects on the River Hooghly viz. The
Damodar Valley Project, the Mor Dam Project and the
Ganges Barrage, but so far, the Commissioners have not
been supplied with any information concerning these
schemes and their probable effects on the regime of the
Hooghly.
'The most important scheme from the Commissioners' point
of view is the proposed Ganges Barrage, which is believed
to aim at resuscitating the Nadia Rivers and providing
a perennial discharge into the Bhagirathi of something
in the region of 10,000 cusecs. This would undoubtedly
be of great value in improving the condition of the
Hooghly, and if this dry weather flow can be coupled with
an ample freshet discharge, then the problem of the
maintenance of the Hooghly as an active river, instead of
a possible tidal creek, may well be on the way to a
solution
'It has been suggested that a continuous flow of headwater
through the Hooghly, will in time, improve the tidal
32
reaches of the river to the extent of deepening the
navigable channel for ocean going craft, thus rendering
further dredging operation unnecessary. This is
undoubtedly a 'consummation devoutly to be wished', but
unfortunately the problem is not quite so simple as it
would appear. In the first place we are not dealing with
a straight channel in which the axes of the flood and
ebb-tides are coincident, but with a winding river in which
divergences of flood and ebb-tides as well as tidal,
seasonal, and other periodical variations have to be taken
into account.
'It is impossible to predict the extent to which the
navigable channel would be improved by a constant and
adequate headwater supply, but speaking generally it is
doubtful if dredging or river training works could be
entirely eliminated, on the score of drafts alone, while
the curvature of the river must continue to impose
restrictions on the length of deep draft ship
which can be navigated, especially in the upper reaches.
'It is recommended however, that a strong representation
be made to Government regarding the need for improving
the headwater supply to the River Hooghly, with particular
reference to the proposed Ganges Barrage, and similar
schemes which may affect the river.' (16)
Webster's was, anyway, only one of the opinions held within the port
authorities. An apparently different view was articulated by the
Chairman of the Port Commissioners. Giving evidence to a government
committee, he suggested that the deterioration of the Hooghly could
be circumvented by the construction of a ship canal linking Calcutta
Port to the sea (17)- (This project is described and discussed in
the following chapter.)
At the end of British colonial rule, then, the idea of diverting
water from the Ganges into the Bhagirathi was no more than an idea.
The Port Commissioners, representing the interests who were presumably
most affected by the problem of the Hooghly, had not decided to
exert pressure for the implementation of the project. They had held
discussions with the Central Water and Inland Navigation Commission
on the subject of the Hooghly in May 19^7, and the CWINC had
started to construct a model of the Hooghly (as recorded in the
previous chapter), but that was as far as the idea had developed.
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1952, The Man Singh Expert Committee
The question of a Ganges barrage was raised (as will be described
in Chapter Five) before the Bengal Boundary Commission in 19^7, and
in 1952 unequivocal support for the project came from the Expert
Committee on the River Hooghly and the improvement of its Headwater
Supply, under the chairmanship of Shri Man Singh (18). The Man
Singh Committee reported it was:
'firmly of the opinion that deterioration can not only be
arrested, but improvements can be affected which will
attract larger trade to the port...Introduction of
perennial headwater supplies can effect permanent
improvement in the regime of the river enabling further
cuts in maintenance costs.' (19)
Although the committee was unable to say exactly how much water
should be diverted, it was in no doubt that a Ganges barrage was
the only way of improving the Hooghly.
In a long and authoritative article, published some months after the
committee had submitted its report, S C Mazumdar, a member of the
Committee and Consulting Engineer to the West Bengal State Government,
expressed his fears that the problem was not being taken seriously:
'from our recent inquiries in connection with the work of
the Hooghly River Expert Committee, I have gathered the
impression that the importance of the headwater supply
has not yet been sufficiently realised even in some
responsible quarters. The impression seems to prevail that
since by far the major problem of the Hooghly flow is
contributed by the tides, it should be possible to maintain
the Hooghly as a navigation channel by tidal inflow and
training works.' (20)
Mazumdar's anxiety was justified. Another nine years elapsed before
a project for headwater control was sanctioned. The parliamentary
record suggests that much of this time was taken up by a tussle
between state and central governments over the priority of and
responsibility for the project.
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Parliamentary pressure to secure central government support
By 1952, the project was sufficiently well known and supported, at
least within West Bengal, for two questions to be put in the Lok
Sabha (lower and directly elected People's House of the Indian
parliament) and a resolution passed in the budget session of the
West Bengal State Assembly. An indication of the Union Government's
uncertainty about the scheme at that time can be drawn from the
response of the minister when that West Bengal resolution was brought
to his notice. The Government of India, he said, have asked West
Bengal how .they propose to finance the scheme (21).
Under the Indian Constitution the legislative power to implement
river development projects is divided between Union and State
Governments. River development is a state responsibility except
when parliament legislates that central control of an inter-state
river is in the public interest. Major ports are, however, a Union
responsibility (22). The prime purpose of the Farakka Barrage being
the improvement of Calcutta Port, it was eligible for central finance,
but the secondary purposes of the project, that is salinity control
and inland navigation, were state concerns. It was therefore possible
for .the Union Government to procrastinate. Not only did the benefits
of the project accrue to West Bengal, but it was also arguable that
constitutional responsibility for the project lay there too.
In 195^5 a West Bengal Member of Parliament managed to extract an
answer from the Deputy Minister of Railways and Transport in which
the Minister accepted that the River Hooghly was deteriorating as
a result of 'lack of perennial upland discharge' and the 'play of
natural tidal forces'. The Ganges barrage scheme was, he said,
under consideration (23)-
Another West Bengal MP tried to increase the pressure in the following
year by asking:
'is it not a fact that the research station at Poona
has commented that unless the Ganga Barrage scheme is
taken up the passage of the Calcutta Port is not safe
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for transportation, and if so, why is the Ganga Barrage
not being taken up at the present?...'
The Deputy Minister replied:
'...There is no use of raising this alarm that the
Calcutta Port will be threatened if something is not done.
This alarm has been there for a number of years. But the
particular question whether there should be a barrage
■ constructed at a particular point is, I think, under the
consideration of the Ministry of Irrigation.' (2k)
In 1956, a 'cut motion' (25) was introduced which proposed a cut
in the grant of the Ministry of Irrigation and Power by a nominal
Rs 100 because of the 'delay in preparing the Ganga Barrage scheme'
(26). A similar motion was put the following year (27). Both motions
were defeated along with other expressions of discontent.
At this stage, in the mid-1950s, MPs representing constituencies in
West Bengal thought the project was of national significance and
considerable urgency; they suggested it should be funded by the
central government. That the Union government on the other hand
thought of it as a state concern of low priority was made clear by
the.Minister of Irrigation and Power at the end of the 1957 debate
on his Ministry's budget. The project is under 'active consideration',
he said, but everything cannot be done at once and, anyway, West
Bengal has the Damodar Valley Corporation (28). A state cannot
expect, he implied, to have more than one major project.
1958, The Lok Sabha debate
In September 1958, the Minister of Irrigation and Power laid a
statement on the Ganges Barrage Project before the Lok Sahha, and in
November it was debated by the house for two-and-a-half hours (29)•
This was the most substantial discussion on the Farakka Barrage to
be held in the Indian parliament. It began with West Bengal MPs
expressing their frustration, and ended in confusion with the Minister
of Transport alluding to a secret he was not able to divulge.
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T K Chaudhuri, Member for Berhampore, West Bengal, commented upon
the six years of 'surprising procrastination, evasiveness, and
indecisiveness' since the project had been mooted in 1952- Two
more West Bengal MPs contributed lengthy speeches with similar
expressions of frustration. One of them, H N Mukerjee of Calcutta
Central drew the house's attention to the secrecy surrounding an
expert report on the project (30).
The Minister of Transport, S K Patil, then gave a long and curious
speech, in which he dismissed various explanations which had been
put forward for the delay in starting the project. It was not,
he told the house, that central government did not accept the
importance of the project5 not that there was any disagreement amongst
experts; nor was there any delay as a result of Pakistan's objections;
it was not even a problem of money, if necessary India would finance
the project without aid. However, there was a reason for the delay,
but he could not tell the house:
'the difficulty that we are experiencing is...that sometimes
perhaps too much of expression is no good on this subject...
'Surely, the Government's mind, if it is occupied on any
particular subject, it is on this more than on anything
else. As soon as we find an opportunity of going into
it, we can do it. Beyond this, hon Members must not
expect me that I should go into any more details...Whatever
hurdles there may be in our way, to which I have not made
a complete reference, surely hon Members will understand
that there is some weighty reason...' (31)
Towards the end of the debate, the Deputy Minister of Irrigation and
Power gave a more mundane explanation of the delay. Heavy flooding
in 195^1 he said, had eroded the river bank at Farakka, and, as a
result further investigations were required (32).
Central Government Acceptance
Patil's enigmatic reticence notwithstanding, it is clear that by
this time, 1958, the Farakka Project had acquired the support of
the two relevant central government ministries, those of transport
and of irrigation and power. Financial and political sanction had
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not been obtained - that would require several more years - but
ministerial backing had.
The Minister of Irrigation and Power's statement, which was the
subject of the 1958 debate, clearly indicated that Ministry's
support for the Farakka Barrage. It said that the barrage was 'the
most effective way of stopping the long term deterioration' of the
Hooghly (33)-
The Ministry of Transport's position was made clear in its report for
the year 1958-59- Previous and subsequent annual reports are silent
on the project, but in the 1958-59 report this passage appears:
'The Government of India are...of the view that the most
effective method of arresting the long term deterioration
[of the Hooghly] is by regulation of upland supplies to the
River Hooghly through the River Bhagirathi which can be
achieved by the construction of a barrage on the Ganga
at Farakka. ' (3^)
CONCLUSIONS
The Indian Government's account of the history of the Farakka Barrage
Project emphasises three features: that it was an eminent British
military engineer who suggested the project in 1853; that the many
experts who examined the Hooghly problem during the following
century were unanimous in supporting it", and, by implication, that
there was a continuity of support for the project which transcended
the transfer of power from the colonial to the independent government.
These points are all included in a speech which the Indian Foreign
Secretary made to the Special Political Committee of the United
Nations in 1976. He said
'Mr Chairman, this problem of Calcutta Port has been
studied for more than a century. Enquiries into the
problem were started as early as 1853 by Sir Arthur
Cotton and continued by a long series of experts and
expert commissions. All of them concluded that the only
means of saving the port from its impending destruction
was by increasing and regulating the headwater supply
through the construction of a barrage over the Ganga
near Farakka. There are few examples in history where
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a river problem has been investigated so thoroughly and
for so long a period and where so many experts, applying
their minds to the problem came to the same conclusion
on what ought to be the best solution to the problem...
'It v/ill be observed that Farakka is not a recently
conceived project... Even its technical feasibility was
established decades before the partition of India.' (35)
We have seen that these appeals to history for support are misplaced.
Cotton was not concerned with the problem of the siltation of the
lower Hooghly. He wanted to provide nagivation on the Bhagirathi.
He was also sensitive to the difficulties which might be caused by
large diversions from the Ganges. One of his suggestions, the 1858
proposal, was for a modest diversion; and the other, took account
of the needs of the downstream areas with a proposal for storage of
the headwaters of the Ganges. Cotton's appreciation of downstream
consequences is in marked contrast to the lack of concern
demonstrated, as we shall see in the next chapter, by Indian
engineers in the late 1950s.
It has been shown that the experts were not unanimous about the
deterioration of the Hooghly, nor about its solution. It is clear
that the technical feasibility of the project was not established
prior to the partition of India. Even in 19^7, there was
disagreement within the Calcutta Port Commissioners about the best
solution to the problem of the Hooghly. The Chief Engineer was in
favour of a barrage across the Ganges, but the Chairman wanted a
ship canal built instead.
It has also been argued, in this chapter, that centre-state conflict
over the priority of and responsibility for the Farakka Barrage was
the prime reason for the delay in implementing the project.
Alternative explanations for the delay were discussed during the
Lok Sabha debate in 1958 but they are not convincing.
We shall see later, in Chapter Five, that there were no consultations
with the Pakistan Government until i960. It seems implausible,
therefore, to suggest that the Indian Government were seriously
considering Pakistan's objections. A second explanation that further
technical investigations necessitated delay seems equally unlikely.
Whilst investigations may have continued during the period 1952-58,
the record of technical publications suggests that few significant
new tests were made.
Obtaining the sanction of any government for a large and expensive
project requires the decisions, spread out over time and place, of
a variety of government bodies. In this case, even after the relevant
ministries had pledged their support for the project, there remained
the hurdles of the Planning Commission, the National Development
Council, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Cabinet and the Prime
Minister, himself. These obstacles must have been surmounted
between 1958 and 19^1, when sanction for the project was announced.
Chapter Four will be devoted to a description of the political,
economic and physical circumstances which may have contributed to
the clearing of these final obstacles.
The intervening chapter, Chapter Three, investigates the potential
alternatives to the Farakka Barrage, the doubts which were raised
about the technical rationale of the project and the consideration




ALTERNATIVES, OPPOSITION AND AMBIGUITY
This third chapter is an investigation into three separate questions
each closely connected with the decision to build the Farakka Barrage
Project and with the subsequent dispute initiated by that project.
The first question is: What alternatives to the Farakka Project were
available? The Pakistan and Bangladesh Governments believed that
there were better ways of providing a navigable channel between
Calcutta Port and the sea (1). These alternatives were preferable,
from the perspective of the inhabitants of East Bengal, because they
did not threaten to damage East Bengal. Were they, however, feasible
alternatives? It will be argued in this chapter that their
practicality was not proven, but nor was it disproven. The Indian
Government bedrs the responsibility for rejecting these alternatives,
and the evidence suggests that they were rejected on the basis of
only a cursory investigation.
The'second question is: What feature of the technical rationale of
the Farakka Barrage Project allowed experts advising the Governments
of India and Pakistan to disagree completely about the efficacy of
the project? In 1957, Professor Walter Hensen of Hanover University
was employed as a consultant by the Government of India to review
the Farakka Barrage Project (2). Four years later, the Pakistan
Government asked two American consultants, Professor Arthur T Ippen
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Clarence F Wicker a
retired hydraulics engineer, to carry out a similar review (3).
The two reports these three consultants wrote came to opposing
conclusions and laid the foundations for a technical controversy
which has never been fully resolved. Hensen thought that the
Farakka Barrage was the only solution to the Hooghly problem, whilst
Ippen and Wicker thought it might make the problem worse.
The alternative explanations of estuarine hydraulics and
sedimentation which led the consultants to opposing conclusions will
be explored in this chapter. It will be argued that the evidence
available was not adequate to enable a choice to be made between the
consultants' ill-formed 'models' of what was happening in the Hooghly
Estuary. There was, it appears, a 'technical ambiguity' in the data
describing the Hooghly.
Finally, this chapter investigates the third question: How much
consideration was given by the Indian Government to the likely
consequences of Farakka Barrage diversions for areas further down the
Ganges? As we shall see in Part II, much of the dispute about the
Farakka Barrage arose from fears that it would cause damage to East
Bengal. Part III shows that those fears were well-founded: the
operation of the Farakka Barrage did have serious consequences for
downstream areas. It is important to know if the decision to build
the barrage was taken with a knowledge of its probable consequences.
When Cotton proposed a similar project to meet different ends in 185^,
he was aware of the damage his project could do. He even suggested
how this damage could be avoided (see Chapter 2). Did something
happen in the intervening century to make Cotton's caution
unnecessary? Pakistan was not given access to the designs of the
Farakka Barrage until the project was in its final form. Were the
disbenefits, which Pakistan, and later Bangladesh, would suffer,
therefore ignored? Such evidence as is available suggests that
Cotton's caution was still relevant, and that India did largely
ignore the disbenefits of the project.
For the discussion of each of these three issues the evidence is
incomplete. In each case the report of the original investigation
made for the Government of India remains confidential. However,
summaries of those reports are contained elsewhere. This chapter is
based on those summaries. The most important one is of the Indian
Government's investigations into the Farakka Barrage Project and its
alternatives immediately prior to the authorisation of the project
(^). This account is provided by K K Framji who directed the
investigations.
Alternatives to the Farakka Barrage
Alternative means for providing navigable access to Calcutta Port
from the sea fall into two categories. There are four alternatives
which can be classed as substitute schemes: a ship canal, a barrage
with a ship canal, increased dredging and an alternative port. Then,
in a second category, there is the view of Kapil Bhattacharya, a
Bengali engineer, who opposed the project on the grounds that the
mechanism by which the Hooghly was deteriorating had been
misunderstood. Bhattacharya presented a different conception of the
problem and an alternative remedy.
Substitute Schemes
A ship canal
In 1946, the consulting engineers Messrs Rendel, Palmer and Tritton
of London produced a feasibility study of a ship canal to link
Calcutta Port to Diamond Harbour, lower down the Hooghly (see
Figure 3-1)- Their report concluded:
- 'The construction of the proposed ship canal is a
feasible engineering project, with no difficulties
beyond those normally associated with such projects.' (5)
The canal would have by-passed some of the worst bars in the Hooghly.
The engineers estimated that the cost of a 180 ft wide canal would
be Rs 14.5 million. They were not, however, asked whether the canal
would solve the navigational difficulties experienced by ships
attempting to enter Calcutta Port.
The Chairman of the Calcutta Port Commissioners, giving evidence in
1946 to a Government Inquiry, said that a ship canal could a) allow
ships to avoid the most difficult reaches of the Hooghly and b) allow
a considerable reduction in the amount of dredging required to
maintain the Hooghly. He noted that the three suction dredgers then
in use were 'practically solely employed on the bars between Garden




Figure 3.1 ALTERNATIVES TO THE FARAKKA BARRAGE PROJECT.
Not to scale
In the early 1950s, the ship canal scheme was under consideration
(7)« But in 195?- "the Man Singh Committee concluded that the Farakka
Barrage Project was preferable. The committee wrote that a deep
channel 'can be achieved more satisfactorily without the ship canal
by providing training works and ensuring perennial headwater supply'
(8).
Subsequently, further hydraulic model tests were carried out which
showed that 'if the river were left to itself, it would gradually
deteriorate' (9)- Since this deterioration would also take place
in reaches of the river below the seaward end of the canal, it could
over-ride the advantages of the canal. The tests were later reported
in more detail:
'To test this [ ship canal] idea the model was run with
freshet season followed by dry season for an eq\iivalent
period of seven years. Results showed that the tidal
ranges at Bansbaria reduced first and then as the
experiment proceeded the same effect was observed at
Garden R£ach. This effect gradually proceeded downstream.
The low waters rose indicating likely deterioration in
the channel retarding tidal propagation. It was
apprehended that in the long run this deteriorative trend
would affect the lower reaches as well. The proposal
[for a ship canal] was, therefore, dropped.' (10)
Although the researchers noted that the limitations of the model
exaggerated the speed with which the river was likely to deteriorate,
they concluded that the deterioration was inevitable.
These model tests seem to have been decisive in turning the attention
of Government of India engineers away from this alternative (11).
Barrage and ship canal
There is however a brief and tantalising mention of a more
sophisticated alternative in Framji's report of his investigations
(12). Framji describes a 'new ship canal proposal' consisting of
a straight, 50 mile long canal with a barrage at Budge Budge. This
alternative looks similar to one publicised in 197^+ by L B Roy, and
subsequently backed by the Bangladesh Government (13)- Roy's
*+5
alternative is shown in Figure 3.1.
Framji dismissed this proposal because he thought there would be
difficulty in constructing the canal through 'creeks and quagmires'
and because meandering and sedimentation would occur in the canal
and in the river above and below it (14). He thought that this
alternative, like the earlier ship canal scheme, would be neither
effective nor lasting without increased headwater to the Hooghly (that
is, without the Farakka Barrage).
Unfortunately, Framji does not provide the evidence on which he bases
his assertions. Possibly the Government of India carried out tests
on this alternative; if so, they are not reported in the usual
technical journals. In the absence of such tests and of a detailed
description of the 'new ship canal proposal', Roy's alternative is
all that can be assessed. At a superficial level this appears
promising. Roy's barrage is intended to maintain the river level
upstream of Budge Budge one metre higher than mean sea level. This
is intended to reduce tidal bores in this section of the river. At
the same time, the barrage would allow saline water into the upper
reaches of the river only for a shorter period than at present,
thereby reducing the salinity at Calcutta. The barrage is further
intended to provide an obstacle to silt being carried inland by the
flood tide. If it could do that, then the steady deterioration of
the Hooghly, the problem which led to the 19^+6 ship canal proposal
being shelved, might be halted. However, it is not clear that
deterioration of the river below Budge Budge could be prevented.
This alternative cannot be assessed without detailed surveys of the
proposed route and tests of the operation of the proposed barrage,
and Framji's account suggests that these surveys and tests have not
been carried out.
Dredging
The lower Hooghly has been continuously dredged since 1906 in an
attempt to maintain a navigable channel. Almost invariably shallow
bars were dredged and the silt redeposited in a deeper section of
channel (15). As late as 1976, the Bangladesh Government believed
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that dredging represented an alternative to headwater diversion.
The Indian Government, with their experience of the size and cost
of the dredging already being carried out in the Hooghly, dredging
which was not preventing the deterioration of the navigable channel,
did not believe that 'more effective' dredging represented any
real alternative.
Framji, in his study of the alternatives to Farakka, concluded that
dredging could be no more than a temporary palliative:
'With the super-imposed long-term deterioration in the
minimum navigable depths also clearly taking place and
seriously limiting the navigational conditions of the
approach from the sea, dredging would doubtless be not
only prohibitively costly, but also an ineffective
permanent remedy.' (16)
A year or two later, in 1961, the World Bank, who had been asked
to provide finance for port improvement, were less certain but,
nevertheless, they did not expect dramatic improvements to be
available from dredging and they proposed a study of the
possibilities:
'The consensus of opinion is that no great improvement
of the depths of water up to Calcutta can reasonably
be expected but that by employing modern, scientific
investigation and the latest research techniques it
should be possible to increase the efficacy of dredging
methods and suggest beneficial training works.
'...it has been agreed by the Calcutta Port Commissioners
and the Government of India that a program of scientific
studies of a type not heretofore attempted be undertaken
promptly to determine the long-term effects of different
dredging techniques on the hydraulic regime of the river
in both its riverine and estuarial sections.' (17)
The results of this study are not available (18) but, since the
dredging alternative had already been dismissed and the decision
taken to build the Farakka Barrage, they are not strictly relevant.
The size of the dredging being undertaken in 1961 can be envisaged
from the US 02 million being spent annually (19) and Framji
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estimated that in order for dredging to be effective a dumping
ground would have to be found for .100 million cubic feet of silt per
year. He did not think that would be possible (20).
Some years after these estimates, the Indian Parliament's Public
Accounts Committee investigated the accounts of the Calcutta Port
Trust for the years 1968-69 to 1972-73* They criticised the
regulation at the port. They stated that there had been 'serious
mismanagement', and that 'dredger utilisation at Calcutta Port has
been miserably low and the same has affected the navigability of the
Port'. They noted an allegation that utilisation was low in order
that more work could be given to dredgers hired from foreign private
companies (21). It is possible that this low utilisation of dredgers
also took place in the years when the decision was being taken that
dredging could not solve the problems of the Hooghly. Perhaps better
usage would have changed the picture.
Ippen and Wicker in their 1962 report to the Government of Pakistan
concluded that existing dredging practice was contributing to silting
in the Hooghly (22). However, they thought that permanent removal
of dredged spoil from the river could provide 'effective control of
navigable depths' (23)-
An alternative port
The difficulties of navigating the Hooghly have led many observers
to suggest that Calcutta is not a sensible site for a port; one
nearer the Bay of Bengal would be preferable.
In 19551 there was a suggestion that an auxiliary port should be
established, but the government said it was 'not considered necessary'
(2b). However, after a World Bank recommendation (25), investigations
were started, and a port was built at Haldia (see Figure 3.1).
Haldia Port was not, however, intended as a replacement for Calcutta
Port. It is not large enough to handle more than a small proportion
of Calcutta's trade. It provides access for ships of up to ^0 ft
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draught carrying bulk cargoes. Nevertheless, an expert on ports,
working at the World Bank, has said that, 'informed opinion at the
time a deep water port was being considered was that Calcutta Port
should be allowed to die, or to become a barge port' (26).
Framji gave two reasons for his dismissal of a new port as an
alternative to Farakka. Firstly, he thought that such a port would
'require a century to develop'. Then, secondly, he argued that 'even
the port of Haldia would be doomed as deterioration will positively
travel downstream without the beneficence of the Farakka Barrage' (27).
A third reason, cost, is given in passing in a World Bank report:
'If it is taken as axiomatic that the present Port of
Calcutta (whose replacement value alone must be greater
than US # 250 million) will remain a major port and
that access thereto must be maintained and improved to
the economic limit of so doing...' (28).
At this time the cost of the Farakka Barrage Project v/as estimated to
be Rs 56^ million, rather than Rs 1,563 million, the 1968 estimate
(29) (about US #27 million and US #120 million, respectively at
relevant exchange rates). If the final cost had been known the
maintenance of Calcutta Port might have seemed less 'axiomatic'.
Framji believed that the Farakka Project would halt deterioration of
the river, and that without it even Haldia Port would be doomed.
He therefore rejected the idea of an alternative port. In the event,
Farakka or no Farakka, Haldia is suffering from siltation. The
Government of India have apparently spent almost US #100 million on
dredging the approaches to Haldia with, nevertheless, a net worsening
of the draught (30). With the b enefit of hindsight, it seems that
even Haldia would not have represented a panacea. It may be that
there is no suitable site for a replacement port but, on the other
hand, there are few indications that the Government of India
seriously searched for one.
Internal opposition
Kapil Bhattacharya, a Bengali engineer living in Calcutta, has for
many years opposed the Farakka Barrage Project. In 1961 he wrote
a pamphlet, Silting of Calcutta Port, setting out the reasons for
his opposition (31)- Essentially Battacharya believes that the
deterioration of the Hooghly was caused not by a natural decline of
the.river's headwater, but by man's intervention in building dams
on the Rivers Damodar and Rupnarayan, Western tributaries of the
Hooghly. Bhattacharya's somewhat sensational resume of his argument
is this:
'The Farakka Barrage proposed on the reach of the Ganga
river will cause disaster in Bihar and West Bengal. By
pressure of misguided public opinion [ KB's italics J the
Government of India is going to implement it. The
government has been advised to tackle the wrong river
to save the Port of Calcutta - the Bhagirathi-Hooghly.
It is the Rupnarayan which should be tackled.
'Inspite of my warnings the Damodar Valley Project has
been implemented without taking into consideration flood-
tides and tide-borne silts into the Rupnarayan and the
Lower Hooghly. As a result the Calcutta Port has been
killed and the main drainage channel (the Hooghly) of
West Bengal choked up causing repeated flood-havocs on
ever increasing scale. If my warnings against Farakka
Barrage is not heeded, people will have to suffer the
consequences.' (32)
The Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) which built the dams on the
Rupnarayan and Damodar Rivers was a direct descendant of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). It was established in the euphoria
following the success of the TVA with the advice of those who had
designed the TVA schemes. The DVC was intended to provide a multi¬
purpose river development to rejuvenate the fortunes of West Bengal,
but it was not enormously successful. Industry was not attracted by
the availability of cheap electricity, little irrigation development
was introduced and, because many of the flood control dams were
never built, the element of flood control in the project is not
strong. Nevertheless, Bhattacharya argues that the control of these
rivers took away the main flushing action in the River Hooghly. He
believes that the Rupnarayan and Damodar provided much greater
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velocity in flood than did the freshets of the Hooghly. Bhattacharya
says that he predicted that the deterioration of the Hooghly would
become serious by i960 if the DVC dams were closed in 1955- This,
he says, is what happened.
In a paper read to the 19&5 Annual General Meeting of the Association
of Engineers (Calcutta), Bhattacharya explained his main point:
'Prior to the DVC dams withholding the Damodar floods,
the ebb flow used to be swifter and continuous during
the monsoon months of June to September and there used
to be little flood flow upwards in those months. Thus
the bars, especially in the lower reach of the river
[Hooghly], were scoured and the navigable channels were
naturally maintained with occasional help of dredgers
at required points. With DVC dams this natural hydraulic
operation has been practically stopped with progressive
deterioration of channels...' (33)
From this analysis, Bhattacharya proposed his remedy for the
deterioration'of the Hooghly, which was: 'perennial and rapid discharge
discharges through a narrowed and deepened Rupnarayan into the lower
Hooghly' (3U). Bhattacharya's ideas are not rigorously defined, but
his analysis has not been adequately rebutted. Both the Man Singh
Committee (see Chapter One) and the Lok Sabha's Public Accounts
Committee (35) discussed Bhattacharya's ideas but neither provided
a systematic critique.
LEGITIMATION AND EXPERT CONTROVERSY
We turn now to the second question asked at the start of this chapter:
what feature of the technical rationale of the Farakka Barrage
Project allowed experts advising the Governments of India and
Pakistan to disagree so completely about the efficacy of the project?
In 1957, Professor Walter Hensen was invited by the Indian Government
to examine the problem of Calcutta Port. The Government wished to
know if the Indian engineers were working on the right lines, and it
also wished Hensen to confer a seal of international scientific
legitimacy on the project. A former General Manager of the project,
Debes Mookerjea, has written of Hensen's 'seal of approval', and
described the review in these terms:
'The study was placed before Dr Hensen. As likely
objections had to be kept in view, Dr Hensen made a brief
review of the proposals of 1956 and recommended the
project with a tentative operation plan...' (36)
Hensen's report has never been made public even though, in the words
of the Lok Sabha's Public Accounts Committee, 'the Farakka Barrage
Project was based on Dr Walter Hensen's report' (37)- Nevertheless,
a summary of Hensen's conclusions has been published in articles by
Mookerjea (38), and a more detailed summary was published in
Preservation of the Port of Calcutta. This reads as follows:
'(1) The best and only technical solution of the problem
is the construction of a barrage across the Ganga at
Farakka with which the upland discharge into the
Bhagirathi-Hooghly can be regulated as planned, and with
which the long-term deterioration in the Bhagirathi-
Hooghly can be stopped and possibly converted into a
gradual improvement. With a controlled upland discharge
a prolongation of the freshet period will be obtained,
and the sudden freshet peaks which will cause heavy sand
movement and bank erosion will be flattened.
'(2) The upper five bars and crossings (namely, Panchpara,
■ Sankral, Munikhali, Pir Serang and Poojali) will be
improved.
'(3) The lower four bars (namely, Eastern Gut, Moyapur,
Royapur and Ninan) will also improve with the construction
of training works.
'(4) With upland discharge and training works and/or
dredging at some of the bars, there will be no additional
difficulties encountered at the bars and crossings
considered above.
The measures adopted on the Ganga-Bhagirathi-Hooghly
system will not have any ill-effect on the estuary below
Diamond Harbour.
'(5) The tidal reach will be improved, and the frequency
and intensity of bores will be decreased.
'(6) The water supply of the city of Calcutta and its
industrial areas will be improved by reduction in
salinity.
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'(7) The drainage capacity of the Bhagirathi and the
Upper Hooghly will be improved and flood hazards in
the catchment area will be reduced, and sanitation and
public health will be ameliorated.' (39)
The significance of Hensen's report is increased by the fact that
two American experts, who were presented with a very similar task
and much of the same information, came to opposite and equally
definite conclusions. Professor Arthur T Ippen and Clarence F Wicker
were engaged by the Government of Pakistan to answer eight questions,
the most important of which were these:
'Pakistani engineers desire consideration of the following
matters prior to undertaking further negotiations with
India. They would like to know:
'(a) If the proposed diversion of sweet water into the
Hooghly River will have a beneficial or a harmful effect
on the problem of Calcutta Port.
'(c)...Can there be any reduction in the proposed diversion
by India'without adversely affecting the Calcutta Port?
Pakistan is interested in reducing the diversions during
the months of January through May.' C+0)
Ippen and Wicker's conclusions include the following:
'(a) The diversion of fresh water into the Hooghly
River through the construction of the Farakka Barrage
will not contribute to the solution of, but is likely
to accentuate, the serious shoaling problems in that
river...
'(b) No evidence is apparent that the economic benefits
from Farakka Barrage justify the cost of the project
whether or not the shoaling conditions are improved.
'(c) The dredging requirements for channel maintenance
will be as high or even higher following the diversion
of more fresh water into the Hooghly.
'(d) The salinity intrusion phenomena in relation to
fresh water flow play a major role in establishing the
shoaling regime in the Hooghly.
'(f) There is no evidence that the average fresh water
flow into the Hooghly from upstream sources has decreased
at least in the last 15 years.
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'(g) The shoaling problems presently encountered must
be largely attributed to the type of dredging practice,
which has been found ineffective and abandoned in
comparable situations.
'(p) Decreased flood discharges and controlled fresh water
flows from the Damodar and Rupnarain Rivers have a definite
bearing on the increased salinity conditions in the Hooghly.
'(q) There can be no doubt that salinity conditions near the
Palta water supply intake will be improved with increased
fresh water flow...
'(r) It is finally concluded that the entire complex of
problems for the 'preservation of Calcutta Port' has not
received adequate technical investigation by model studies
simulating salinity fresh water mixing and penetration. It
is suggested that a major project costing ft 117 million
should not be undertaken without receiving such attention
in view of many precedents, which revealed unforseen
consequences.' (4-1)
Thus, it can be seen that whilst Hensen thought that the Farakka
Project was the 'best and only' solution to the deterioration of
the Hooghly, Ippen and Wicker thought that the project would
exacerbate the problem; Hensen thought the project would also
contribute to the solution of a whole range of secondary problems,
whilst Ippen and Wicker said it would only help to reduce the salinity
of Calcutta's drinking water, leaving other conditions unchanged.
A technical ambiguity
Why should three experts faced with the same body of data come to
conflicting conclusions? One possible explanation for this
contradiction is the existence of what I have termed (in the
introduction to this thesis) a technical ambiguity. It is possible
that the data describing sedimentation mechanisms in the Hooghly
was such that it could support two conflicting interpretations of
the processes involved. Under one interpretation, Hensen could
conclude that the Farakka Project represented the 'best and only
solution' to siltation in the Hooghly, whilst Ippen and Wicker, with
a different interpretation of the mechanism, could conclude that
the project would 'accentuate' the problem rather than solve it.
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This appears to be what happened. Without access to all the relevant
Indian Government publications, notably the text of Dr Hensen's
report, it is impossible to fully identify the two conflicting
theories. The outlines of the two interpretations can, however, be
distinguished and it can be shown that, at the very least, Ippen
and Wicker were able to cast doubt upon the completeness of Hensen's
(and the Indian Government's) theory of sedimentation in the Hooghly.
Hensen's view seems to correspond with that of the Man Singh Expert
Committee, as quoted in Chapter One. The committee argued that the
strong flood tide in the Hooghly brought sediment up the estuary
which the weaker ebb tide was not capable of carrying back toward
the sea. Additional fresh water flow could, according to this
theory, reinforce the ebb tide so that the sediment could be carried
back out to sea. This is the 'flushing' theory at its simplest.
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Hensen's conclusions support
this theory. Hensen writes that 'with a controlled upland discharge
a prolongation of the freshet period will be obtained' (^2). The
freshet period is the period, during the monsoon season, when the
Ganges contributes a considerable volume of fresh water to the
Hooghly's flow. Hensen argues that controlled upland discharge,
that is the Farakka diversions, will extend the beneficent flushing
into other seasons of the year.
Ippen and Wicker doubt that flushing with fresh water is beneficent.
They find that some at least of the observations made of the Hooghly
suggest the opposite. They include in their report a graph
(reproduced here as Figure 3-2) relating depth at one of the bars
in the Hooghly with the volume of freshets, or upland flow. From
this they conclude:
'It is immediately apparent that a higher upland discharge
in the period 1935-^5 than in 1925-35 produced shallower,
rather than greater, depths over the crossing studied.
The conclusion that an increase of discharge causes
shoaling of the 'low water' crossings rather than
preventing it is warranted.' (^3)
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Figure 3.2: Ippen and Wicker's graph relating navigable depth
in the Hooghly to the volume of freshets.
GRAPH NO II
Source: Ippen and Wicker, The Hooghly River problem, mimeo, 1962.
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This is a correlation which contradicts the traditional flushing
theory propounded by the experts employed by the Indian Government.
Ippen and Wicker suggest one reason wKy the theory does not fully
explain sedimentation in the Hooghly. They maintain that a crucial
variable has been ignored: salinity. On this Ippen and Wicker write:
'It has been repeatedly emphasised by India in response
to requests from Pakistan for salinity measurements over
' the vertical and longitudinal directions that such
information is irrelevant. The argument is "that the
water in the river Hooghly with the prevailing high
velocities, heavy turbulence and immense volume of tidal
inflow, constitutes a well-mixed tidal channel at all
depths. There is no indication whatever of stratification
or density currents in the Hooghly".' (MO
What is in question here is the existence and effect of salinity
gradients in the Hooghly. The greater density of saline (sea) water
creates a tendency in all estuaries for sea water to intrude as a
wedge beneath river water flowing toward the sea. This tendency
can create water 'strata' of different salinities and different
densities. If a saline wedge exists then there will be a net
landward movement of water near the bed of an estuary, with a
compensating seaward movement near the water surface. Much of a
river's sediment load is carried near to the bed of the river and
a landward current in this region can cause sediment deposition.
However, the picture may be complicated by turbulence in an estuary.
If turbulent mixing is intense then the vertical density gradient
will be slight; instead there will be a horizontal, or longitudinal,
density gradient, varying from the density of sea water to the
density of fresh water. This is the condition for an estu&ry
described as 'well mixed'.
We have seen that the Indian Government, according to Ippen and
Wicker, state that the Hooghly estuary is well mixed, without
stratification or density currents. Ippen and Wicker say that this
conclusion is reflected in the absence of experiments simulating
salinity conditions and salinity-related sedimentation in the Hooghly.
They contend that salinity effects cannot be ignored whether or not
the Hooghly is well mixed.
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Ippen and Wicker accept that the Hooghly estuary falls into the
'well mixed' category but they do not accept that salinity effects
are, therefore, unimportant. They maintain, on the contrary, that
salinity is the most important factor explaining the type and position
of shoaling, or sediment deposition, in the Hooghly.
According to Ippen and Wicker, upstream mean velocities are to be
found near the bed of well mixed estuaries. They cite river
observations and laboratory simulations which have identified this
phenomena. Turbulent mixing prevents defined stratification, say
Ippen and Wicker, but it does not wholly remove the vertical density-
gradient in an estuary. The slight vertical density gradient
remaining in a well mixed estuary is sufficient to cause slight,
but nevertheless important, upstream bottom velocities. These
currents will be weakest at the upstream and downstream ends of the
portion of estuary in which saline water is mixing with fresh. It
is in these zones, according to the Ippen and Wicker theory, that
sediment deposition will take place. They describe the process in
these words:
'As the upstream limit of the salinity intrusion is
approached, the bottom currents tend towards zero and
eventually reverse direction. No material moving into
this zone can, therefore, be transported any further
downstream and must accumulate in shoals. Only suspended
material light enough to be diffused into the upper
layers still may move downstream in part. However,
in almost all estuaries flocculation of these fines,
especially when the sediments involved contain clays,
in the presence of salt water promotes the settling out
of even these formerly suspended materials into the lower
portions of the section and mud deposits are formed in
the same area.' C+5)
In this passage Ippen and Wicker have explained that estuarial
sedimentation cannot be understood without study of the salinity
conditions prevailing in the estuary. The ends of the longitudinal
salinity gradient define the positions where sediment carried near
to the bed of the estuary is likely to be deposited and, also, the
regions in which the flocculation and deposition of finer sediments
can be expected.
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In support of their theory, Ippen and Wicker show that the shoaling in
the Hooghly is where it would be expected: at the end of the salinity
gradient. They write:
'Toward the end of the dry season the salinity registers
its farthest upstream advance and the profiles of Figure 5
[not reproduced] indicate that the river stretch from
Hooghly Point to Garden Reach falls in the zone of the
largest salinity gradients. There can be little doubt,
even though the intrusion may be classified as in a well-
mixed state, that the heavy shoaling in this river length
is related to the salinity gradients there.' (^6)
Having introduced this new variable, salinity, into the explanation
of sedimentation, Ippen and Wicker then show how this variable alters
the picture of the flushing action to be expected from Farakka
diversions. They argue that whilst the large (natural) freshet flows
may be adequate to move sediment to the lower parts of the estuary,
the smaller Farakka discharge will be insufficient:
'Any smaller discharge, such as visualized for the diversion
scheme at Farakka, [ will be ] inadequate to accomplish a
reversal of the upstream bottom velocities engendered by
the salinity intrusion and will result only in a downstream
shift of the shoaling areas from the upper crossings for a
- relatively small distance. The prediction of the exact
location for the new shoaling concentrations is beyond
present knowledge, but from experiments it is known that
the intrusion length is relatively insensitive to changes
in the fresh water flow...' (^7)
Ippen and Wicker argue, however, that although increased fresh water
flows may cause the salinity intrusion to recede, they will also
cause the salinity gradient to be steeper. Stronger upstream bottom
currents and increased shoaling may be associated with steeper
salinity gradients. This conclusion leads Ippen and Wicker to argue,
in complete contradiction of the theory of flushing, that the
introduction of fresh water into an estuary increases sedimentation.
The point is expressed as follows:
'Finally, it must be emphasized that in view of the role
which fresh water plays with respect to the mechanics of
the salinity intrusions, the minimum shoaling in estuaries
is to be expected with the least amount of fresh water flow
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and vice versa. Furthermore, the sediment introduced into
an estuary will to the major part be retained in the
estuary and thus will accumulate progressively and
indefinitely unless removed from it by dredging.' (^8)
Thus, the experts employed by the Government of Pakistan, Ippen and
Wicker, came to a very different conclusion than those employed by
the Government of India. The former argued that the latter had
overlooked an important variable; inclusion of that variable suggests
that the Farakka diversions will not produce the expected improvement
in the River Hooghly. The experts employed by India, on the other
hand, seem to have argued that the variable is unimportant and can be
ignored. The difference between the two theories constitutes a
technical ambiguity or uncertainty.
Ippen and Wicker's point about salinity effects was raised, along
with other technical doubts, in the discussions of the Public Accounts
Committee in 1975- It was answered to the satisfaction of the
committee by fi. note submitted by the Ministry of Irrigation and Power.
The note restated the view that the phenomenon of density currents
(and salinity-induced sedimentation) is associated with stratified
estuaries and does not occur in well mixed estuaries, of which the
Hooghly is an example.
This unsatisfactory answer notwithstanding, it can be deduced that the
Indian Government recognised in 1962 that their theory of sedimennt
transport was open to question. In that year, on the advice of (and
with financial support from) the World Bank, a well-equipped
Hydraulic Study Department was established under the aegis of the
Port Commissioners. It began work with measurements 'intended to
clarify the physical behaviour of the system' of the River Hooghly.
These measurements included:
'Systematic measurement of flow, sediment transport,
temperature and salinity at a few selected cross-sections,
with simultaneous measurements at three or more points in
any cross-section, in addition to measurements of tidal
level and surveys of the bed which supplemented the routine
surveys. Radioactive tracer tests were used to determine
local rates of sand transport.' (^9)
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These are the sorts of measurements which would be made to determine
whether or not salinity-induced sedimentation was taking place.
The establishment and initial work of the Hydraulic Study Department
provides further evidence of the existence of technical uncertainty.
The Department was intended to 'clarify' an uncertain behaviour;
it began by observing a variable which had previously been thought
insignificant.
Ippen and Wicker were not the only foreign experts to have doubts.
F Posthuma, Managing Director of the Port of Rotterdam, led a World
Bank advisory mission to Calcutta Port in 1957• He wrote:
'If, after the completion of the Farakka Barrage there will
be silt-free fresh-water in abundance for the Hooghly, it
may be possible to deepen the Hooghly, but in this respect
so little is known about the results of this barrage and,
besides, it does not seem very likely at all that there
will be such a supply of water.' (50)
Presumably, one element in the World Bank's decision to fund the
Hydraulic Study Department was its recognition of doubts about the
Farakka Project (5^) -
The consequences of ambiguity
Thus, in 1961, there seems to have been a profound uncertainty about
the sedimentation process of the Hooghly - a technical ambiguity.
From the Pakistan Government's point of view, this cast doubt upon
the whole Farakka Barrage venture. The existence of this ambiguity
raises two questions. Firstly, why did India decide to build the
barrage if there was doubt about its technical rationale? Secondly,
what effect did this profound doubt have upon the Pakistan Government's
response to the project? Chapter Four, the following chapter, is
directed to an examination of the issues relevant to the first
question. The second, about the consequences of ambiguity is
discussed briefly below.
At one level, the ambiguity provided a resource which the Pakistan
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and Bangladesh Governments have used in the dispute. Thus, a
pamphlet published by the Pakistan. Government in February 1971
contained a chapter entitled, 'Farakka Barrage Project and its
technical weakness', in which the following paragraph appears:
'The Indian project is termed as the "Project for the
preservation of the Port of Calcutta" aimed to divert
waters of the Ganges river with the avowed objective of
■ improving navigation in the Hooghly. An analysis of the
data supplied by India, however, shows that the diversion
of the fresh water into the Hooghly river by the
construction of the Farakka Barrage will not contribute
to the preservation of the Port of Calcutta. On the
contrary, the proposed diversion is likely to accentuate
the shoaling problems of the Hooghly River.' (52)
The pamphlet continues with a more detailed description of Ippen and
Wicker's conclusions. In a similar manner, five years later, the
Bangladesh Government employed the resource. B M Abbas, an adviser
of the Chief Martial Law Administrator told a BBC interviewer in
March 1976:
'...you have said it is for the improvement of Calcutta
Port. We hold the opinion that the improvement of
Calcutta Port will not be facilitated by diverting the
" fresh water from the Ganges and there would be a much
better use for this water to produce a food crop.' (53)
Later in that year, the Chairman of the Bangladesh delegation to
the United Nations declared that India's use of the water was 'new
and wasteful' because:
'Many experts of repute have questioned the very
practicality of the diversions for the purpose of
removing silt.'
In this manner, the Governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh
to employ Ippen and Wicker's conclusions and the technical
to cast doubt upon India's case.
At a less public level, the ambiguity contributed to the generation
of a myth about the malignancy of Indian policy; the Farakka Barrage





not solve the problem of the Hooghly, why was India constructing it?
The answer, suggested by the context of Indo-Pakistan and Indo-
Bangladesh hostility was: India is building a barrage to deprive
East Bengal of Ganges water; it is an attack against East Bengal.
This myth about the Farakka Barrage is rarely publicly stated but
it is one which senior participants, particularly technical experts,
offer in private (55)- The importance of this myth in the development
of the dispute is impossible to establish, but there can be little
doubt that it enhanced the hostility toward India of many Pakistan
and Bangladesh participants.
CONSIDERATION OF DOWNSTREAM CONSEQUENCES
Finally, we turn to the third question of this chapter: How much
consideration was given by the Indian Government to the probable
consequences of the Farakka diversions for areas further down the
Ganges?
In 1961, Nehru told the Lok Sabha:
'there should be no real injury caused to Pakistan by
. this scheme [ the Farakka Barrage Project ] '. (56)
We shall see in Part III that there was real injury; Nehru's was a
sanguine interpretation of the project's consequences. Why were
JL.
these effects unforeseen by India?
In his 1975 article, Framji describes an investigation he directed
in 1958 into these downstream effects. It is clear that this
investigation was inadequate. Framji writes that proof of the
efficacy of the Farakka Project:
'was not enough to obtain sanction for the project. It
had also to be established that the supplies required
for the Farakka Project would not prejudicially affect
other interests, upstream or downstream of Farakka, in
the water resources of the Ganga.' (57)
He was, therefore, charged with the responsibility of assessing the
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downstream consequences of the Farakka Project, and this is how he
describes his method:
'The numerous reports and Projects prepared by Foreign
Consultants and Consulting Engineers of Pakistan
concerning irrigation, flood control and drainage of the
area of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were thoroughly
scrutinised; and subject to the limitations of the
available data alternative projects were prepared, having
■ regard to the existing and ultimate surface and ground
water resources in the Padma-Jamuna-Brahmaputra basins.
Particular attention was given to the estimation of
dependable regeneration in the low water season at
different stages of development. As far as data permitted,
preliminary studies were also made of the possible
remedial measures - storages, barrage and link canals
- for augmenting the flow.' (58)
This study, probably the only study of downstream effects made prior
to the decision to build the project, can be criticised on two
grounds. Firstly, Framji's study concentrates, apparently to the
exclusion of all else, on irrigation, flood control and drainage
projects in East Pakistan. Framji does not anticipate that the
effects of reduced flow in the Ganges may be diverse and general.
He does not consider whether salinity will increase, nor whether it
will effect agriculture, industry, fisheries, forestry and drinking
water. He does not consider the possibility that there might be
effects on 'traditional' agriculture - which is much more important
to Bangladesh's (East Pakistan's) food production than the 'modern'
agriculture to which he turns his attention. He does not mention
the disruption of navigation, or ecological effects. Secondly, even
within the area on which Framji concentrates, he does not show that
there are no 'prejudicial' consequences. On the contrary, he accepts
that there are such consequences. He even talks in terms of 'remedial
measures'. What Framji showed, according to his own account, was that
it is possible to overcome the prejudicial effects of the Farakka
Project, at least as far as modern agriculture is concerned, by
turning to other sources of water and, presumably, less 'thirsty'
crops. It is not that there were no disbenefits; Framji did no more
than show that certain narrowly defined disbenefits could be overcome.
He does not say what this would cost.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has dealt with three discussions closely connected with
the decision to build the Farakka Barrage Project in the years just
prior to that decision. We have looked at the alternatives to the
project, at the debate over the technical efficacy of the project
and at the consideration given by India to the project's downstream
consequences.
At least five alternative solutions to the problem of providing access-
to Calcutta Port were discussed in the years immediately before the
Farakka Project was sanctioned. Only one of them, the Diamond
Harbour ship canal, seems to have been investigated thoroughly at
that time. The remaining four alternatives were all subject to
reasonable objection but, as this thesis shows, the project finally
chosen was also subject to reasonable objection.
The Pakistan and Bangladesh Governments believed not only that there
were better ways of providing access to Calcutta Port, but that the
Farakka Project would actually exacerbate the deterioration of the
Hooghly (59)- The foundation of this belief appears to be the advice
given by Ippen and Wicker. The contrast between their conclusions
and those given by Hensen to the Indian Government provides the most
dramatic example of technical controversy in the whole history of the
Farakka Project. Hensen thought that the project was the 'best and
only technical solution of the problem', whilst Ippen and Wicker
said that it was 'likely to accentuate' the deterioration of the
Hooghly.
There are two possible explanations for this disagreement. One is
that Ippen and Wicker did not have access to all the evidence, and
therefore could not come to the correct conclusion. If this is the
case, it rebounds on the Government of India, who at this stage of
the negotiations (in 1962) claimed to have supplied to Pakistan all
material necessary for a complete assessment of the Farakka Project.
Pakistan gave Ippen and Wicker access to the material supplied by
India. If that data was inadequate the fault lies with India.
However, this does not appear to be the case. The crucial evidence
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on the mechanisms of sedimentation seem to have been available to
neither party.
It seems to have been this evidence which the Hydraulic Study
Department set out to collect in 1962. The second explanation of
the disagreement is, thus, that there was a technical ambiguity in
the data describing the sedimentation mechanism of the Hooghly.
The .three consultants approached the problem of the Hooghly with
different preconceptions, that is with different 'models' of
sedimentation, and they were able to find the evidence needed to
support their preconceptions.
Ippen and Wicker believed that salinity was an important variable
in the sedimentation process, and they were able to fit their model
to the evidence available. Hensen was apparently more inclined to
accept a theory of 'flushing' in which salinity was discounted as an
insignificant variable, and sedimentation rates were primarily related
to velocities of flow. According to this theory, salinity could be
ignored in a 'well-mixed' estuary, of which the Hooghly is an example.
This model, as we have seen in earlier chapters, had a lengthy
history in Indian engineering circles. It was pointed out in the
conclusions of Chapter One that three inquiries into the Hooghly
problem showed a marked prejudice in favour of controlling the
Hooghly's headwaters. It was this 'flushing' model of sedimentation
which directed their attention toward the headwaters. It is
therefore apparent that Hensen's conclusions suited Indian
preconceptions.
The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, were anxious about the
effects of the Farakka diversions on East Pakistan. Ippen and Wicker's
ability to cast doubt upon the technical rationale of the project
therefore aided its case against the project. Without detailed
information on salinity variation in the Hooghly it was possible
for the two models, Hensen's and Ippen and Wicker's, to co-exist.
Despite repeated requests from Pakistan, the Indian Government were
unwilling to supply this information. As a result, the technical
ambiguity was prolonged; India was able to believe that the Farakka
Project was the best solution to the Hooghly problem, whilst
Pakistan believed the project was no solution at all.
Lastly, this chapter dealt with the extent of Indian consideration
for the downstream effects of the Farakka Project. If Framji's study
was, as it appears, the only Indian Government study of these effects
prior to the approval of the project, then it is clear that the
Indian Government was negligent in this respect. Framji's study
ignores most of the consequences for East Pakistan of Farakka
diversions. He overlooked effects on traditional agriculture,
industry, navigation, fisheries, forestry, and the ecology of the
region.
It is probably true that, although Pakistan had been raising objections
to the Farakka Project since 1951, the emphasis of the objections at
this stage was on the fact that less water would be available for
projects providing irrigation water for modern agriculture. However,
the Indian Government w&s aware of the sorts of effects which
follow from the reduction of a river's flow. A part of the
justification for the Farakka Project rested on just such effects.
The consequences of salinity were at that time affecting Calcutta,
and navigation in the Bhagirathi and Hooghly had been reduced, as a
result, according to Indian expertise, of reduced flows in the
Bhagirathi. Would reduced flows in the Ganges have a different
effect? These two consequences, at the very least, should have been
assessed in the Indian Government's study of downstream consequences.
They should have been foreseen by Framji.
Even in the area of modern agriculture, the area on which Framji
focussed his attention, he did not show that there would be, as
Nehru claimed, no injury to East Pakistan; he showed only that
remedial measures could be taken to overcome that injury.
The final conclusion of this chapter is that when the decision to
build the Farakka Barrage was taken, the technical rationale of the
project had not been adequately established. The mechanism by
which the project 'would work was apparently still being investigated
after the project had been sanctioned. Alternative and contradictory
interpretations could find support in the data available at the time
the decision was taken.
Chapter Four
THE FARAKKA BARRAGE
In preceding chapters three aspects of the development of the ideas
which provided the technical rationale for the Farakka Barrage
Project have been explored. The first chapter provided a resume of
the diagnoses given by those who had listened to the pulse of the
River Hooghly. Out of disagreement, emerged a consensus description
of the disease of the Hooghly. The second chapter investigated the
origins and preparation of a remedy for this disease, the remedy of
fresh water flushing. In this chapter we learnt that the disease
was at first thought to be localised, not the concern of the whole
body-politic. By the end of the 1950s, however, the relevant organs
of the body-politic were conscious of the disease and convinced of
the remedy. As a last, and almost token, check the doctors of the
central government briefly considered alternative treatments and
consulted colleagues (some from other lands) for a second opinion
before prescribing their chosen remedy. This was described in the
third chapter. There we must leave the medical metaphor.
This chapter is an investigation into the political, economic and
physical circumstances which contributed to the final decision to
build the Farakka Barrage Project. It is concerned with the latter
years of the 1950s and the early years of the 1960s.
We have seen in Chapter Three that the technical rationale of the
Farakka Project was, at the least, questionable. We shall see, in
Part II, that the Pakistan Government regularly objected to the
Project, throughout the 1950s, on the grounds that it would cause
damage to downstream areas dependent on water from the Ganges. The
central question, therefore, which this chapter seeks to answer is
how, in these circumstances, was the project sanctioned?
Wi'thout access to the government papers for the period answers to
this question must inevitably be sketchy and speculative. However,
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some of the political and economic factors which influenced the
decision can be identified.
What we wish to know can be summarised in four questions: who? why?
when? and how?:
Who influenced the decision to build the project, and
. who stood to gain from it?
Why did they want the Farakka Project? and why that
project rather than an alternative?
Why was the decision taken in 1960/61?
How was pressure brought to bear upon the Indian central
Government?
It cannot be pretended that this chapter provides complete answers
to these questions. It identifies some possible answers and suggests
directions for further study by those who obtain access to the
government pap'ers.
Table 4.1 is an outline chronology of the decision to start
construction of the Farakka Project. It can be seen, even in this
summarised and incomplete chronology, that the decision to build the
project involved a series of decisions, spread over a period of years,
by a variety of bodies. This chapter is primarily concerned with
the decisions taken between 19591 when the relevant central government
ministries had decided to support the project, and 1961 when the
formal announcement of the start of construction was made.
Who influenced the decision?
In 1853 it was the anxiety of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce which
prompted the Government of Bengal to establish the Hooghly Commission.
Again in 19591 the same chamber of commerce, representing primarily
British interests, was troubled by the deterioration of the Hooghly.
Its President, Mr J D K Brown, told the 1959 Annual General Meeting
of the Chamber:
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Table k.1: Chronology of Decision
19^7 West Bengal Govt starts investigating Ganga
Barrage Project. Field surveys made and preliminary
report prepared.
19^+9 Investigations taken over by central government.
1952 Expert committee chaired by Man Singh reviews
model studies and recommends the project.
1952-58 Pressure in Lok Sabha from West Bengal MPs.
1956 Preliminary report revised. Cell created in Central
Water and Power Commission to investigate the
project.
1957 Dr Walter Hensen invited to review the preliminary
report. He recommends the project.
1958 Long debate in Lok Sabha.
K K Framji, head of Ganges Basin Organisation,
starts 'scientific study of the problem' -
rejecting alternatives, looking at adverse effects
and preparing an operational programme.
1960 MAR Nehru tells West Bengal Chief Minister 'this
project is certainly being included in our plans'.
APR Administrative approval and financial sanction given.
Ganga Barrage Field Investigation Circle formed.
1961 JAN National Development Council sanctions inclusion of
the project in Five-Year Plan.
Pakistan Government is informed that work has
started. .
JUN Farakka Barrage Control Board formed.
AUG Technical Advisory Committee formed.
OCT R B Chakraborty appointed as Chief Engineer.
1962 Port Commissioners set up Hydraulic Study
Department which starts investigating the quantity
of diversion required.
1963 SEP Site for Barrage chosen by Dr K L Rao.
OCT Mookerjea replaces Chakraborty as Chief Eningeer
1964 Construction of Barrage starts.
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'A matter which has gravely concerned shipping interests
in particular and commerce and industry generally in this
part of India throughout this past year has been the state
of the River Hooghly. This is not entirely a local problem
as it has all-India significance when we consider the
proportion of the export and import trade which passes
through the Port of Calcutta...it appears that unless
something is done, and done as quickly as possible, the
repercussions on the trade and industry of North East
India and of India itself might be very severe.' (1)
The Economic Weekly noted in April 1961:
'Since reduction in draft means heavy loss of cargo-
carrying capacity, and shipping is crippled, there has been
a unanimous demand for years by all the Chambers of
Commerce, both Indian and European, that high priority
should be given to the implementation of the Farakka
Barrage Project.' (2)
Commercial and industrial interests in West Bengal have particularly
close links with the Congress Party, the party in power both in West
Bengal and at the centre at the time in question. Dilip Hiro has
commented upon the 'traditional affinity between the business communi
and the Congress' (3)- More specifically, an American political
scientist has written:
'The business community of West Bengal tends to give
more support to the State government than business
communities elsewhere. It involves direct financial
support to the Congress Party organisation and for the
Congress candidates to the State legislative assembly and
to parliament... [ in return] both Bengali and non-Bengali
business communities have the ear of B C Roy, the Chief
Minister.' (k)
It is not surprising, therefore, that the anxiety of the business
community should have been translated into the questions put in
the Lok Sabha during the 1950s.
Dr B C Roy was a strong supporter of the Farakka Project. He told
Prime Minister Nehru, in a letter dated March 8 I96O:
'I can only tell you that this scheme is essential not
merely for the economy of the State itself but also for
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the safety of the Port of Calcutta which handles a
very large quantity of goods for export and import
purposes. It will save the city of Calcutta from extra
salinity during the hot weather. Meanwhile it will help
us to have a balanced distribution of water in the Delta
and to the different parts of West Bengal.' (5)
It can be seen that Roy held the view that the project would bring
a variety of benefits to the State, not just better access to the
port: it 'is essential... for the economy of the State', he wrote,
Why did they support the project?
The reasons why the chambers of commerce were demanding the Farakka
Project are straightforward. On the one hand, the deterioration of
the lower Hooghly was increasing the cost of exporting and importing
through Calcutta Port and therefore cutting into the profits of
commerce and industry. On the other hand, the reduction in the
draught available to ships visiting the port was allowing only
smaller and smaller ships to visit the port at a time when the
economics of shipping were dictating that ships should be larger
and larger.
In their Report submitted to the World Bank Mission, of November
1957, "the Commissioners for the Port of Calcutta wrote:
'The port has to take cognisance of the economics of
shipping. In the past, ships might have been designed
and constructed to suit the port conditions of Calcutta,
now the port has to be constructed to keep in step with
the economics of shipping.' (6)
The Commissioners used this as an argument for the establishment
of a subsidiary port nearer the sea. But it is likely that
industrial and shipping interests hoped that the Farakka Project
would stabilise or even increase the draught available to shipping
so that Calcutta Port itself could more nearly compete with other
ports.
Why should the chambers of commerce, and other influence groups,
support the Farakka Project rather than its alternatives? Against
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all the remedies, including the Farakka Project, there were either
political or technical objections or both.
The construction of an alternative port raised the spectres of
unemployment and wasted investments. Dredging of the Hooghly was
being tried and was perceived to be failing. The two ship canal
schemes would have bisected industrial areas to the South of
Calcutta and, in addition, a fairly clear technical objection could
be raised against them. Even Kapil fthattacharya's alternative
conception could only have been implemented against opposition from
the Damodar Valley Corporation and its industrial and agricultural
beneficiaries. Only in the case of the Farakka Project were the
objectors outwith the boundaries of India.
The Farakka Barrage Project was, as we have seen in earlier chapters,
the subject of both technical doubts and political disapproval.
However, the technical doubts may not have been obvious to Indian
experts in the period 1959-61 (Ippen and Wicker wrote their report
in 1962 and it was for the consumption of the Pakistan Government),
and the Pakistan Government was effectively unrepresented in West
Bengal and apparently ignored in Delhi.
The political influence which the Pakistan Government might have
brought to bear upon the Indian Government's deliberations was
seriously undermined by expert assurances that there would be no
adverse effects in East Pakistan. K K Framji believed, as we saw
in Chapter Three, that his studies had established that the Farakka
Project 'would not prejudicially affect other interests, upstream
or downstream of Farakka' (7)- Therefore, Prime Minister Nehru could,
with a clear conscience, tell the Lok Sabha in 1961:
'...our approach to the Farakka Project is that we do
not wish in any way to harm the interests of East
Pakistan in this, and we shall try to adhere to that in
the best of our ability.' (8)
A few days later he told the Lok Sabha:
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'It is our view that there should be no real injury
caused to Pakistan by this scheme.' (9)
Thus, the Farakka Project was preferable to its alternatives partly
because its objectors were distant and their objections discredited.
But, in addition, the Farakka Project, unlike its alternatives,
promised a package of subsidiary benefits. Not only did it offer a
solution for the navigational problems of the lower Hooghly, it
seemed likely to ameliorate the salinity of Calcutta's water
supply, provide year-round navigational facilities on the upper
Hooghly (Bhagirathi) and provide a rail and road bridge across the
Ganges at a strategically useful point.
If any further explanation is required for the strong support that
MPs, particularly West Bengal Congress party MPs, gave to the project,
there is an additional factor upon which we may speculate. There
appear to have been political benefits associated with projects
intended to improve the River Hooghly, and specifically with the
Farakka Project.
There is evidence that West Bengal in particular and the states of
North East India generally were, from the time of independence,
'under-developed' by the central government. The financial policies
of the centre discriminated against West Bengal and in favour of
states like Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (10). It is possible that
MPs for West Bengal and members of the state government looked on
the Farakka Project as a panacea that would attract a large
investment from the central government and rejuvenate the economy
of the state.
In the minds of some the delay in starting the Farakka Project was
related to the more general central government discrimination against
the state. Speaking during the 1959 budget debate in the West Bengal
Assembly, Rankim Mukherjee, a member for the Communist Part of India:
'criticised New Delhi's attitude toward West Bengal.
The Farakka Barrage scheme had not yet been taken up for
execution though Calcutta Port was dying. It was the
7^
Centre's policy he alleged, to move important
government offices from Calcutta to Bombay...' (11)
That the Farakka Project was seen as a ^technical panacea for the
\J **
political and economic decline of West Bengal can, perhaps, be
indicated by the extravagant responses to the project when it was
finally inaugurated a decade and a half later. Framji, who had played
an important role in the preparations for the project, referred to
its completion as the 'fulfilment of a dream' (12). The Public
Accounts Committee of the Lok Sabha wrote in 1976 that the dedication
of the project was:
'for many in the country...almost like a dream come
true. Hopes long deferred now seemed near fulfilment.' (13)
For the Congress party, a technical panacea for the economic ills of
the state may have seemed particularly attractive. The Indian
National Congress, having been built to fight colonial rule and gain
national independence, is a cross-class alliance. In the years after
independence the basis of that alliance was brought under strain by
economic failure. An analysis of the ills of West Bengal which laid
the blame on the Hooghly River and looked to central government
investment for its solution did not threaten but actually facilitated
that alliance. If, on the other hand, West Bengal's economic decline
had been attributed to the structure of land tenure in the state, or
to central government policies toward the state, the basis of the
party's support would have been in danger. Political and economic
solutions to the decline of West Bengal would, almost inevitably,
have been much more divisive.than a technical solution, such as the
Farakka Barrage. This latter project had all the makings of a panacea;
not only did it have few effective opponents and promise to bring a
variety of benefits, it also had almost a ready-made popular support.
As early as 19*1-0, T M Oag, the Deputy River Surveyor, was referring
to:
'the current popular belief as manifested by articles
which have appeared in the press at frequent intervals
from the pens of public men...' (1*0
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This was a belief in the deterioration of the river. What seems to
have happened is that commercial anxiety about the condition of the
river gradually became accepted by a wider public as reality. By
1961, business and other interests favoured the Farakka Project as
the remedy for deterioration, and Bhattacharya noted that there was
the 'pressure of misguided public opinion' supporting this project
(15).
Why was the decision taken in 1960/61?
Various spokesmen for the Indian Government have asserted that the
Farakka Project would have been announced or built earlier but for
one or other of three factors: discussions with Pakistan about the
Indus, discussions with Pakistan about the Ganges, and constraints
on India under the Barcelona Convention.
In a letter dated March 12th i960, Nehru told B C Roy:
'I can assure you that we are all anxious to go ahead
with this scheme in fact, work to that end is being done
in various ways. We did feel, however, that we might
not make a public announcement about this for two or three
months while the canal waters discussions are going on.
We hope they will be completed in about two months time.
But this does not mean any delay and this project is
certainly being included in our plans.' (16)
The canal waters discussions were the negotiations between India and
Pakistan, mediated by the World Bank, over the sharing of the Indus
Rivers. Nehru and President Ayub Khan signed the Indus Waters
Treaty in September i960. In the passage quoted here Nehru is
saying not that the Farakka Project would be delayed by the Indus
negotiations but that its announcement would be. In fact, it was
four months after the signature of the Indus Treaty before the
Farakka Project was announced.
It is probable that apprehensions about the political consequences
for relations with Pakistan contributed some delay to the decision
to build the barrage. Shri Hathi, Deputy Minister of Irrigation and
Power, attributed postponement to that cause in a statement to
the Lok Sabha in November 1961:
'Government of India had delayed the Project to take into
consideration Pakistan's reasonable interests. The
Project has been sufficiently delayed in the past to
take Pakistan's interests fully into account, but there
is no obligation or intention that there should be any
further delay.' (17)
Another cause for postponement has been mentioned by Debes Mookerjea,
former Chief Engineer of the project:
'There was some initial hesitation about the Farakka
Project since India was a signatory to an international
navigation treaty which might have acted as a prohibition.
The treaty expired in the late fifties.' (18)
He was probably referring to the Barcelona Convention which states:
'No state is allowed to alter the natural conditions of
its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural
conditions of the territory of a neighbouring state.' (19)
India unilaterally withdrew from the Convention in 1957- At the
time Dawn commented:
'...the conclusion is inescapable that she [ India ] wants
to wriggle out of an international obligation, to pave
the way for the construction of the Farakka Barrage.' (20)
Further delays may have been occasioned by a search for foreign aid
to finance the project but there is no direct evidence to suggest
this (21). If there was such a search it was almost fruitless.
There is a suggestion that the USSR may have offered to provide
Rs 1^0,000 worth of equipment (22) (probably connected with the
unsuccessful coffer dams, built with Russian advice). That is,
however, a small sum compared to the total cost of the project.
There were, thus, at least four possible reasons why the project should
be postponed until i960. But, the question 'why was it built then?'
may be best answered not by searching for tangible reasons for delay
but by finding reasons which injected urgency into the pressure-
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group demands for the project. The project might have languished
indefinitely in the pile of proposals submitted to the Planning
Commission had not some new element directed the attention of the
government to the proposal and persuaded them that it should be
overlooked no longer.
This new element was possibly the sharp worsening of the Hooghly's
decline which took place in the late 1950s. A World Bank report
noted:
'The promptings of the Bank Mission in 1957 coupled with
the sudden deterioration of the Balari Bar in 1958,
spurred the Calcutta Port Commissioners and the Indian
Government to increased efforts to solve the problem of
the access of deep draughted vessels...' (23)
It was in 1958 that the Government of India started their study of
alternatives to the Farakka Project. The Personal Assistant to the
West Bengal ClpLef Minister has written about the situation in 1960,
and a particularly alarmist statement from foreign shipping companies:
'The continually deteriorating trend in the silting up of
the River Hooghly and the consequent fall in the river
■ draught loomed large in the minds of both the Government
and the shippers. On April 8, representatives of foreign
shipping companies publicly expressed the view that if
the deterioration continued for another two years the
Port of Calcutta would be lost.' (2k)
How was pressure brought to bear?
We have seen that the business community of West Bengal was concerned
that something, preferably the construction of the Farakka Barrage,
should be done to stop the deterioration of the Hooghly; that the
Congress party in the state had strong links with the business
community and that, in addition, there may have been political
benefits for the Congress party from giving support to the Farakka
Project. However, the discrimination by the central government
against the state has also been noted. Clearly West Bengal MPs did
not have great influence at the centre. How, in that case, did they
persuade the government to sanction the project?
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There is evidence of the meeting, in March 1959) of an ad hoc caucus
of Congress MPs representing constituencies all over North East India.
They decided to use their combined influence to get the project
sanctioned. The Statesman reported:
'A meeting of Congress MPs called today to discuss the
Calcutta Port problem came to the conclusion that top
priority should be given to the Farakka Barrage to
.enable big ships to continue to come to Calcutta Port.
MPs from eastern Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Assam,
Orissa, Manipur, Tripura, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands
were present. Members expressed concern at the increasing
salinity of the waters of the Bhagirathi River. It was
felt that this problem as also the construction of the
Sone Bund and the Rihand Barrage should be examined in
relation to the entire region. It was generally agreed
that members should try to impress upon the Government
to take steps to 'save' Calcutta Port and to make efforts
for the proper utilisation of water resources for the
region.' (25)
A pressure group of MPs had been formed. Their constituents shared a
common interest in the well-being of Calcutta Port: all the states
mentioned are served in one way or another by the port. However,
the group is not quite so straightforward as that. Two of the states,
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, also have a conflicting interest in the
waters of the Ganges. These two states are part of the powerful
group of North Indian states, known more recently as the 'Hindi belt',
whose interests have dominated most Congress Governments of India.
The inclusion of MPs from these two states increases the influence of
the caucus considerably. The two projects mentioned in addition
to Farakka (the Sone Bund and the Rihand Barrage) are projects
specifically benefitting Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. A plausible
hypothesis can therefore be constructed, suggesting that these two
projects were added as enticements for two states whose political
backing was important, but whose interests were, to some extent, in
conflict with the needs of the Farakka Project.
A DIVERSION?
The Farakka Barrage was constructed to divert water into the Bhagirathi.
At the same time, it may have been a diversion, a distraction, from
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the historically significant issues in the sharing of the waters of
the Ganges. In the twenty years since the Indian Government decided
to build the project, the demand for irrigation water has risen
dramatically. Perhaps if the issues could be presented all over
again, an Indian Government would now decide that the demands of
agriculture should take precedence over those of industry and commerce.
In these final paragraphs of Part I, the circumstances in which the
Farakka Project was conceived and sanctioned are summarised, questions
which this account raises are identified, and the possibility that
the project is now, or soon will be, a 'white elephant' is discussed.
The history of the Farakka Barrage starts in the middle of the
Nineteenth Century. From about 1853i f°r almost one hundred years,
there was an intermittent controversy amongst experts concerning
the deterioration of the Hooghly. That controversy was effectively
ended in 1952, when the Man Singh Committee presented fairly
conclusive evidence of deterioration. Several participants in this
debate had a marked preference for headwater control as a means of
restoring the Hooghly i_f its decline should be proven. They ov/ed
this preference to the insights provided by a 'flushing' model of
sedimentation in the Hooghly.
Between 1952 and 1958, the focus of the history moves to the Indian
parliament. In this period, West Bengal MPs succeeded in changing
the central government's perception of the project, from that of a
state preoccupation to being a national priority. In 19571 Hensen
was consulted and provided his seal of approval. He embraced the
traditional 'flushing' theory of sedimentation in the Hooghly so
his view coincided with the main current of Indian expert advice.
In 1958, Framji made a final technical assessment of the project in
which he dismissed alternatives and gave a sanguine assessment of
the project's 'side-effects'. The history of the project over the
next three years is obscured by government secrecy. The project was
considered and approved by a series of governmental organisations
from the Ministries of Finance and External Affairs to the Indian
Cabinet. Their deliberations are confidential, but some of the
circumstances which contributed to their decisions can be identified.
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With hindsight it can be seen that the technical rationale for the
Farakka Project was inadequate. The setting up of the Hydraulic
Study Department and its immediate investigation of matters central
to the understanding of sedimentation in the Hooghly, when seen in
conjunction with the technical scepticism of Ippen and Wicker, suggest
that the primary consequences of the project were not fully understood.
The presence of a number of economic and political pressures for a
rapid solution to the problem of the Hooghly explains why an inadequate
technical rationale was accepted and the project approved.
In 1959) as in 1853) business interests provided the main pressure
for government action. The profitability of shipping, industrial
and commercial ventures was threatened simultaneously by the
shallowing of the Hooghly and the deepening of the average draught of
international shipping. MPs and the Chief Minister of West Bengal
acted as intermediaries communicating this pressure to the central
government. In order to obtain the support of MPs from more
influential states, MPs from West Bengal appear to have entered into
a bargain in which they supported projects in nearby states, in
return for the support of MPs whose interest in Farakka was slight
or even contradictory.
West Bengal MPs were not only acting in response to the demands of
the Chambers of Commerce. There were political factors which
reinforced those demands. The continuing underdevelopment of West
Bengal provided good reason why they should seek, and be seen to be
seeking, large scale central government investment in the state. The
Farakka Barrage was, however, more than that. It was a useful
panacea for the economic decline of the state, and one which did
not threaten the cross-class alliance fundamental to the politics
of the Congress party. Social or political programmes to rehabilitate
the economy might have exposed the political base of the party.
The advantage of maintaining party unity could also have arisen from
the implementation of other technical programmes, but the main
alternatives to the Farakka Barrage would have roused political
opposition. The Farakka Project was a proposal for which public
support already existed, whereas dredging of the Hooghly had been
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carried out for many years, and was seen to be failing. An
alternative port could not be suggested without raising the support-
withering spectres of unemployment and wasted investments. Kapil
Bhattacharya's suggestion could only be implemented against the
opposition of the Damodar Valley Corporation and its industrial and
agricultural beneficiaries. The two ship canal schemes also
threatened industrial developments and, in addition, a fairly clear
technical objection could be raised against them. Finally the
secondary benefits of the Farakka Project, salinity control, inland
navigation and a strategic bridge across the Ganges, would not have
accrued from any of the alternative projects. All these factors
contribute selective considerations which may have made up for the
project's unsatisfactory technical rationale.
This choice between alternative projects, on political grounds, is
only plausible if the Government of Pakistan and the interests of the
people of East Bengal were effectively unrepresented in Calcutta and
Delhi. If sePious account had been taken of the Pakistan Government's
objections to the project, and of the damage it could do to East
Bengal, it is unlikely that the same choice would have been made.
As I wrote at the start of this chapter, it cannot be pretended that
this account provides a complete answer to the questions: who, why,
when and how was the decision taken to build the Farakka Project?
The history of the project can be followed in the public record up
to 1958, after that the trail becomes blurred because governments
are wary of releasing information about a sensitive subject. Amongst
the questions which remain to be answered by further research are
these:
Was Framji's study the only investigation into Pakistan's
interest in the project?
What role was played by the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs, particularly in estimating the reaction of
Pakistan?
Was the Farakka Project rejected by foreign funding
agencies?
Were Indian experts aware of the technical ambiguity to
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which Ippen and Wicker drew attention? If so, how had
they satisfied themselves that salinity effects were
insignificant?
With the benefit of twenty years of hindsight, the decision to approve
the project looks ill-judged. Quite apart from the international
dispute which followed in the wake of the decision, and whether or
not 'the project achieves what is expected of it, continuing economic
trends in shipping and in the development of irrigated agriculture
leave the project ill-suited to the needs of India in the 1980s.
The average draught of the world's merchant fleet has continued to
rise since 1961. Even the rejuvenation of the Hooghly to the
extent that it can normally expect to accept ships of 26-28 ft
draught, will only make Calcutta Port accessible to a small percentage
of sea-going ships. It seems most probable that the future of
Calcutta Port is as a feeder port for Haldia and as an inland
trading centre, not as an international maritime port.
The Government of India is generally coy about issuing statistics
which indicate the trend of consumptive water use in the Ganges
Basin. Irrigation development is invariably measured by the area
irrigated not by the volume of water consumed. It is therefore
difficult to compare the water used by Calcutta Port with the needs
of agriculture in India or Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the Indian
Government has indicated the extent of the overall shortage of water
in the Ganges Basin by a comparison which shows that whereas
intensive irrigation requires a depth of water of 1.2 m/yr, the
annual flow of the Ganges distributed over the basin would provide
only 0.57m (26). This gives only an approximate indication of
water shortage. Read in conjunction with an Indian estimate that
the entire low season flow of the Ganges could be consumed by
irrigation within fifteen years (27), it does provide a measure of
the scarcity of Ganges water. It may be that India and Bangladesh
will agree to build engineering works to increase the dry season
flow in the Ganges (this question is discussed in Part IV of this
thesis). Even then, it is likely that the demands of Calcutta Port
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will be competing with the needs of irrigated agriculture for scarce
water. In the context of using Ganges water to combtt saline
intrusion in Bangladesh, Indian spokesmen have argued that it is
wasteful to allow water to flow into the sea. By the same
argument, it is wasteful to use scarce, dry season water in flushing
Calcutta Port (28).
The case for saying the Farakka Barrage is a 'white elephant' is
not conclusive, but it is sufficient to raise doubts about the
priority of the project, its appropriateness to the needs of India.
Calcutta Port may be dying anyway, and the water may be required more
urgently elsewhere.
The Farakka Barrage Project initiated the dispute about the sharing
of the Ganges. It set the stage and chose the actors for the start
of the dispute. In the early years, it was also the focus of the
argument. Nevertheless, the project is not the central issue of the
argument. This is the fact that there is insufficient water in the
dry season for the needs of both countries. In the next section of
this thesis, Part II, a history of the conflict which arose from
this scarcity is presented.
II
A DISPUTE
Was there any point when the Indian Government could have
acted differently so that the dispute could be settled?:
'There may have been. Things took place so
fast. We had so many problems.'
- Mrs Indira Gandhi, author's
interview, September 26, 1978.
II
INTRODUCTION
This part of the thesis presents the first detailed history of the
conflict between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh over the sharing of
the water of the Ganges. The dispute arose from the construction of
the Farakka Barrage, but that was only the immediate cause. At root
the conflict occurs because there is insufficient water, for the
needs of both countries, in the river during the dry season.
Conflict over the division of the water started in 19^7 and is
continuing at the time of writing. Some of the subsidiary issues
within the conflict have, however, been resolved. The dispute can
therefore be divided into a number of phases, or subsidiary disputes,
corresponding to the main concerns of the parties. Three phases can
be identified'as follows:
Period Main issue
1951 - ^97'' Riparian rights and the
Farakka Project
1971 - 1977 Division of the existing dry
season flow
1977 - to date Augmentation of the dry
season flow.
It will become clear in Chapter 9 and in Part IV that a fourth phase
concerned with the overall development and management of the Ganges
may be emerging at the present.
The selection of historically significant facts is a subjective
process. In this case my selection has been guided by three
primary objectives:
(i) to identify underlying government strategies and
tactics in the conflict,
85
(ii) to identify opportunities for its resolution which
were missed, and
(iii) to attempt to explain why these opportunities were
missed and why at other times the resolution of
elements of the dispute was possible.
The negotiation and dispute over the sharing of the Ganges did not
take place in a political vacuum. No evidence has emerged of a
direct link between this issue and other bones of contention between
the parties concerned, although assertions of such linkage are not
uncommon. There is, however, a general connection between the
'state of relations' between the concerned nations and the progress
of the conflict. This general relationship can be seen in Figure
II. 1.
The 'state of relations' between two nations is an ill-defined,
aggregated concept including the decisions of a variety of
governmental organisations and the perceptions and interactions of
many individuals. However, in this case, the chart of bilateral
relations is used only to draw attention to two 'windows' of
cordiality, the existence of which is confirmed by participants in
the conflict. The windows in 1969 and 197''~71 indicate missed
opportunities which will be investigated in these chapters.
In all, there are four main landmarks in the conflict which need to
be investigated. There are the two 'windows' in i960 and 1972-1975i
and two partial resolutions of the conflict, in 1971, when the
question of riparian rights was set aside, and in 19771 when a
division of the existing dry season flow was negotiated. These four
landmarks are described and discussed in the chronological order of
this section.
The main points I intend to draw from this account are these. Until
1971 India conducted a policy of procrastination in the conflict over
the Ganges. Under this policy technical 'talks' with Pakistan were
occasionally permitted, but not political 'negotiations' (1). This
policy was effective in defusing Pakistan's opposition to the Farakka
Project while it was under construction.
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Between 1972 and 1975 Bangladesh failed to prosecute the negotiations
with diligence, possibly as a result of an internal power struggle
within the Bangladesh Government. But, in 19771 after Bangladesh
had suffered a virtual defeat at the United Nations, the newly-
elected Janata Party Government of India made a calculated sacrifice
of India's interests in order to resolve the immediate issue of
sharing the dry season flow.
The chapters in Part II each cover a particular period, as follows:
Chapter Title Period
5 Partition and after 19*+7 - 1961
6 The Indian position and the
Pakistan response 1961 - 1971
7 The Sheik and Mrs Gandhi 197*1 - 197*+
8 Arrival and departure 197*+ - 1976
9 The Ganges Waters Treaty 1977 - 1980
« Within each of these chapters there is first a section setting out
the events in chronological sequence. This section is predominantly
based on documentary evidence. It is followed by one or more sections
in which questions raised by consideration of the events are explored.
In these sections material from my interviews with participants^in





On the night of August 15th 19^7i British imperial rule in India
ended. Out of British India emerged two independent states, Pakistan
and India. This partition and the manner of its doing has reverberated
through the subsequent history of the subcontinent. The origins,
meaning and consequences of Partition are still, thirty years later,
controversial questions. This study is not concerned with that
controversy, whether the event was the culmination of a British
policy of 'divide and rule' or, alternatively, whether Mountbatten
made the best of an intrinsically difficult situation. This study is
concerned with the minutiae of the event because in the midst of the
struggles for territory can be found the first political dispute
over the Farakka Barrage.
Before India and Pakistan existed, but only by a few weeks, lawyers
acting for the fledgling states had crossed swords in a tussle for
territory which would allow the victor to control the Ganges. This
tussle, out of which the new state of India gained the District of
Murshidabad and the site for the Farakka Barrage, was only a slight
murmur almost lost in the hubbub of historic events. But it is
here that a narrative of the Farakka dispute must start.
The narrative continues in this chapter up to India's decision to
build the Barrage. Through the 1950s, the Government of Pakistan
regularly protested against India's proposed project and, until i960,
India generally responded that no decision had yet been taken on the
project. In i960, the first of a decade of intermittent technical
exchanges took place, and in 1961. there was a brief meeting between
Prime Minister Nehru of India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan.
This chapter will show that two Indian assertions, one minor and one
important, about the history of the conflict are incorrect. First,
it is stated that India was awarded Murshidabad District because
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the Farakka Barrage was considered essential (1). We shall see that
the partition award was more complex than that, and that this attempt
to find support for the project is misplaced.
A second claim made by the Indian Government is more important. If
dispute and conflict are to be avoided in the development of any
shared resource, negotiation, or at the least consultation, is
required between the parties concerned. The following paragraph
outlines the Indian Government's claim that consultations took place:
'Throughout the period of technical studies, planning
and actual construction of the Farakka Barrage India held
extensive consultations first with the Government of
Pakistan and then with the Government of Bangladesh to
ensure that the reasonable requirements of water of
East Bengal and later Bangladesh were duly taken into
account.' (2)
This chapter documents the political and technical contacts between
Pakistan and India during 'the period of technical studies and
planning'. It will be seen that no political discussions took place
prior to India's formal announcement that the Farakka Barrage was to
be built. . The technical exchanges which did take place were brief,
formal exchanges of data difficult to describe as 'extensive
consultations'.
The nature of political and technical contacts between the Governments
of India and Pakistan must be established if the conflict is to be
fully understood. It is argued in this chapter and the next that
the Farakka Barrage was a unilateral act of the Indian Government.
It was the Indian policy to enter into talks which had the appearance
of negotiations or consultations, but the Indian Government did not
give consideration to the objections and alternative courses of
action raised by Pakistan.
At the end of the period covered by this chapter Nehru and Ayub Khan
met and discussed the Ganges conflict. The imprecise and verbal
agreement which they reached at that meeting was the only agreement
on this subject made between India and Pakistan. In Chapter 6 it
will be seen that even this agreement was, in practice, flouted by
India with impunity.
Before the Nehru-Ayub meeting in March 1961, there was a 'window' in
the relations between India and Pakistan. A period of amicability
occurred in which genuine negotiations might have been possible.
This opportunity was neglected; the reasons why are here explored.
Partition
'The root of [ the disputes between India and Pakistan],' Rajeshwar
Dayal, a former Foreign Secretary of India, told me 'was the manner
in which Partition was carried out' (3)- Or, as an American scholar
put it, 'On the face of it, it would certainly seem that Partition
could have been accomplished in a less hasty and less violent manner;
that the boundaries could have been drawn more carefully had six
months been allowed instead of six weeks...' (k). Since the first
murmur of the Farakka dispute took place during the hearings of the
Bengal Boundary Commission, it may be useful to establish how those
hearings came to be carried on with such haste.
Though it has been justified after the event, the real reason for the
unse-emly haste does seem to be a spur-of-the-moment decision taken
by Mountbatten. It is certainly correct to note that all three
parties to the Partition - the Congress, the Muslim League and the
British Government - were agreed that a speedy transition was
necessary. But, as far as the British Government was concerned, on
June 3rd) this was expressed as a willingness 'to anticipate the date
of June 19^8' (5). The following day, Mountbatten foreshortened
this anticipation from twelve months to ten weeks. 'I think the
transfer could be about the 15th of August', he is reported to have
said (6). More recently, Mountbatten himself has described the
occasion. It was at a press conference and the very last question
put to Mountbatten was, when will transfer take place? Mountbatten
says that until that point he had not had time to consider when it
would be. He, 'did some very quick thinking' and 'settled on the
15th of August' because it was the second anniversary of the surrender
of Japan (in which Mountbatten had played a part), and it seemed
a suitable occasion (7)- British historians have taken pains to
stress that all parties were associated with the decision for a
rapid partition (8), but they were, not consulted about the exact
date until after Mountbatten had made his public announcement.
One of the consequences of Mountbatten1s haste, and the acquiescence
of Nehru and Jinnah, was that by the time all the formalities had
been completed less than a month was left for the crucial work of
dividing the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab (9)- This work fell
to a British barrister, Sir (later Lord) Cyril Radcliffe, who was
chosen to chair two Boundary Commissions, one for the East and one
for the West, each made up of four judges chosen by the contending
parties. Arrangements were made for the Boundary Commissions to
hold public sessions at which evidence concerning the boundary and
territory of the new states could be presented. Radcliffe did not
attend these hearings but made arrangements to read each day's
transcripts.
The Bengal Boundary Commission met in Calcutta and held public
hearings for eight days at the end of July. In subsequent discussions
the four judges partitioned themselves according to their communal
loyalties and they were, therefore, unable to agree on a partition
of Bengal. Radcliffe, as a result, 'had no alternative but to proceed
to give my own decision' (10).
The Bengal Boundary Commission was: ,
'instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts
of Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous areas
of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also
take into account other factors.' (11)
The main cases presented to the Commission were from counsel
representing the Congress, the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha and
the New Bengal Association on the one hand, and representing the
Muslim League, on the other. (The territorial claims of the Congress
and the Muslim League are shown in Figure 5-1•) The 'other
factors' tagged on to the terms of reference allowed a very wide
range of evidence to be put. The complexity of the evidence is
reflected in the two long and detailed reports written by the judges
Figure 5»1- Map of Bengal and Assam showing the
District boundaries in 19^7i the Congress
claim, the Muslim League claim and
Radcliffe's Award.
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at the end- of July (12). The Muslim and Non-Muslim judges were able
to agree that twelve of the Districts involved could be assigned to
one or other state, but on the remaining fifteen Districts there was
dispute. For the Presidency Division and one District within it,
Murshidabad District, the dispute was focussed primarily on the
River Bhagirathi-Hooghly and its role.
According to the two Muslim judges, the Hindu Mahasabha told the
Commission that control of the river system of the Presidency Division:
'should be vested in West Bengal authorities in order that
they might maintain the Port of Calcutta in a satisfactory
and workable condition. It is maintained that the Port
of Calcutta depends for its existence on a well-regulated
flow of water in the Hooghly...' (13)
But, the Muslim judges noted, 'there seems to be a conflict of expert
opinions on these points'. They cited, and included as annexures to
their report, .expert opinion opposed to the barrage proposal. The
two judges came to the conclusion that there had been 'no progressive
deterioration in the Hooghly as the navigable outlet for the trade
of Calcutta', and 'we cannot, therefore, accede to the view that
retention of the Nadia river system as an integral unit for the
benefit of the Port of Calcutta, is a compelling factor which would
justify the inclusion of a large Muslim majority area in West Bengal'
(1^-). These two judges argued that the Bhagirathi-Hooghly provided
the most satisfactory line between the two parts of Bengal.
The other two, non-Muslim, members of the Commission took a different
position and selected different experts to support their position.
They wrote:
'We are conscious of the fact that in the district of
Murshidabad only the Kandi sub-division and all the
police-stations comprised within it have a non-Muslim
majority...But as the question of having the head-waters
of the river Hooghly is a matter of vital importance to
the existence of Bengal and its capital, we think that
this is an overriding factor to which the principle of
contiguity and majority of population ought to be
subordinat ed.' (15)
9^
The non-Muslim judges did not, it should be noted, express an opinion
on the barrage project itself. 'Whether a barrage is to be
constructed, or dredging has to be resorted to', they wrote, 'it is
not pertinent for us to discuss for our present purpose. It is
necessary that some means or other should be found by which an
appreciable portion of the Ganges flood can be induced to pass through
these three Nadia rivers in preference to the Padma...' (16).
It is established that, as far as the four members of the Boundary
Commission were concerned, the allocation of this one district turned
on the importance of the Hooghly for Calcutta. Radcliffe, the final
arbiter, however, extracted from the mass of detail, of which the
issue described above is only one of many, seven 'basic questions'.
Two of these questions are directly relevant to this issue:
'(1) To which State was the City of Calcutta to be
assigned, or was it possible to adopt any method of
dividing the city between two States?
'(2) If the City of Calcutta must be assigned as a whole
to one or other of the States, what were its indispensable
claims to the control of territory, such as all or part
of the Nadia river system or the Kulti rivers, upon which
the life of Calcutta as a city and port depended? (17)
On the basis of his own answers to these questions, Radcliffe made
his decision. This boundary is shown in Figure 5-1- Radcliffe
refrained from justifying his decision (18); explanation has to
come from his basic questions and the line itself.
There is however one official interpretation of Radcliffe's line.
This is a document prepared for the India and Burma Committee of
the British Cabinet. It was issued over the initials of Arthur
Henderson, Minister for Commonwealth Relations. The relevant section
reads as follows:
'(b) In the Presidency Division, the Murshidabad
District (containing 927i7'+7 Moslems and 6^8,987 Hindus)
goes from East to West Bengal and the Nadia and Jessore
Districts are both divided between the two Provinces
instead of going entirely to East Bengal. These changes
are designed to leave to West Bengal control over Calcutta's
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river system. The Kulna [ sic ] District on the other
hand (containing 977^693 Hindus and 959^172 Moslems)
goes from West Bengal to East Bengal because its
communications with the latter are easier.' (19)
The Indian Government have recently claimed that Radcliffe 'considered
Farakka so important for the Port of Calcutta' that he 'awarded the
district of Murshidabad...to India in exchange for...Khulna' (20).
This assertion lends a somewhat spurious legitimacy to the Farakka
Project. Radcliffe's question and the British Cabinet interpretation
sustain the view that as far as Murshidabad District was concerned
the 'indispensable claim' of Calcutta for control of the river system
over-rode the marginal Muslim majority. But Radcliffe was without
independent advice on technical matters and short of time, so it is
most unlikely that he considered the case for the Farakka Project
proven. What Radcliffe did was to provide India with an option to
control the intake into the Bhagirathi from the Ganga. In fact
Radcliffe's award has a subtlety which has eluded the Indian
Government and which belies the Indian assertion quoted above.
During the debates before the Bengal Boundary Commission, the
territory in question was that through which flowed the offtakes of
the-Nadia Rivers. It is probable that the actual site for a barrage
had not then been chosen. Certainly Farakka is not mentioned in the
reports of the commission members nor in contemporary newspaper
reports. Dr K L Rao, an engineer and the Irrigation Minister during
the period of construction of the Farakka Barrage, told me, 'If
Radcliffe could have given 10-20 miles more, there would have been
no need for the feeder canal, the barrage could have been sited at
Lalgula' (21). (Lalgula, Farakka and the Radcliffe line are shown
in Figure 5-2.) Radcliffe did award the Nadia offtakes to India
but he drew a line down the centre of the Ganges. If a barrage had
been constructed at the offtake of any one of the three Nadia Rivers,
half of the barrage and one abutment would have been within Pakistan
territory. Radcliffe partitioned the Distict of Malda, drawing a
line which joined the River Ganges just upstream of the Bhagirathi
offtake. It is possible that he drew the line in this way in an


































Figure5*2:MapofarakkaPr jectshowingRadcliffe'sbound y,theBhag rathiofftakanLalgol . Source:India,PreservationfthePorCalcut a,D lh1961.
might choose to build. (India avoided such joint control by choosing
a site further upstream and building a 23-mile long feeder canal.)
There can be no certainty that this was Radcliffe's intention but
his line is capable of such an interpretation.
The partition of the Punjab also involved the division of a river
system and a network of. irrigation canals. In his Award for the
Punjab, Radcliffe wrote:
'I think it only right to express the hope that, where
the drawing of the boundary line cannot avoid
disrupting such unitary services as canal irrigation,
railways, and electric power transmission, a solution
may be found by agreement between the two States, for
some joint control over what has hitherto been a
valuable common service.' (22)
When earlier he had suggested that the Punjab water system should be
run as a joint venture by the two countries, 'He was rewarded for
hii suggestion by a joint Muslim-Hindu rebuke,' wrote Mosley:
'Jinnah told him to get on with his job and inferred
that he would rather have Pakistan deserts than
fertile fields by courtesy of Hindus. Nehru curtly
informed him v/hat India did with India's rivers was
India's affair.' (23)
The sharing of the Indus Rivers was a subject of dispute between
India and Pakistan from 19^+8 to i960, when rights to the use of the
water were established. A historian of the Indus dispute has argued
that the dispute might have been avoided if Radcliffe's line in
the Punjab had bisected the barrage at Ferozepur (on the Sutlej River)
instead of skirting it and giving control of the river to India.
He writes:
'Such an arrangement would have forced the parties to
cooperate from the start and might have set a precedent
that would have obviated the need to partition and
divorce the Indus Rivers in i960.' (2<+)
It is possible that a similar idea was in Radcliffe's mind when he
drew the boundary partitioning Bengal.
Early protests
After the Indian Government's victory in the first round of the
dispute in 19^7, nothing more was publicly heard until 195''•
that year, Indian newspaper reports on the Ganges Barrage Project
prompted a protest from the Pakistan Government. In a note dated
October 19 1951i Pakistan expressed concern and demanded consultation
before schemes prejudicial to Pakistan's interests were implemented.
The Indian Government's reply, on March 8 1952, was that the project
was at a preliminary stage and Pakistan's apprehensions were therefore
'purely hypothetical'. The note did, however, suggest co-operation.
A further protest from Pakistan in May 1952, was not replied to until
the following May, when India repeated the undertaking of co-operation
but the co-operation 'would have to be reciprocal'. This was a
request for information on Pakistan's Ganges-Kobadak irrigation
project, a project which would suffer from Farakka diversions but
which could not influence conditions in India because it was
downstream of'India and incapable of causing changes upstream. In
195^1 Pakistan supplied information on the Ganges-Kobadak Project.
At this point, India had supplied no information on the proposed
Ganges Barrage, but there was a suggestion of general co-operation
on flood control for the Ganges and Brahmaputra basins. In Hay 1955,
the Pakistan Government took up this suggestion by proposing a joint
survey of the upper reaches of the two rivers. India's reply, in
February 1956, advised Pakistan to set up its own flood control
commission on the model of those set up in India (25).
The first suggestion of arbitration in this dispute came from the
Pakistan Government in 1957- They proposed that (i) a United Nations
technical programme should be asked to assist in the development of
the eastern river system; (ii) the projects in both countries should
be examined jointly by experts from both countries before
implementation; and (ii) the UN Secretary General should be asked to
appoint an engineer to participate in experts' meetings (26).
According to Bangladesh, India rejected all three proposals.
But, from the correspondence surrounding Pakistan's proposal emerged
a rather limited agreement for a technical information exchange. The
grudging manner in which India conceded even this small step can be
gauged from the statement made by .the Indian Minister of Irrigation
and Power to the Lok Sabha:
'...Government of India have agreed to a meeting of
experts of India and Pakistan for the limited purpose of
discussing procedural details and arrangements for
exchange of information.' (27)
It was not until June i960 that the first meetings of technical
experts took place. By this time Nehru had already sent assurances
to the Chief Minister of West Bengal that the Farakka Project would
be constructed, but Pakistan had not been formally informed of this
intention.
The first technical exchanges
During the first meeting of technical experts from India and Pakistan,
India did not 'present information on the Farakka Project. According
to a list held by the Bangladesh Government (28), India supplied only
a note on the Tista Project, a barrage to be built across the Tista
River in the North of West Bengal. It was not until October 1960,
when the experts met in Dacca, that a 'Project report for the
preservation of the Port of Calcutta' was provided for the Pakistan
Government. In addition a record of River Ganges flows between 19^8
and i960 was supplied and some more information on the River Tista.
The meetings, though they took several days in each case, were
apparently confined to an exchange of data (29) and it would seem
that the information was of a fairly rudimentary nature. Subsequent
meetings of technical experts held in 1961, 19&2 and 1968 were
somewhat similar.
Nehru-Ayub agreement
In March 1961, after Pakistan had been informed that the Project was
going ahead, the first meeting of the political representatives of
the States took place. Even then it was not a meeting arranged to
discuss this matter, but an informal conversation which briefly
touched upon the Farakka issue. Prime Minister Nehru and President
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Ayub Khan were in London for the Commonwealth Prime Minister's
Conference and they met to discuss a number of topics.
Ayub and Nehru had met in September 1959- That meeting was described
at the time as 'friendly'; more recently it has been described as
'a disaster' (30). A year later, the two leaders met to sign the
Indus Waters Treaty. Their meeting in London appears to have
followed the more productive precedent of this second meeting. Nehru
described the discussion some months later, in a speech to the Indian
Parliament. Nehru said that he had suggested to the Pakistan
President that Pakistan and India co-operate over the Farakka Project.
He had said to Ayub Khan, 'Let us do it in such a way as to benefit
each other...and let us decide this at ministerial level...'. Nehru
recounted how they had agreed that there should be a meeting of
ministers but that this could only be fruitful if the facts had first
been gathered. For that reason engineers of the two countries had
met twice already. Nehru went on to say:
'I hope that after the next meeting, which is going to
take place fairly soon, both parties would be in
possession of these facts. Then the time will come,
if it is considered necessary, for ministers on both
sides to meet and discuss, that is, not to allow matters
to be dealt with by officials who cannot decide things.' (31)
There was no written agreement and, within a month or two of the
understanding being reached, there was disagreement over its
interpretation. This was, however, the only agreement between
India and Pakistan concerning the Farakka Barrage, and it laid the
guidelines for the dispute throughout the 1960s until, in 1971,
Bangladesh was formed.
An opportunity missed?
Between 19^7 and 1961, there were two periods when relations between
the Governments of India and Pakistan were such that progress might
have been made on the Farakka question. In 1953? soon after the
appointment of Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Nehru and he entered into direct negotiations over Kashmir. But at
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this time, the dispute on the River Ganges was no more that a shimmer
on the horizon and the issue was not raised.
A much more promising, and in the context of this dispute much more
timely, 'window' in Indo-Pakistan relations occurred between 1958 and
1960. This window started soon after Ayub Khan took power in Pakistan
in 1958 and ended in the first months of 1961 as progress ground
to a halt in the negotiations over several areas of dispute between
India and Pakistan.
The two lasting achievements of this period are the demarcation of
most of the border between India and Pakistan and the negotiation
of the Indus Water Treaty.
Soon after Ayub took power, he met the Indian High Commissioner to
Pakistan to discuss the demarcation of the Indo-Pakistan boundary.
Radcliffe had drawn a line, but the line had not till then been marked
on the ground: Out of this meeting came agreement to enter into
formal negotiations, and from a year of formal negotiations emerged
agreement on demarcation of almost all of the boundary. One area
where agreement was not reached was the Rann of Kutch. Rajeshwar
Dayal, who was Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan at the time, told
me:
'Supposing Kutch had been taken up. There were problems.
Pakistan was making some claims, challenging the boundary
on the basis of administrative practices. There were
points for negotiation but putting it off lost the
momentum generated by the overall boundary settlement. I
pressed the Ministry very hard. If we had pushed the
Pakistanis, they couldn't have said no to discussions in
the same spirit. When the overall negotiations were
taking place, Pakistan said they had certain claims on
Kutch. Our people, not Nehru, the official advisers in
the Foreign Office, they somehow let the thing drop. I
don't think there was any motive, just a disinclination
to get involved in another long negotiation.' (32)
The first of the two Indo-Pakistani wars of 19&5 was fought over the
Rann of Kutch.
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Rajeshwar Dayal also thinks that at this time it might have been
possible to negotiate a cooperative division of the Ganges:
'...my own feeling is that in the early years of Ayub's
time when agreements were being made, then perhaps we
could have reached agreement on Farakka but we had
already started our work by that time.' (33)
Dayal's recollection is incorrect. Work had not started on Farakka
at that time; construction did not start till 19^3/^ and a final
decision on the Project was not announced until 1961, but in 1959
the strength of feeling behind the Project must have made it
difficult to postpone or cancel.
The negotiations which led up to the Indus Waters Treaty took much
longer than those over the boundary demarcation but again they
provided both a precedent and a momentum for a quick settlement of
the rapidly growing Farakka dispute. Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar
has reported that there were indications that Pakistan was aware of
the opportunity:
'In a communication of New Delhi, Dayal also drew New
.Delhi's attention to indications in Government circles
in Pakistan that it would extend the principle of sharing
waters, as agreed upon in the Indus Waters Treaty, to
the Ganga Basin. Dayal warned that India should never
agree to Pakistan's claim to the waters of the Ganga
as a riparian State...' (3*0
Commenting on this, Dayal has said:
'My attitude in regard to India and Pakistan relations
generally was that I felt the problems very rapidly
became psychological and, if not tackled promptly,
assumed almost unmanageable proportions. Where there
is tension and lack of trust even a minute problem
becomes a major hurdle if not dealt with immediately.
I said this [ to New Delhi ] in explanation of a large
number of problems which had become major since
Partition.' (35)
So, what happened to Dayal's recommendation? Nothing came of it.
The Indian Government decided not to pursue the matter further.
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Perhaps, as with the Rann of Kutch, there was a 'disinclination to
get involved in another long negotiation'. It is more likely that
there was a substantive reason. This may be the first occasion when
India refrained from entering into formal negotiations with Pakistan
because to do so would recognise Pakistan's locus standi in the
matter. It was certainly not the last such occasion.
India has maintained for much of the dispute, that the Ganges is not
an 'international river'. To have entered negotiations with Pakistan
would have been a denial of this line of argument, Possibly this is
an example of the comment attributed to Nehru, 'what India did with
India's rivers was India's business'. Certainly, at this time the
Indian Government's approach was that they would be willing to talk
to Pakistan, but the word negotiate, or any other indication that
Pakistan might have rights to the water, was noticeably absent from
Indian statement. This, for example, is from Nehru's speech, quoted
earlier, to the Lok Sabha:
'...our approach to the Farakka Project is that we do
not wish in any way to harm the interests of East Pakistan
in this, and we shall try to adhere to that to the best
of our ability. We are certainly prepared to talk to
them about the whole area or about other schemes that they
may have and we may have on the basis of the information
gathered.' (36)
By the time Nehru made his statement, the cordiality had evaporated
from his dealings with Ayub Khan and from the relations between the
two governments. The window in Indo-Pakistan relations had been
shuttered, and Nekm's attention was being turned toward the North
and relations with the Chinese.
CONCLUSIONS
Radcliffe's decision in 19^7 to award Murshidabad to India followed
from his assessment that the headwaters of the Hooghly should be
given to the state which included Calcutta. The Government of India
is, however, mistaken in interpreting this as support for a particular
project. Radcliffe's decision to divide Malda District is difficult
10*t
to interpret but there is a suspicion that he intended to enforce
inter-government cooperation if a.barrage should be built in that
reach of the Ganges.
In the succeeding ten years such cooperation was denied to Pakistan.
The Indian Government's assertion that consultations took place is
mistaken. Only formal data exchanges ocurred. The first political
meeting took place in March 19611 after approval had been given to
the Farakka Barrage. Neither in the 1950s, nor, as we shall see
in the next chapter, in the 1960s did the Indian Government permit
substantive negotiations.
An opportunity for negotiation occurred in i960. The Indian High
Commissioner to Pakistan informed his government that Pakistan was
willing to negotiate but he got no response. This was an auspicious
time for negotiations; other issues had been resolved, and the formal
announcement of the Farakka Project had not yet been made. We do not
know why this' opportunity was neglected but we may speculate that in
i960 the Indian Government had already decided upon a strategy of
procrastination in order to construct the Farakka Project as it was
designed, without any concessions to Pakistan.
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Chapter Six
THE INDIAN POSITION AND
THE PAKISTAN RESPONSE
Between 1961 and 1971 > little progress was made in the Farakka
dispute. In 1961, the Government of India formally told Pakistan
that construction had started. In the same year, President Ayub
Khan and Prime Minister Nehru struck a nebulous agreement to
cooperate. Vague though it was, that verbal agreement was the only
one to be made on this subject between the governments of India and
Pakistan. Frequently throughout the sixties the Pakistan Government
despatched protests to India and, on occasion, the two sides met
for discussions on the technical aspect of the dispute. In the late
sixties, Pakistan increased the force of its protests to the extent
that they included a semi-covert threat to retaliate by flooding large
parts of V/est'Bengal. Neither the protests nor the threat of
retaliation influenced either the construction of the Barrage or the
Indian Government's attitude to the needs of Pakistan. The Farakka
Project was constructed with great haste and the needs of Pakistan
were determined by India according to that government's unilateral
and paternal interpretation.
At no point in this decade were relations between the two governments
as promising as they had been at the end of the fifties. The decade
was dominated by a hostility which broke out into war in 1965- This
hostility was briefly set aside in 1969, when a settlement was reached
for the Rann of Kutch territorial dispute. But dispute over Kashmir,
the most prominent conflict between the two governments, remained.
In 1970 a vigorous movement for provincial autonomy started in East
Pakistan, and in 1971 India intervened to assist in the establishment
of an independent state, Bangladesh. India's victory in that war
established India as the dominant power in the subcontinent and
removed the Pakistan Government from involvement in the Farakka
dispute.
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In the decade 1961 - 19711 which is the subject of this chapter,
little of significance happened in the Ganges water dispute. It is
what did not happen that is important. Talks took place occasionally
between India and Pakistan, but negotiations and consultations did
not. We shall see in this chapter that the nature of these talks
was not hidden from Indian MPs. The Farakka Project was, as an
External Affairs spokesman in the Lok Sabha conceded, a 'unilateral
action'. Nehru told the parliament that work on the project was
going ahead, 'and we do not intend to stop it in any way'. The
ministerial negotiations promised in the Nehru-Ayub agreement did not
happen. There were four technical exchanges in 1961, a fifth in 1968,
and then five meetings were held at Secretarial (senior civil servant)
level between 1968 and 1970. But still there were no political
meetings. Was this protracted process what was intended by the
Nehru-Ayub agreement?
This chapter investigates the Indian Government position and the
Pakistan Government's response, in this decade, to seek an answer to
that central question. It will be argued that the Indian Government
deliberately chose a strategy of procrastination, and made repeated
requests for technical data in order to indefinitely postpone the
political negotiations promised at the Nehru-Ayub meeting. An
alternative explanation for the failure to progress toward a
settlement of the dispute has been suggested. It has been alleged
that the Pakistan Government's response in the conflict was weak
because the Government gave low priority to the interests of East
Bengal. This alternative explanation will be dismissed.
A brief section at the end of the chapter describes an attempted
international intervention in the dispute by some scientists in
the Pugwash movement. The intervention was unsuccessful in so far
as it failed to bring the parties together, but it initiated some
very interesting research on the possibilities of using ground water
storage to provide sufficient water for both countries' needs.
Table 6.1 provides a chronology of the conflict in this period.
107
Table 6.1: Chronology of the Farakka dispute, 1961-1971
1961 Jan Pakistan formally told Project going ahead
Mar Ayub-Nehru meeting in London, correspondence till June
Apr 3rd Experts meeting, Calcutta
Lok Sabha told Project will not be stopped because
of Pakistan
July Joint barrage proposal rejected by India
Aug Discussions in Lok Sabha
Dec ^fth Experts meeting, Dacca
1962 Nov Pakistan proposed ministerial meeting
1963 May Pakistan again proposed ministerial meeting
1964 Joint survey of banks of the Ganges in border area
1965 May Pakistan sends reminder on final experts meeting
Rann of Kutch war
Aug 'India agreed another Experts meeting should be held
Sep Indo-Pakistan war
1967 May Pakistan raises dispute in Water for Peace Conference, USA
Lok Sabha told of theft of Farakka plans
Oct Pakistan makes another request for Experts meeting
1968 Jan Agreement is reached that another meeting be held
May 5th Experts meeting, New Delhi
Pakistan renews pressure for a ministerial meeting
Jul Kosygin sends letter to Mrs Gandhi urging Indus-like
settlement
Sep Issue raised at the UN General Assembly by Pakistan
Dec 1st Secretaries' meeting
1969 Mar 2nd Secretaries' meeting, Islamabad, ends in deadlock
Jul 3rd Secretaries' meeting, New Delhi
1970 Feb 4th Secretaries' meeting, Islamabad
Apr Jayaprakash Narayan et al urge Indus-like settlement
Jul 5th Secretaries' meeting, New Delhi
1971 Jan Agreement to hold another meeting of Secretaries
Mar Start of Bangladesh Independence struggle




The Nehru-Ayub meeting of 1961 established an interpretation of the
dispute which has been accepted ever since: that the dispute has
two parts, one technical and the other political. That meeting also
laid down the principle that the technical points should be resolved
first, to lay the foundations for the political discussions which
would follow. Terms of reference for these technical discussions
have never been published. The wide range of topics which have
been discussed suggests that the nature of the discussions may never
have been well-defined.
Perhaps as a result of this lack of definition, there was, through
the sixties, a tension between repeated demands from Pakistan for an
upgrading of the talks and the response of the Indian Government that
more data ware required. Pakistan wanted to move on to the political
questions (presumably the sharing of the water) for which ministerial
discussions were deemed, both by Pakistan and India, appropriate;
while India stated that more data were required, primarily to
substantiate the demands that Pakistan had made for irrigation water.
From 1961 onwards, statements were made by representatives of the
Indian Government, in the Lok Sabha, which characterised the
technical discussions with Pakistan as consultations, or talks, which
would not influence either the building of the Farakka Project or the
quantities of water to be diverted for Indian needs.
In April 1961, just a few months after Pakistan had been informed
the project was going ahead, an MP asked a spokesman for the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs: Had the Government made it absolutely
clear to Pakistan that the Project 'is a matter of unilateral action
and that we will not wait for any negotiations and the project will
proceed according to schedule?'. The spokesman replied, 'Yes sir...
The work on the Project will not be stopped because of this'. Later
in the same discussion, another MP asked,
'If the Project will continue as before, may I know what
is the use of having these negotiations?1.
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The External Affairs spokesman replied:
'Negotiations are always good. It is good to talk things
over in a general way.' (1)
If the Pakistan Government retained their faith in the negotiations
after that exchange, a statement by Nehru a few months later must
have made them at least sceptical. He was asked about the protests
from Pakistan and the correspondence between himself and Ayub Khan:
'They say that this will affect their water supplies...
in East Pakistan, and nothing should be done which
affects it. This is their main argument.
'We are proceeding with the work. We have not allowed
it to be stopped or suspended and we do not intend to
stop it in any way.' (2)
Nehru explained his Government's response to Pakistan's previous
protests; Pakistan had been told that they would be 'informed' when
the Indian Government's enquiries into the Project were complete.
This had been done. Nehru also explained that it is always desirable
to 'discuss' conflict. When asked how Pakistan could be affected by
the -Project if it was only going to regulate monsoon water and not
the minimum flow, Nehru did not correct his questioner's
misunderstanding. He vaguely replied:
'It is our view that there should be no real injury
caused to Pakistan by this scheme. But I cannot answer
Hon. Members question how it can be affected. Unless
the scheme is understood it is not possible to say.
Anyhow it is Pakistan's fear and apprehension that they
will be affected.' (3)
Nehru did admit that Pakistan had asked the Indian Governement to
suspend work on the Project until their dispute had been settled.
In November of the same year, a parliamentary answer was misunderstood
by newspapers to mean that the project was being delayed or postponed.
But the Government was quick to rectify the misunderstanding:
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'Government of India had delayed the Project to take
into consideration Pakistan's reasonable interests. The
Project had been sufficiently delayed in the past to take
Pakistan's interests fully into account, but there is no
obligation or intention that there should be any further
delay.' C+)
The Pakistan Government would not have accepted this account. There
were after all no meetings between the two governments to discuss the
project prior to i960, and neither government at this time believed
that adequate data had been exchanged. The Lok Sabha was not told
when this delay had occurred.
Throughout the sixties, spokesmen for the Government of India restated
the view that India had taken Pakistan's 'reasonable interests' into
account. During this period India did listen to the Pakistan
Government's interpretation of what constituted East Pakistan's
reasonable interests, but the Indian Government had strong views on
what was and was not reasonable. When, in August 1961, the Indian
Minister of Irrigation was asked in the Lok Sabha if Pakistan's points
had been considered, he took the opportunity to say that two of East
Pakistan's irrigation schemes were not reasonable. The expansion of
the Ganges-Kobadak Project was 'only at the conception stage...Indian
engineers have serious doubts whether some of these paper schemes
are technically realistic.' Another project, the Faridpur-Barisal
Project, he thought was 'highly speculative':
'It has just been conceived, long after the construction
of the Farakka Barrage was commenced, and cannot have
the same status or equal priority with that Project.
Nor can the scheme be said to be as vital for East
Pakistan as the Farakka Barrage is for Calcutta...'
'The Government of India have informed the Government
of Pakistan of their view that the requirements of
the unreal Faridpur-Barisal scheme cannot be taken into
account...' (5)
To an extent, these Indian claims have been justified by subsequent
events. The Faridpur-Barisal scheme has not been built, and the
expansion of the Ganges-Kobadak Project has not taken place. The
reasons why these schemes have not reached fruition are more than
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simple 'unreality', though there probably was a measure of bargaining
motivating Pakistan's proposal of them in 1961- The point to be made
is that the Indian Government adopted a paternal stance to Pakistan's
claims. India had the power, and India would decide what was
reasonable. In 1968, after a technical exchange at which the
Pakistan delegation had increased their estimate of East Pakistan's
water needs, the Lok Sabha were told, 'the Indian delegation considered
these requirements prima facie untenable' (6). A few days later,
Dr K L Rao, the Irrigation Minister, commented:
'I do not think Pakistan is really serious about the
discussions when they suggest such a large volume of water.
Nobody would, normally suggest any such thing. If one is
really interested in getting something, one must make a
reasonable demand. No one goes to the extent of this
absurb exaggeration. That defeats their case itself. I
know the case. There is very little for us to feel, in
any way, about having any kind of doubt on our stand
about this issue. After all Ganga river is an Indian
river.' (7)
This paternalism, with the Indian Government holding discussions
but maintaining the right to veto Pakistan's claims, is one element
in the Indian Government's management of the dispute during the
sixties. A second element, is a repetitive demand for more data.
As late as December 19^9, with the Farakka Barrage itself on the
verge of completion, the Indian Government was still maintaining
that political discussions could not take place because Pakistan
had not supplied all the information they required. After five
meetings of water resources experts and three at the level of
Secretary (senior civil servant), India still needed more data:
'Mainly because of continual changes introduced by
Pakistan in their projects, there are still important
gaps which require to be filled.' (8)
The promise of a ministerial level meeting, and therefore one able
to discuss the political issue of sharing the water - the promise
held out by Nehru's discussions with Ayub in 1961 - was never
fulfilled during the Pakistan reign in East Bengal. Pakistan proposed
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in 1962, 1963, 1965 and repeatedly thereafter that a ministerial
meeting should be held. The obstacle to such a meeting was always
that India believed more data were' required. The interpretation and
judgement of India's conduct of the dispute in this period is dependent
primarily on a judgement of this obstacle: was India's demand for
more data reasonable?
Nehru touched on this need for information about projects in the
lower riparian Country, when he wrote, in a letter to Ayub Khan in
1961:
'One more matter to which I must also refer, is the
distinction you still seem to make between the rights
of the upper and lower riparians in paragraph 7 of
your letter, which implies that the lower riparians
can proceed unilaterally with projects, while the
upper riparian should not be free to do so. If this
was to be so, it would enable the lower riparian to
create, unilaterally, historic rights in its favour
and go on inflating them at its discretion thereby
completely blocking all development and uses of the
upper riparian. V/e cannot, obviously, accept this
point of view, especially when three-fourths of the
length of the Ganges lies in Indian territory, which
gives India the priority interest in this river'. (9)
Nehru implicitly concedes the right of a lower riparian to influence
projects in an upper riparian state. This is in contrast to the public
statements of his government at that time. Was the information, which
the Indian Government voraciously demanded, required in order to
establish Pakistan's 'reasonable interests' in the Farakka Project or
was it demanded as an exercise of India's right to veto projects in
East Pakistan? Or, simply in order to prolong the talks? Certainly
if India did amend the requirements of Calcutta Port to take account
of Pakistan's interests, no public statement was made of the fact.
But this is not surprising because India was presumably holding
concessions in reserve for the real.bargaining at ministerial level.
It was agreed at the last of the Secretaries' meetings, held in July
1970, that a meeting would be held within 3-6 months to consider the




The Pakistan Government's response to the Farakka Barrage Project can
be interpreted as a response in five stages with each stage putting




(iii) Pressure to upgrade the talks;
(iv) Attempts to involve third parties; and,
(v) A threat of retaliation.
Once Pakistan had been formally informed of the sanction for the
Farakka Project, attempts to open negotiations were started in earnest.
Ayub Khan made his suggestions to Nehru in London and a correspondence
ensued between them. These exchanges are reasonably documented
elsewhere (TO). What is not well-known is a suggestion that Pakistan
made in 1961 that the two countries should consider constructing a
joint barrage. How seriously Pakistan took the proposal is not known,
but such co-operation might have been technically feasible. The South
West of East Bengal could be irrigated by gravity canals fed from a
barrage across the Ganges. A potential site existed, at Lalgola,
which, superficially at least, could have served the purposes of both
countries. That site would have put the barrage equally in India
and East Pakistan. If the site was satisfactory from engineering
considerations, the project would have had substantial economic
advantages. The expensive feeder canal would have been unnecessary
and Pakistan could have provided a substantial contribution to the
cost of the Barrage itself. Unfortunately, but perhaps inevitably,
India gave the idea short shrift. According to a report in Dawn, the
Indian team to technical talks held in Dacca rejected the idea of a
joint barrage on the grounds that:
'considerable work had already been done on the Farakka
Barrage and the Indian Government did not intend to give
it up.' (T T )
11^
That rejection ended Pakistan's first response suggesting genuine
cooperation. Any other reference to cooperation would henceforth
mean sharing the water, a discussion in which the countries had no
common objectives, only opposing interests.
Technical discussions
Technical discussions, the second stage of the Pakistan response,
continued in fits and starts throughout the sixties. A great quantity
of hydrological data and project descriptions was exchanged in these
meetings. From the list of data supplied by India (summarised in
Appendix B), it is possible to identify some of the technical issues
which were raised in the discussions. The data exchanged fell into
three categories:
(a) Basic discharge measurements,
(b) Project descriptions, and
(c) Issues arising from (a) and (b).
The main issues in category (c) were firstly, Pakistan's doubts about
the Farakka Project and its technical rationale and, secondly, the
subject of regeneration. India had presented a historical series
of discharge measurements taken at Farakka or Rajmahal nearby.
Pakistan had presented a series taken at Hardinge Bridge. The two
series did not tally. One reason why they did not tally was that
water flowed from the ground water reservoir to the river and vice
versa. During the dry season this flow tended to increase the flow
of the river so that the measurement at Hardinge Bridge would be
greater than the discharge measured at Farakka, some sixty miles
upstream. The estimation of the quantity and continuity of this
regeneration became the subject of a long technical discussion on
which each side wrote numerous papers (none, unfortunately, have
reached the public domain).
Technical discussions were prolonged, but, from the Pakistan
Government's point of view, they achieved little. Anxious to
achieve a resolution of the dispute before India operated the Farakka
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Barrage, and under some pressure from MPs representing constituencies
in East Pakistan, the Pakistan Government renewed pressure to upgrade
the talks and attempted to involve third parties in the dispute.
These actions can be interpreted as the third and fourth stages in
the Pakistan response.
Pressure for political negotiations
In 1968, Pakistan again urged that the ministerial discussions
promised by the Nehru-Ayub agreement should take place in the near
future. In the same year, they raised the dispute on the floor of
the UN General Assembly and persuaded the USSR to give support to their
case. At the end of 1968, India made a slight concession. They did
not agree to ministerial discussions, but they were willing to take
part in Secretarial level discussions. Even then, Indira Gandhi,
the new Indian Prime Minister, told the Lok Sabha that her Government
believed ministerial talks to be premature; the technical exchanges
had to be comp'leted first. The purpose of the Secretarial talks
would be to review the progress of the technical exchanges and
establish procedures for speeding up the exchange of data (12).
The 'Pakistan delegations to the Secretarial talks kept up the pressure
for higher level talks, but at the same time they expanded the basis
of Pakistan's case. At the technical exchanges, Pakistan had
opposed the construction of the Farakka Project on the basis of the
consequences it would have for the economy of East Pakistan (13)> and
a strong element in that case was the argument that they had a prior
right to the water of the Ganges. That right rested mostly on the
Ganges-Kobadak Project (14).
In 1968, Pakistan's High Commissioner in Delhi, Arshad Hossein, was
promoted to Foreign Minister. He visited East Pakistan and decided
that Pakistan's case should be founded more solidly on the economic
consequences of Farakka diversions. This new case was presented
to the second Secretaries' meeting in March 1969, and drew a strong
response from the Indian delegation. Arshad Hossein intended to
create a deadlock and then break off negotiations, but he was unable
to contact the President to obtain his support for this line of action.
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Ayub Khan was unobtainable because he was being toppled from power
by Yahya Khan. Arshad Iiossein was replaced a few days later, and
the Pakistan delegation to the talks were left without instructions.
The idea of creating a deadlock petered out as Pakistan entered a
crisis of succession (15)-
Discussions at the UN
The fourth stage in Pakistan's response - the involvement of third
parties - was partly successful but it did not achieve one apparent
objective, that of obtaining a mediator or arbitrator in the dispute.
Pakistan did succeed in raising the dispute at the UN. According to
Hossein, who led the Pakistan delegation, India was afraid that the
General Assembly might pass a resolution demanding that India stop
construction of the Farakka Project. In the light of Bangladesh's
difficulties at the UN in 1976, when they found that few countries
would support their stand, this sounds an unlikely event. In any
case, Hossein'reassured India that Pakistan was only giving a warning
in order to get the negotiations moving: 'we are trying to negotiate,
in case we don't succeed, we will come back' (16).
As part of this stage, the Pakistan Government informed the super¬
powers of the dispute and apparently obtained some support from the
USSR. Mr Kosygin wrote a letter to Mrs. Gandhi urging a settlement
along the lines of the Indus Water Treaty (17)- There is little
doubt that the World Bank would have been willing to play a role
similar to the mediatory and conciliatory role it had played in that
treaty. India publicly rejected the suggestion (18). However,
Arshad Hossein, when he was in the USA for the UN meetings, raised
the question directly with the Bank's President. A number of
conversations were held between the Bank and Hossein, on the one hand,
and the Bank and Morarji Desai, then Indian Finance Minister, on the
other. Desai apparently told the Bank that India would be willing to
consider mediation by the World Bank. Nothing further was heard of
the proposal. Hossein says, 'If Ayub had not fallen, maybe that line
could have been pursued' (19).
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A threat of retaliation
Emerging at various stages in the dispute, from 1962 to the present
day, is a project known as the Ganges Barrage. Not a stone has been
laid for this project though several consultant's reports have been
prepared, and the project has been discussed at length in several
meetings of the two governments. Though the evidence is contradictory
and confused, it does seem that the main reason why Pakistan proposed
this project was as a threat of retaliation against India. This
project was the fifth stage in the Pakistan Government's strategy.
The Ganges Barrage would have been built in the vicinity of Hardinge
Bridge, in East Pakistan, probably at the offtake of the Gorai-
Madhumati River. Its ostensible purpose was to irrigate huge areas
of the West and South West of East Bengal; one report claimed that a
gross area of 6.35 million acres could be irrigated (in 19691 East
Bengal irrigated only 2.6 million acres). The barrage was also
intended to store water for dry season use. The reservoir would have
extended into India, almost certainly as far upstream as the Farakka
Barrage. This reservoir could have flooded areas of India. India
reacted to the threat with a protest. K L Rao, Indian Minister of
Irrigation, told the Lok Sabha that the project:
'If executed, will cause harm to large tracts of
territory belonging to India by way of submersion and
erosion, etc. The Government of India have lodged a
strong protest with the Government of Pakistan and have
urged that no construction should be undertaken on
Padma which may injure the upstream area in India.' (20)
The Pakistan proposal had a certain subtlety. As a Pakistan
journalist explained it, the height of the barrage would depend simply
on how much water India agreed to release at Farakka. If India agreed
to release very little, then the Ganges Barrage would have to store
more water, and this might pose a threat to West Bengal (21).
Arshad Hossein and other participants in the negotiations with India
have now admitted that the project was primarily intended as a
threat (22).
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In the last of the Secretarial meetings, in July 1970, some progress
was made. The two sides agreed that 'the point of delivery of
supplies to Pakistan of such quantum of water as may he agreed upon
will be Farakka' (23). They also agreed that a meeting should be
held in J>-6 months to decide the 'quantum of water' Agreement on
the 'point of delivery' ended, presumably, the technical argument
surrounding regeneration; agreement that the next meeting should
discuss water-sharing signified the end of the technical exchanges.
The second part of the Nehru-Ayub Agreement was reaching fruition,
ten years after the Agreement. Participants in these discussions say
that there was, behind the scenes, some agreement even on the
quantity of water to be released at Farakka (24). However, the next
meeting was never held. There was agreement in January 1971, at
India's suggestion, that another meeting should be held. In March,
the Bangladesh independence struggle started, but even before this
there were indications that the Pakistan Government was taking a less
conciliatory line. In February, 1971i it published a pamphlet,
India's Farakka Barrage and its adverse consequences on East Pakistan
(25), which was not likely to elicit cooperation from India.
Before discussing the reasons for this decade of delay, we now briefly
consider an attempted intervention in the dispute.
The Pugwash initiative
'On January 1, 1966 in Addis Abbaba a small group of
eminent scientists who were gathered at a Pugwash
conference talked late into the night about the problems
of world peace and international cooperation. They were
looking for ideas that would capture the imagination of
the world community and which, at the same time, would
provide the focal point for international cooperation
between nations that were currently or historically in
conflict. The discussion ultimately focussed on India
and Pakistan. The previous year, 1965, had seen a war
between these countries which both could ill-afford
and which had seriously dislocated their economic
development programs. The Pugwash group resolved that
some organisation, outside of both India and Pakistan,
should identify problems common to both nations on which
they might work on a co-operative basis. Professor Roger
Revelle, Director of the Center for Population Studies
at Harvard University, offered to provide the services
of his research staff to write a prospectus for such a
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study. It was agreed that there was a need to look in
some detail at the natural resource development of that
area of the Indian subcontinent comprising the basin
of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers...' (26)
Revelle had been associated with President Kennedy's technological
approach to the solution of all manner of problems (27): in
particular, he had directed a large-scale desalination .programme
in Pakistan. All went well with the Pugwash initiative. It seemed
at first that both Ayub Khan and Indira Gandhi were enthusiastic but,
in 1967) a team from the Centre for Population Studies set out to
meet both leaders. They did meet Ayub Khan but at the last moment
D P Dhar, Mrs Gandhi's Secretary stopped answering their telegrams.
No explanation for this was ever received (28).
Preliminary studies of cooperative development of the water resources
of the Ganges basin had already been completed and, rather than lose
the work already completed, the group continued with a study on the
Pakistan portion of the Basin, with funding from the World Bank and
other international agencies. From this study emerged the concept
of a 'Ganges water machine' (29)» a massive system for increasing
underground water storage in the Ganges basin. The researchers from
the'Center for Population Studies quantified, possibly rather
earlier than the negotiators of Pakistan and India, the dry season
water shortage in the Ganges basin and suggested induced groundwater
recharge as a solution. During the dry season, heavy pumping would
lower the groundwater table and provide water for irrigation and
other uses, and, in the wet season, various measures would increase
the rate of percolation so that the flood waters would be used to
recharge the underground reservoirs. By this means, the Harvard
researchers estimated that nearly 30% of the annual flow of the
River Ganges could be stored, providing enough water for both India
and Pakistan and, therefore, undermining the basis of the dispute.
(This proposal is described in greater detail in Appendix D.)
The proposal could have influenced the course of the dispute but it
did not. One explanation why it did not can be gauged from the
response of a civil servant in the Ministry of External Affairs.
He was asked why Indian enthusiasm for the Harvard proposal had waned:
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'This is my personal view. I have little trust in those
who want to offer assistance of this nature. One should
first consider whether the countries themselves have the
expertise to tackle the problem...I do not see that
Britain, the US, or Harvard have more knowledge of dam
construction than India would have. Quite often the
assistance does nothing more than make the developing
countries into an experimenting ground. Sorry to put it
so strongly. This dispute can't be solved financially,
it can only be eliminated if the countries decide to
eliminate it. No country, if it has any self-respect,
would like to be made into a testing ground.' (30)
This view, suspicious of the motives of aid (particularly American aid)
is, however, only one of the views held in the Ministry of External
Affairs. Rajeshwar Dayal, who was Foreign Secretary at the time,
thinks that it is 'a very narrow outlook; one should not disregard
ideas whatever their source':
'One of my last notes as foreign secretary before I
retired was concerning this question. I urged
government to set up a technical group without
commitments to study this project, with Revelle's
advice if necessary, without it if possible. I spent
half a night with Revelle in October 1968 in Harvard
going through his studies.' (31)
For whatever reason, Dayal's view did not prevail.
CONCLUSION: PROCRASTINATION OR WEAK ADVOCACY?
There was no progress in the water sharing conflict during this decade;
the promise of a ministerial meeting and political negotiations held
out by the Nehru-Ayub agreement was denied. Why? Two possible
explanations have been suggested. In 1970, the Awami League's
election manifesto blamed weak advocacy:
'The criminal neglect of earlier governments has allowed
Farakka Barrage to become a FAIT ACCOMPLI [ their
capitals].' (32)
On the other hand, it has been suggested in these pages that the
Indian Government may have conducted a deliberate policy of
procrastination.
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Analysis of the Pakistan Government's response to the threat of the
Farakka Barrage shows that there was a five-stage strategy starting
with an offer r cooperation and ending with a threat of retaliation
in kind. Short of using force, for which Israeli artillery bombardment
of a Syrian barrage site provided a precedent (33) t "the Pakistan
Government appear to have responded with considerable vigour. The
Awami League's explanation must be dismissed (3^)-
The second explanation, however, appears to be nearer to the truth.
In an interview in 1978, I put this point to Mrs. Gandhi:
BC: 'It seems odd, given that the sharing of a resource
is a political issue, that the discussions with
Pakistan were confined first to technical experts
until 1968, and then to Secretarial meetings after
that.'
IG: 'Pakistan was not willing to meet us.'
BC: 'That's not how it seems from the historical record.
It looks as though they made several requests to
upgrade the talks.'
IG: 'Well, I don't know. Talks can only be held if
there is an atmosphere of confidence and amity.
That was a period when there was acute distrust,
and no respect, therefore there was no agreement
even on much lesser issues.' (35)
Mrs Gandhi is here referring to the absence in this period of what I
have referred to as windows in the relationship between the two
countries.
Rajeshwar Dayal, who was Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and
then Foreign Secretary for parts of this decade, is more frank on
this question. In an interview with myself, Dayal has implicitly
confirmed that India did not regard the talks with Pakistan as
negotiations, but as a means of staving off more vigorous dispute:
ED: 'India could never have got Pakistani agreement.'
BC: 'Was it wise to go ahead without it?'
RD: 'There were only two ways to handle it. Assuming
that the project was essential for the Port of
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Calcutta which is what the technicians told us,
if you start negotiations and come up against a stone
stone wall, the first thing would be they'd apply
an injunction. In that case, what would happen
to the Indian economy?...' (36)
Dayal did not spell out the second approach, which India took, but
the implication is clear that India was playing for time, in order
to get the project completed.
What also emerges from these two interviews is that the Indian Prime
Minister and the Indian Foreign Secretary both perceived the dispute
as determined by the overall state of relations between the two
countries. This perception is partially contradicted by the account
of Arshad Hossein, formerly Pakistan High Commissioner of India and
then Foreign Minister. He says there were opportunities for
progress in the conflict, but extraneous events intervened. In an
interview with me, he summarised the problem as follows:
'First there was the Chinese business, then Nehru dies
and we had to wait for the succession, then there was
the war. All the time the issue was being raised by us
but the circumstances were not right .' (37)
According to Hossein, it was not simply hostility which prevented
the start of negotiations. Although on one occasion war intervened,
at other times the Indian Government's attention was turned elsewhere.
Certainly Hossein implies that the state of relations was not a
restraint from the Pakistan Government's perspective (38).
It seems reasonable to conclude that there was an Indian strategy
of procrastination in force until at least 1971. One factor
influencing India's choice of that strategy may have been the
perception by India's leaders of a general state of hostility between
Pakistan and India (39)- terms of legal principle, the Indian
Government was adhering to a position close to absolute territorial
sovereignty, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis. In
Chapter 16 we shall see that this principle did not correspond with
Indian practice in settling inter-state water disputes, nor with the
conduct of upper riparian states elsewhere; in both those cases
equitable utilisation had been generally accepted as the appropriate
principle.
The creation of Bangladesh, as we shall see in the next chapter,
brought changes in Indian policy, the first phase of the conflict
over the Ganges came to an end.
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Chapter Seven
THE SHEIK AND MRS GANDHI
At the end of 1971 > when the new Awami League Government of
independent Bangladesh came to power, they were presented with an
unusual opportunity. The strength of popular commitment to the
struggle against the Pakistan Army was inherited by the new government
and gave them carte blanche in their internal affairs. Popular and
governmental goodwill toward India was also at a historically
unprecedented high level. The political inclinations and class
origins of the new government were similar to those of the government
in New Delhi but, more significantly, the role played by the Indian
government and military forces in the birth of Bangladesh left a
debt of gratitude of which the new government was acutely aware.
The Government of Bangladesh was in a position to implement the
promise they had made in their Manifesto for the 1970 election.
'Every instrument of foreign policy must be immediately
utilised to secure a just solution of this [ the Farakka ]
problem.' (1)
Within four months of the surrender of Pakistan forces in East
Bengal, it was announced that India and Bangladesh had agreed to
establish a Joint Rivers Commission:
'so that the water resources of the region can be
utilised on an equitable basis for the mutual benefit
of the people of the two countries.' (2)
Not only was the atmosphere propitious for a settlement of the dispute
over the Farakka Barrage and for a cooperative sharing of the Ganges
waters, but a forum had been created within which technical
discussions could be held and the foundations created for a political
settlement.
In fact, the independence of Bangladesh brought, almost unnoticed at
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the time, a resolution of the first phase of the Ganges waters
conflict. The Bangladesh Government accepted, in general, that
India had a right to use the Farakka Barrage. In return the Indian
Government recognised Bangladesh's right to negotiate the sharing of
the water. The change in governmental attitudes did not take place
immediately but, from the beginning of 1972, India began to concede
the principle that Bangladesh had standing as a co-user of the Ganges,
and .Bangladesh began to come to terms with the existence of the
F&rakka Barrage. The Pakistan Government's ten year old request for
ministerial negotiations with India was granted to Bangladesh within
two months. The change of government brought considerable progress
in the negotiations.
Discussions continued between Bangladesh and India for the next two
years. Ministers came from India to meet their counterparts in
Bangladesh. Bangladesh ministers returned their visits. The joint
Rivers Commission held a series of meetings.
In 197^1 when the two Prime Ministers (Sheik Mujibur Rahman and
Mrs Indira Gandhi) met to discuss, amongst other matters, the Ganges
conflict, an observer might reasonably have predicted that substantial
progress would be made toward the settlement of this, the most
important outstanding dispute between the two countries. On almost
every other issue discussed there was progress. On this there was
none.
This chapter attempts to explain why the promise of settlement was
denied, how the best opportunity for a settlement of the dispute was
mislaid.
It is an investigation into a paradox of delay. There was a long
window in Indo-Bangladesh relations between 1972 and 197V5i but
there was little progress in the dispute. The delay seems to have
come not, as in earlier periods, from the Indian side, but from that
of Bangladesh. If India had continued the stalling and postponement
characteristic of the previous two decades, the Bangladesh Government
or participants on the Bangladesh side would have protested. That
they did not do so is a reliable indication that the strategy of
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procrastination had been relinquished. This chapter, is, therefore,
an attempt to understand why the Bangladesh side may have contributed
to delay in the settlement of the dispute.
From the recollections of Bangladesh participants, three possible
causes of the delay can be identified.
■ (i) The government was too busy with other concerns to
concentrate on the solution of this dispute.
(ii) The body of officials responsible for the technical
negotiations may have chosen to prolong the dispute.
(iii) The minister primarily responsible on the Bangladesh
side for the negotiations may have had reason to
prolong the dispute.
These three potential explanations correspond, to a certain extent,
to Allison's three models of government decision making, outlined
in the introduction to this thesis: the first corresponds to the
idea of government as rational actor; the second could be made
to fit the 'organisational process' model; and the third is an
example of 'bureaucratic politics' where the minister was able to
manipulate his ministry and the cabinet. This correspondence is
not very deep because it has not been possible to show in detail
what was happening inside the Bangladesh Government and, as a
result, the models cannot be articulated.
However, several participants have been willing to give their
personal views of what happened. On this basis it has been possible
to tentatively evaluate the three explanations. This assessment
suggests that the delay may be partially attributed to a leadership
struggle within the Bangladesh Government.
From independence to the Foreign Ministers' meeting in 197^
During the first confused months of Bangladesh's independence,
substantial progress was apparently made toward a settlement of
the dispute, inherited from Pakistan, over the Farakka Barrage.
Before the end of January, B M Abbas, who had been East Pakistan's
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Table 7-1: Chronology of negotiations, 1972 to May 197^
1972 Jan B M Abbas met K L Rao in Delhi
Mujibur Rahman visited Mrs Gandhi in Delhi on his way
back to Dacca from jail in Pakistan
Mar Indo-Bangfft-desh Treaty of Friendship signed
Apr Formation of Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) announced
Water Ministers, Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed and
K L Rao met
June First meeting of the JRC
Dec JRC meeting
^973 Jul Water Minister Moshtaque Ahmed met Indian Foreign
Minister Swaran Singh in Delhi and India agreed not
to operate the Farakka Barrage unilaterally
197^ Jan Foreign Secretaries met in Dacca
Feb Foreign Ministers met in Dacca
Mar Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed transferred to Commerce
Ministry
Apr Tripartite conference of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
in Simla resolved many subcontinental disagreements
May Sheik Mujibur Rahman and Mrs Indira Gandhi met in Delhi
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most influential engineer and who had played an important part in the
earlier negotiations between Pakistan and India, had travelled to
Delhi for talks with the Indian Government. There he met K L Rao,
the Minister for Irrigation and Power. On the 24th January, Abbas
told the press that suspicions which had previously hampered the
negotiations between India and Pakistan had now been dissipated.
On leaving Delhi he said, 'I am satisfied with the talks I had with
the Government of India' (3)-
Many statements of intent were signed during these early months of
Bangladesh's existence. India and Bangladesh appeared to be able
to co-operate in almost every sphere. The Prime Ministers met in
January, February and March. The Joint Statement issued at the end
of their February meeting said:
'The two Prime Ministers emphasised that the geography
of the region provided a natural basis of co-operation...
They discussed the problem of flood control, Farakka
Barrage and other problems.' C+)
Following the example of the Treaty of Friendship which India had
concluded with Russia just prior to the Indian invasion of Pakistan,
an Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship Co-operation and Peace was
signed at the conclusion of the Prime Minister's meeting in March.
This treaty was to be valid for twentyfive years, and specifically
included agreement to:
'make joint studies and take joint action in the fields
of flood control, river basin development, and the
development of hydro-electric power and irrigation.' (5)
In the discussions between officials which took place simultaneously
with the meeting of the Prime Ministers, the decision was taken to
establish a Joint Rivers Commission (6).
The Statute of the Joint Rivers Commission, signed eight months later
in November, includes the following paragraphs:
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'ARTICLE k
(i) The Commission shall have the following functions
in particular:
a) to maintain liaison between the participating
countries in order to ensure the most effective -
joint efforts in maximising the benefits from
common river systems to both countries...
d) to study flood control and irrigation projects
so that the water resources of the region can be
utilised on an equitable basis for the mutual
benefit of the peoples of the two countries...
(ii) The Commission shall also perform such other
functions as the two governments may, by mutual
agreement, direct it to do.' (7)
The Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) was apparently intended to act as a
forum for cooperation in all aspects of river development. The
Statute laid down that each government should appoint a Chairman and
three members, two of whom should be engineers, to the JRC and provide
adequate secretarial and supporting staff. The Chairmanship of the
Commission was to alternate between the two governments on successive
years. Article 7 of the Statute ruled out public scrutiny of the
JRC's proceedings:
'All meetings shall be closed meetings unless the
Commission desires otherwise.'
The Farakka dispute is not specifically mentioned in the JRC's terms
of reference, but the paragraphs from the Statute quoted above gave
the governments freedom to refer the topic to the Commission if they
so chose (8).
At the end of April, Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed, Bangladesh's new
Minister with responsibility for water and power, met Dr K L Rao
his Indian counterpart. Complete agreement on power, flood control
and irrigation projects was announced at the end of their talks, and
Rao said that Bangladesh's misconceptions on Farakka had been cleared
up. On his return from Dacca, Rao gave more details about the
meeting. These are important. The sharing of the waters, said Rao,
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would be settled at a meeting of the two Prime Ministers, but the
Farakka Barrage was no longer a problem. The proportion of the
waters to go to each country had yet to be settled, but the doubts
and misgivings of Bangladesh had been removed (9)» Dr Rao did not
clarify the role of the JRC in these negotiations. It is possible
that the two ministers had agreed that the JRC should undertake
technical discussions laying the groundwork for the political
discussions to be held between the prime ministers.
The first meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission was held in June
1972 (before the Statute had been signed). A press note issued at
the end of the meeting said:
'The commission considered river development works
in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna System in general
and will take it up in detail in its next meeting.' (10)
In the same month Sheik Mujibur Rahman gave an interview in which he
talked about the relationship between India and Bangladesh. 'Don't
talk about a relationship,' he said, 'this is a friendship. It is
close and it will grow.' Later in the interview he said, 'India
will not find the people of Bangladesh to be ungrateful people.'
The interviewer noted that at this point Mujib muttered, 'except
Moulana Bashani.' (11)
During August of 1972, two events took place which indicated that
progress was being made toward a settlement of the dispute. Political
leaders in West Bengal began lobbying with the Indian central
government for what they saw as their share of the Ganges water, and
in the upper house (Rajya Sabha) of the Indian parliament Rao, the
Minister of Irrigation and Power, made a statement confirming that
the 'legitimate interests' of Bangladesh would be kept in view, and
that no arrangement for operating the Farakka Barrage would adversely
affect Bangladesh.
The Chief Minister of West Bengal returned from a week in Delhi with
what the press reported as an 'agreement' on the operation of the
Farakka Barrage According to this 'agreement':
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o the feeder canal of the barrage would be completed
by December 1973* (the main barrage structure had
been completed in 1970); '
o for five years after that *10,000 cusecs could be
diverted down the Hooghly and, for the following two
years, the diversions would be varied experimentally;
o at the end of seven years there would be a review. (12)
With hindsight this 'agreement' can be interpreted as the technical
experts' preferred option almost entirely undiluted by political
realism. Since West Bengal did not subsequently invoke the 'agreement'
in their negotiations with the Indian Government, it seems likely
that it was no more than a statement of that government's intent.
In 1972, the World Bank was not overtly involved in the negotiations
but it was maintaining rather more than a watching brief. In 1969,
the Bank had approached at least one opposition leader in East
Pakistan to express its interest in the Ganges dispute and its
willingness to give support to an agreed solution. Again in 1972
similar contacts were made to personnel now in the new Bangladesh
Government (13)» The Bank also employed an eminent consultant to,
amongst other objectives:
'evaluate the water supply picture [ of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna Basins ] and to examine the
possibility of maintaining or even augmenting the low
flow of the rivers...[and J to examine the need and
possibilities for international cooperation between
the countries situated in the river basins.' (1*0
The consultant recommended that consideration be given to the
establishment, under the auspices of the UN, of a Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna Coordinating Committee, with five member countries - India,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan (15)- The consultant's report
went through three drafts but remained 'strictly confidential' (16).
Whatever role the World Bank may have played behind the scenes, it
made no public intervention in the dispute.
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The Joint Rivers Commission met again in December. The press were
informed that the Commission had:
'decided to consider a framework for preparation of
long-term plans for the development of major river basins
common to India and Bangladesh.
'The Commission also recommended a programme for joint
survey of the river Ganges from Farakka up to the Gorai
off-take to enable the planning of development works of
mutual interest... Two groups have been set up for the
study of certain rivers in Bangladesh and India, on
possibilities of augmenting winter discharges in these
rivers. The Commission also received basic data on works
executed or under execution in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna river basin and decided that this should be
supplemented further.' (17)
This is an evasive press release, but it does imply that the general
question of the long-term development of the Ganges, and the specific
question of the Farakka Barrage and its effects were under discussion
in the JRC (18). There is, however, no indication that these topics
were being treated as matters of urgency or that the central question
of Bangladesh's agreement to the operation of the Farakka Barrage was
being discussed.
In 1973) several more meetings of the Joint Rivers Commission were
held, but little was published about the subjects they discussed.
It is presumed that the Farakka issue and development of the Ganges
were not discussed.
Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed led a Bangladesh delegation to Delhi, in
July. It met an Indian team led by Sardar Swaran Singh, India's
Minister of External Affairs. There was some surprise that Swaran
Singh, rather than K L Rao, led the team, but the composition of the
team, which included three Indian ministers (D P Dhar, Minister for
planning, and K L Rao in addition to Swaran Singh), was welcomed
in Bangladesh (19)- Possibly the replacement of a junior minister
having a technical background by a senior minister with a political
background and experience in inter-state relations indicated that both
sides were beginning to realise that even in an atmosphere of friendly
bilateral relations the issue could prove difficult to resolve.
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The meeting reaffirmed that a final decision on the sharing of the
Ganges waters would be taken when .the two prime ministers met (20).
This was despite an half-hour meeting between Khondakar Moshtaque
Ahmed and Mrs Gandhi (21). The press release issued after the talks
belaboured the possible effects the Ganges diversions might have on
flooding inside Bangladesh:
• "The discussions dealt mainly with the commissioning
of the Farakka Feeder Canal and its impact on Bangladesh
...Farakka Project might increase the flood intensity of
Padma in Bangladesh by reducing the natural spill discharges
into the Bhagirathi. This point was discussed and the
Indian side assured the Bangladesh side that the feeder
canal and the Jangipur Barrage will be so operated that the
Bhagirathi will continue to receive during the monsoon
period as much water as before, or more if possible. It
was accepted by the Government of India [ sic J that the
Farakka Barrage Project will not increase the flood
intensity of Padma in Bangladesh.
'There was discussion about the Farakka Barrage Project
and its impact on both countries. It was agreed that the
two sides' will meet again and continue the discussions
with a view to arriving at a solution to the problem.
The two sides further agreed that a mutually acceptable
solution will be arrived at before operating the Farakka
Barrage.' (22)
The last sentence, though it provided no basis for a solution, was
the first definite and public commitment by the Indian Government
that it would not act unilaterally.
The third round of regular bilateral consultations, which had been
arranged soon after the Independence of Bangladesh, took place in
Dacca in January 197*1 • Kewal Singh, the Indian Foreign Secretary
came to meet Enayet Karim of Bangladesh. The meeting was interpreted
as preparation for the impending meeting of the Prime Ministers (23).
Kewal Singh met Sheik Mujib and Bangladesh's new Foreign Minister
Kamal Hossein, but no mention was made of Farakka in the press release
issued at the end of their talks (2*0.
Other subcontinental concerns were dominating the Indo-Bangladesh
relationship at this time; most of them appeared more urgent and were
reported more prominently than the sharing of the Ganges. The most
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prominent issue, in the early months of 197'+1 was Bangladesh's
attempt to get recognition at the United Nations and acceptance at
the Islamic Summit. China, on behalf of Pakistan, was successfully
holding the threat of veto to prevent war crimes trials of 195
prisoners of the 1971 war.
At the talks in January, Kamal Hossein had renewed an invitation for
the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to visit Dacca, and in
February he came. In the words of their Joint Communique, this is
what they discussed (amongst other things):
'Both sides availed of the opportunity to discuss the
use of the water resources of the two countries for the
common benefit of the peoples of Bangladesh and India.
They agreed that to meet this objective the Joint Rivers
Commission should continue, as a matter of priority, its
investigation of the development of the water resources
of the region. The two Foreign Ministers also discussed
the question of the distribution of the waters of the
Ganges between India and Bangladesh and the need for an
early decision on the matter. They were confident that
their discussions on this subject had advanced their
common approach for an early solution to this issue.
Both the Foreign Ministers agreed that a mutually
acceptable solution will be arrived at before operating
the Farakka Barrage Project.' (25)
In plain words, almost no progress had been made. The agreement that
a 'mutually acceptable solution' must precede operation of the barrage
had first emerged, with almost identical wording, in Swaran Singh's
earlier discussion with Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed. That it was
reiterated at a meeting of two Foreign Ministers can hardly be judged
as substantial progress.
Five days after this meeting, a hint of dissatisfaction with the
work of the Joint Rivers Commission emerged in the Times of India;
'The issue has been handled ineptly so far. Instead
of getting the Commission to assess the discharge of the
river in different seasons and the extent of the
replenishment at different points, another infructious
attempt was made to evolve a solution based on the
previous data.' (26)
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In March 197^t Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed was transferred from the
Ministry of Water, Power and Flood Control to the Ministry of Commerce
and Foreign Trade.
In Delhi, a few months earlier, Dr K L Rao had been dismissed by
Mrs Gandhi after nearly ten years as Minister of Irrigation and Power.
The correspondent of The Hindu couldn't resist linking these two
ministerial changes. K L Rao, he wrote, 'was known to dig himself
deep in a stance based on old arguments.' And Khondakar Moshtaque
Ahmed had 'a reputation of being a 'hardliner' on the Farakka
question.' The correspondent noted that there was speculation in
Dacca that the transfer of Khondakar Moshtaque indicated a new
approach to the Farakka question (27)-
Later in this chapter the speculation surrounding the transfer of
Khondakar Moshtaque will be discussed, but K L Rao's dismissal does
not seem to have been related to the Farakka issue. Mrs Gandhi told
K L Rao, when-she asked him for his resignation, that there had been
complaints from the Chief Minister of a Northern state (of India) that
Rao had not looked after their interests, and Mrs Gandhi also said
that she needed a place in the cabinet for an Andhra Pradesh leader
(28). It seems that K L Rao had suffered from the complaints of
Bansilal, the Chief Minister of Harayana, who was to emerge as an
important and corrupt figure during the Indian Emergency of 1975-6.
Bansilal felt that Harayana was not being well treated in one of
India's internal, inter-state rivers disputes - the question of the
sharing of the Ravi-Beas waters.
The Sheik and Mrs Gandhi
When the Sheik and Mrs Gandhi finally met in May 197^, in the
immediate wake of the Simla Tripartite Conference between India,
Bangladesh and Pakistan, which had successfully resolved many
subcontinental issues, they and their large supporting casts were
able to settle several disputes longstanding between India and East
Pakistan and agree new areas for trade and industrial cooperation:
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o many small boundary disputes were settled;
o closer trade cooperation was agreed,
o both countries pledged to increase their exports to
meet balanced trade targets set at earlier talks;
o establishment of four joint industries, taking raw
materials from one country to labour and machinery
in the other, was agreed;
o it was agreed a joint survey would be carried out
for a rail link to connect Calcutta with Agartala
(a district of India lying to the East of Bangladesh);
and
o protocols were signed making new Indian credits
available to Bangladesh.
The exception to these successes was Farakka. The Prime Ministers
publicly admitted for the first time, that the dispute had not been
a figment of the Pakistan Government's imagination. There was a
genuine conflict of interest. In their Joint Declaration they agreed
that there would not be enough water to meet the needs of both
countries:
'The two Prime Ministers took note of the fact that the
Farakka Barrage Project would be commissioned before
the end of 197^- They recognised that during the periods
of minimum flow, there might not be enough water to meet
the needs of the Calcutta Port and the full requirements
of Bangladesh and, therefore, the fair weather flow of the
Ganga in the lean months would have to be augmented to meet
the reqiiirements of the two countries. It was agreed that
the problems should be approached with understanding so
that the interests of both countries are reconciled and
the difficulties removed in a spirit of friendship and
cooperation. It was, accordingly, decided that the best
means of such augmentation through optimum utilisation of
the water resources of the region available to the two
countries should be studied by the Joint Rivers Commission.
The Commission should make suitable recommendations, to
meet the requirements of both the countries.
'It was recognised it would take some years to give effect
to the recommendations of the Commission as accepted by
the two governments. In the meantime, the two sides
expressed their determination that before the Farakka
Project is commissioned they would arrive at a mutually
acceptable allocation of the water available during the
periods of minimum flow in the Ganga.' (29)
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In 1978, a senior Bangladesh official gave this account of the
aftermath of the meeting:
'Mujib was not well-informed by the people he took with
him. Mentally he was troubled. When he returned he
chastised the officials that Bangladesh's officers
could not reply to the Indian questions. Mujib had the
impression he was being undermined. When he returned
he asked for a report to be prepared by people not
• connected with the Ministry of Power, Water and Flood
Control.1
The report was to answer these questions: What is the role of the
Ganges in the Gangetic Delta? How much water do we (Bangladesh)
actually require? What is the validity of the Indian claim? (30) It
is a serious criticism of the previous two and half years of
negotiation on this issue if these, the most basic questions, remained
unanswered in May 197^ •
This Bangladesh official's account of the meeting, is partially confirmed
by Mrs Gandhi's recollection; when she was asked why they were unable
to reach a settlement of the issue at that meeting, she said:
'Sheik Mujib felt that his experts should look again at
the issue, and they were not here.' (3^)
The public record of the meeting shows that at least three of Mujib's
v/ater experts were present. Asafoduwlah, Acting Secretary of
Irrigation and Power, was there. B M Abbas, Adviser to the President,
was there. Even Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed was present, though in his
new capacity of Minister of Commerce.
The meeting of the Sheik and Mrs Gandhi took place several days after
the Indian Lok Sabha had been adjourned sine die and the members of
parliament were only able to comment two months later on the agreements
the two leaders reached (32). The details of the border agreement
were not released immediately for fear of criticism.
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DISCUSSION: THE PARADOX OF DELAY
This chronological account has identified the major public incidents
which contributed to a paradox of delay. The paradox consists of
a set of auspicious circumstances surrounding a period during which
little or no progress was made toward the resolution of the conflict.
There was progress in 1972, and the negotiations which followed might
have built upon that to create the groundwork for a substantial advance
at the Prime Ministers' meeting in 197^- Instead, the Bangladesh
Prime Minister seems to have entered that meeting ill-prepared and
left it in confusion.
At the start of this chapter, three potential explanations for this
state of affairs were presented. They have been constructed from
the accounts given by different participants in the events, and they
are as follows:
(i) The incoming government of Bangladesh either failed
to recognise the Farakka question as a conflict of
interest, or gave it relatively low priority.
(ii) Bangladesh officials prolonged the dispute.
. (iii) The Bangladesh Minister in charge of the negotiations
prolonged the dispute.
These possible causes for the delay do not represent rigorous
formulations of the events in question, nor do they constitute a
complete list of the possible alternative reasons for the delay. They
are a condensation of the perceptions of different observers within
the organisations concerned. The discussion which follows should be
interpreted as a first attempt to analyse what happened, and a guide
for future research.
A government looking the other way?
There is some evidence to suggest that Bangladesh failed to take heed
o-f the conflict of interest inherent in the dispute - failed, that is,
to recognise that there was insufficient water in the Ganges during
the driest season to meet the stated demands of both countries.
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The failure of recognition might be attributed to one of two alternative
explanations. Either, the government believed that the conflict was
a politically-motivated fabrication of the preceding governments of
Pakistan (a view repeatedly fostered by Indian publicity); or,
possibly, the government was too busy undertaking other tasks to turn
its attention to this question, and therefore failed to recognise the
importance of conflict.
The passage in the 1970 Awami League election Manifesto on Farakka
does not indicate a belief that the dispute was a fabrication:
'The criminal neglect of earlier governments has allowed
Farakka Barrage to become a FAIT ACCOMPLI resulting in
grave and permanent damage to the economy of East Pakistan.
Every instrument of foreign policy must be immediately
utilised to secure a just solution to this problem.' (33)
Senior figures in the government do, however, lend some credence to
the belief that the government's priority concerns did not include the
Farakka question. It could have been overlooked.
Kamal Hossein, Foreign Minister from 1973 to 1973 and before that
Bangladesh's first Law Minister, responsible for the drafting of the
first constitution, said this in 1979:
'People forget now, but during those first three years
we were preoccupied by so many urgent issues. In that
context three years should not be seen as a long time.' (3*0
A less senior member of the government of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, and
one less involved in this issue, Abdul Malek Ukil, then Speaker of
the Bangladesh Parliament, gives a similar explanation:
'During 1972 we could only think of reconstruction...
India was doing everything for us, reconstructing
bridges, providing transport, giving us food...
India was giving us massively. (35)
Ah official of the government, who must remain anonymous, one who was
closely associated with the negotiations from 197^+ onwards, also lends
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credibility to this explanation:
'Any kind of friendship if it is not based on firm
rocks... [ sentence incomplete], Bangladesh ignored
the basic facts which are underlying and are in direct
conflict with the interest of India. As time passed they
emerged. The Mujib-Indira declaration did not solve
anything. In a wishy-washy manner they thought they could
solve it.' (36)
Thus, perhaps the government of Bangladesh allowed this opportunity
to pass because its full attention was on other matters.
What were the officials doing all this time?
The first explanation overlooks the fact that a body of officials
in the Bangladesh Secretariat and a cabinet Minister had responsibility
for all matters concerning water, power and flood control. For these
people, the issue of the sharing of the Ganges water and the impending
completion of'the FaraJkka Barrage must surely have thrown a long
shadow. What were they doing from 1972 to 197^?
Some people certainly believe that officials with responsibility for
this issue chose to maintain and prolong the dispute - perhaps by
taking a harder line than the political climate justified.
A close assistant and adviser of Mrs Gandhi offers this explanation
for the failure to resolve the conflict during the years of amicable
relations:
'He [ Mujib] had barely settled down when he was bumped
off. In any case, his Adviser, Abbas [ B M Abbas] is
a durable character. He was also Ayub's Adviser, he
continued to treat it as a technical question rather
than political... If you had negotiated a peace treaty
after World War II with a man from Nazi Germany,
naturally he would be accustomed to thinking in that
way.' (37)
It is certainly true that B M Abbas has survived numerous changes of
government, and Mrs Gandhi's adviser is not alone in his belief that
Abbas's interpretation of the situation may on occasion have
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determined the Bangladesh government's political response.
Kamal Hossein, the former Bangladesh Foreign Minister, agrees that
technical advisers do sometimes take a harder line than political
officers in the same negotiating team, 'partly because technical
people da attach importance to things they think are technically
important' (38).
Perhaps the relatively 'hard' positions that had been evolved during
the negotiations under Pakistan - insistence that East Pakistan needed
b9,000 cusecs for irrigation, for example - had become organisational
goals. Similar organisations with many of the same personnel took up
the cudgels after the independence of Bangladesh, and the goals may
have been carried over without consideration for their continued
relevance.
Enayatullah Khan, in 1978 Bangladesh Petroleum Minister, but in 197^
outspoken editor of the weekly Holiday, also appears to believe that
the officials prolonged the dispute, but he puts a more sinister,
and political interpretation on the possibility. Enayatullah was
not in any sense a participant or policy maker for the negotiations
at the time in question, but the issues were followed fairly closely
by Holiday. This is Enayatullah's recollection, in 1978:
'There were tough negotiations, the political climate
was changing. Some people in the [Bangladesh] Water
Development Board were making it difficult...' (39)
He was asked if the 'some people' referred to Asafoduwlah, by then
Chairman of the Water Development Board (^0):
'Yes, Asafoduwlah, and Moshtaque was keeping the issue
alive for political reasons. Mujib's feeling was
similar to Moshtaque's, he more than anything reflected
the views of the people at that time...' (41)
But the explanation of official intransigence must be largely
discounted if, as the evidence suggests, the negotiations were not,
during this period, in the hands of officials. From April 1972 until
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May 197^1 the question of what to do when the Farakka Barrage
diversions started seems to have been a subject primarily kept at
the ministerial level.
What was Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed doing?
The first Indo-Bangladesh meeting at which the water sharing is known
to have been discussed was between B M Abbas and K L Rao in January
1972. The second meeting, between Rao and Moshtaque in April of that
year, appears to be the more important one. According to Rao's
account, it was at this stage that the subject was set aside for
Prime Ministerial negotiation and decision (^2). We have seen that the
Joint Rivers Commission seem to have discussed the Farakka conflict
on several occasions between 1972 and 197^- A Bangladesh Government
publication, however, confirms Rao's account:
'The question of the sharing of the waters of the Ganges
and the Teesta was, however, kept out of the purview of
the Joint River Commission, to be settled at the level of
the Prime Ministers.' (9-3)
In view of the complexity of the issue and the agreed purpose of the
JRC -this was a strange decision.
Kamal Hossein recollects that when he took over as Foreign Minister, in
March 1973» the question was raised: How would the Farakka issue be
dealt with? The water ministry Was asked to broach the matter with
India, and Moshtaque reported back to the Foreign Office (presumably
after the meeting in July 1973 in New Delhi with Mrs Gandhi and
Swaran Singh) that little had been achieved.
Hossein became more concerned with the issue as the Farakka Barrage
neared completion and in the preparations, early in 197^1 for the
meeting of the prime ministers. At this time he remembers noticing
that: a) the problem had not been dealt with by the JRC, Moshtaque
having presumably directed that it be kept out of the JRC, and b)
even at ministerial level no progress had been made. In 1978, Hossein
commented, in an interview with me:
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'I had taken the JRC to be the instrument that would
explore the technical options, but by 1974 we had just
reached the point where the matter had to go back to the
Commission.' (44)
Why had the issue been removed, presumably on the agreement of
Moshtaque and Rao, from the JRC's agenda? Hossein says:
. 'There was.a question mark left in one's mind...why this
opportunity should not have been taken.' (45)
The transfer of Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed
It is possible that a realisation of this missed opportunity was the
reason for Sheik Mujib's decision to transfer Moshtaque to another
ministry in March 1974. Moshtaque himself apparently believes that
he was transferred because he was 'too hard on Farakka' 0+6).
There is a suggestion that Moshtaque was prolonging the dispute to
further his political career. This is Enayatullah Khan's thesis:
'[Moshtaque] was not a hardliner. He was trying to make
it big with the issue, trying to make his career out of
■ it. He had almost capitalised on it...The tussle between
Mujib and Moshtaque was not ideological. There was a
potential rivalry. Only two people could historically
have challenged Mujib: Tajuddin Ahmed [ Finance Minister
and leader of the government-in-exile]...and Moshtaque.' (47)
Moshtaque was the leader of the right-wing faction within Mujib's
cabinet. In August 1975i if not earlier, he gave his support to the
group of majors who staged the coup d'etat in which Mujib and many of
his family were killed (48). For three months in 1975 Moshtaque was
President of Bangladesh, but in November he was overthrown and later
jailed for corruption.
CONCLUSIONS
There is genuine puzzlement expressed by participants on the Bangladesh
side about the failure to grasp the opportunity for progress offered
by the conditions of 1972 - 1974. More could have been achieved and
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it is not clear why it was not. Where was the tardiness located?
We have been offered three tentative solutions: an inattentive
government, 'hardline' officials, or a power-hungry minister. One
crucial question has been identified: what was the Joint Rivers
Commission doing in this period? The Foreign Minister thought it
should be preparing the ground, exploring the technical options,
ready for the prime minister's meeting in 197^. The evidence suggests
that the JRC was not fulfilling this role, its brief having been
withdrawn by the Water Minister Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed.
Without further corroborating detail, the three explanations are
insubstantial and unsatisfactory. Our knowledge of the events inside
the JRC and during ministerial meetings is confined primarily to
evasive joint communiques. How manipulation of this dispute could
have served Moshtaque's ends in this struggle for power is not manifest.
Such participant's accounts as we have, are those of cautious actors
conscious that they are still on stage, and their accounts depend on
their recollection of events two to four years previous. Nevertheless,
of the three causes for the stagnation of the conflict, the third,
postulating use of the conflict within a Bangladesh leadership struggle,




Two days of negotiation in April 1975 brought a brief resolution of
the dispute over the Farakka Barrage. An understanding was concluded
which allowed India to divert small quantities of water from the
Ganges for forty days during that year's dry season. Talks to arrange
a more permanent agreement were to continue. At the end of the agreed
forty days India started diverting much larger quantities of water.
In August 1975 the Bangladesh Government was overthrown in a coup d'etat.
A second coup and then a revolutionary mutiny followed three months
later. Relations between India and Bangladesh sharply deteriorated in
this period.
Throughout the 1975 monsoon season and into 1976 India continued to
divert water in quantities close to the maximum allowed by the Farakka
Barrage. During the months of March and April 1976 the flow in the
Ganges in Bangladesh fell to 56% of the lowest flow previously recorded
(see Table 10.1, Chapter 10), and Bangladesh suffered serious damage
as a result of the reduced flows (Part III of this thesis is devoted
to an assessment of that damage). In early 1976, with the dry season
approaching, the Bangladesh Government sent a series of strong
protests to India and then began seeking diplomatic support from other
governments. In September 1976 Bangladesh raised the dispute in the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
This chapter chronicles the conflict over the Ganges in the period
June 197^ to December 1976. Unlike the preceding chapter which was
about a period of stability and delay, this chapter is concerned with
a spell of rapid change both in the conflict over the Ganges and in
the relations between India and Bangladesh.
We shall see that the renewal of public conflict about the Farakka
Barrage in 1976 brought with it a reversion by both parties to pre-
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Bangladesh negotiating postures. In particular, the Indian Government
re-stated the formulation that political negotiations could not take
place until experts had held preparatory 'technical talks'.
As we have seen, the May 197^ prime ministerial meeting was not the
success it might have been. Nevertheless, a conceptual distinction
was agreed at that meeting between two fundamental elements in the
conflict. The conflict was divided into a short term and a long
term, question: firstly, how should the existing low flow of the Ganges
be shared between the two countries in the immediate future? and,
secondly, by what method should the low flow of the Ganges be increased
so that in the future there would be enough for both parties' needs? The
prime ministers' meeting mandated the Joint Rivers Commission to discuss
the latter augmentation question, but left open the exact forum in
which the issue of sharing the existing flow should be negotiated.
We shall see in this chapter that on neither question was there great
progress, although the agreement of April 1975 temporarily resolved
the issue of sharing. (Table 8.1 summarises the events of the period.)
In this chapter, I intend to examine some of the reasons why the 1975
understanding was acceptable to both parties and the reasons why
renewed conflict occurred in 1976. I shall argue that the 1975
understanding was a 'holding action' made possible by the favourable
state of relations between the two parties at that time, and that the
renewal of open conflict was at least partly the result of a breakdown
of relations of trust.
Negotiations and an interim agreement
The question of sharing
The May 197^ prime ministerial meeting gave the Joint Rivers Commission
a mandate to discuss augmenting the flow of the Ganges. No forum or
method of negotiation was laid down for settlement of the more urgent
question of how to share the existing dry season flow of the river.
No negotiations took place on this sharing until February 1975, when
Abdur Rab Serniabat, Sheik Mujib's brother in law and the new
Bangladesh Minister of Water and Power, met Jagjivan Ram, India's
newly appointed Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, in Delhi.
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Table 8.1 Chronology of conflict, May 197^ to December 1976
197^ June to Six meetings of the Joint Rivers Commission
Dec (JRC) discussed alternative ways of augmeting
the lean season flow in the Ganges
1975 Jan Bangladesh's Sheik Mujibur Raham assumed near
dictatorial powers
Feb Water Ministers A R Serniabat and Jagjivan Ram
met in Dacca
Apr Water Minister met again in Dacca and reached an
'understanding' allowing India to divert small
quantities of water for forty days
Jun 13th meeting of JRC
Declaration of Indian Emergency
Aug Coup d'etat in Bangladesh killed Mujibur Rahman,
Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed assumed power
Nov Attempted 'pro-Indian' Coup in Bangladesh
followed by Army mutiny which established Ziaur
Rahman in power
Dec Bangladesh -emissaries visited Delhi
1976 Jan Bangladesh objection to India's continued
withdrawal of water at Farakka started exchange
of protests
Feb Indian High Commissioner to Dacca returned to
Delhi to see Mrs Gandhi
Mar Mrs Gandhi offered to reduce withdrawals
Apr Technical discussions began in Dacca
May 100-500,000 Bangladeshis marched toward Indian
border in protest against Farakka
Jun Indian Foreign Secretary led goodwill delegation
to Dacca
Aug Bangladesh announced that the conflict would be
raised at the UN
Sep Rear Admiral M H Khan of Bangladesh was 'snubbed'
by Mrs Gandhi
Oct to Discussions at the UN resulted in a compromise
Nov resolution which committed the two parties to
meet again
Dec Meetings in Dacca were inconclusive
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Ram brought considerable experience and political seniority to the
negotiations, but the two ministers made little progress (1).
Nevertheless, there are suggestions that India was testing the barrage
in the early months of 1975 and keeping it in readiness for full-scale
operation (2).
The ministers met again two months later. They were optimistic at
the .start of their meeting (j>) and, within two days, an interim
'understanding' had been constructed. It was agreed that India could
divert small quantities of water for the forty days until the end of
May. India received only a fraction of the water demanded (see
Table 8.2), but Bangladesh did concede the precedent of operation of
the barrage.
The understanding settled neither of the outstanding principal questions
of the conflict: discussions on both sharing and augmentation were to
continue. The government-owned Bangladesh Observer noted:
'The agreement will not disturb the discussions regarding
the allocation of fair weather flows of the Ganges during
the lean months as was envisaged in the Prime Minister's
declaration of May 197^-' (^)
It was an interim agreement allowing experimental operation of the
barrage. Joint teams were to observe the effects of the diversions
at Farakka, on the Hooghly and inside Bangladesh.
The ministers' understanding was given a mixed reception. It was
generally welcomed as a step forward, although there was criticism
on both sides of the border. The absence of Serniabat, the
Bangladesh Minister, from the official opening of the Farakka Barrage
has been interpreted as an expression of Bangladesh's reservations,
and a West Bengal State Minister was quoted as describing India's
share of the water as 'driblets...in quantities that do not serve our
purpose' (5)- Nevertheless, water started flowing down the newly
constructed feeder canal into the Bhagirathi and joint observation
teams set out to observe the effects of the diversions.
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NOTES: (l) As defined by the 1975 Agreement, see Appendix A.
(2) Based on the water available in the most scarce
73% of observed years (1948-73) as given in the
November 1977 Agreement (see Appendix A).
(3) Assumed to be 40,000 cusecs.
(4) Assumed to be 49,000 cusecs.
(5) As (2).
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The question of augmentation
Whilst the two ministers were negotiating an interim allocation of the
existing flow, the Joint Rivers Commission was discussing methods of
increasing that flow. Although the JRC met monthly from June 197^,
its discussions had come to a standstill by December. The Bangladesh
team was supporting one method of increasing the flow and the Indians
another, and:
'The Joint Rivers Commission could not therefore come to
any agreed conclusion on the subject.' (6)
Bangladesh proposed that the dry season flow of the Ganges should be
augmented by the construction of storage reservoirs on the river's
Himalayan tributaries. These reservoirs could store the monsoon flow
of the tributaries for release later in the year when water became
scarce. The Indian team opposed this concept, arguing that a canal
to transfer surplus water from the Brahmaputra into the Ganges was a
more 'realistic' alternative (?)•
We shall see in Chapter 9 that the Indo-Bangladesh negotiations
concentrated on these two proposals in the period 1977 "to 1980 without
either side substantially altering from the positions developed in
the 197^ meetings of the JRC. The two proposals are described in
detail in Part IV of this thesis.
Joint observation
\
One of the features of the interim understanding which must have
commended it to both sides was the clause providing for three joint
teams to observe the effects of the experimental diversions. These
three teams took up their tasks at a few days notice and jointly
measured what was happening during the forty days covered by the
understanding.
None of the three teams ever submitted joint findings. At least two
of the teams experienced difficulty in arriving at a consensus (8),
and such cooperation as they were able to muster was overtaken by
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events. Before the teams finally met to draft joint reports, the
leaders of the Government of Bangladesh were overthrown, and the
meetings did not take place (9)-
Soured relations: August 1975 - September 1976
1975 was a year of reckoning in Bangladesh. At the beginning of the
year, the Awami League government was transformed into a one-party
dictatorship. In August a coup d'etat brought a right-wing, pro-
American regime to power. A second coup d'etat in November was
overtaken after only a few days by a revolutionary mutiny within the
armed forces. Although the mutiny was led by a left-wing party, the
regime it brought to power became populist and capitalist (10).
For the last months of 1975» the Ganges conflict was forgotton in
the turmoil of coup and counter-coup. From the end of the forty day
interim agreement, India had been diverting almost 40,000 cusecs from
the Ganges (11), and presumably this continued throughout the remainder
of 1975- Bangladesh did not protest publicly about these withdrawals
until the early days of 1976. Just before this outbreak of renewed,
vociferous dispute, representatives of the two sides met in Delhi.
Representatives of Bangladesh's new President met Mrs Gandhi, the
Indian Foreign Secretary and others but at the end of the visit only
a strained and uninformative statement was released (12). On January
15 1976, a Bangladesh protest note started a year of public dispute.
Bangladesh alleged that Indian withdrawals after the end of the forty
day understanding constituted a breach of the agreement (13)- The
Indian Government's response said it was 'surprised and pained' at
such propaganda, particularly because it had been agreed at the
previous month's meeting that both sides would refrain from 'hostile
propaganda' (1k).
In February and March, the Bangladesh Government protested frequently,
in several forums and by a variety of media. During all this period,
and with the dry season of low Ganges flows imminent, Indian withdrawals
of Ganges water were continuing at or near the maximum allowed by the
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Farakka Barrage Project. We shall see in Section III that these
diversions caused serious damage to agriculture, industry and ecology
in South Western districts of Bangladesh. Bangladesh's sense of
crisis during these months was based on reality. And, simultaneously,
Bangladesh was suffering armed attacks from across the Indian border.
Awami Leaguers and others, opposed to the new regime were making
intermittent raids into Bangladesh (15)*
Bangladesh's concern that Indian diversions at Farakka were causing
economic and ecological disruption was not well reported in the Indian
press. The American Consul in Calcutta has suggested there was
effectively censorship on this issue (16).
Both India and Bangladesh set preconditions to be met before talks
could be held. According to the Indian Foreign Ministry, Bangladesh
had told them: 'Negotiations can only start when withdrawals stop'
(17)* The Bangladesh Government reported that India was only willing
to meet if thd talks were confined to sharing of the water in the
period March 15th to May 15th (18). Both sides also made more positive
suggestions, even at the height of the dispute. Bangladesh proposed
the creation of international commissions for the Ganges and
Brahmaputra (19) and, toward the end of March, after Bangladesh had
relaxed its precondition for talks, India announced a concession.
Mrs Gandhi reportedly told the Bangladesh High Commissioner in Delhi:
'India is taking steps to keep up the downstream flow at
the March 15th level during the rest of the two-month
lean season to the extent possible on the basis of the
availability of the waters...It is now Bangladesh's turn
to choose its response in a helpful manner to pave the way
for a restoration of mutual confidence.' (20)
At the same time Mrs Gandhi told Bangladesh that an offer India had
made - for the JRC to study the effects of withdrawals on Bangladesh -
remained open. The offer was accepted, and talks began the following
month in Dacca. They were, however, technical talks on a restricted
topic. As had happened during the 1960s, India was again emphasising
that political negotiations could not take place until technical
talks had:
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'At the suggestion of the Government of India, the
Government of Bangladesh have agreed to hold technical
level talks to exchange information and data and to
assess the alleged effects in Bangladesh of the
operation of the Farakka Barrage Feeder Canal.
Opportunity will also be taken for discussing arrangements
for joint observation of the effects of the operation of
the Farakka Barrage feeder canal in [ on? ] irrigation,
salinity, navigation etc the [in?] Bangladesh and on the
Hooghly River for the benefit of Calcutta Port.
'In our view meaningful talks on the allocation of.the
Ganga waters which is a highly technical matter, can
take place only after experts of the two sides have been
able to study and evaluate all the relevant data.' (21)
The talks occurred in a period when relations were at a low ebb. A
few days before the talks were announced, India had protested about
two shooting incidents on the border (22). The officials met for
two rounds of discussions, and travelled through South West Bangladesh,
up the Hooghly and to the Farakka Barrage. Neither side issued details
of what they had achieved, and within a few days of the return of the
Bangladesh team, B M Abbas was quoted saying that the Indian figures
for withdrawals from the Ganges did not tally with Bangladesh's
measurements (23).
At the end of April Bangladesh's venerable peasant leader, Moulana
Bhashani, had:
'called on India to dismantle the Farakka Dam...and
threatened to organise a protest march of one million
people.' (2*0
Bhashani carried out his threat ten days after the end of the talks.
Estimates of the size of the march, ranged from hundreds of thousands
to half a million (25)- The Indian Government prepared for violence
and border violations, but the march stopped six miles short of the
border (26).
A few days later, Rear Admiral M H Khan, Chief of the Bangladesh Navy
and a member of the ruling junta, who had become Bangladesh's main
spokesman and negotiator on the Ganges issue, announced an attempt to
excavate the Gorai River in the South West of the country to help
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overcome low water levels (27)-
India's Foreign Secretary, Jagat Mehta, led a 'goodwill mission' to
Bangladesh in mid-June, and the public clamour of the dispute died
down for almost two months (28). At the beginning of August, however,
Bangladesh announced that it had decided to take its case to the
United Nations.
One final round of talks was held before the issue was raised at the
UN. M H Khan led a delegation to Delhi in September but no agreement
was reached. From the statements each side issued after the talks,
four main differences of opinion can be identified: Bangladesh insisted
that augmentation should take place within the Ganges Basin; India
did not accept that Bangladesh had a right to veto upstream withdrawals;
the two sides differed over the length of the dry season; and India
rejected any notion that Nepal should be a participant in the
discussions (29)-
According to a Bangladesh diplomat's account, a meeting between Khan
and Mrs Gandhi was brief and unsatisfactory. Khan wanted to raise
two issues: guerrilla attacks and water sharing, but after hearing him
on the first question Mrs Gandhi turned to discuss it with Jagjivan
Ram. Evidently she decided that what Khan was saying was incorrect,
for she apparently ended the meeting there and then, without discussion
of water sharing. According to another Bangladesh account, Mrs Gandhi
took a violent dislike to Khan and at least one message was sent to
Ziaur Rahman, by way of the Bangladesh military attache in Burma who
was close to Zia, suggesting that progress might be possible if Khan
were dropped from the negotiating team (30). Khan was one of the few
officers who had played no role in the Bangladesh liberation struggle.
He is therefore considered to be pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian.
Frustration at the United Nations
Faced with the failure of bilateral negotiations with India, and with
serious and possibly cumulative damage occurring as a result of India's
withdrawals, the Bangladesh Government searched for a new strategy.
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The attempt to muster international support during the first half of
1976 had not been particularly successful - only China and Pakistan
had whole-heartedly backed the Bangladesh position (jl). Nevertheless,
Bangladesh decided to raise the issue within the United Nations, ^he
government then faced the question of how, exactly, that should be done;
several courses were open to it.
The .United Nations system includes a variety of different forums and
a series of specialised agencies. Bangladesh could have raised their
grievance in at least nine different ways:
(a) Through the 'good offices' of the Secretary General;
(b) by raising it in the General Assembly;
(c) through the Security Council if the dispute was likely
to endanger international peace;
(d) by bringing the case to the International Court of
Justice;
(e) by raising the issue in the International Law
Commission;
(f) through the International Water Conference due to
be held in Argentina in 1977i
(g) by asking the Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific to investigate;
(h) through the United Nations Environment Programme; and
(i) by asking the World Bank to use its 'good offices'
as it had done in the Indus Waters dispute between
India and Pakistan. (32)
A Bangladesh diplomat on secondment to the UN recommended to his
government that the final option of involving the World Bank should
be chosen. He proposed that:
'at an appropriate stage of negotiations [Bangladesh]
may agree to discuss the Indian proposal for a link
canal between Brahmaputra and Ganges provided that India
agrees to a World Bank role in the realization of a
project involving Ganges-Brahmaputra basin development...' (33)
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This course was rejected in favour of a more public confrontation
in the UN General Assembly. In preparation for this meeting, first
Bangladesh and then India published pamphlets setting out their
cases (3*0.
In order to raise their grievance successfully, Bangladesh diplomats
had to negotiate a course through the preparatory procedures of the
General Assembly: an item had to be included in the agenda of the
Assembly; the item had then to be manouvred into a committee with
appropriate concerns; and, finally, that committee had to be persuaded
to recommend a favourable resolution for the consideration of the
General Assembly. At each of these three stages Indian diplomats
could be expected to attempt to defeat or divert the agenda item.
This is what happened.
In the first procedural stage India opposed consideration of the
dispute, but the item was accepted. At the next stage, India pressed
for the question to be considered by the Economic Committee of the
General Assembly, rather than by the Political Committee. Again,
India was defeated; the item was referred to the Special Political
Committee, in line with Bangladesh's wishes (35)- These first two
stages were, however, only preparatory skirmishes. India's
representatives were able to recoup their losses in the backstage war
which followed.
After a postponement, Rear Admiral M II Khan put the Bangladesh case
to the Special Political Committee and India's Foreign Secretary
Jagat Mehta replied. At that stage the public proceedings ceased and
there was what amounted to an embarrassing delay while both parties
lobbied and negotiated, through intermediaries, behind the scenes.
The Bangladesh resolution was withdrawn and replaced by a consensus
statement which had been evolved with the assistance of an ad hoc
mediation committee consisting of representatives of five non-aligned
states: Algeria, Egypt, Guyana, Sri Lanka and Syria (36). The
consensus resolution was, as a Bangladesh diplomat has admitted, 'a
way of saving face' (37)-
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The Bangladesh representatives found that they were received with
sympathy, to the extent that UN members did not want to send away
a small state with a grievance. This sympathy carried Bangladesh
through the first procedural stages at the UN, but no further.
Concern could not be transformed into positive support. Most member
states did not want to take sides in the dispute, least of all
against a relatively important state like India. The Bangladesh
delegation realised that they had a choice of either taking a militant
line and moving a resolution which would gain mostly abstentions, or
accepting a face-saving compromise. One factor influencing their
choice of the latter course was their assessment that the major powers
considered themselves to be upper riparian states, like India, and
so did a majority of member states of the UN (38).
As an attempt to mobilise support, or to obtain third party intervention,
Bangladesh's action at the United Nations was a mistake (39)-
Bangladesh did achieve publicity for its case, and the consensus
resolution which the General Assembly confirmed did contain one
concession to Bangladesh's objectives:
'It is open to either party to report to the General
Assembly at its thirty-second session on the progress
achieved in the settlement of the problem.' (Uo)
These were, however, small rewards compared to the diplomatic effort
expanded. Bangladesh returned to bilateral negotiations having tried
a remedy of the last resort and found it wanting.
We shall see, in the following chapter, that the bilateral negotiations
which succeeded the referral to the UN were as intractable as those
which preceded it.
DISCUSSION
1975 and 1976 were years of rapid change in the conflict over the
River Ganges. A few days of negotiation in April 1975 brought a
written understanding on the operation of the Farakka Barrage. The
agreement covered only forty days and it was, as we shall see, a
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flawed contract, but it was progress. Nevertheless, within a year,
open conflict had begun again with renewed vigour.
In the same period, the framework of cooperation which had been built
up between India and Bangladesh during the Mujib regime was altered
radically by the changes of government in Bangladesh.
An analysis of the interaction between the changes in the 'state of
relations' between the two parties and the changes in their perception
of the Ganges conflict would make a valuable case study. Did the
specific dispute influence the general relations or was it the other
way round? The latter seems more probable. There is, however,
insufficient evidence to support such an analysis. This discussion
is, therefore, limited to a brief assessment of the 1975 understanding
and an exploration of the two countries' motives in allowing the
recrudescence of conflict.
Arrival: the 1975 understanding
Two participants have given their interpretations of the factors which
contributed to the acceptance of the 1975 understanding by the two
governments. On the Indian side, a senior Ministry of External Affairs
official gave me these reasons:
'One, we did some things with Mujib which we would not
do with any other leader. It was a matter of trust. He
understood the context and when it comes to something
else we knew he will cooperate.
'Two, tactical: the matter of over-riding importance was
to open the barrage. Having invested so much money, the
government would have been foolish not to use the barrage.
They wanted it opened and then would discuss it further.
'Three, in the wording of the 1975 understanding the fact
that it was interim was made very, very clear.' C+1)
What, on the other hand, did Bangladesh gain from the agreement? The
then Foreign Minister, Hossein, thinks that the agreement established
three principles of benefit to Bangladesh:
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a) that the whole of the utilisable water was to be
regulated by agreement, that it would not be used
unilaterally;
b) that the subsequent long term agreement would be
influenced by the findings on the impact of the
diversions (in recognition of the interests Bangladesh
was seeking to protect); and,
c) that the impact would be under constant review to
see how the two countries' interests were being
affected. (^2)
Two aspects of these participants' comments should be emphasised. The
Indian participant has drawn attention to the importance of trust,
that is, to the 'state of relations' between the two countries.
Hossein, the Bangladesh participant, has emphasised factors which may
have been implicit in the agreement, but were not written into it
(see the Joint Press Release reproduced in Appendix A). This emphasis
also indicates a level of trust, of cooperation, between the two
countries.
The understanding, as published, is a perfunctory document confined
to the few points of agreement. This too suggests a considerable
degree of cooperation and trust between the negotiators.
Paradoxically that trust may have laid the foundations for the renewal
of the dispute. The shortcomings of the understanding may have
contributed to the conflict which occurred in the following year.
The understanding was deficient in one notable respect: it made no
provision for succeeding dry seasons. Hossein has argued (bj>) that
the 1975 understanding created a precedent for succeeding dry seasons.
He believes that the negotiators of the 1975 agreement anticipated
that a similar agreement would be worked out for the following year,
and that this is implied by the understanding (bb). If a brief
clause to that effect could have been agreed the following years
conflict might have been avoided.
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Departure: the 1976 conflict
During 1976 both parties to the Ganges conflict reverted to postures
and demands characteristic of the period before the independence of
Bangladesh. The Indian Government again had recourse to the formula,
'technical talks but not political negotiations', and to a virtual
denial, of Bangladesh's locus standi in the sharing of the water (^5);
Bangladesh relapsed into a questioning of the utility of the Farakka
Barrage (^+6). From 1972 until 1976, India had accepted Bangladesh's
standing as a co-riparian state and had been willing to enter into
political negotiations. Similarly, Bangladesh had not sought to veto
the Farakka Barrage Project in this period; it had accepted the
existence of the project and attempted to negotiate an equitable
sharing of the water. In other words, the principle of equitable
utilisation had prevailed between 1972 and 1975- In 1976 India
reverted to a 'positivistic1 theory of law and Bangladesh to a
'jusnaturalistic' one (as defined in the Introduction to this thesis).
There is some evidence suggesting that the new postures adopted by
the two governments after 1975 were at least partly the result of
political objectives unconnected with the Ganges conflict. These
independent objectives may not have been the cause of intensified
conflict but they were almost certainly contributing factors.
It has been argued by an Indian participant that the Bangladesh position
in the dispute was motivated by a need to create an external threat
to the country in order foster a sense of national unity (h?). There
is no doubt that the coups d'etat and subsequent executions in
Bangladesh left a deeply divided country, and that Ziaur Rahman
needed to create support for his military regime. There is .StJCprising,
if possibly unintended, support for this thesis - that the dispute
was 'used' to forge national unity - from one of Ziaur Rahman's
ministers. Enayatullah Khan was a (private citizen) member of the
Bangladesh delegation to the UN in 1976, and subsequently a minister
in 1977 and 1978. He interprets Bangladesh's decision to raise the
Ganges conflict in the UN as follows:
'We made Farakka first into a national issue. We tried to
transform the issue so that it was no longer just about
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water, into a symbol of national resistance...
'Then the demand arose to take the issue to the UN. The
main purpose of that was not to solve the problem, it
was to internationalise the issue in its totality with
other relevant issues. It helped us in breaking the
barriers in the international community. The Bangladesh
profile was not very good after 1975- It gave us a
forum where we could defend ourselves and win over other
countries with similar experience of river disputes...' (^8)
This quotation provides some support for the view that the Bangladesh
Government had additional motives, besides obtaining a fair share of
the Ganges, in promoting the dispute in 197b. Enayatullah appears
to be saying that the Ziaur regime needed first a 'national issue' to
unite the country and, secondly, an issue with which the new regime
could introduce themselves to other members of the international
community.
It has been alleged, by a senior civil servant in the Bangladesh
Foreign Office*, that the real cause of renewed conflict in 1976 was
India's opposition to the new regime. He argues that India:
'did not like the present government, they wanted to
destabilise it...' (^9)
Whilst there is no direct evidence to support this allegation, a
comparison of the 1975 understanding with the concession offered by
Mrs Gandhi at the end of March 1976 indicates that India was
approaching the dispute in a very different spirit. Figure 8.1
provides a graphical comparison of the 1975 understanding and
Mrs Gandhi's ambiguous and unilateral concession (50)* It is quite
clear that the concession was a modest one, and Bangladesh claims
that even less than the amount promised in that concession actually
flowed into Bangladesh.
CONCLUSIONS
In addition to providing an account of a period of rapid change in
the Ganges waters conflict, this chapter has discussed two questions





Figure 8.1 A comparison of the 1975 understanding with Mrs. Gandhi's
concession
See notes overleaf.
Figure 8.1: Notes to 'A Comparison of the 1975 Agreement with
Mrs Gandhi's Concession'.
(1) This curve is based on figures for average (ten-day) discharge
at Farakka. It does not coincide with the data used in Table
8.2. Those figures are for the '75% availability' discharge.
(2) The curve represents the quantity of flow continuing to
Bangladesh. It is the curve left after the quantities agreed
in the 1975 Agreement have been deducted from curve (l).
(3) This represents an estimate of the most plausible interpretation
of the concession announced by Mrs Gandhi on March 30th 1976.
She said India would attempt to maintain the flow at the
March 15th level.
l6^f
(i) What made the 1975 Understanding acceptable
to both governments?
(ii) Why did the dispute flare up again only a few
months later?
The evidence available provides only partial answers to these questions.
Participants in the negotiations emphasise the fraternal relations
existing between the two governments in early 1975i predisposing them
to put their trust in a temporary expedient, an incomplete and very
short term contract. Trust paved the way for the 1975 Understanding;
the Indian Government's impatience to experiment with the barrage in
the impending 1975 dry season gave impetus to the negotiations. India
therefore accepted a small and experimental diversion for initial
operation of the barrage.
Whilst the Indian participant argues that the Bangladesh President
'understood tfre context' of the Understanding, it is clear that the
Bangladesh Foreign Minister read rather more into the contract than
was justified by subsequent experience. The state of intergovernmental
trust in the months preceding the 1975 dry season was not replicated
in 1976; Hossein's anticipation that a similar understanding could
be negotiated for 1976 was not warranted. The change of regimes in
Bangladesh brought a break down of trust between India and Bangladesh.
Without trust it proved impossible to negotiate. In these
circumstances the Indian Government interpreted the 1975 Understanding
to the letter: the agreement referred only to forty days in April
and May 1975j not to 1976.
In the absence of negotiations in 1976, Mrs Gandhi offered Bangladesh
an ambiguous concession: that the flow of water in the Ganges should
remain at the March 15th 1976 volume. This concession compared
unfavourably with the 1975 Understanding; it gave India 80% more
water than the average of the 1975 dry season.
Both sides to the conflict allege that the renewal of open dispute was
caused not just by the absence of intergovernmental trust, but also
by decisions to 'use' the conflict in furtherance of independent
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political ends. The Indian participant argues that the Bangladesh
Government needed an external threat to foster national unity;
a Bangladesh participant argues that India was implementing a
'destabilisation1 policy against Bangladesh. These are serious
accusations made by serving officers of the two governments. In
part, no doubt, both accusations are rhetoric generated by an
intractable and passionately fought conflict. There is, however,
also some evidence lending substance to both allegations.
A minister in the Bangladesh Government has said that the conflict in
1976 was 'no longer just about water [but transformed] into a symbol
of national resistance...' Is this not confirmation that Bangladesh
was meeting other ends by renewing the open conflict?
The Indian Government's acquiescence to guerrilla attacks upon Bangladesh
during 1976 provides no proof of a conscious policy to undermine the
Bangladesh Government. It was nevertheless a distinctly unfriendly
act. Mrs Gandhi's concession of a slight reduction in the Indian
diversions from the Ganges falls into the same category of unfriendly
act. Whether or not these two unfriendly acts grew from one decision
to destabilise Bangladesh is a question for future historians to
decide. The facts are that Bangladesh was suffering military raids
from across its borders, and at the same time was suffering ecological,
agricultural and economic disruption as a consequence of unprecedented
low flows in the Ganges; it is not surprising that the Bangladesh
Government should interpret these facts as the consequences of an
Indian decision to undermine the new Bangladesh regime.
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Chapter Nine
THE GANGES WATERS TREATY
In November 1976, the Bangladesh Government accepted a face-saving
compromise in the Special Political Committee of the United Nations
because they found few members of the UN were willing to support
their case. They were forced back into bilateral negotiations, having
gained almost nothing and with fewer weapons at their disposal.
Bangladesh's bluff had been called. The remedy of the last resort
had been tried and found ineffective.
Not surprisingly, in these circumstances, the resumed bilateral
negotiations did not progress. But within a few months, political
changes inside India came to the rescue of the Bangladesh Government.
Mrs Gandhi was ousted by the Janata Party in March 1977, and the new
government were anxious to mend fences with their Eastern and Northern
neighbours. Within weeks of the Janata government taking office, an
understanding had been reached with Bangladesh on the sharing of the
Ganges waters. Six months of detailed negotiation ensued before the
understanding could be formalised in a treaty, but the Ganges Waters
Treaty did emerge.
This Treaty resolved the immediate issue of sharing the water (the
second phase of the dispute identified in the Introduction to Section
II) but set aside the issue of how to increase the dry season flow
of the Ganges (the third phase of the dispute).
This chapter chronicles the process by which the Treaty emerged,
examines some of the limitations of the Treaty and records the
progress of the discussions about increasing the dry season flow.
It is argued that the Ganges Waters Treaty was made possible first
by an Indian concession on the allocation of the flow during the
driest ten-day period, and second by an agreement from India to
cease giving sanctuary to guerrillas operating against Bangladesh.
At the end of the chapter, a review of the conclusions of Part II is
presented.
167
Chronology of the settlement
The consensus statement of the UN dictated that both parties should
meet again, represented at ministerial level, in Dacca. This they
did in December 1976, but little progress was made. The meeting,
between Jagjivan Ram, representing India, and Rear Admiral M H Khan,
representing Bangladesh, was adjourned, resumed, adjourned again and
then resumed in Delhi before being broken off altogether. The
discussion was apparently focussed on the issue of water sharing.
One report says India offered Bangladesh 'more than half' the lean
season flow but Bangladesh was not willing to accept India diverting
more than 15,000 cusecs (1). At the end of the talks in Delhi, the
Indian Government announced that the talks had merely ended without
agreement, whilst a Bangladesh Government spokesman said:
'The negotiations were not successful because the Indian
side failed to recognise the urgency of the situation
and the serious adverse effects in Bangladesh of continuous
withdrawal of Ganges water at Farakka, especially with
the onset of the dry season since November.' (2)
The details of the talks, described a month later in the Far Eastern
Economic Review, reveal that the Bangladesh delegation, lead by
M H Khan, apparently received a snub from Mrs Gandhi, rather similar
to the one he had suffered in September 1976 (see Chapter Eight):
'Before the Bangladesh delegation arrived in New Delhi
for talks, Indian Premier Indira Gandhi had announced a
general election. As the Bangladeshis reached Delhi
she was heading for the Kumbha Mela (fair) about 500
miles away. On arrival, the delegation's leader, Navy
Chief Rear Admiral M H Khan, met the then Agriculture
Minister Jagjivan Ram in what was described as the
opening of formal talks. He was told that the Indians
had nothing new to offer. Khan was flabbergasted. "What
was the sense of asking us to come to Delhi then?" he
asked Ram. The veteran Indian politician said he was
sorry he could not reconsider the Indian position as the
Premier was away from Delhi. The Bangladesh delegation
had little left to do except sightseeing.
'Another meeting was scheduled for the following morning,
but it was cancelled unceremoniously 10 minutes before
the Bangladesh delegation was due to leave the hotel for
the talks. An assistant protocol officer of India's
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External Affairs Ministry was considered sufficiently
competent to inform Khan of the cancellation. Before
the Bangladesh team left for' home, Ram and the head of
India's Policy Planning Division, G Parthasarathy,
called on Admiral Khan to tell him 'off the record' that
the Indian Government coxild not initiate any new move on
its own, and could not consider any proposal presented
by Bangladesh because "such a move may have serious
adverse effects on the Congress Party's election chances,
especially in West Bengal."' (3)
Neither side used the breakdown of the talks to generate significant
levels of propaganda. The Indian Government had no reason to because
the status quo suited its interests. The Bangladesh Government had
characterised the UN resolution as a 'vindication' of their position;
to have publicised the deadlock in the discussions so soon afterwards
might have drawn attention to the limitations of the UN resolution
C+). No arrangements were made for a resumption of discussions.
One insight into the discussions was provided by the US Embassy in
Dacca, who cabled their government as follows:
'Khan and Jagjivan met several times separately from
advisers on both January *\k and 15 but were unable to
reach [ the ] political agreement which several Bangladeshis
have hoped would emerge from discussions not 'burdened'
by presence of technical personnel. The latter have
been accused of splitting cusecs so minutely as to be a
hindrance to a solution.' (5)
Bangladesh reached a nadir in the negotiations during these early
months of 1977- In cfesperation, the threat of building a Ganges
Barrage to flood India was revived and labour-intensive river
clearances instigated in anticipation of the effects of Farakka
diversions (6). President Ziaur Rahman had visited China in
January, where he had received renewed declarations of Chinese
support for Bangladesh and for the Bangladesh Government's stand on
Farakka (7)- After the failure of M H Khan's visit to Delhi, Zia
visited Iran, but he did not get support from the Shah, who would
only say that he hoped the two nations would be able to settle
their differences (8). Bangladesh could muster the public support
of only a few friendly nations. Amongst the more powerful, only
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China was willing to make public declarations of support and, since
China and India had not resolved .the differences which had caused
the 1962 war, that support could not readily be converted into
pressure on the Government of India.
The Bangladesh Government's parlous circumstance was complicated by
the political situation inside India. Khan had been told, 'off the
record', that the Congress Party were unwilling to risk the electoral
consequences, particularly in West Bengal, of a compromise settlement
with Bangladesh (9)- However, it was the election which rescued
Bangladesh from its nadir of powerlessness. In March 19771
Mrs Gandhi's faction of the Congress was defeated at the polls by
the Janata coalition. The incoming government was pledged to a
policy of good-neighbourliness (10), as was its predecessor, and it
chose to produce results in this area of policy in the early days
of its reign. The necessary concessions were made and, within weeks
of the election, an understanding of sorts had been achieved.
A new 'understanding'
Jagjivan Ram, now the Defence Minister of the Janata Government,
rather than the Agriculture Minister of the Congress Government, led
an Indian delegation to Dacca on April 15th 1977- By most accounts
it was a dramatic occasion. The Indian delegation postponed their
departure more than once, and angry scenes were recorded before they
finally left. This is how it was reported in the Far Eastern Economic
Review:
'In a rare if not unprecedented outburst of rage, India's
Babuji Jagjivan Ram shouted at pressmen waiting at the
state guest house here, 'Take it from me, nothing has been
settled.' ...And half an hour later at the airport, while
Khan and Ram remained behind closed doors in the VIP
lounge, Jagat Mehta [India's Foreign Secretary] read out
a one-sentence statement to newsmen: 'An understanding
has been reached, the details of which are to be worked
out at a meeting of the officials of the two governments
to be held in Delhi as soon as possible.'
'When asked to elaborate, the irate Indian diplomat
replied: 'In the interest of Indo-Bangladesh friendship,
for God's sake do not ask any more questions."' (11)
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It appears that a limited, verbal understanding was reached, Jagjivan
Ram's anger notwithstanding, and that India had made a concession
on the quantity of water to be given to Bangladesh in the driest
ten-day period of the year. The details of the understanding have
never been authoritatively published but they can be tentatively
pieced together from what different participants told the newspapers
at the time.
In January, the Indian delegation had been willing to concede that the
withdrawals at Farakka in the driest period might be reduced to
25,000 to 27,500 cusecs. The Bangladesh delegation had at that time
raised the 16,000 cusecs ceiling of the 1975 understanding to 171000
cusecs, with hints that 20,000 cusecs might be acceptable. The two
sides therefore entered the April round of discussions separated
by between 5^000 and 10,500 cusecs. Newspaper reports suggest that
the understanding emerging from these discussions laid down that
India could divert only 20,000 to 2^,000 cusecs in the driest ten
days, with ohe report stating that a quantity of 20,500 cusecs had
been agreed. Since this is the quantity enshrined in the treaty
signed the following November, it seems most probable that this
report was correct. If that is the case, the Indian delegation had
conceded between k,500 and 7i000 cusecs, whilst Bangladesh had
given away only 500 to 3?500 cusecs (12).
In addition to this main concession on the division of the waters,
the Indian delegation seem to have accepted that the flows should
be shared for a longer period. Earlier, India had insisted on a
lean season, the period of lowest Ganges flows defined by them as
the period from mid-March to mid-May, whereas Bangladesh had wanted
a seven-month, November to May, dry season. In the November treaty
a five-month period of sharing, from January to May, was agreed.
Certain issues were not resolved by this understanding. The division
of the water during the remainder of the five month period was not
decided, nor was the long term augmentation question. Also, the
question of Indian support for guerrillas attacking Bangladesh does
not seem to have been settled, though Ram went with the intention
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of raising the issue (13), and there can be no doubt that the
Bangladesh Government were enraged and seriously worried by the
attacks. It is just possible that the emotional scenes which occurred
when the Indian delegation departed had more to do with this unresolved
question than with the I'arakka discussions. Immediately prior to
his departure Jagjivan Ram had had a three-hour meeting with Ziaur
Rahman.
In May, B M Abbas, the most senior technical official on the
Bangladesh side, led a delegation to Delhi. In discussions with an
Indian delegation led by Jagat Mehta, the issue of increasing the
dry season flow of the Ganges was raised. Bangladesh wanted third
party technical aid to help plan projects. Then, as before and since,
the Indian delegation rejected the suggestion because they believed
that international technical agencies and foreign engineering
consultants would tend to favour Bangladesh, and that this was why
Bangladesh wanted their intervention (1*0 . One account of this
meeting, by G K Reddy, a normally well-informed Indian journalist,
suggested that the meeting had reached a deadlock; each side was
insisting^its own proposal for increasing the flow. The same account
mentions that the deadlock could be broken by agreement in principle
to study both country's proposals (15)- This is the solution which
was accepted finally, but not at that meeting, which was postponed.
Dawn suggested that the meeting had to be postponed because agreement
would have prejudiced the forthcoming legislative assembly elections
in West Bengal (16), whilst The Hindu thought that Bangladesh was
waiting for an agreement preventing guerrilla attacks across the
border (17)«
In June, Ziaur Rahman and Morarji Desai went to London for the
Commonwealth Conference and, as in 19&1, the Conference provided
circumstances, which might otherwise not have arisen, for the
leaders of the two nations to meet informally. At this meeting
Prime Minister Desai agreed to 'see that no shelter was given to
criminal elements from across the border, whatever might have taken
place under the previous regime' (18). India had now made what
they saw as two concessions, on the quantity of water and on the
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guerrilla attacks, and they thought that mutual confidence had been
restored by the Zia-Desai meeting. However, Bangladesh had suggested
that Nepal and China should be involved in any long term development
of the Ganges (19)- At this time, several Members of India's upper
house of parliament, the Rajya Sabha, expressed their fears that
the settlement of the guerrilla issue, which was widely interpreted
as a necessary preliminary to settlement of the Ganges dispute, was
a 'sell-out' to Bangladesh (20). Newspaper reports suggested that
the guerrillas were being forcibly returned to Bangladesh whereupon
some were massacred (21).
During August and September more discussions took place. Jagat
Mehta went to Dacca in August and, during talks with B M Abbas, the
differences between the two sides were, according to the official
statement, 'narrowed down' (22). Other accounts were less sanguine.
Bangladesh was apparently sticking to its case that the long-term
developments were not a matter for bilateral, but for quadrilateral,
discussion (23)- Nevertheless, preparations were being made for a
settlement. Jagjivan Ram visited Calcutta to prepare West Bengal
for a change of tune. He told the Merchant Chamber of Commerce,
'It would not be fair to flood Bangladesh during the monsoon and
leave it dry during the summer months when it too needs water' (2*0.
Ram was bold enough to use Bangladesh's interpretation of the water
shoi-tage, an argument he had himself spent many months rebutting.
He told the businessmen that if India withdrew ^0,000 cusecs,
Bangladesh would be left with only 15,000 cusecs. As a Calcutta
paper pointed out, this calculation did not tally with the sums that
the central government had previously used. Where was the 25,000
cusecs of recharge? (25) West Bengal leaders lobbied the Central
government, demanding the maximum diversion at Farakka, but to no
apparent effect (26).
There was something of a hitch when talks resumed in September.
B M Abbas led, a Bangladesh delegation to Delhi, and the talks went
on in fits and starts through most of September. Prime Minister
Desai said, early in the month, that there was agreement and received
a sharp rebuttal from Bangladesh: it was only a verbal understanding
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(27). By mid-month, there were reports that the talks had broken
down. G K Reddy, of The Hindu, reported 'Admiral M H Khan has ripped
open the whole controversy with his latest contention that there
was no such thing as a package deal under discussion..' Evidently,
the problem was over the parties with rights in the long term issue.
Reddy wrote, India 'cannot afford to let Nepal line up with
Bangladesh and look to China for inspiration... And, whatever King
Birendra's fixation, India has to display all possible patience and
imagination in making him realise in his own way where Nepal's real
interests lie in the geopolitics of the subcontinent' (28). (A lucid
example of India's paternalism to Nepal.) Towards the end of the
month, there were hints that a summit meeting between Zia and Desai
would be necessary before agreement could be reached. The main
details of an agreement had been achieved but the 'real hurdle' was
'lingering suspicion of each others basic intentions...' (29)-
In the event, the summit was not necessary. The talks were held up
whilst Desai*was in the South of India and whilst Zia was in Egypt.
Once they returned, the Political Affairs Committee of the Indian
Cabinet met, and B M Abbas shuttled backwards and forwards between
Delhi and Dacca (30) getting final instructions on what would and
would not be acceptable to Bangladesh. The Hindu said there was a
need to 'prepare public opinion in the two countries for a compromise'
(31)- The final problem seems to have been on a choice between a
linear distribution of the flow or an asymmetric division (32). The
verbal understanding had set the division for the leanest ten-day
period. A five month dry season had been agreed. And the principle
that the long term developments should be studied, and therefore
set aside for the time being, had also been agreed. Much of this
final discussion seems to have been on how to divide the waters in
the remaining 1*f ten-day periods of the five months. A linear
division would presumably have given Bangladesh five eighths of
the Ganges flow for the whole of the five month period of sharing.
An asymmetric division, which was agreed, gave India an increasing
proportion of the flow. According to one report, Desai had told
Abbas that India would meet Bangladesh on an increased period of
sharing if Bangladesh would agree to the asymmetrical division (33)-
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In the early morning of September 30th 1977, the agreement was
initialled. The Ganges Waters Treaty (text in Appendix A) was
signed on November 5th by M H Khan and Surjit Singh Barnala, the
new Indian Minister of Agriculture. Certain points in the Treaty
were deliberately left vague, but were covered in a confidential
exchange of letters between Jagat Mehta and B M Abbas (3^). The
text of these letters has still not been published (35)- There was
something of an outcry against the agreement in West Bengal (36),
but it was not as fierce as had been expected and Prime Minister
Desai gave a long and detailed statement to the Lok Sabha which put
India's compromises in the best light and successfully rebutted
some of the more outrageous criticisms of the Treaty (37)•
The limitations of the Treaty
The Ganges Waters Treaty resolved the dispute over the sharing of
the Ganges Waters. Both sides made substantial concessions. In
the driest tfen-day period Bangladesh gave away 20,000 cusecs of the
historical flow (38), whilst India could divert only 20,500 cusecs,
compared with the ^+0,000 which she had demanded. But, the Treaty
did not resolve the third dispute, around the proposals for increasing
the Ganges River's dry season flow. However, the Treaty is, in the
words of a lawyer, 'in the nature of a pactum de contrahendo' (39),
or agreement to conclude a later final agreement. In Article 10,
the Treaty says, 'The two Governments shall consider and agree
upon a scheme or schemes...and take the necessary measures to
implement it or them.' This clause provided something of an escape
route from the interminable arguments which had taken place in the
Joint Rivers Commission in the period of Mujib's reign.
Part A of the Treaty is illustrated in Figure 9-1, showing,
graphically, the sharing of the waters. Part B of the Treaty,
the 'long term arrangements',^sets out bilateral technical
negotiations for choosing the best method of augmenting the flow.
Both sides are relying on a project or projects to make the abundant
water in other seasons or other places available when and where both
countries need it. The proposals under discussion, as- will be
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Figure 9.1 Division of Ganges Waters
100% of nominal flow in Ganges
Ten day periods
described in Section IV of this thesis, have proved to be more than
value-free engineering projects. The project of one side appears
to the other to have political motives and mistaken assumptions.
In its assumption that the primary features of augmentation proposals
are technical rather than political, this Treaty continues a tradition
established by the earlier periods of negotiation. In its definition
of the problems to be solved by these engineering proposals, the
Treaty also builds on tradition, rather than introducing an 'ideal'
solution. The sole definition of the nature of the proposals is
that they should relate to the augmentation of the dry season flows
in the River Ganges. On the one hand, the reasons why such
augmentation is desirable are omitted and, on the other, more general
objectives for development and control of the river are excluded.
Sensible choice between alternative projects might be aided by a
consideration of the reasons for increasing the flow - irrigation,
industrial use, navigation, salinity control or ecological benefit,
are all tenable examples. The two negotiating teams were not in
agreement on the priority to be given to these alternative uses so
they could not provide direction in the Treaty. Similarly, future
negotiations may be restricted because desirable objectives for river
development, for example, flood control, power generation or silt
limitation, have been excluded. The Treaty cannot be interpreted
as an ideal agreement for the development of an international river.
It is the product of its historical circumstances, the disputes
which forced the two countries to enter into an agreement. These
circumstances dictated that negotiation should concentrate on only
one aspect of the development of the river, augmentation of the dry
season flow. Future treaties may be required to resolve disputes
arising from other aspects of riverine development.
The negotiation of augmentation
Since the Treaty was signed in 19771 negotiations have continued
intermittently, little progress has been made. During 1978 and 1979?
discussions centred on the procedures to be followed; there were no
substantive examinations of alternative augmentation proposals.
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The Joint Rivers Commission convened several times in 1978 and 1979
without announcing any achievements. Such slight progress as
occurred was the result of high-level interventions in the negotiations.
At the end of 1977i President Ziaur Rahman visited India and during
his visit it was agreed that the Joint Rivers Commission should be
upgraded to include the relevant ministers from each government (ko).
The JRC was transformed from an official-level forum, dominated by
technical experts, to a political and technical commission with,
presumably, greater powers. The transformation of the JRC suggests
that the two governments recognised that the technical and political
aspects of augmenting the Ganges flow were closely intertwined.
Nonetheless, the new ministerial-level commission made no more progress
than its predecessor.
In March 1978, detailed proposals for alternative projects to augment
the Ganges flow were exchanged (these proposals are examined in
Section IV of this thesis). The negotiations did not, however,
proceed beyond this preparatory stage because one important political
issue remained unresolved. This issue is the question of whether
only two countries, or three or more, are vitally concerned in the
augmentation of the Ganges. The Indian Government has consistently
argued that the augmentation of the Ganges is a bilateral concern, to
be discussed by Bangladesh and India. That view is supported by the
1977 Treaty which makes no provision for the involvement of other
governments. The Bangladesh Government, on the other hand, has
insisted that the interests of Nepal cannot be ignored. Nepal is
situated within the Ganges Basin, its rivers contribute most of the
Ganges' dry season flow and Bangladesh's proposal for augmenting
the Ganges would be situated mostly within Nepalese territory. For
those reasons, Bangladesh argues, Nepal must be a party to the
negotiation of augmentation.
Neither government moved from its stand until May 19791 when there
was a slight concession from India. In the 17th Joint Rivers
Commission meeting, the third since the Treaty, there was agreement
that the Nepalese Government should be 'approached'. Even this
slight and, as we shall see, ambiguous understanding was the result
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of a prime ministerial intervention. The Indian Prime Minister,
Morarji Desai, had visited Bangladesh just prior to the JRC meeting,
and it was apparently his suggestion which briefly broke the impasse.
However, the concession was made by India on the understanding that
it did not prejudice 'the basic bilateral character of the problem
of augmentation of the flow' (41). The exact status which the
Nepalese Government might have in the negotiations was not publicly
clarified. The Indian Government did not envisage a trilateral
commission, but it did concede some form of consultation with Nepal,
This was not, however, enough to instigate significant progress in
the negotiations. There was no agreement to commence surveys of the
alternative schemes for augmenting the Ganges' flow; without surveys,
feasibility studies could not be started, and without feasibility
studies there was no basis for an informed decision on building the
schemes.
The intransigence of India's commitment to bilateralism can be
illustrated b"y reference to the response given to a third party
intervention which was made in January 1978. In a speech to the
Indian Parliament, President Carter of the USA offered assistance
for the development of the region's rivers (42). Two days later in
Bangladesh Prime Minister Callaghan of Britain made a similar offer
(4-3). The intervention was welcomed in Bangladesh but rebuffed by
India, and nothing further has been heard of it.
The return of Mrs Gandhi
In January 1980, Mrs Gandhi's Congress (Indira) Party achieved an
absolute majority in the Indian elections, and Mrs Gandhi returned
to power as Prime Minister. During her election campaign she had
given notice that she thought the fence-mending agreements made by
the Janata Government should be undone (44). This view seems to
have been expressed by India in discussions with Bangladesh in the
subsequent months. The focus of Indian concern has moved from the
question of augmentation back to the short term sharing of the
existing dry season flow.
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In February, when Ziaur Rahman visited Delhi to address a UN
conference he met Mrs Gandhi. The Hindu reported the Indian position
in the discussion as follows:
'The new government's policy towards the neighbouring
countries is to continue to strive for a consolidation
of relations with them in mutual interest. [ But] the
Indian view is that one-sided concessions do not lead
to lasting friendship, but only end up by distorting
the relationship and doing more damage in the long run.
So it is necessary to aspire to a certain degree of
reciprocity to give both sides an abiding stake in the
preservation of equally beneficial relations.' (9-5)
In other words, the new government was not willing to accept the
short-term sharing of the flow negotiated by its predecessor. When
the JRG met in March, the new Indian Irrigation Minister (who had
previously been Irrigation Minister for the State of West Bengal)
warned that India would invoke her right to review the Ganges Treaty
in November if no progress was made in investigating augmentation
proposals (9-£). Questioned in the Lok Sabha later in the month,
the minister did say: 'since it is a bilateral agreement, we stand
by it' (^7). Nevertheless, the minister's statement was interpreted
as follows by G K Reddy of The Hindu:
'The Minister...is missing no opportunity to do some
plain speaking to Bangladesh on the Ganga waters
problem. He has been sounding a note of warning,
presumably with the prior knowledge of his senior
Cabinet colleagues, that the 1977 Farakka agreement,
in its present form, will have to be scrapped if
Bangladesh continued to drag its feet over the question
of augmentation of the flow during the dry season.' (9-8)
The 18th meeting of the JRC was held in April and, although the
leader of the Bangladesh delegation described the talks as 'friendly',
The Hindu reported that the two sides had not been able to agree
even on the minutes of the meeting (9-9). A 19th JRC meeting in
July made no further progress. There was a suggestion that a summit
meeting at a higher political level might be necessary, and the
leader of the Indian delegation was reported as hoping that India




Whilst the Ganges Waters Treaty of November 1977 was a limited and in
some senses unsatisfactory one, it brought a resolution of the
second phase of the Ganges conflict: the existing dry season flow
of the Ganges was shared between Bangladesh and India. With the
return of Mrs Gandhi in 1980, even that resolution may prove to have
been temporary. Nevertheless, it is worth attempting to identify
some of the circumstances which made the Treaty possible.
As we have seen, agreement was achieved in two stages. First, an
understanding was reached within a month of the election of the
Janata Party. This understanding almost certainly laid down the
division of flow during the ten days of minimum flow, and probably
also determined that the Indian withdrawals should be subject to
negotiation over a five month nominal dry season. The understanding
was raised to the status of a formal agreement only after a further
five months of sometimes acrimonious bargaining. This second stage
of the agreement fixed the division of the waters for the remaining
Ik -t en-day periods of the five month dry season and "laid down the
arrangements for negotiating the augmentation of the flow.
Without reducing a complex and protracted process of negotiations to
too simple a formula, it is possible to suggest some of the factors
which made each of these two stages feasible. The first understanding
was achieved, obviously enough, only after the election of the Janata.
Party. That coincidence is suggestive, but it is not proof that the
Janata-led government created the circumstances necessary for the
understanding. Is there evidence that a government under Mrs Gandhi's
tutelage would have acted otherwise?
There is strong evidence that it was the decisions of the Janata
Government which made the understanding possible. In 1978, I was
"told the following by a Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs who had been closely associated with the 1977 negotiations:
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'The new government was willing to make more concessions.
They wanted to project an image of having achieved
success in foreign policy in a short time. What they
did with Pakistan and Nepal amounted to getting over
some mental blocks. But with Bangladesh there was a
calculated sacrifice of the national interest with a
view to achieving wider purposes. We thought that if
the biggest irritant was removed the climate would
change.1 (51)
As we have seen, there was a substantial concession made by the
Indian side during the April 1977 negotiations which led to the
understanding. It was matched by a rather smaller concession from
Bangladesh. It is clear from subsequent events that this is a
concession with which the present Congress (Indira)-led government
is dissatisfied. There are few grounds for believing that the April
1977 understanding would have occurred if Mrs Gandhi had been
re-elected in the preceding month.
The second stage of the agreement was achieved less easily than the
first and it is difficult to know exactly what made it possible.
However, one element in the agreement is clear: an obstacle was
removed from the path of the negotiations when Morarji Desai assured
Ziaur Rahman in London that 'no shelter would be given to criminal
elements from across the border.'
Participants on both sides of the discussion concur that this
assurance was an essential prerequisite for the Treaty. In 19791 a
Bangladesh diplomat told me:
'It was a package deal., it was not in the interests
of those in power to keep the issue burning.' (52)
And the Secretary in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, in the
interview quoted above, went on to say:
'More significant, if you want to see the political
level, India undertook the cessation of hostilities
on the border.' (53)
There is much yet to be told about how the agreement was reached but
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India's willingness to concede five-eighths of the flow during the
driest period and to arrange for .guerrilla attacks to cease appear
to be the main elements in the 'package' settlement. Those elements
were made available because the Janata Government needed to project
'an image of having achieved success'.
The Treaty itself is a product of its historical circumstances. It
defines development of the water resources of the Ganges Basin solely
in terms of increasing the dry season flow. The shortage of water
provided conditions for the dispute to arise; the Treaty, in its
'long term arrangements', maintains that focus. There is no provision
for general regulation and development of the river's resources.
Nevertheless, even with this concentration on increasing the dry
season flow, subsequent discussions have not progressed. Bangladesh
has refused to embark on feasibility studies of alternative schemes
unless Nepal is allowed to participate in the negotiations. India
has so far been unwilling to allow Nepal's participation because
the Indian Government believes that augmentation is a 'bilateral'
matter.
In'Part IV of this thesis, the two governments' alternative proposals
for augmenting the Ganges flow are examined. This examination will
suggest that the proposals, and their governments' negotiating
positions, express a narrowly defined concern for national
sovereignty.
THE PRIORITIES OF SOUTH ASIAN LEADERS
This section, Part II of the thesis, has investigated the history of
the Ganges conflict and some of the 'reasons of State' which have
determined that history. In the process a brief exploration has
been made into the political priorities of the leaders of India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh as they have been expressed in this conflict.
These priorities may be little different from those of political
leaders elsewhere but they have tragic consequences for the population
of the Ganges Basin whose future prosperity depends in part on the
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harnessing of the waters of the Basin.
The exploration suggests that the development of the Ganges for the
benefit of those whose lives are dominated by it is rarely the
determining principle in the conduct of the dispute.
In the first phase of the dispute, from 1951 "to 1971, the Government
of India as the upper riparian power was able either to recognise
or to ignore Pakistan's concern about the Farakka Barrage. It chose
the latter. In the light of the general level of hostility prevailing
between the two governments this is understandable, but less excusable.
For a short period, in 19^0, there was, however, relative cordiality
when negotiations might have been fruitful. The Pakistan Government
tentatively suggested that the principles of sharing devised for the
Indus might be extended to the Ganges. The proposal was not grasped
by India. Then, and for the subsequent decade, the Indian Government
organised an effective strategy of procrastination. Indian claims
that 'extensive consultations' were held with Pakistan are refuted
by the evidence. In addition, no less an authority than a former
Indian Foreign Secretary has implied that there was indeed a strategy
of procrastination. There were, he said, 'only two ways to handle'
the dispute: if India had started negotiations, Pakistan would have
applied an 'injunction' ; therefore, India did not start negotiations
but only technical level 'talks'.
In this decade, the Indian Government's over-riding concern was the
construction of the Farakka Barrage; the export-import trade of
Calcutta had greater priority than any possible consequences to the
agriculture and economy of East Pakistan. The Indian Government's
responsibilities extended only so far as the border, no further.
In Chapter Sixteen, Indian conduct during this phase of the dispute
will be compared with Indian policy regarding internal inter-state
river disputes, and with the policies of other upper riparian states.
In both cases, the Indian conduct of the Ganges conflict compares
unfavourably.
This first phase of the Ganges dispute was brought to a close when
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a more sympathetic, perhaps even pliant, regime was installed, with
Indian assistance, in East Bengal. The Indian insistence on
prolonged data exchanges ceased with the independence of Bangladesh.
Within months of the creation of Bangladesh, ministerial discussions
on the sharing of the Ganges had taken place and the Joint Rivers
Commission had been formed. However, the promise of progress, as
we have seen, was denied. No doubt many factors contributed to this
denial. One important factor may have been the struggle for the
leadership of Bangladesh between the social democratic faction of
Sheik Mujibur Rahman and the right wing faction led by Khondakar
Moshtaque Ahmed, then Minister in charge of water resource development.
In this phase, the development of the rivers seems to have been
subordinated to the exigencies of the internecine struggle for power.
With the overthrow of the government of Sheik Mujibur Rahman, a
period of renewed hostility began. During 1976 and 1977» India
appropriated a significant proportion of the Ganges' dry season flow.
We shall examine the consequences of this appropriation in Part III
and conclude that it caused serious damage to both the economy and
the ecology of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Government's vigorous
protestations during those years were, therefore, founded in genuine
grievance. Nevertheless, we have seen that Bangladesh's conduct of
the dispute in this period was also informed by objectives unconnected
with the sharing of the Ganges: prosecution of the dispute was, in
addition, an exercise in internal consensus-building and international
image-creation. On the other side of the border, India's intransigence
and insensitivity to Bangladesh's claims of damage and Mrs Gandhi's
rather niggardly 'concession' to reduce Indian withdrawals can be
seen, in the light of Indian toleration of guerrilla attacks against
Bangladesh, as owing more to Indian hostility toward the new
leadership of Bangladesh than to Indian concern about the Hooghly.
Again, in this phase, the horizons of leadership are no more distant
than immediate political needs.
The second phase of the conflict, focussed on the division of the
existing flow, was terminated because it served just such a need of
the newly-elected Janata Government. One interpretation suggests
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that the new leadership made a 'calculated sacrifice of the national
interest' in order to promote an image of success. However, the
a
motivation for this sacrifice is the interpretation of only one
Indian civil servant; the sacrifice could equally be interpreted as
serving the wider interests of the population of the Ganges Basin by
allowing the development of the resources to proceed.
If this latter interpretation were correct, we might reasonably
anticipate progress toward agreement on augmentation during the
third phase of the conflict. This third phase, dubbed in Chapter
Nine as the negotiation of augmentation, has not in practice been
fruitful. Between November 1977 and January 1980 the negotiators
of the two governments were unable or unwilling to rise above questions
of national sovereignty or the national interest to embark upon
development of the region's water resources. This tends to confirm
the civil servant's interpretation and suggests that the Janata
Party's priorities were no more elevated that its predecessor's. The
return of Mrs*Gandhi swept Janata from office and -presaged a return
to the second phase of dispute focussed on a renegotiation of the
existing dry season flow.
There can be little doubt that the failure to develop and control
the Ganges will have and is having tragic consequences, but perhaps
it is unfair to lay the whole blame on the priorities of political
leaders. Leaders operate under many constraints: of elections, of
economics and of super power rivalry. This account assumes they are
autonomous actors able to rise above the constraints on power in
order to reach toward the end of regional prosperity through the
means of river development. Are they so able? It is the privilege
of historians to muse upon the broad sweep of what might have been;
a politician's horizons are perhaps inevitably more limited by the
details of what was. As Mrs Gandhi says, in a slightly pathetic
explanation of what happened:




'There should be no real injury
caused to Pakistan by this scheme'
- Nehru, Lok Sabha, 19/8/61.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this third section is to examine the consequences of
Farakka diversions during 1976 and 1977* These chapters provide
an .assessment of the impact of the operation of the Farakka Barrage
Project.
During 1976 and 1977 the Farakka Barrage was used to divert large
quantities of water down the Hooghly River. As a result the flow
in the River Ganges downstream of the barrage was significantly
reduced for the dry seasons of those two years. It has been asserted
by the Bangladesh Government that this reduction in flow caused
widespread and grave damage to the agriculture, industry and ecology
of South Western Bangladesh. The Government of India have denied,
or minimised-the extent and gravity of such damage. This section
seeks a measured judgement of what happened.
The impact of the Farakka diversions is complex. Figures III.1 and
III.2 show chains of cause and effect linking reduced river flows
to potential consequences. Maps reproduced here as Figures III.3
and III.J+ indicate the extent of the potential effects in the opinion
of the Governments of India and of Bangladesh, respectively.
Three documents provide most of the evidence used in this section.
The first two are thin, glossy pamphlets distributed by the two
governments in September or October 1976 to diplomatic missions,
delegates to the UN and interested people all over the world. These
represent the views of the two governments at a time when diplomatic
activity was at a peak. The Government of India's The Farakka Barrage
(1), and the Government of Bangladesh's White Paper on the Ganges
Water Dispute (2) are negotiating documents intended, in the first
place, to impress delegates to the United Nations with the strength
















































SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF
REDUCED GANGES FLOWS
Source: Based on
Chapter 2, "White Paper
on the Ganges Water Dispute",
Government of Bangladesh.
Figure III.2. 'Ramifications on the agro-ecosystem of decreased
dry-seasonal Ganges flow!
From; Special Studies.
Figure III.3: The Indian Government's map of the area of
Bangladesh dependant on the River Ganges.
Source: India, The Farakka Barrage, Delhi, 1976.
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Figure III.if: The Bangladesh Government' s map of the area




























Source: Bangladesh, Deadlock on the Ganges, Dacca, 1976.
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The third basic document is a fat, four volume work, funded by the
World Bank and produced jointly by the Government of Bangladesh
and a San Francisco-based firm of engineering consultants,
International Engineering Company Ltd (IECO). It is called simply
Special Studies (3)» and it constitutes the most thorough investigation
so far made into the impact of Farakka diversions on Bangladesh.
At the time of writing, this document had been given only a restricted
distribution.
These three documents provide descriptions of the mechanisms by which
a reduction in the flow of the Ganges may cause agricultural,
industrial or ecological damage, and quantitative assessments of the
extent of damage caused by the reductions experienced by Bangladesh
in 1976 and 1977- In weighing and comparing the different conclusions
drawn in these documents, I have tried to ask four questions:
a) Is the 'mechanism' well described? Does the chain
of pause and effect provide a credible explanation
of the physical processes involved?
b) Is the method chosen for measuring the effect well
designed?
c) Has that measurement been executed satisfactorily?
d) Have the measurements been interpreted with an
awareness of the sources of error and bias? (b)
Special Studies is the more 'scientific' of the three documents. It
was prepared by a group of experts who were given access and the
resources enabling them to make empirical measurements of the
physical processes involved. These experts, most of them from
America, worked in cooperation with the Bangladesh Government's
Special Studies Directorate and under the overall guidance of three
eminent American hydrologists (5)- The experts' professional
reputations will have provided a restraint against the conscious
falsification of data. Nevertheless, unconscious bias and selective
interpretation of the data will have occurred (6). Special Studies
has been examined and my conclusions drawn with such bias in mind.
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This section is divided into four chapters. Chapter 10 lays the
groundwork for subsequent chapters by summarising the information
on the quantity of water flowing into Bangladesh during the dry
seasons of 1976 and 19771 and estimating the extent to which those
reduced flows were reflected in the hydrology of South West Bangladesh.
Chapter 11 provides an assessment of the impact of reduced water
availability on the salinity of surface water in the area; from
that assessment an estimate of industrial disruption is made.
Chapters 12 and 13 examine the consequences for agriculture and
forestry, and navigation, fisheries and ecology, respectively.
The conclusion which can be drawn from Part III of this thesis is
that there was damage to Bangladesh in 1976 and 1977i caused by the
operation of the Farakka Barrage. The Bangladesh Government
exaggerated the extent, seriousness and, in some cases, the nature
of the damage, and the Government of India under-estimated the damage.
One reason why the two governments were able to differ in their
assessments is the complexity of the processes involved. We shall
see that some questions remain unresolved even after the Special
Studies team have deployed their very considerable resources to
investigate those questions. Before that investigation many more
issues were 'moot-points', capable of very different interpretations.
Here we find another example of technical uncertainty providing a




This chapter is an attempt to assess the hydraulic consequences for
Bangladesh of the diversions at the Farakka Barrage. An estimate
of .these consequences is a prerequisite for any assessment of other
effects because all further effects are caused by, or alleged to be
caused by, the changes in the surface and ground water flows in
South West Bangladesh.
The hydrology of South West Bangladesh
South West Bangladesh, an area larger than Belgium and Holland combined,
combined, is the area which could have been affected by the reduced
flows in the River Ganges. It is the major part of the complex delta
of three rivers, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna (1).
The delta is bounded by the Bhagirathi (in India) in the West, the
Ganges to the North and the combined River Meghna to the East. The
major rivers of this area are shown in Figure 10.1.
The Western part of the delta, from the River Bhagirathi across the
Bangladesh border to the line of the Gorai-Madhumati and Rupsa-Pussur
rivers, is known to geographers as the moribund region of the delta.
In this area the characteristic land-building activities of a delta
have ceased. Most, if not all, of the many rivers and channels are
no longer distributaries of the River Ganges but for most of the
year have no flowing water and during the rainy season only drain
the immediately adjacent countryside.
The extent to which the remainder of the delta is actively building
land is uncertain. There are frequent changes in the land forms
and the extent of these changes is currently being studied with the
aid of both satellite and aerial photography. Land is certainly
being formed in the mouth of the Meghna, sometimes, as in Noakhali,
with the aid of man-made cross-dams. Land is also, however, being
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eroded. As much as a third of Bhola Island has been lost to the
rivers in recent years. One study has reported a comparison of
early maps with more recent ones which indicates that land forms
are changing but the total area of land within given boundaries is
remaining roughly constant (2). It is probable that deep water
and heavy tidal currents have placed limits on the extension of the
delta by deposition.
There are three sources of water flowing into the South West Region
of Bangladesh. They are, firstly, the flow of the major rivers
coming from India, primarily the River Ganges; secondly, rainfall
draining from the surrounding countryside;and, finally, there may
be a contribution from water stored in the ground. For the River
Ganges, the largest source is the water flowing across the border
from India. Two distributaries withdraw water from the Ganges in
Bangladesh, the Rivers Gorai and Arial Khan. In the upper reaches
of these rivers the water drawn from the Ganges or Ganges-Brahmaputra
is their largest source; lower down the rivers this may not be the
case.
At different periods both the Gorai-Madhumati and the Arial Khan
were probably the main channel of the Ganges or Ganges-Brahmaputra.
In the late nineteenth century several writers thought the Gorai-
Madhumati might again become the main channel of the Ganges, but the
activity which had led to this belief subsided (3)- Now these two
distributaries withdraw only a small percentage of the discharge of
the River Ganges.
The Ganges delta is not a stable environment. The 'normal' deltaic
activities are complicated by the influences of geologically recent
events. Several major earthquakes have occurred in the region in
recent centuries, the most recent being one in 1950, with its
epicentre in Assam. These have caused subsidence and increased
sediment loads in the rivers, both of which have in turn altered the
energy and channels of the major rivers. Deforestation and bad
agricultural practice in the catchment areas of the Ganges,
Brahmaputra and Meghna, in India and Nepal, are also widely believed
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to have changed the ratios of maximum to minimum flow in these rivers
and increased their sediment loads. Decreased forest area may
indeed have reduced groundwater storage and percolation in the basins,
and may have led to increased flooding and decreased dry season flows
(5).
In these unstable circumstances the relationship between the flow
in the River Ganges and the flow in its two major distributaries
may not be direct. As can be seen from Figure 10.1, the flow in the
River Arial Khan will also be influenced by the quantity of water
brought down by the Brahmaputra. In the case of the Gorai-Madhumati,
the discharge in its upper reaches, the Gorai, is influenced by the
movement of the channel of the River Ganges near Kushtia and the
extent to which the offtake of the Gorai is blocked by sand banks.
In some periods there has been almost no flow in the Gorai because
the offtake has been blocked. One East Pakistan Government publication
records negligible flows in the river in the first five months of
1951 and again in the first months of 195^ (6). This information is
confirmed by Special Studies, where it is recorded that at different
times an average monthly discharge of less than 1,000 cusecs has
been recorded for all months between December and May (7)- This
natural variation complicates the assessment of the effects of
human intervention.
The effect of the Farakka diversions on river flows
Measurement of the flow in a large river with a variable cross-
section is somewhat problematic. The beds of the Ganges, Brahmaputra
and Megha are of fine sand which is scoured deeper every monsoon
and then re-created with a new formation during the next dry season.
The quantity of flow is calculated from a measurement of the cross
sectional area at a given point multiplied by the average velocity
of the water at that point. In order to simplify these measurements,
they are, preferably, made at points where the river banks are stable.
For the Ganges in Bangladesh the longest series of discharge
measurements have been made at the Hardinge (or Sara) Bridge near
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South West Bangladesh: Major rivers and discharge measurement stations.
Figure 10.1.
Kushtia. Here records have been kept since 1933-
For the Gorai River a similar set of records (starting in 19'+7) exist
for the discharge at the Gorai Railway Bridge, also near Kushtia.
On other rivers records have been accumulated at a railway bridge
(at Bhairab Bazaar) on the Meghna, at a ferry crossing (Bahadurabad)
on the Brahmaputra, at the offtake from the combined Ganges-
Brahmaputra for the Arial Khan and at the Baruria-Goalundo transit
of the combined Ganges-Brahmaputra. These stations are indicated on
Figure 10.1.
The complete records of measurements at these different stations are
not available but Special Studies provides the information in a
partially processed form. The discharges during the two years of
maximum diversions and, for comparison, the prior monthly averages,
monthly maxima and monthly minima are given. These figures are
reproduced here in Tables 10.1 to 10.6.
The Special Studies team were not given access to the records of
withdrawals at Farakka. They were forced to deduce the magnitude of
these withdrawals from the figures in Table 10.1.
A cursory comparison of the figures for the discharge at Hardinge
Bridge shows that the flows in the dry season months (February,
March, April and May) during the two years 1975-76 and 1976-77 depart
from the historical pattern of discharge as indicated by the prior
average monthly flows and the prior monthly minima. Table 10-7
provides a comparison between average flows (in ten-day periods), the
average flows in the leanest 73%° of years, and the average flows in
1975-76 and 1976-77- This confirms the departure from the norm of
previous years and shows that during the March of 1976 and 1977 the
flows in the Ganges were less than half the average flows recorded
in the 73% of leanest years.
In order to make an estimate of the quantity of water diverted at
Farakka, the Special Studies team developed a relationship for
calculating the 'unimpaired discharge', the flow that would have been
198
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Table 10.7: Comparison of ten-day flows at Hardinge Bridge
before and after diversions (discharges in
1,000 cusecs).
Month and Average 73% dry Flow Flow
Period flow year flow during during
1934-1973 1975-1976 1976-1977
Nov I 309 213 317 197
II 242 186 241 197
III 201 156 181 127
Dec I 171 135 141 101
II 146 119 124 86.5
III 129 104 100 74
Jan I 108 88 77-6 50.7
II 101 83.7 65.8 49.1
III 95 80.9 57.3 45.9
Feb I 91.7 79-5 55.3 41.5
II 89.1 76.2 52.9 36.4
III 85.4 75.1 47.1 34.6
Mar I 81.7 73.2 35-3 31-9
II ' 78.1 69.1 28.7 30
III 75 67 24.5 30.4
Source: Table 111-10, Special Studies
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recorded at Hardinge Bridge if no water had been diverted at Farakka.
These flows were calculated from an equation of the following form:
Q1 - aQ0b
Where is the average monthly discharge to be established,
is the average monthly discharge for the previous
month, and a and b are constants.
Using this method, correlations between preceding and following monthly
flows produced correlation coefficients in the range 0.81 to 0.95 (8).
With these parameters the figures in Table 10.8 were calculated and
estimates of the Farakka diversions made. (These estimates are shown
graphically in Figure 10.2).
These estimates of the Farakka diversions may be conservative. They
can be compared with the statement of the spokesman for the Ministry
of External Affairs of the Government of India (9)1 to the effect
that up to February 1976 diversions of the order of *+0,000 cusecs had
been taking place.
In order to be able to assess the likelihood of the flows recorded in
1975-76 and 1976-77 occurring naturally, the Special Studies team
fitted a distribution curve to the recorded discharges prior to 1975-
From this the minimum flows for probabilities ranging from 50% to 2%
were calculated, as shown in Table 10-9* If the conditions which
gave rise to the discharges on record are representative of conditions
likely to be found in the future, then a minimum flow in the Ganges
of 41,000 cusecs is likely to occur only in two years out of every
hundred. In April 1976 a discharge of 25,700 cusecs was recorded.
This is a very strong indication that the flow was being influenced
by an unnatural intervention in the river system. Only by the
postulation of the most exceptional circumstances can that intervention
be identified as anything other than the diversions at Farakka.
One criticism of the Special Studies method has been mentioned in
note (8). An additional criticism can be made. There is an implicit















Table 10.8 Estimate of diversions (1,000 cusecs)
DEC JAN FEB MAR APR
1975-76 Unimpaired discharge 120 88 75 65 58
Impaired discharge 120 67 52 29 26
Estimated diversion 0 21 2k 36 32
1976-77 Unimpaired discharge 129 81 70 60 59
Impaired discharge 86 50 39 32 J>k
Estimated diversion 23 31 31 28 22
Source: Table 111-10, Special Studies
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Table 10.9: Frequencies of low flow occurrence at various




















Source: Table 111-23, Special Studies
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varies in an effectively random manner - in other words, that no
progressive change is to be expected in the series of discharge
figures. This assumption is inadequate. Two developments can be
expected to introduce progressive change into the discharge data.
Irrigation and other withdrawals of water must be systematically
reducing the lean season flow in the Ganges. Also, as mentioned
earlier, deforestation of large parts of the basin can be expected
to have a significant influence on the low flows. Adequate data
for assessing this trend gt-fO-not available, but such data as dXC-
available indicates no discernible tendency for the low season
discharge to decrease over time (see Table 10.10).
The two other sources of water in the Ganges flow at Hardinge Bridge -
rainfall and groundwater recharge - may be safely ignored. Any
groundwater recharge will have tended to reduce the Special Studies
estimate of diversions, so making them more conservative, and rainfall
in the first four months of 1976 and 1977 was not abnormal (10) so
it is unlikely.to have introduced a significant error.
If these estimates of the Farakka diversions are, as they appear to be,
reasonable estimates, it may be concluded that during the months of
February, March and April of 1976 and 1977 between ~52°/o and 55% of" "the
flow which could have been expected to pass under Hardinge Bridge
did not do so. On average the Ganges flow was reduced by ^5% for
these months.
The records of discharge for the Gorai River are summarised in
Table 10.2. In the years 1975-76 and 1976-77 the flow past Gorai
Railway Bridge during the months from November to June is consistently
below the average for those months. In the months February to May
of 1976, the average flow is only 1*+% of the average previously
recorded at that site. Nevertheless, none of the discharges recorded
in Table 10.2 for the years 1975-76 and 1976-77 are below minima
previously recorded.
The low flows recorded in the Gorai River during the years 1975-76 and
1976-77 cannot be so conclusively blamed on the Farakka diversions.
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Table 10.10: Trend in low flows at Hardinge Bridge








Source: Table A III-8, EPWAPDA, Master Plan,
Supplement A; with 1964-1973 average
deduced from the overall average given
in Table III-8 of Special Studies
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As has been explained above, in some years natural events result in
low flows in the Gorai. This is reflected in the figures in Table 10.9
which show that in one year in ten small flows could be expected at
Gorai Railway Bridge and at Kamarkhali. This is a relatively frequent
event, so the suspicion that flows as low as those recorded in the
Gorai in the two years 1975-76 and 1976-77 might have occurred
naturally cannot be completely dispelled. The likelihood of very low
flows occurring naturally for the whole of two successive dry seasons
was not apparently estimated by the Special Studies team. The fact
that such low flows were recorded for the two years in question must
increase the suspicion that the cause of the low flows was due to the
Farakka diversions.
Table 10.11 (extracted from Table III.18 of Special Studies) shows
the relative likelihood of low flows occurring naturally or as a
result of different quantities of upstream withdrawal. Comparing the
flows in the dry season months (January to April) of 1976 with the
likely recurrences in this table, it can be estimated that these
discharges would have occurred naturally once in twentyfive years,
whereas with the Ganges flow reduced by 30,000 cusecs the discharges
would have been expected between once in two years and once in five
years for the January, February and April flows and once in ten years
for the March flows. This procedure is open to criticism but it
does again indicate that the Farakka withdrawals were the more likely
cause for the 1975-76 and 1976-77 low flows in the Gorai than natural
events.
The discharge of the Arial Khan River at its offtake is also below
average in the dry seasons of the two years in question. It can be
calculated from Table 10.5 that in the months January to March of
1976 the flow was only by/o of the previously recorded average and in
1977 it was only 23% of the average for these months. In the months
of February and March of 1976 and January, February and March of 1977
the recorded discharge falls below the minimum previously recorded.
The indications are that these unusually low flows may also be
attributable to the reduction in the Ganges flows. The flow in the
Brahmaputra for these months is generally above average, while the
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flow in the combined river (measured at the Baruria and Goalundo
transit) from which the Arial Khan divides, is rather below average
and in one month dips below the minimum previously recorded.
The effect of the Farakka diversions on groundwater in Bangladesh
It has been shown that the flow in the River Ganges in Bangladesh
was significantly affected by Farakka withdrawals during the months
of February, March and April of 1976 and 1977 and that the flow in
the River Gorai was probably also affected. In turn, these changes
in surface water flows will have had some effect on the level of
groundwater in adjacent areas of Bangladesh but it is difficult to
establish the size of this effect.
Figure 10-3 is an idealised section showing the sorts of water
conditions which prevail below the ground's surface. An aquifer
receives water both from rainfall and from surface water, rivers and
ponds. Groundwater is extracted from an aquifer through wells, it
flows out into the sea and it may flow into rivers and ponds. In a
flat region like the Ganges delta, rivers may be effluent during the
dry season - that is, they will receive water from ©Lj acent aquifers -
and -the same rivers may be influent during the following wet season -
that is, they may contribute water to recharge adjacent aquifers. A
river will receive groundwater if the adjacent water table is higher
than the water level in the river, and vice versa. These flows will
be large or small and the influence of reduced river discharges will
be correspondingly extensive or localised according to the
permeability of the soil constituting the aquifer (11).
In their White Paper, the Bangladesh Government claimed:
'The hydraulic cycle of surface and ground water are
interdependent. In 1976 the groundwater level in the
highly affected area went down by 5 feet on average with
a range of 3 to 8 feet below normal.' (12)
The White Paper does not define the 'highly affected area', and the
Government of India's publication, The Farakka Barrage, does not
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include a specific response to this claim.
The Special Studies report does not support the sweeping generalisation
of this Bangladesh allegation, nor the implication that reduced
groundwater levels were due solely to the Indian withdrawals.
Surface and ground water levels are inter-related but to say that
they are interdependent is to substitute a simple, direct relationship
for a complex one in which other variables, like precipitation and
permeability, are generally present (13)•
Special Studies does record that:
'Groundwater conditions during recent dry seasons differ
from conditions that existed during the dry seasons prior
to 1975- Reported changes include lower water levels in
wells, increased pumping lifts, dry wells, reduced
groundwater yields and increased salinity.'
'The water levels during the dry season of 1976 were
at the lowest level ever recorded in many of the wells
in the Study Area.' (14)
Figure 10.^ shows the differences in groundwater levels between the
1973 and 1977 dry season. These differences are substantial and
Special Studies notes circumstances which made the impact of the
differences devastating for users of suction pumps, which are used
for the majority of wells. Suction pumps can only operate to water
depths of 25-29 feet. The depths to the water table in many wells,
particularly along the Ganges and Gorai are normally about 25 feet.
Many of those pumps were reported inoperable during the 1975-76 dry
season (15)-
Three possible causes of lower groundwater levels are listed in
Special Studies:
o increased groundwater pumping for irrigation.
o meteorological conditions, reduced rainfall combined
with increased pumping to meet the shortfall.
o upstream diversion reducing the recharge from the rivers.
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Figure 10.^: Differences in groundwater levels between March 197"?
and March 1977*
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Source: IEC0, Special Studies, Figure V-10.
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In an attempt to quantify the effect of upstream diversion, the
Special Studies team tried to establish relationships between rainfall,
river levels and groundwater level for a number of wells for which
records were available. Of the fifteen wells for which hydrographs
are given, in only five cases does the level in the adjacent river
appear to be the determining factor. In the other ten cases the
water levels 'appear to be affected more by direct precipitation than
by stream flow'. Some wells up to 1.5 miles from rivers show a good
correlation between the river level and groundwater level but, the
Special Studies team note, 'the effect greatly diminishes with distance
from the river' (16).
Using an equation developed, by Feris (17) j "the team calculated that
the effect of annual water level fluctuations on groundwater level are
reduced to 83% at 1 mile, at 10 miles and 16% at 20 miles. The
effect would be less in a confined or partially confined aquifer. The
geology of South West Bangladesh indicates that much of the groundwater
is stored in sandy aquifers partially confined by lenses of silt.
Therefore, Special Studies concludes that there have been significant
changes in the groundwater levels in the years in question and that
those changes have had acute consequences for many people living in
South West Bangladesh. The causes of the changes are, however,
difficult to establish accurately, and the blame cannot be laid wholly
or even primarily on the Farakka diversions.
The effect of the Farakka diversions on river morphology
Major structures introduced by man into a river channel generally
alter the relationship of forces present in the river. That
alteration may significantly influence the river's action on the
surrounding countryside.
As has been explained earlier in this chapter, the major rivers in
Bangladesh have increased sediment loads as a result of recent seismic
and human activity. The mechanism of sediment transport and deposition
in these rivers has been only superficially studied and is
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ill-understood. The Brahmaputra is a river with a braided channel
and it regularly and sometimes dramatically moves the course of its
main channel. The River Ganges is somewhat more stable but it, too,
has a channel which changes its cross section and plan every year (18).
Undoubtedly, the construction of a massive barrage across the River
Ganges at Farakka will have altered the way in which the development
of the river takes place (19)- In general, a dam across a river
would be expected to intercept a large proportion of the sediment
carried by that river. The river may then, with energy released
from sediment transportation, erode its channel downstream of the dam.
A barrage presents a different case because the flow is only partially
intercepted and the capacity of the pond upstream of the barrage to
store sediment is likely to be small compared with the annual sediment
load of the river.
The Farakka Barrage includes several high velocity sluices, known
as silt excluders, which are intended to allow silt to flow down the
Ganges. The barrage was designed so that silt-free water would be
diverted down the Bhagirathi-Hooghly and the sediment load of the
Ganges would be carried by the remaining flow in that river on to
Bangladesh and the sea. It might be reasonably expected, in that
case, that increased sediment deposition will occur downstream of the
Barrage and hence, perhaps, that the river bed will rise and the
river will be more prone to spill over its banks. These effects may,
however, be small. The sediment load of the Ganges is relatively
small during the dry season and, during the four months of high flow,
when 95% of the sediment is carried (20), the change of the discharge
of the river induced by the Farakka Barrage will be slight.
The effects of the Farakka diversions on river morphology inside
Bangladesh have not been emphasised by the Government of Bangladesh.
Nevertheless, a chapter of Special Studies is devoted to analysis of
this effect.
The following 'possible responses' to upstream diversion are identified:
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o lower water levels (stages) during low flow and
marginally lower stages during high flow.
o reduced capacity to transport sediment during the
low flow season, partly offset by storage of sediment
upstream.
o increased potential for bank erosion during the low
flow season.
o increase of the lateral shifting of the main channel
of the river.
o possible release of sediment waves when the gates of
the barrage are opened to pass flood flows.
o adverse effect of water level and entrance conditions
at spill channels (river offtakes).
o reduced depth of flow in pools and crossings affecting
navigation during low flow season.
The Special Studies team conclude that although these effects may be
significant, they are, with the exception of lower water levels,
almost impossible to evaluate.
In March 1976, the water level at Hardinge Bridge fell to an all time
minimum of 16.5 feet. The previous minimum stage, in 56 years of
records was 20.4 feet in April 1918 (21). Figure 10.5 (Figure IV-10
of Special Studies) shows that the river stages at Hardinge Bridge
during the dry seasons of 1975-76 and 1976-77 fall well below the
envelope bounded by the 10% and 90% annual recurrence probabilities.
After examination of similar low water stage frequency profiles for
the other major rivers in South West Bangladesh, the Special Studies
team conclude that the navigation depths of 1974-75? 1975-76 and
1976-77 'would have been rare occurrences during the pre-diversion
regime' (22). (Consideration of the effect of lower water stages
on navigation is given in a later chapter). The report also concludes
that the changes in the River Ganges are likely to increase flooding
and to have effects on the regime of the River Brahmaputra. However,
no quantitative assessment of these effects is made.
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CONCLUSIONS
Special Studies provides adequate data for an assessment of the
hydraulic consequences of the operation of the Farakka Barrage. Three
effects have been studied: (i) changes in the low flow of major
rivers, (ii) changes in the depth of groundwater, and (iii) changes
in river morphology.
The main rivers in Bangladesh likely to have been influenced by
changes in the flow of the Ganges at Farakka were the Ganges downstream
of Farakka, the River Gorai-Madhumati and the River Arial Khan.
There can be little doubt that the Farakka diversions significantly
reduced the flow in the Ganges at Hardinge Bridge. The unusually low
flows observed in the dry seasons of 1976 and 1977 were low as a
direct consequence of the Farakka diversions. If a minimum flow of
^1,000 could normally be expected only in two years out of every
hundred, then .a flow of 26,000 cusecs (April 1976) is clearly an
exceedingly rare event requiring explanation. The Farakka diversions
provide that explanation. On average the Ganges flow was reduced by
50% in the driest months of March and April.
The lower flows recorded in the Gorai-Madhumati would normally have
been expected once every ten years. The Bangladesh case is here
complicated by the natural action of the River Ganges in occasionally
silting up the channel supplying the Gorai River. However, the fact
that low flows were recorded in both the years of high Farakka
diversions increases the suspicion that these diversions were the
cause of the reduced flows in the Gorai. The unprecedented low
water levels in the Ganges are the most probable cause of the reduced
Gorai flows. However such reductions have occurred naturally in the
past.
The flow in the River Arial Khan may also have suffered from the
Farakka diversions during the dry seasons of 1976 and 1977- This is,
perhaps, surprising because the Arial Khan draws its water from the
combined Brahmaputra and Ganges. A change in the flow in the Ganges
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might have been expected to cause only a small change in the flow of
the combined river and, therefore,, have little effect on the Arial Khan.
However, the change in the Ganges flow seems to have had a significant
impact on the aombined flow and, hence, may have caused the flow in
the Arial Khan to dip below the minimum previously recorded.
The Bangladesh Government's sweeping allegation of large and widespread
changes in groundwater levels, as a result of the Farakka diversions,
is not supported by the evidence in Special Studies. Exceptionally
low groundwater levels were recorded in 1976 but it is difficult to
believe that they were caused by the Farakka diversions. The Special
Studies team were able to demonstrate a conclusive relationship between
river and groundwater levels only for wells within a few miles of a
river. However, many suction pumps were already operating close to
the 25-29 ft maximum depth for the operation of such pumps. They may,
therefore, have been sensitive to quite small changes in the
groundwater. Pumps within a few miles of the major rivers may have
been affected by the Farakka diversions.
Further study would be required to identify the causes of the
widespread, exceptionally low groundwater levels of 1976. Possibly
long term changes in rainfall, flooding intensity and pumping rates
were to blame.
The Farakka diversions were, similarly, only one factor amongst many
influencing changes in river morphology in South West Bangladesh.
Clearly river stages were affected but probably little else.
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Chapter Eleven
SALINITY INTRUSION AND INDUSTRIAL DISRUPTION
The increased intrusion of sea water into the surface water of South
West Bangladesh is one of the most substantial effects claimed by
Bangladesh as a result of the Farakka withdrawals. It is also the
basis for several other objections. Part of the case for the effect
that diversion has had on agricultural production and all of the case
for the effect that diversion has had on industrial production and
forests, rest on the assertion that there was unusual change in the
salinity of rivers and estuaries in South West Bangladesh.
Sea water travels up an estuary for two reasons. It is first of all
carried inland, against the force of the river's fresh water flow, by
the tides - but, even where tides are slight, there is a tendency for
sea water to move upstream because it is more dense than fresh water.
The extent of saline intrusion will therefore depend on the quantity
and velocity of the fresh water travelling down the river, on the
strengths of the tides at a given time and also on the turbulence of
the -river (if the saline and fresh waters are not 'well mixed', a
wedge of saline water may intrude larger distances along the river bed
with relatively fresh water flowing above it).
Salt concentration in water may be measured by chemical analysis in
a laboratory, but it is most conveniently measured by measuring the
electrical conductivity of the water. This conductivity is generally
measured in reciprocal ohms (that is, Siemens) at a standard
temperature of 25 degrees centigrade. Special Studies expresses this
unit as micromho. For simplicity and clarity this has been changed
to microsiemens (^S). Increased conductivity gives a consistent
measure of increased salinity.
The limits of salinity above which water becomes unusable for a given
purpose are these:
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depends on the process and
equipment.
An estimate is made in this chapter of the salinity intrusion suffered
in Bangladesh in 1976 and 1977 and the extent to which this can be
attributed to Indian withdrawals of Ganges water at Farakka. It will
be shown that exceptionally high salinity levels were observed in
the rivers of South West Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Government blames
these levels entirely upon Indian diversions. Evidence will be
provided suggesting that some, but not all, of the exceptional
salinity intrusion was caused by Indian withdrawals.
The Bangladesh Government also alleges that considerable damage was
inflicted on industry as a result of salinity changes. The extent of
this disruption is estimated.
THE BANGLADESH CLAIM
The Bangladesh Government's claim as to the extent of increased
salinity is summarised in Figures 11.1 to 11.J>, reproduced here from
the government's Deadlock on the Ganges. In the text of the White
Paper, the cause of the intrusion is explained as follows:
'The increased salinity is totally explicable in the
light of the increased withdrawal of the Ganges water.
A large part of the affected region is subject to the
tides of the Bay of Bengal. Historically this saline
intrusion was counteracted by the upland flows. Quite
logically, with a decrease in the upland flows the
salinity has increased and advanced for distances
inland.' (3)
This short paragraph is the substance of the Bangladesh case on
salinity and it contains one considerable assertion. Although the
wording of the first sentence is somewhat inexact, the reader is left
in little doubt that any increased salinity (greater than the range






Figure11.1:BarCha tofmaximumonthlys liniinRiveBhair b,K uln Source:Bangladesh,DeadlockntheG g s,D c a,1976.
,Bangladesh.
Figure 11.2: Salinity intrusion in 1976 (500jjS contour).
Source: Bangladesh, Deadlock on the Ganges, Dacca,
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1976.
Figure 11.3: Salinity intrusion in 1976 (2000 /iS contour).
Source: Bangladesh, Deadlock on the Ganges, Dacca, 1976.
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THE INDIAN RESPONSE
The response by India is rather longer:
'Indian experts who visited Bangladesh recently found
that the problem of salinity had been exaggerated out of
all proportions- According to technical studies carried
out by experts, including those of the World Bank, the
withdrawals at Farakka should not affect salinity in the
Meghna estuary and Khulna area, where increased intrusion
of salinity is alleged to have taken place.
'The World Bank study stated that no substantial adverse
effects of salinity are likely to be felt in the lower
Meghna region even if 100,000 cusecs of water are
withdrawn from the major rivers out of the 250,000 cusecs
or so available in the lean season.
'If a withdrawal of this order from the river systems of
Bangladesh would cause no excessive salinity the withdrawal
of 40,000 cusecs at Farakka would have practically no
effect at all. The study also concluded that depletion
of the low flow of the Ganga would not increase salinity
in the Khplna region. The slight movements in the salinity
margins there are associated with local runoffs and monsoon
rainfall.
'The salinity problem in the areas allegedly affected is
largely influenced by the penetration of saltwater from
the sea. It should also be remembered that over a 1,000
million acre-feet of water drain into the Bay of Bengal
from the river systems of Bangladesh and create a
freshwater reservoir in the coastal areas which helps
check penetration of seawater inland.' (k)
The Indian Government has gathered, in this quotation, three
observations in support of its position. They are, firstly, the
observations of Indian experts; secondly, the predictions of
'independent' technical experts; and finally, a comment on the
mechanism of saline intrusion. These observations are worthy of
separate consideration.
First there is the visit of the Indian experts to Bangladesh. This
reference is presumably to the May 1976 visit of an Indian technical
team (there had been another visit in May 1975, but they only observed
the effects of a diversion of 11,000 - 16,000 cusecs at Farakka). No
report has been published showing the detailed findings of this team.
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A short paragraph in The Hindu reported that the team had visited
Khulna, Rajshahi and Bheramara (the site of the Ganges-Kobadek
Project pumping station), and that the team had made a small step
forward in their discussions with their counterparts in Bangladesh.
This, then, is an example of a reference to observations which have
not been published or recorded in any manner which would allow informed
discussion. We do not know what was observed, nor the methods used.
Then there is reference to the conclusions of two or more studies
carried out by experts. At least one of these was issued by the
World Bank. This reference is also inadequate. If the Indian
Government's draughtsmen had intended readers to be able to find the
documents mentioned, they would, one imagines, have provided more
information. Not even the subject matter of the reports in question
is given.
Nevertheless, it is possible after a review of the literature to
identify the reports they had in mind. It seems that the Indian
Government was referring to a study (5) carried out by Harvard
University's Center for Population Studies, and to the work of a
World Bank (IBRD) team reported in the Bank's "Land and Water Resources
Sector Study, Bangladesh" (6) (some of the Harvard work was also
incorporated in this study).
The crucial fact that these two studies were predictions is not
emphasised by the Indian Government pamphlet. The Harvard study
reported an attempt to model (on a digital computer) the process of
seawater intrusion into the river system of Bangladesh, whilst the
World Bank study used an informed assessment of the situation
(including, presumably, a knowledge of the Harvard conclusions) to
judge the likely effects of reduced freshwater flow on the penetration
of saline water. Neither study had the benefit of the observations
of the actual effects of reduced Ganges flow, because both studies




The most substantial body of evidence which can be brought to bear
on the question of the extent of salinity intrusion in 1976 and 1977
and on the extent to which this was caused by Indian withdrawala at
Farakka, is contained in the Special Studies.
Chapter VI in Volume C is entitled 'Tidal hydraulics and saline
intrusion'. It has this objective:
'...to assess the effects of upstream diversion on
hydraulic parameters and saline intrusion in the
Southwest region and to prepare a schedule of investigations
required for future studies...' (7)
The Special Studies team carried out a systematic review of the
methods being used in Bangladesh for observing salinity in the rivers.
They collected historical and current measurements and analysed them
in order to obtain the best assessments of the extent and causes of
change. The 'Study Area' (the South West region of Bangladesh) was
divided, for the purposes of their analysis, into five 'compartments',
North-South strips of about 25 miles in width. The team thought that
these strips 'could be considered somewhat independently' (8). (These
divisions are marked on Figure 11.^.)
The basic method of the team was a comparison of the salinity intrusion
in 1967-68 with the situation which occurred during 1976 and 1977
(see Table 11.1). The base year of 1967-68 was chosen because, 'the
unimpaired dry season flows of these years were comparable and since
better records were available for these years...' (9)-
The conclusions which they drew from this analysis were these:
'The salinity pattern in the portion of the study area
east of the Gorai-Madhumati rivers are largely independent
of the flows in the Ganges and Gorai-Madhumati rivers.
The reason for the rapid penetration and retreat of high
salinity in the Shahbazpur-Tentulia estuaries such as
occurred at Ilsaghat in 1976-77 was in conjunction with
reduced flows in these estuaries. The reduction in flow
in these two estuaries in 1976 and 1977 was aggravated by
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Table 11.1: Comparison of maximum monthly salinities in
1968, 1976 and 1977
STATION NUMBER WATER JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE
YEAR
Bagerhat 49 1968 _ 2300 3850 6000 7000 1500
1976 - 3000 6800 9000 9300 8100
19 77 2250 4800 10500 30000 7000 3300
Bardia D/15 1968 - - - - - -
1975 - - - - - -
1976 - 460 880 2700 3500 500
1977 440 480 480 420 380 410
Charfession B/24 1976 - 15200 19000 — - _
1977 - 28000 19000 18000 4000 -
Chandpur - 1976 - - 185 170 148 120
(Comilla) 1977 230 300 400 - - -
Deulatkhan B/22 1967 _ 2800 2425 2100 — _
1976 - - - - 1300 -
* 1977 - 2500 1000 650 - -
Dumuria K/12 1967 4000 4000 6500 8000 8000 17500
1976 - - - - - -
1977 5600 3000 5200 6500 7500 -
Dasmonia B/18 1967 220 - 350 500 - 135
1976 - 710 2350 2350 410 170
1977 245 240 790 1500 260 200
Golachipa B/25 1967 500 270 700 350 235 400
1976 - - - 1700 1600 300
1977 420 440 890 2400 340 320
Hazimara 1976 _ — — 230 _ _
Kobadak 26 1966 15000 15000 15000 32000 33000 -
1977 17500 19900 28400 17900 - -
Ilsaghat B/21 1967 - 260 540 430 150 -
1976 - 1500 2380 3400 185 220
1977 - 1100 1750 3250 220 180
Khulna A 1968 380 620 340 450 1000 150
1976 364 1650 7200 13000 13600 6000
1977 460 1950 4ooo 7950 1570 1000
Khepupara B/10 1967 8000 - - - - -
1977 1 1500 11500 22000 25500 13000 -
Mongla 22 1968 2300 3900 7500 11800 13500 9000
1976 - 7100 12500 16500 18500 1700
1977 5000 8000 11900 15600 - -
Cont/d...
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STATION VOLUME WATER JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE
YEAR
Morrelgonj 33 1968 280 900 3^5 600 koo 145
1976 - 3000 ^750 6500 8500 6000
1977 2300 3750 7000 6000 if500 1700
Malianala 25 1968 — 2300 3850 6000 7000 1500
1976 - 3000 6800 9000 9000 8100
1977 2250 if800 10500 30000 7000 3300
Patherghata B/5 1967 2000 2300 8000 6000 625 205
1968 - 2300 3850 6000 7000 1500
1977 2^+00 5000 12500 9800 3050 7ifO
Rayenda if 1968 308 350 k25 360 260 155
1976 - 570 2500 if700 7^0 950
1977 550 825 2^00 1750 1000 630
Tajumuddin b/23 1967 - 8000 8000 8000 - -
1976 - - 17500 17600 13100 7000
1977 - 19500 22^00 15500 2100 -
Source: Special Studies, Table VI-11 .
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upstream diversion from the Ganges river.' (10)
'The Pussur estuary to Khulna and beyond is completely
dependent on fresh water from the Gorai-Madhumati to
prevent saline intrusion into the Khulna area. This
intrusion severely affects some 50 miles of channels
of the Mongla, Daratana and Gasiakhali and even affects
somewhat the Gorai-Madhumati at its intersection with
the Daratana. These undesirable effects increase as
fresh water flow in the Gorai is decreased...The
steady state fresh water flow past Khulna that would be
required to hold the salinity at Khulna below 1,000/J >S
is probably something more than 3,000 cusecs but less than
7,000 cusecs. Therefore the high salinity intrusion at
Khulna and on up to Bardia and into the Gorai-Madhumati
above Kamarkhali in early 1976 and 1977 was the direct
result of the decreased flows coming through the Gorai
offtake from the Ganges at that time. The 500 yuS
salinity intrusion front reached upstream past Bardia to
2 to 5 miles beyond Kamarkhali and for an undetermined
distance downstream of Bardia in the Gorai-Madhumati.
'The lower Kobadak compartment is a pool of medium to
high saline water in both the low flow and flood season.
This condition is not related to any significant degree
to changes in the low flow in the Ganges.' (11)
These conclusions are a vindication of the more thoughtful Bangladesh
claims on salinity intrusion. They do not support the impression
given in much of the Bangladesh propaganda that the whole of South
West Bangladesh has suffered severe salinity intrusion. Any changes
in salinity intrusion in the Eastern half of the study area are not
attributed primarily to the Indian withdrawals. Similarly, the Western¬
most compartment is excluded. But, as shown in Figure 11-3, Bangladesh
claimed only a small advance of salinity fronts in these areas. The
central claim that a serious increase in salinity incursion occurred
in the Pussur river and immediately adjacent estuaries is upheld.
The method used in the Special Studies investigation
Having established data for comparable years, the Special Studies
team attempted to relate the flows in the different creeks, channels,
rivers and estuaries, to the changes between the base year and the
two years in which Ganges withdrawals were large (1976 and 1977)-
The team evidently did not consider that a contour map of the salinity
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advance adequately reflected the processes involved. They included
in their report figures which show the maximum saline penetration in
individual years as statistics on the map of the study area (see
Figure 11-5) but not contour maps. Instead of producing a graphical
representation they described the processes involved in each compartment
of the study area.
From these descriptions they were able to reject the influence of the
Ganges withdrawals as an explanation of saline penetration in the
two Easternmost and one Westernmost compartment.
They concluded that the Meghna-Tentulia compartment was dominated by
the combined flows passing Chandpur. Although in April 1976 a
salinity of ^,000/tS was observed at Ilsaghat and high salinities
in areas to the West of that point, the Ganges withdrawals could not
be held to be the sole or major cause. In 1976, the flows passing
Chandpur in February, March and April averaged 218,000 cusecs, 2.33,000
cusecs and 337)000 cusecs. These flows were less than the mean
for these months but not less than the minimum recorded (12).
Similarly for the Tentulia estuary, they concluded, it 'appears to
receive enough fresh water from the Meghna estuary to prevent severe
intrusion of bay water up the estuary' (13)-
In the next compartment (going West), the Arial Khan-Barisal-Buriswar
compartment, the study team decided that fresh water from the Arial
Khan (taking off from the combined discharge of the Brahmaputra and
the Ganges) and fresh water from cross channels connecting the
compartment with the Meghna and Tentulia estuaries were the main
forces combating saline intrusion. Again such salinity as had been
noticed in the compartment could not be blamed on reduced Ganges flows.
The saline pocket which had been recorded at Patuakhali had apparently
travelled across from Ilsaghat and down the Lohalia. (Figure 11.6
shows the directions of saline advance and fresh water flow, as
indicated by the study team for 1976 conditions).
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figure 11.6 South .Vest Bangladesh - Main directions of fresh water flow
and saline advance in 1976 (from Special Studies Drwg No VII-4)
The relatively large cross flows in the channel passing Kaukhali
(Kawkhali) were identified by the study team as one of the main
factors limiting saline intrusion in the Arial Khan-Barisal-Buriswar
compartment including the Balewar estuary (see Figure 11.7)• They
estimated dry season flows of the order of 26,000 cusecs past this
point and commented: 'The importance of this flow past Kawkhali is
shown by the fact that during the months of March and April, 1976
with essentially no flow down the Gorai-Madhumati, the Kawkhali
flow prevented severe saline intrusion up the Baleswar-Madhumati
to some extent' (1*0. The team concluded that in the low flow season
the water flowing past Kaukhali is the dominant factor in the lower
part of the Baleswar (that is, Gorai-Madhmati) and Bishkhali
estuaries.
The Kobadak compartment is in the far West of the study area. The
report concludes that, 'this compartment received almost no fresh
water flow in the low flow season and only the local fainfall plus
a limited flow from the Pussur in the wet season'(15)-
These are the reasons the report gives for excluding the influence
of Ganges withdrawals in those areas. The more important section
of -this chapter is the study team's evidence for the salinity
intrusions up past the town of Khulna and the reason why they
connect this to Ganges withdrawals.
The most dramatic saline intrusion during 1976 and 1977 occurred
in the Pussur estuary and up the Rupsa-Pussur to the Nabaganga,
the Atharabanka and the upper Gorai-Madhumati. It so happens that
the second city of Bangladesh and its industrial centre, the town
of Khulna, is situated by the Rupsa-Pussur. It is there that the
increased salinity of the river water has been most pronounced and
where the industry (and therefore the economy) of Bangladesh is
least tolerant to such increased salinity.
The Special Studies team identified a quirk of nature which made the
river beside Khulna particularly sensitive to changes in the flow
of the Gorai-Madhumati, and hence sensitive to changes in the flow
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Figure 11.7 Superimposed graphs of electrical conductivity in
the Daratana-Ghasiakhali River at Bagerhat in
the years 1968, 1976, 1977.
of the Ganges. Their explanation of what happened in this region
is very important. It justifies some of Bangladesh's apparently
outrageous claims (see the bar chart in Figure 11.1, and the
relevant electrical conductivity records in Figure 11.8), and
explains why the reports of the World Bank, Harvard University and
the team of Indian Government experts appear to have underestimated
salinity changes in this area. These three different groups did
not have the detailed data to enable them to analyse the specific
features of this small but very significant sector of the delta.
The Special Studies description of the process involved in saline
intrusion in the Nabaganga-Pussur compartment is here quoted in
full:
'The estuary depends entirely on fresh water of the Gorai
at Bardia to prevent saline intrusion. These spills in
the low flow season have never been sufficient to defend
the Pussur against severe saline intrusion to Chalna
[Mongla] 50 miles from the Bay and to within a few miles
of Khulna. For example, in 1968 when the average monthly
flow in the Gorai in the dry season exceeded 3,600 cusecs,
salinities of 3,800 Mrnhos were registered at Station B
four miles below Khulna.
'Due to the channel arrangement at Khulna, the fresh water
flow is confined to this single channel in front of
Khulna and therefore has a higher average velocity than
five or six miles downstream where the flow is divided
into two channels and is later divided again. These
higher average velocities at Khulna are more effective in
holding back the saline bay water. Thus, in 1968 with
3,800 yuS registered only four miles downstream, the
maximum salinity registered at Khulna was about 1,000 /US.
But when the Gorai flows dropped to almost zero in 1976,
the high salinities moved past Khulna and on up to
Bardia. The maximum salinity measured at Khulna in 1976
was about 13,600 ,uS. ' (16)
In other words, the higher river velocities at Khulna maintained a
steep salinity gradient. But it was a salinity gradient which in
normal years allowed the river to maintain relatively low salinities
just adjacent to Khulna. The industrial water offtakes at Khulna
could therefore operate without difficulties. The fairly small
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Figure'.8. Superimposed graphs of electrical conductivity in
the Rupsa-Pussur River at Khulna for the years
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change in the salinity in this the most sensitive stretch of river
for Bangladesh's industrial production (1?)-
The Special Studies report also contains the results of a regression
analysis which attempted to indicate the relationship between the
maximum monthly salinity at a given station and the average monthly
discharge in the Gorai-Madhumati river (at Gorai Railway Bridge,
near Kushtia). The results of this analysis are reproduced here
as Table 11.2.
These correlation coefficients do not show a very striking
relationship, but the report comments:
'As mentioned in paragraph 6.5-3 the salinity in the
Nabaganga-Pussur compartment is completely dependent on
the flow at the Gorai Railway Bridge. However, the
functions that define this relationship at any one point
along the channel may not be a simple linear function
of concurrent salinity and flow.' (18)
Discussion of the Special Studies results
The descriptive analysis adopted by the Special Studies team does
not rely on sophisticated techniques. It is no more than a common
sense investigation of the process of the delta. Its accuracy
relies on the adequacy of the data and the rigour with which the
team have approached the subject. The data is reasonably consistent
over the three methods of observation used: central laboratory
analysis of collected water samples; static (in situ) observation;
and dynamic observation (from a boat drifting with the current).
The interpretation put upon the data is plausible. The Special
Studies team have rejected the unlikely claim that the saline
intrusion all along the South West coast of Bangladesh had increased
solely because the Ganges flow had been reduced by India. They have
indicated not only that the combined flow in the Meghna is dominant
in the areas adjacent to that estuary, but also that substantial
quantities of water flow West along cross-channels to dominate large
areas as far as the Madhumati and prevent the influence of the
2^3
Table 11.2: Results of correlation analysis between flow in
the Gorai River and maximum salinity intrusion
Electrical conductivity correlation coefficient
station Jan Feb March April May June
Khulna (Rupsa-Pussur) 0.209 0-504 0-713 0-673 0.887 0-588
Mongla (Pussur) 0-373 0-553 0-399 0-724 0-571 0.693
Morrelgan j (Ghasiakhali) 0.220 0.627 0.64-5 0.170 0.266 O.652
Regression analysis made using the following equation:
EC^ = oPq where EC is max monthly salinity at station A
Pq is the corresponding average
monthly discharge at Gorai railway
bridge and,
a and b are parameters determined
by the regression
Source: Special Studies, pVI-28 to VI-29 •
244-
changes in the flow in the Ganges having a significant effect. They
have also provided a reasonable explanation for the apparently
anomalous rise in the salinity in the Rupsa river at Khulna.
One source of doubt remains, however. The report does not indicate
the extent to which the flow in the Gorai-Madhumati river is
recharged from the groundwater of adjacent areas. It is nevertheless
unlikely that this element could explain increased salinity. Reduced
flow in the Gorai from the Ganges would tend to result in increased
recharge from the groundwater, though the effect would probably only
be small.
The Special Studies analysis provides a thorough investigation of the
causes of the exceptional saline intrusion experienced in parts of
South West Bangladesh during 1976 and 1977-
INDUSTRIAL DISRUPTION
Bangladesh's major centre of industry is at Khulna in the middle of
the South West. As we have seen, the rivers near to Khulna were
subject to large salinity changes in 1976 and 1977-
In its White Paper the Bangladesh Government claimed:
'The increased salinity has already injured the
industrial sector. There has been only one source of
power for the south-west region, the Goalpara Thermal
Power Station. The salinity levels of the river went
too high for the tolerance of the power station equipment.
As a result the power station had to close for some time
and operated intermittently at increased cost on the
basis of fresh water brought by barges from long
distances. The impact of the loss of power to the
industries dependent on the power station was
significant. Actually the paper mills and the newsprint
mills suffered because the saline water was unusable
for processing the end product, as well as from its
loss of power. But jute industry, Bangladesh's
biggest export earner was hampered in its operation in
a major way.' (19)
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The Government of India responded as follows:
'No data have been furnished to show how the Farakka
withdrawals have been directly responsible for these
adverse consequences. The available facts however show
that the Khulna reach used to have higher salinity
levels in the past. These levels might have increased
as a result of human activities in the region. In this
context India has been asking Bangladesh for data to
enable it to study the results of salinity jointly with
Bangladesh. But these have not been furnished.' (20)
The Bangladesh Government asserts that serious industrial disruption
occurred because a power station, paper mills and jute processers
were unable to use highly saline water, or used it and suffered
damage. India argues that the chain of causation is unproven. A
survey carried out by the Bangladesh Water Development Board is
reported in Special Studies (21). The results of this survey are
summarised in Table 11.3- If the survey has accumulated reliable
data, salinity changes caused industrial losses to a value of at
least Taka 120 million (US 08 million).
The disruption is plausible. The shut-down of the Goalpara Power
Station would have serious consequences. Industries facing
unexpectedly high salt content in their cooling or process water
might well suffer production delays, mechanical failure, and
increased corrosion. During 1976 and 1977 some industries shipped
fresh water by barge from upstream sources to their factories.
The causes of increased salinity have, earlier in this chapter, been
established: the evidence suggests that the Farakka withdrawals were
to blame.
However, the survey of industrial disruption is open to question.
The questionnaire used is not reproduced in Special Studies. The
reader is left in doubt about the wording of the questions and may
reasonably imagine that the industries concerned tended to submit
a pessimistic assessment of their losses in hopeful anticipation of
government compensation. Special Studies reports that some of the
industries were visited to verify the losses, but at the time
2k6
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Special Studies were written surveys of damage were still continuing.
There can be little doubt that industrial damage occurred (22), but,
perhaps, the Tk 120 million estimate of loss should be interpreted as
an upper valuation of the actual loss.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has provided an assessment of the extent and causes
of the salinity intrusion experienced in Bangladesh in 1976 and
1977, and of the industrial disruption which resulted from that
intrusion.
The Bangladesh Government claimed that exceptional salinity levels
were experienced in these years, and that these exceptional levels
were caused by India's Farakka diversions; the Indian Government
responded that the problem had been 'exaggerated out of all
proportion'. The Special Studies team investigated and upheld the
Bangladesh Government's central claim of significantly increased
salinity in the Pussur River and immediately adjacent estuaries.
We have seen in this chapter that the descriptive analysis employed
by Special Studies appears sound, and the data they have accumulated
appears reasonably consistent. Special Studies therefore provides
a basis for judgement.
There appears to have been unprecedented saline intrusion during the
years of maximum Indian diversions. However, only in the central
'compartments' of the Nabaganga-Pussur and Gorai-Madhumati estuaries
is this attributable to the reduced flows in the Ganges and Gorai
Rivers. In the Eastern compartments the flows and tides of the
Meghna River, cross-connected to other estuaries by the Westward
flowing Swarupkhati channel, seem to be the predominant influence on
salinity intrusion. The Farakka diversions cannot be blamed for
salinity changes in this area. In the Westernmost compartment little
salinity change was observed.
In the important Khulna region Special Studies identifies a quirk
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of river channel formation which may explain why small changes in
the flow in the Gorai caused large changes in the salinity at
Khulna. There was a particularly steep salinity gradient present
in previous years in the river just downstream of Khulna. This
may have made the River Pussur at Khulna prone to a large change in
salinity as a result of a relatively small change in flow. This
quirk of nature may partly explain why the significance of the
salinity changes was overlooked not only by the Indian Government
but also by other investigators.
If the Farakka diversions caused the reduction in Gorai flows then
the salinity increases observed in the central compartment are also
a consequence of Indian withdrawals. Chapter Ten concluded that the
Farakka diversions are the most likely cause of reduced Gorai flows
and, therefore, they are also the most likely cause of the
exceptional salinity levels experienced in the central compartment.
Industrial ldsses totalling Tk 120 million are claimed by the
Bangladesh Government. The total value of those losses may be
over-estimated, but there is little doubt that damage took place as
a direct result of increases in salinity. The chain of causation is
long, but it seems to lead back to the Farakka diversions. The
weak link in the chain is the connection between the Farakka
diversions and the reduced Gorai flows. If that is taken as the
'most likely' connection, then the industrial damage suffered by





Chapters 10 and 11 assessed the primary physical consequences of the
Farakka diversions - exceptionally low river flows and unexpectedly
severe saline intrusion. This chapter builds on the conclusions of
those chapters in an attempt to follow the chain of causation as
far as the influence of Indian diversions on agriculture and forestry
in Bangladesh.
Agriculture in Bangladesh employs about 75% of the labour force and
contributes some 56% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Approximately 30% of the GDP comes from the growing of rice (1).
There are three main rice crops, Aus, Aman and Boro, corresponding
with the three rice-growing seasons. For each crop there are a
large number of local strains and also some recently introduced
high yielding varieties (HYVs). Aman is the largest crop, and is
sown in April and May, to be harvested between November and January.
Some varieties of Aman are adapted to deep water flooding. Aus, the
second largest crop is sown in March and harvested in August. Both
Aus and Aman are generally rain-fed crops, although increasingly
these crops are irrigated, and in some areas the crops may depend on
water from nearby channels or natural inundation. The third crop,
Boro, is an irrigated winter crop, sown in December and January, and
harvested in April and May (2). Between i960 and 197^1 rice
production grew at an average rate of 1-9% per year, but Boro output
rose 15% annually during the same period (3)- Other food crops
include wheat, pulses, oilseeds, sugar and vegetables.
Bangladesh's major cash crop is jute which provides 77% of "the value
of the country's commodity exports (k). Bangladesh produces 75% of
world jute exports. Other cash crops include tea, tobacco and cotton.
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Forest industries contribute 3% of the country's GDP. The wood is
used for house and boat construction and in the making of newsprint
and matches (5)- In the South West of the country, most wood comes
from the Sundarbans, a large area of mangrove forest and swamp, where
the main species is the Sundri tree which can thrive in mildly saline
water.
In .its White Paper, the Bangladesh Government asserted that India's
diversions had resulted in a loss of rice output of 236,000 tons
in 1976. Bangladesh argues that there are three ways in which the
Farakka diversions reduce rice and other agricultural production:
Firstly, reduced river flows cause depleted soil moisture levels,
with the result that crop yields are lower. Secondly, increased
salinity in river water may preclude irrigation or, if the water is
used for irrigation or inundation, crops may be damaged by the
salinity. Finally, Bangladesh farmers may perceive increased salinity
levels or decreased water availability and may, therefore, choose to
delay planting their crops. If this happens, crop yields may be
reduced because the crop has a shorter growing season.
We shall see that Special Studies concludes that rice losses were
under-estimated by the White Paper. However, it will be argued in
the following pages that the agricultural consequences of the
Farakka diversions are poorly estimated by Special Studies.
Agricultural damage almost certainly occurred, but that damage is
difficult to prove and to quantify.
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The estimation of adverse effects on forestry production is also
problematic. In this case the Special Studies investigation is
more rigorous, but the Special Studies team were not able to wholly
discount influences other than the Farakka diversions. In this
aspect, as in others, there is a strong presumption that observed
deterioration was caused by Farakka diversions. However, that




The Bangladesh White Paper argues that there are two quite different
effects to be accounted for in agriculture. There is the concurrent
and relatively tangible effect on agriculture in the years of
withdrawal; and there is a potential or pre-emptive effect in
reducing the water available for future irrigation projects. The
White Paper does not attempt to assess this pre-emptive effect but it
comments that the potential benefits of dry-season irrigation could
not have been foreseen twentyfive years previously when the waters
of the Ganges first became an issue. The development of high-yielding
varieties (HYVs) of rice and wheat with their need for accurately
controlled and large quantities of water was subsequent to India's
decision to proceed with the Farakka Barrage (6).
On concurrent, though in some cases cumulative, effects on agriculture
the White Paper has this to say:
'The dangers of salinity for agricultural production are
well-known. However, the real hazards of increased
salinity only began to be appreciated in practice by the
farmers themselves. Fresh water is required not only to
flush salinity from the soil but also to counteract the
onrush of saline water from the sea. As the soil becomes
saline, productivity is reduced and eventually the soil
becomes barren. Another negative input of increased
salinity is that the water itself becomes less suitable
for irrigation purposes. The combined effects of such
increased salinity have both immediate counter-productive
effects and produce damage over the longer term, which
is irreparable.
'When the natural balance has been upset to the extent
that it has been, one cannot attribute crop loss only to
salinity, for the problem of the low flow combines with
salinity as an equally important damaging factor. A
very preliminary and conservative estimate shows that
during the 1976 dry season over four hundred thousand
acres of land were affected in the area dependent on
the Ganges due to soil moisture deficiency and
increase of salinity. More than ^000 low lift pumps in
the area suffered due to scarcity of water in the
sources and increase of salinity in the area. All the
shallow tubewells were adversely affected. A large
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number of deep tubewells in the area were affected due
to fall in the sub-soil water level. The subsidiary-
pumps of the G K Project ceased to operate as the
Ganges water level fell below the lowest operation limit.
Three main pumps faced operational difficulties for
increase in lifts and decrease in head on the suction
side. Rice production alone fell short by 236,000 tons
(20% of Bangladesh's food imports).
'This loss does not take into account the loss or the
reduction of the second crop arising from delayed planting
of the crop...'
'The repercussions of...reduced water availability on
agricultural production were severe. It reduced the
capacity to irrigate. It is estimated that approximately
33% of the irrigation facilities could not operate
because of the decreased availability of water. Second,
it militated against the planning of non-irrigated crops
which depend upon the residual moisture of the soil.
Third, it delayed the planting of the crop which decreased
the yield, shortened the growing season and affected the
planting and productivity of the subsequent crop.
'It is estimated that delayed planting reduced high-yielding
variety .yields by 30% and the inability to provide
supplemental irrigation reduced the crop yield by roughly
10%. A country attempting to emerge from subsistence
agriculture is confronted with man-made handicaps. For
the effect of reduced yields is not only the immediate
reduced income, but also the disillusionment of the
farmer with modern agricultural practices; a
disillusionment that takes years to overcome.' (7)
In other words, as a result of increased salinity, decreased water
availability and delayed planting of crops, Bangladesh's rice output
was 236,000 tons less than anticipated. Longer term and cumulative
consequences have also to be taken into account, but they are even
more difficult to quantify.
A second document, circulated within the Bangladesh Government,
asserts that the White Paper assessment is an underestimate. This
second document is a typewritten note produced by the Bangladesh
Special Studies Directorate and entitled A short note on the loss of
agricultural crops in Bangladesh due to withdrawal of Ganges water at
Farakka (8). According to this note, Bangladesh's loss of rice,
wheat and vegetables in 1976 totalled nearly 6^-0,000 tons. We shall
see that this latter estimate is in close agreement with the
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conclusions of Special Studies.
(ii) Forestry
The White Paper asserts that Farakka diversions will reduce the
quantity of water flowing into the Sundarban forests. Surface and
ground water salinities will rise and, as a result, the quality of
the trees will deteriorate and the yield of timber will fall. These
changes will threaten the employment of ^5,000 people (9)«
THE INDIAN RESPONSE
Having argued that Bangladesh really only needs 9,000 cusecs of
Ganges water, compared to a dry season flow, after Farakka diversions,
of 23,000 to 26,000 cusecs, the Government of India's The Farakka
Barrage makes these specific responses to the Bangladesh claim:
'Bangladesh has alleged that *+00,000 acres of land were
adversely .affected in the dry season of 1976 because
of soil moisture deficiency and increased salinity. It
is well known that soil moisture depends entirely on the
characteristics of the soil and local rainfall. Soil
moisture has hardly anything to do with the groundwater
table. As for adverse effects of salinity on cultivable
area, the Padma reach is totally unaffected by salinity
and in the Gorai reach salinity effects cannot be
significant.
'About one third of the Ganga's riverine bank lying
below Farakka falls within India and is subject to the
effects of withdrawals at Farakka. But careful studies
of the groundwater table as well as the functioning of
tubewells and lift pumps have not disclosed any such
adverse effects.
'A high-level technical delegation from India visited
the Ganges-Kobadak headworks in April 1976 and found
that the project's full requirements of irrigation were
met by the pumps in operation. The old subsidiary pumps
have been suffering from several deficiencies ever since
they were installed and the Bangladesh Government are
reported to have decided to scrap them and install new
ones. There is also conclusive evidence, including a
World Bank report of March 22 1976, to show that failure
to use the existing pumping and tubewell capacity is due
to a variety of other factors such as poor maintenance
and repairs, lack of spare parts and low demand for
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irrigation water.
'Bangladesh has further stated that the Farakka
withdrawals have brought about a decline of 236,000
tons of the production of rice. This has been related
among other causes to fluctuations in the water level
in the Ganga in the lean season of "1976. The water
level in the lower reaches of the Ganga is said to
have fallen 0.9 to 1.2 metres [3 to k ft ] as a result
of the withdrawals. But according to data furnished
by the Bangladesh Government fluctuations of a much
higher order have been frequent in the past because of
silting and shoaling of the river bed.
"There is also no mention of the target or the base
level of production from which the alleged decline is
supposed to have taken place. Bangladesh harvested a
record rice crop in 1975> and official documents on the
country's future economic prospects project another record
production of foodgrains in 1976. How therefore can one
believe that the Farakka withdrawals have had, or are
likely to have, any adverse effects on food production in
Bangladesh?' (10)
On forestry, The Farakka Barrage comments that the quality and
productivity of the trees depends on local rainfall and the depth
and spread of the tides, and:
'The lean season flows in the Padma cannot reach any
part of the Sundarbans and the Farakka withdrawals
cannot thus have harmful effects on forestry in
Bangladesh.' (11)
ASSESSMENT OF AGRICULTURAL EFFECTS
The Special Studies method
Sadly, although the effect of upstream withdrawals on the agriculture
of Bangladesh may have been serious, the chapter on these effects
in Special Studies is one of the weakest in the report. The processes
by which Farakka withdrawals caused agricultural damage are
inadequately described, and the method chosen for estimating the
quantity of damage was not satisfactorily implemented. Before
Setting out the conclusions of the Special Studies team, I shall
describe and criticise the manner in which they arrived at those
conclusions.
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The Special Studies method is summarised in this quotation:
'The study of the effect of upstream withdrawals of
Ganges water on agriculture was initiated by the
Special Studies Directorate of Bangladesh Water
Development Board by sending agricultural
questionnaires to 131 thanas of the Study Area. This
was followed by field trips to specific areas by the
officers of the Special Studies Directorate and then
by expatriate personnel. Field Officers of the
Department of Agriculture, Bangladesh Agricultural
Development Corporation and Bangladesh Water
Development Board were contacted to collect first
hand information of the problem. Agricultural data
including long term records and research findings of the
Study Area were collected from different agencies for
study of the base period 1973~7'+••-The survey unit of the
Special Studies Directorate has been engaged in monitoring
soil salinity agricultural properties and sampling the
socio-economic conditions of the farmers of the Study
Area. The accumulated data was compiled, processed.and
comparisons were made for period before and after upstream
diversion to evaluate the impact of this diversion.' (12)
The reduction in agricultural production was caused by moisture stress,
increased salinity and delayed planting. In turn, each of those
factors, it is alleged, was the result of reduced flows in the Rivers
Ganges and Gorai-Madhumati. As earlier chapters of this thesis have
shown, there is little doubt that the reduced flows in the Ganges were
caused by the Farakka withdrawals, but, the reduced flows in the
Gorai-Madhumati might have occurred anyway. It is probable but not
certain that the reductions were caused by the Farakka diversions.
This remains an unavoidable uncertainty in the assessment of
agricultural effects.
Having established, as far as is possible, that Farakka diversions
did cause reduced flows, it is then necessary to establish that there
are links between:
a) reduced flows and moisture stress,
b) reduced flows and delayed planting, and
c) salinity and reduced agricultural production.
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These links are not authoritatively established by this chapter of
Special Studies. The core of the method used to assess the
agricultural effects is a questionnaire survey. That in itself is
a reasonable way to approach the problem. The only alternative
method would have been comprehensive observation of a representative
sample of farms. For the questionnaire method to be convincing,
however, the processes about which questions are being asked must
be well-described, the questions must be well-chosen and, there
must be an awareness of the possibilities for error being introduced.
Without these three attributes the result of a questionnaire survey
will be meaningless and, on none of these points does Special Studies
give assurance.
The description of the processes involved requires that the causative
links a), b) and c), mentioned above, should be at least sketched.
In order to quantify the extent of moisture stress, it is necessary
to establish that in 1976 irrigation was reduced in areas where
crops are normally irrigated, that moisture available to crops was
reduced in non-irrigated areas and that both these problems were
caused by reduced flows in the major rivers. This was not done in
Special Studies.
The statistics of irrigated area, given in Table VII-27, do not
indicate that the area irrigated in 1975-76 was substantially below
previous years. It was 98% of the area irrigated in the preceding
year but 10% above the average of the irrigated areas in the
preceding three years. The area irrigated by powered pumps in 1975-76
is slightly above the average for the period 1972-5 to 197^-5* Only
in canal irrigation is there a substantial drop from the preceding
year. That was presumably attributable to the problems of the Ganges-
Kobadak Project (13)*
If the area irrigated was not affected, then, perhaps, the availability
of irrigation water was. There is good reason to believe this was
the case. In Chapters 10 and 11 of this thesis the evidence for
reduced flows and increased salinity has been summarised. An
estimate could have been made of the effect these factors would
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have on the availability of irrigation water. This is not done in
the Special Studies. The absence of such an estimate deprives
the reader of a possible check on the results of the questionnaire
survey.
In order to establish the effect of reduced flows in producing
moisture stress in non-irrigated areas, the link between reduced
groundwater levels and reduced soil moisture has to be, at the very
least, described. This is not done in Special Studies. As has
been shown in Chapter 10 of this thesis, the effect of reduced flows
on groundwater levels is difficult to establish and, in all
probability, is restricted to the land in narrow belts on either
side of the major water courses. In any case, the depths to the
water table in the Northern part of South-West Bangladesh, the
Districts of Kushtia, Faridpur, Jessore, Rajshahi and Pabna, of
greater than 10 feet, are such that it is most improbable that
groundwater contributes significantly to the moisture available to
rice or wheat crops (1*0.
Thus, although it appears probable that there was reduced rice and
other crop production in 1976 caused by moisture stress, the mechanism
by -which it occurred is not well described or estimated by Special
Studies.
It is difficult to provide conclusive evidence of delayed planting
by farmers except, perhaps, in the relatively controlled conditions
of the Ganges-Kobadak Project. Special Studies describes how
different varieties of rice in use in Bangladesh are heat and light
sensitive and in some cases intolerant of excess water, and how
delayed planting may therefore have reduced yields of these varieties.
It is not difficult to imagine that farmers, seeing the reduced level
of water in major rivers and in local channels, or testing the
increased salinity of the water, may have decided to delay sowing in
the hope that better conditions would come. It is, however, equally
easy to attribute such a delay to the slightly below average rainfall
of the first months of 1976. In this case we are studying complex
questions of individual motivation and perception within which it is
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difficult to identify a chain of causation. This chapter of
Special Studies provides little help in identifying such a chain.
There is no indication that the authors of the report were
sufficiently aware of the problems involved, and the difficulty
of investigating such a process with a questionnaire.
As far as salinity is concerned, the Special Studies description
is brief but relatively convincing. In the Southern portion of
South West Bangladesh large areas of land are tidally inundated.
In part of this area the water remains fresh all the year round -
or did so until 1976. During the dry season of 1976, the water
in this fresh water zone is reported to have become saline. Rice
and other crops ill-adapted to saline water may have suffered
severe damage as a result. In other parts of South West Bangladesh,
normally fresh river water became saline. If this water was used
for irrigation, reduced yields will have resulted.
These three sources of reduced agricultural production - moisture
stress, delayed planting and salinity - were investigated by sending
Thana Agricultural Officers out into the field to question the
farmers of South West Bangladesh. Special Studies does not include
a copy of the questionnaire, nor does it describe the instructions
given to the Thana Agricultural Officers (TAOs). What the reader
is told is this:
'In order to make a preliminary estimate of the loss
in agriculture that occurred in 1976 calendar year,
a special questionnaire was prepared and sent to
each of the 131 TAOs of the Study Area to collect a
complete history of agricultural development for the
past five years.' (15)
This appears, from the context, to be the questionnaire on which
this chapter is primarily founded. If that is the case, then the
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TAOs were not given any training in the complexities of this task;
they were simply sent some written instructions. Apparently,
different officers of the Special Studies Directorate visited the
field and may have checked on the survey methods of the TAOs. The
way in which natural climatic variations was eliminated from the
study does not inspire confidence that this did happen:
'There are climatic adversities that are natural in
Bangladesh. One of these is natural dryness in the
months of November through May. From one year's data
it is very difficult to separate the effects of natural
adversities and upstream withdrawals of the Ganges water.
So, for assessment of loss of production of agricultural
crops in dry season, it was assumed that the loss due to
natural adversity would not be more than 20%. Accordingly,
information sent by Thana Agricultural Officers and other
agencies regarding the loss of agricultural production
was mostly corrected and 20% of estimated reduced yield
was subtracted.' (16)
This is unsatisfactory. It may be that natural climatic variation
accounts for a variation of 20% in overall crop production, although
evidence is not given to support this assumption. In individual
cases certainly - and, for aggregated Thana production, probably -
the variation from year to year is likely to be much larger. If the
last sentence in the above quotation is correct, not even 20% of
variation in production was discounted. '20% of estimated reduced
yield', is not a 20% loss of production due to natural adversity: it
is 20% of the figure which the Thana Agricultural Officer estimated
was the reduction in 1976.
One further factor casts doubt on the figures reported in this
chapter of Special Studies. The figures finally accepted by
Special Studies (Table VII-26 and VII-36 of Special Studies) are,
with a few minor corrections, the figures which the Special Studies
Directorate included in their report of February 1977) A short note
on the loss of agricultural crops..., mentioned at the beginning of
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this chapter. Within a month of agreement to bring an expatriate
team to study this problem, the figures which finally emerged in
their report had been calculated. The expatriate experts employed
by International Engineering Consultants appear to have added only
padding to this chapter of the Special Studies. Their critical
assessment of the methodology used to estimate the effects of
Farakka diversions on agriculture did not cause them to modify either
the estimate of the area affected or the estimate of the quantity of
lost production.
The conclusions of Special Studies
Nevertheless, despite all these doubts and criticisms, can any support
be mustered for the figures calculated by the Special Studies
Directorate? Are they of the right order of magnitude?
Table 12.1 shows the area affected by different processes, according
to Special Studies estimates; Table 12.2 shows the estimated tonnages
of lost rice production by district and cause of loss; and Table 12.-3
provides a summary of the total crop losses.
From Table 12.2 it can be seen that the districts of Khulna, Barisal
and Patuakhali suffered the largest losses. These three districts
suffered 81% of the total lost rice production. But Barisal and
Patuakhali are areas which did not suffer significant changes as a
result of Farakka diversions. We saw in Chapter 11 that these
districts, falling as they do in the Eastern compartments of the
study area, did not experience excessive salinity intrusion as a
result of the Farakka diversions. The salinity and river flows in
these districts are primarily influenced by the flow in the combined
River Meghna which was not changed dramatically by the Farakka
diversions. Farmers may have delayed planting rice either because
they perceived there was insufficient water in the soil or in nearby
rivers, or because they perceived that the salinity of their water
source was too high for irrigating their crops. Reduced harvests may
also have resulted where crops were irrigated by water which was too
saline. But, in none of these cases can the blame be laid on the
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Table 12-3: Summary of the Special Studies estimate of lost
Agricultural production in South West Bangladesh







3 610p tons 10 Taka
SALINITY
Irrig. area 134 Rice 146 130 420
Non-irrig. 20 Pulse 8 1 1
MOISTURE DEPLETION
Irrig. area 97 Rice 268 100 324
Non-irrig. 220 Wheat 14 2 4
Pulses 31 2 5
Potatoes 4 5 6
Vegetables 1 1
DELAYED PLANTING AND SOWING
Irrig. area* 94 Rice 1 ,094 405 1,310
Tidal** 1,000 - - -
Non-irrig. NR NR NR NR
TOTAL FOOD GRAINS AND RABI CROPS
1,566 647 2,074
STRAW 1,507 382*** 57
Notes: NR - not reported
*
- Ganges Kobadak Project in Kushtia and Jessore
Districts
**
- In the tidal zone single transplanted Aman is
cultivated extensively with river water
***
- Production loss of straw was calculated on
the basis of 40% of paddy
Source: Table VII-36, Special Studies
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Farakka diversions. There may have been excess salinity and
insufficient moisture for crops in Barisal and Patuakhali but it was
probably not caused by the Indian withdrawals. Therefore, the
3^1,000 tons of rice production lost in Barisal and Patuakhali must
be omitted from the total of Farakka-caused losses.
Table 12.provides a comparison between Bangladesh Government
statistics for. rice output in the districts of the South West for
the years 1973-^ to 1976-7, with the totals of lost rice output
which Special Studies attributes to Farakka diversions. It can be
seen that the total rice output for 1975-6 does not reflect the
substantial losses calculated by Special Studies. It can be
calculated that total rice production in these five districts
averaged 2.5 million tons in the period 1969-70 to 1977-8, with a
standard deviation of 0.32 million tons (17)- If the 'lost' output
is added to the recorded rice production in 1975-6, then that
'potential' output exceeds the average by more than three standard
deviations. 'This is unlikely: either the total output, or the lost
production figures are incorrect. Bangladesh Government agricultural
statistics are unreliable, but they probably come from the same
Thana Agricultural Officers who supplied the Special Studies estimates.
There is no obvious way of choosing between them.
When all the doubts about the understanding and description of the
processes involved, and the criticism of the methods used to estimate
their extent, are taken into account, little reliance can be placed
on the estimates of lost production. This is not the same as saying
there was no effect. There certainly was an effect. But the
processes involved are not sufficiently well documented for that
effect to be accurately measured. The estimate of 650,000 tons of
lost food output calculated by Special Studies represents an upper
limit to the loss.
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Kushtia 197 223 192 195 33
Jessore if80 572 589 553 31
Khulna kk8 i+91 556 537 17^
Faridpur kk6 kz8 i+77 if07 ifO
Barisal 655 527 692 697 212
Patuakhali 239 283 379 362 128
2,^65 2,525 2,885 2,751 618
3
Note: All quantities are in 10 tons
Sources: Cols 2-5: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics,
1979 Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh,
1979, p 166.
Col 6: Special Studies, Tables VII-30 to
VII-35.
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ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF FARAKKA DIVERSIONS ON FORESTRY
The contrast between Chapter VII of Special Studies, on agriculture,
and Chapter X, on forestry, is considerable. Whereas the chapter
on agriculture fails to substantiate some of the more probable
effects of upstream diversion, the chapter on forests is successful
in suggesting a link between the Farakka diversions and damage which,
at first, sight, appears unlikely to be related. The forestry
observers had an advantage over those investigating agriculture
because not only could the damage to forests still be seen (by the
time the expatriate members of the Special Studies team arrived in
Bangladesh, most agricultural crops which they were to study had
been harvested) but to some extent the date when the damage had been
caused could be deduced from the trees themselves.
The Sundarbans are the world's largest single tract of mangroves,
covering one million acres. The forest has been managed as a
productive industry since the late nineteenth century. It is
completely flushed with fresh water every monsoon season and, we
are told by Special Studies, 'the major forest species do not
possess an adaptive tolerance to high salinities, resulting in their
dominance in areas of the forest with the lowest salinities' (18).
From water budgets for the areas of the Sundarbans, the authors of
4
this chapter show that during the six-month dry season precipitation
falls short of evaporation and transpiration by twenty inches.
This water is made up from the rivers and khals of the area but,
in the dry season, water levels are at their lowest and the
brackish water becomes increasingly saline as upstream flow reduces.
The authors comment that if the fresh water flow is reduced further
than normal the equilibrium of the forests can be destroyed and a
long period of change may ensue before a new equilibrium is
established with different species taking over areas of increased
salinity (19)-
Members of the Special Studies team visited the Sundarbans to verify
the extent of the deterioration reported by the Bangladesh Government
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and to evaluate all the possible causes of the deterioration. Their
observations are summarised in this paragraph taken from the report:
'1. The forest showed evidence of recent extensive
damage in localised areas.
2. The damage appeared to have been initiated at
some previous time, possibly as long as five years ago,
and deterioration of the forest was continuing.
3. The damage appeared to be most severe in the north-
central portion of the forest influenced by the Sibsa
River.
k. Moderate damage was observed at several places along
the Pussur River.
5- The north-eastern portion of the forest, influenced
by the Baleswar River, showed only slight to moderate
damage.
6. In the affected areas, seedling mortality appeared
to be close to 100 percent and individuals of the youngest
year's class were largely absent .
7. Local discontinuities in the presence and severity
of the damage appeared related to local differences in
land elevation.' (20)
On the seedling mortality, the authors comment:
'The high incidence of Sundri seedling mortality
approaching 100% is highly significant in terms of
the future production of the Sundri forest, as
regeneration would cease to keep up with harvesting and
mortality. The present failure of Sundri regeneration
contrasts markedly with observations made by Curtis (1933):
"Natural regeneration is so satisfactory and easy in the
Sundarbans that one is inclined to omit any reference
to it..."' (21)
Three possible causes of deterioration are cited: insufficient fresh
water, increased salinity and chlorinity, and insufficient nutrients.
The authors reject the possibility that changes in the availability
of these elements could have occurred naturally:
'In the natural condition the forest is liable to
injuries by a number of agencies but the extent of
the damage is minor in nature.' (22)
The authors conclude that:
'Upstream diversion of the Ganges water is responsible
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for the accelerated deterioration of the Sundarbans.
Consideration of the observations made during the
survey together with an intensive perusal of the
literature lead to the following conclusions:
1. The Sundarbans forest is in a state of relatively
rapid deterioration evidenced by the decline of
Sundri and the failure of Sundri regeneration. With
increase of salinity, excess salt accumulates in the
soil. This excess salt may influence seed germination
either by diminishing the absorption rate of the water
or by facilitating the influx of ions in quantities
enough to make them toxic...
2. The primary cause of deterioration is insufficient
fresh water during the dry season to control soil
salinities during that period.
3- Even though the cause may be insufficient fresh
water, the effecting mechanism(s) is unknown, but
with decrease of fresh water flow, water stress will
prevail which limits plant growth.
k. The geological history (Williams, 1919) and
associated changes in the vegetation (Curtis, 1933;
Blascoe1975) uniformly indicate that the Sundarbans
is in a period of slow decline and the results of this
survey indicate that the decline has rapidly accelerated
during the past few years due to shortage of fresh water.
5- To the extent that the newly initiated processes
occurring in the Sundarbans and leading to its decline
continue unabated, a point in time will be reached when
the situation becomes irreversible and the current
production value of the Sundarbans is lost...
7. It can be postulated that significant portions of
the Sundri forest will enter into an irreversible
decline within five to ten years if no immediate
measures are taken to reverse the process.' (23)
The variation in volume which can be harvested from the forest is
from 1500 cubic feet, in the best quality (Class I) forest in the
&
fresh water zone, to 20 cubic feet in the worst forest (Class III)
in the saline zone. Special Studies contains a calculation for the
annual average lost production based on the pessimistic assumption
that current deterioration will continue to the extent that at the
end of a twenty year felling cycle all Class I and II forests will
have been replaced by Class III. The loss is then 350 Million Taka
per year (US $23 million).
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This analysis of the deterioration of the Sundarbans is a great
deal more rigorous and, therefore, more convincing than the analysis
of the reduced production of agriculture. Nevertheless it falls
short of proving that the deterioration of forests was directly
caused by the reduced flows in the rivers of South West Bangladesh.
Doubts are raised by the observation, quoted above, that the
deterioration may have started up to five years prior to the
Special Studies field trip in early 1977- The first Farakka diversions
were only tv/o years prior to that trip. It is certainly true that
the salinity of the Pussur river seems to have increased more
substantially during 1976 than the salinity of the Baleswar. This
fits with the observations of lesser damage in the area of forest
fed by the Baleswar River. But, although there are no observations
of salinity on the Sibsa River, where the forests deteriorated most,
it seems unlikely that salinities in this river would have changed
more as a result of reduced Gorai flow than did salinities in the
River Pussur'itself.
A rejection of natural explanations for the deterioration which
simply states that, in the past, natural damage has only been minor,
is-not adequate. There are possible alternative explanations of the
deterioration. One of them is mentioned, in passing, by the athors
of this chapter of Special Studies. In an area of severe forest
deterioration adjacent to the Pussur River, South of the confluence
of the Mirgamari Gang and the Chachan Gang, they noted that the
Chachan Gang 'had recently silted-in to the point that it was
partially blocked and unnavigable' (2^). It is not impossible that
recent silting of these rivers could be a contributory cause of
fresh water shortage and increased salinity.
CONCLUSIONS
The consequences of Farakka diversions for the agriculture of South
West Bangladesh can only be proved by following a series of long and
exceptionally complex chains of cause and effect. The chains
described in Special Studies have several weak links.
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The first weak link is the possibility that the negligible flow of
the River Gorai in 1976 might have occurred naturally. I have
concluded that the Farakka diversions are the most likely cause of the
reduced flows, but it can be established no more strongly than that.
A second weak link is the description of the processes by which
reduced river flows cause moisture stress and delayed planting and
by which salinity reduces agricultural productivity. There can be
no doubt that such processes exist, but there is doubt about the
magnitude of each effect. A clear description of the processes
involved would aid the estimation of the size of each effect. In
the absence of such a description, estimates must rest primarily
upon the survey of agricultural losses.
That survey, unfortunately, constitutes a third weak link. Several
doubts have been raised in this chapter about the implementation
of the survey reported in Special Studies. The Thana Agricultural
Officers who carried out the work appear to have been inadequately
briefed and t-he survey results only cursorily checked.
Of these three weak links, only the first casts doubt upon the
existence of agricultural losses. The second is a criticism of the
work of the Special Studies team and the third suggests that
agricultural losses may have been over-estimated in Special Studies.
The crux of the matter is the extent of the over-estimate.
Special Studies establishes that there were serious agricultural
losses, but the Special Studies estimate of 650,000 tons of lost
foodgrain production represents an upper limit of the loss.
The Indian Government's dismissal of agricultural damage is mistaken.
It appears to be based primarily on the Indian assessment of likely
salinity changes. The Indian Government did not believe that Farakka
diversions would or did cause significant changes in salinity
patterns in Bangladesh. Therefore, they rejected the possibility
of agricultural damage.
The investigation of forestry carried out by the Special Studies
team is more convincing than that made into agriculture. There is
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clear evidence of recent, serious deterioration of trees in the
Sundarbans. Although the consequences of this deterioration are
less serious than those caused by agricultural losses, a threat
to ^5,000 jobs and of up to US $23 million of production cannot
be ignored. The authors of Special Studies concluded that 'upstream
diversion of Ganges waters is responsible for the accelerated
deterioration of the Sundarbans'.
Three doubts can be cast on this conclusion. It depends, as does
so much else, on a direct link between reduced flows in the River
Gorai and upstream diversion. That link can be presumed but not
proven. A second doubt is raised by the failure of Special Studies
to investigate and reject alternative explanations of forest
deterioration, notably recent siltation. Finally, a third doubt is
introduced by the time scale of the deterioration. The authors of
Special Studies note that the decline started 'possibly as long as
five years ago'. Farakka diversions commenced only two years prior
to their visit to the area.
These doubts are largely allayed by the rigour with which the
Special Studies authors dealt with this subject. They knew of these
possibilities but, evidently, did not attach great importance to
them.
The Government of India's rejection of claims of forestry damage
is inadequate. India says that water from the Ganges does not reach
the Sundarbans. The evidence suggests that the flows in the Gorai
may influence the salinity of water in the Sundarbans, and that the
flow in the Gorai may have been reduced by the Farakka diversions.
This being so, the decline of the Sundarban forests in Bangladesh
may be attributable to the Farakka diversions.
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Chapter Thirteen
NAVIGATION, FISHERIES AM) ECOLOGY
Professor B L C Johnson, in his book on the geography of Bangladesh,
succinctly describes the communication problem of Bangladesh:
'Bangladesh suffers more than most countries from
geographical handicaps to communications. Not only is
the territory quartered by great rivers, exceedingly
expensive to bridge, but for several months of the year
these rivers and the deluge of monsoon rainfall on the
near-level surface of the delta plains cause floods
which further aggravate the problem. The extremes of
seasonality add greatly to the costs of transportation.
Much motor transport is rendered immobile by floods and
heavy rain in the wet season when boats can ply in
almost any direction across country. Alternately in the
dry season river boats are limited to the deeper channels
and the roads come into their own again.' (1)
Was this communication problem greatly increased by the Farakka
diversions? Were the ferries, passenger launches, mechanised cargo
boats and indigenous 'country boats' disrupted? The first part of
this' chapter is concerned with this question. It is argued that
reduced river levels in the Ganges are a direct and undeniable
consequence of Farakka diversions. Lower water stages in other rivers
are also likely to be the result of Indian withdrawals. There can
be little doubt that inland navigation was hampered by unusually
shallow river depths in 1976 and 1977- However, the Bangladesh
Government's estimate that transport costs increased by 1 million
Taka (US £65,000) is an over-estimate.
The fishery sector of the Bangladesh economy contributes approximately
five per cent to the Gross Domestic Product, four per cent to export
earnings and, provides a livelihood to eight per cent of the population
(2). Was the life-cycle of the fish in the rivers of Bangladesh so
affected by the reduced flows that the yield of fish fell drastically?
This is the second question to be discussed in this chapter.
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The Bangladesh Government claims that fish catches went down by
25-66% as a consequence of upstream withdrawals. The Indian
Government dismisses this claim, arguing that fish catches were
already declining. The evidence presented in this chapter supports
the Bangladesh claim.
Finally, did the whole eco-system of Bangladesh suffer such a dramatic
change as a result of the Farakka diversions that the micro-organisms
of human disease began to thrive as never before and the emblem of
Bengal, the Royal Bengal Tiger, began to suffer from salinity?
According to Bangladesh, widespread changes in disease propagation
and ecology generally were beginning to be felt in 1976 as a result
of Indian withdrawals. The evidence for these effects is slight
and it is concluded in this chapter that the Bangladesh argument on
these effects is unproven and in some places improbable.
NAVIGATION
Bangladesh has asserted that:
'The reduced flows of water seriously impeded inland
water navigation. The role of inland water transport
'
is critical in Bangladesh, since it has a poorly
developed transport infrastructure and since it is
making every effort to minimise its energy import bill.
It is not really possible to monetize the loss from the
impeded ability to navigate. However, the following
disruptions of normal flows indicate the losses that
Bangladesh suffered.
'Two major ferry terminals had to shift their operations:
one four miles and one five miles. The major disruptions
to navigation were as follows. Ninety miles of
navigation routes on the Ganges (from Godagari to Aricha)
went out of commission, ^5 miles on the Gorai, and 15
miles on the Padma. These are significant distances in
a vital development section in Bangladesh. In addition
to these three specific reaches, navigation throughout
the entire region was hampered.' (5)
To which the Government of India replied as follows:
'Hardly any mechanised vessels ply on the Padma in
Bangladesh up to its confluence with the Brahmaputra.
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According to transportation studies carried out by
an independent group of experts the annual traffic in
the Ganga varies from 2,000 tons upstream to about
28,000 tons near the confluence of the two rivers.
Navigation is possible only in the months of high
flow from June to November and practically ceases in
the lean months.
'Given the unpredictability and negligible tonnage
of navigation, the withdrawal of *10,000 cusecs at
Farakka will make no material difference. Moreover
the configuration of the bed of the Padma is such that
there are only a few sandbars with deep pools between
them. With a little dredging of the bars and river
training measures it should be possible to sustain
navigation on this river.' (*+)
Assessment of disruption of inland navigation
Despite referring (on page XI-2) to large-scale hydrographic surveys,
the authors of Special Studies do not cite empirical data on the
navigable depths in the rivers of the region before and after
diversions from the Ganges. Instead, they have deduced, from
stage-discharge relationships, the change in depth to be expected for
a given change in discharge. The answers produced by this procedure
are plausible, but the method does not seem to be appropriate for
rivers subject to large cross-sectional changes. Where is the data
from the hydrographic surveys? In lieu of that data, Special Studies
informs the reader that depths of less than three feet were observed
on the Rivers Ganges and Gorai-Madhumati during the low-water seasons
of 1975-76 and 1976-77- The reader is also told that:
'Navigation was suspended in 1975-6 during the low
flow season in the Ganges upstream of Raita, at the
Gorai offtake, at Shilaidah and from Daulatdia to
Tepurakandi. In 1976-77 the traffic was again
disrupted upstream of Talbaria, at Shilaidah and at
Satbaria. In these two years navigable waterways of
about 105 miles length in t«he Ganges River between
Godagari and Goalundo became unserviceable. In these
two years, traffic by vessels drawing three feet or
more was impossible in the Gorai River in the low
flow season between its offtake and Kamarkhali, a
distance of *+5 miles.' (5)
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Though these claims are not adequately supported by field measurements,
they are not unreasonable. At first sight, however the subsequent
claim that, as a result, over ten million ton-miles of cargo traffic
was disrupted, seems unlikely. The authors of Special Studies are
not claiming disruption to the heavily trafficked waterways of
Khulna, Barisal and Pathuakhali Districts, but they are nevertheless
claiming that large tonnages of cargo could not be carried on the
rivers adjacent to Kushtia and Faridpur Districts. Their claims are
reproduced here in Table 13-1•
Unfortunately, the chapter of Special Studies dealing with this issue
contains no estimate of the usage of the waterways of South West
Bangladesh for navigation. In this case, a comment by the Indian
Government appears to be valid, not only for the White Paper (for
which it was intended) but also for the Bangladesh Government's more
thoughtful presentation, Special St;idies:
"The Bangladesh Government have refused to provide the
base or benchmark data from which the alleged declines
or deteriorations are said to have taken place. This
failure suggests that the 'facts' and 'figures' they
have quoted in support of their case are unfounded.' (6)
The rivers of the South West Region of Bangladesh to the North of
Khulna do not appear to be commercially important water routes. The
rivers to the South and East of Khulna are, on the other hand,
heavily trafficked both by mechanised cargo boats and by cargo-
carrying country boats.
Bangladesh's waterways are classified by the Inland Water Transport
Authority (BIWTA) into three categories. The navigability and depth
of Class I waterways are guaranteed by BIWTA. All feasible aids are
provided for Class II, but depths are not guaranteed. Class III
routes are only marked for information, depths are not guaranteed (7).
These classifications indicate the commercial importance of different
routes.
The River Ganges above Ishurdi is unclassified, and between Ishurdi
and Aricha, where it joins the Brahmaputra, it is only Class III
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Table13.1:








8,571,530 1,750,320 100,190 10,^21,8^+0
95,232 38,896 6,679 1^,807
2,571,399** 525,096** 30,057*** 3,126,552
Notes:*freightcostiTaka0.3pernmile **alternativeisra l ***alternativeisro d Source:Spe ialtudies,TablXI-2
with a draught of k.5 ft. The upper reach of the Gorai, between
Kushtai and Kamarkhali, is also Class III with a k.5 ft depth.
Between Kamarkhali and Bardia, just above the offtake of the
Atharabanka River, the Gorai is unclassified. It is only the lower
reaches of the Gorai-Madhumati which achieve Class I status,
indicating importance (8).
These BIWTA classifications appear to support the Indian Government's
contention that navigation on the Ganges and Gorai is negligible
during the dry season. However, the Special Studies team asserts
otherwise. Table 13.1 indicates the Special Studies estimate of
cargo diverted from the Ganges and upper Gorai to other routes.
An approximate check can be made on the cargo carried on the Ganges
during a normal dry season. From a survey carried out by the
Economist Intelligence Unit, it is possible to identify dry season
country boat cargoes from Rajshahi and Pabna Districts to Dacca and
Chandpur. These cargoes are clearly going to use the Ganges route.
In a ninety-day dry season approximately 26,500 ton of cargo is
carried by country boat between these destinations (9)* This is
something of an underestimate because other points will be served
by this route, though the size of that traffic cannot be identified
from the EIU data. Annually, a further 50,000 tons is carried on
this route by mechanised cargo boat (10). The proportion of that
traffic carried in the dry season is difficult to determine, but
5,000 tons is unlikely to be an over-estimate. In two dry seasons,
therefore, a traffic of at least 63,000 tons can be expected along
the Ganges. The 95,000 ton estimate of Special Studies, therefore
appears to be of the right order of magnitude. That traffic is not,
however, carried 90 miles, as the calculations of Table 13-1 imply.
Some of it travels the full 90 miles of waterway, some less. An
average distance of ^5 miles might be a closer estimate.
This confirmation of the Special Studies estimate suggests that,
although the Ganges and Gorai are not amongst Bangladesh's most
important waterways, nevertheless significant disruption of inland
navigation was caused by Indian withdrawals of Ganges water.
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There is a further Bangladesh claim that the terminals of the major
ferries across the Ganges had to be moved as a result of reduced
flows. This is improbable. Special Studies records the claim but
does not provide evidence of the stability of the terminals in years
when there were no diversions. Special Studies states that the
Aricha terminal was moved four miles downstream to Daskandi, the
Goalundo terminal was moved, 3*5 miles East to Daulatdia, and that
terminals at Paksey and Bheramara, near the Hardinge Bridge, had to
be moved 1,000 ft because of lower water levels. The cost of moving
these terminals is estimated at two million Taka for 1975-6, and a
similar estimate is given for 'increased maintenance' in the following
year (11).
My observation of the terminals in question casts doubt on these
estimates. The terminals are simple floating wharves, joined to
highways by crude earth and brick roads. They are apparently
intended to b.e relocated from season to season and year to year.
Seasonal variation in river levels, and natural river course changes,
mean that the terminals have to be mobile. The costs of relocation
cannot be attributed to the Indian withdrawals.
FISHERIES
In its White Paper, the Government of Bangladesh has claimed:
'Fish is by far the largest source of Bangladesh's protein
as well as one of its major export products. The reduced
water availability significantly reduced the landing of
fish probably because of the disturbance of the historic
food chain and the inability of the fish to tolerate
shallow depths and the unprecedented levels of salinity.
At three key landing points namely, Khulna, Goalundo and
Chandpur, the percentage of reduction in the landing of
fish during February to June, 1976 compared to the
corresponding period of 1975 was 73%, 3b% and k6%
respectively. Fish prices increased approximately by
25°/, 13% and 3^%> respectively at those landing docks.
The near and long term effects on the spawning cycles
and fish size and population need also to be recognized.
The effect of depletion in the water level of the Ganges
in the dry season registered its effect on the migratory
'Hilsa' that comprises bO% of the total fish catch, in the
very insignificant catch of this variety of fish in 1976.' (12)
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The Indian Government's The Farakka Barrage contains this reply:
'The Farakka Barrage cannot have harmful results for the
monsoon Hilsa catch in Bangladesh as it does not alter
the flow pattern in the monsoon months. All the sluice
gates of the barrage remain open in that season. In
addition, a special lock to facilitate the movement of
fish has been provided in the barrage in consultation
with fishery experts...
'It is commonly known that the migration of the Hilsa
varies widely from year to year. According to figures
available, landings of this fish in India declined from
3^1 tons in 196^ to kok tons in 1973- In 1976 too
catches have been very meagre in West Bengal in spite of
the Farakka water releases through the Hooghly.
'It may be added that over several years Bangladesh has
been experiencing a decline in fish production. This
may be due to a variety of factors such as: indiscriminate
netting on account of the existing system of leasing
fishing grounds; conversion of ponds into agricultural
land; uncontrolled use of insecticides and pesticides in
farms, resulting in serious losses of the fish population;
construction of embankments in estuaries in the coastal
districts, thus impeding the movement of fish; and
industrial pollution of water systems.' (13)
Countrywide statistics of fish catches in Bangladesh are apparently
as -unreliable as statistics for agricultural production. Despite
the Bangladesh Government's claim, above, the Directorate of
Fisheries recently issued figures which show the catch of Hilsa fish
uncannily constant at between 382,000 tons and 38^,000 tons for the
four years from 1972-73 to 1975-76 (1*0. The latter year is one in
which large scale Farakka diversions took place. In the same period
the total annual catch from inland waters varied only from 7315000
tons to 73^,000 tons.
The Special Studies investigators of this sector were reasonably
methodical and they did avoid using the Fishery Directorate's
statistics. They first described the processes by which the Farakka
diversions could have affected the fish catch, and then presented
their statistics to show that fish catches had fallen.
Landlocked water areas, they wrote, suffered from lower water levels
and. in some cases dried up. These areas of ponds and ponded water in
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river channels normally provide habitat for fish. 'The lowered level',
they wrote, 'may cause an environmental change, in which the habitat
is not favourable to fish life'(15)- In open fisheries, they claimed,
'the decreased flow and shallow depth of fresh water in the Ganges
and its distributaries severed the fish run from the Bay of Bengal
to the spawning areas'(16). In addition they claimed that the
barrage itself, fish-lock or no fish-lock, would prevent Hilsa fish
from reaching their spawning grounds. In support of this claim,
they cite the effects on Hilsa migration of dams or barrages across
four Indian rivers, the Cuvery (Cauvery?), Coleroon, Kistna and
Godavery and, similar effects on the Sardine fisheries of the Nile
after the construction of the Aswan High Dam.
Having described how they think that the Farakka diversions affected
the tonnage of fish caught in Bangladesh, the authors then produce
their evidence of reduced fish catches. If national fishery statistics
are unconvincing, there is at least a possibility that a local fishery
will keep reliable records which will accurately reflect the national
pattern of fish catches. Co-operatives in Bangladesh are not normally
noted as bastions of accounting rectitude but the Nawabganj Fishermen
Co-operative Society of Rajshahi may be an exception. Their figiires
(Table 13*2) do not look unreasonable and, if they are believed, they
show fairly constant monthly catches between 1968 and 1973 (with the
exceptions of 1971 and 1972 when the co-op did not function), a
slight drop in 197^ 1 followed by dramatic reductions in 1975 and 1976,
when average monthly catches were only 19% and 7% respectively of the
preceding years catches.
The statistics for Minkur-Jafarabad Fishery are supported by figures
for the tonnages of fish transported from selected Faridpur District
railway stations (Table 13*3)* These statistics are less satisfactory
because they cover only the dry season (November to June), because
they are only annual, not monthly, figures, and because only four
years of data are provided. Nevertheless, they show a similar
pattern to the figures from Nawabganj. The 1973-7^- shipments are
substantially down on the preceding years and in subsequent years
only negligible tonnages of fish were transported.
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MONTH 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
January 6150 8200 1020 8200 10250 492 164
F ebruary 4100 4920 6150 - 5330 2050 410 164
March - - 820 410 - - -
April 820 1230 2050 1230 - 246 82
May 2050 4100 4920 2050 820 856 162
June 4100 6150 6150 2870 2050 820 410
July 8200 2050 7380 820 820 1230 820
August '820 410 1640 164 246 246 164
September 410 410 12.30 820 410 246 82
October 2050 820 2050 2050 820 328 164
November 4100 4100 4920 8200 2460 574 32.8
December 8200 10250 7380 - 7380 10400 2050 246
Source: Special Studies, Table IX~9
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Table 13»3: . Hilsa transported by train from railway stations
in Faridpur District, November to June 1972-76
QUANTITY TRANSPORTED BY TRAIN
NOVEMBER TO JUNE
Tonne
1972-73 1973-7^ 197^-75 1975-76
Surjanagar 56.3 7^.8 3.9 3-9
Belgachi 108.0 8.8 b.b
Kalukhali 173.9 7.3 6.5
Pangsha 778.2 10k. 0 11.7 8.7
Source: Special Studies, Table HX1 O
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The authors of this chapter also claim that increased salinity will
have affected the supply both of phytoplankton, on which the fish
feed, and of fresh water fish. In the summary, which appears to
be different in tone to the chapter which it summarises, the
authors conclude:
'1. Upstream withdrawals can lead to problems of water
shortage and saline intrusion.
2. Part of the Ganges and Gorai riverbeds emerge from
the water and form shallow pools.
3- Intensive fishing in the pools cause a reduction in
fish production during the following years and a
decline of fish seed industry and seed supply for fish
culture in impounded fisheries.
k. The Ganges Ilisha [ Hilsa ] which is well liked by the
people and is the most important fish will suffer
extinction because of the decrease in its main spawning
ground.' (17)
The only plausible and informative statistics in this chapter are
those from the Nawabganj Co-operative. If those statistics are
reliable, two conclusions may safely be drawn. Firstly, the Indian
suggestion of variable and declining Hilsa catches appears to be
incorrect. Secondly, something happened in 1975 and 1976 which
dramatically affected the catch of Hilsa. The Farakka Barrage itself
was actually completed in 1970 but, diversion of water began
possibly at the end of 197^+, certainly in April of 1975- If "the
problem is that the migration of the Hilsa is interrupted by the
Barrage it is surprising that the effects were not noticeable earlier
than 197^- Nevertheless, there does seem to be a case that the
diversions have disrupted the catch of Hilsa. There could, of course,
be other explanations for the dramatic fall of the Nawabganj catch,
and the Indian Government has suggested several such explanations.
However, the Farakka Barrage and the Indian withdrawals from the
Ganges appear to be the most dramatic human interventions in the
ecology of the Ganges in the period of declining catches. New
embankments, pesticides, industrial pollution, indiscriminate netting -
these are all possibilities. But there is no particular reason why
these factors might suddenly have caused declining fish catches in
1975 snd 1976. The Farakka Barrage is a much more likely cause of
damage to the ecology supporting inland fisheries.
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ECOLOGY AND HEALTH
The chapter in Bangladesh's White Paper on 'the impact of India's
unilateral withdrawal of Ganges water' ends with these two paragraphs
on health and ecology:
'Increased salinity also has an adverse effect on health.
The ill effects result principally from increased salinity
in the drinking water. Roughly 5°/° of "the drinking water
tubewells were rendered inoperative during last year's dry
season and substantial part registered high salinity. The
effect of salinity on health occurs when the body is
incapable of absorbing any more sodium. The manifestations
are hypertension. The shorter term system of disease
is dysentery. In addition, the propensity to fall prey
to cardiological illness is increased. The problem of
saline effects on human consumption can be serious anywhere
in the world. It is of a much larger order of potential
threat in Bangladesh since the nutritional standards
already made the bulk of the population tremendously
susceptible to all forms of illness.
'Finally,, it is necessary to consider the total ecocycle
and ecology of the region. It is also necessary to
consider more than the economic aspects of ecology. The
wild life of the Sundarbans are already endangered species.
It is hard to reconcile to this abrupt change in the
balance of nature when the awareness of the necessity for
taking full account of its own ecosystem, that of its
neighbour, that of its region, and that of the world, is
ever growing in countries all over the world.' (18)
India's response to these claims (treated in reverse order) is as
follows:
'Bangladesh has stated that the existence of wildlife,
and recently even some species of birds, have been
endangered in the Sundarbans. India shares the natural
forest wealth of the Sundarbans together with its
wildlife and birds, but no such adverse effects have been
noticed on the Indian side. If the animal and bird life
of this region is endangered because of other reasons
such as ineffective measures for their preservation and
man-made activities it is a matter of concern to India.
"The eastern region, the Indian part of it as well as
Bangladesh, has always faced environmental problems
related to climatic and geographical factors. Because
this region is close to the sea the problem of salinity,
with its adverse environmental implications, has always
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been present. Floods of the kind which devastate the
region every year during the monsoon constitute a threat
to its environment. Withdrawal of water from time to
time for beneficial uses is also likely to have some
impact on ecology, but this cannot provide a justification
for allowing the river waters to drain into the sea
unused.
'Ecological and environmental problems are complex and
call for a comprehensive, integrated and multi-
disciplinary approach. Such problems cannot be solved on
the basis of an exaggerated emphasis on only one factor
such as withdrawals at Farakka, or on the problems of
only one area to the exclusion of others. Insistence on
a single-river approach and a reluctance to examine all
available and feasible technical alternatives cannot also
lead to a solution.' (19)
The Government of India does not attempt to answer the allegations
regarding the effect on the health of Bangladeshis.
The authors of Chapter VIII, 'Environment and Ecology', of Special
Studies, might profitably have read the Indian Government's comments
quoted above before they started researching and writing their
chapter. It contains useful descriptions of the ecology and
population of Bangladesh but it adds little to the Bangladesh
Government's assertion of damage.
The archeological sites of South West Bangladesh are listed and we
are told that they are liable to damage by 'the aggressive
environmental conditions created by the upstream withdrawals' (20).
Humidity, temperature and salinity changes, it seems, will be
attacking these structures. Without more detailed evidence indicating
the peculiarity of the conditions introduced by Farakka diversions
this is difficult to believe.
Various diseases are discussed in the same chapter. Specifically,
malaria and cholera are expected to increase as a result of the
Farakka withdrawal. Increased areas of stagnant water, we are told,
may provide added mosquito breeding grounds and saline intrusion will
provide new habitats for those mosquitoes which thrive in saline
water. 'Cholera has reached its peak severity as a result of
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inadequate sanitary water availability during the dry season. A
further reduction in this availability', say the authors, 'has
been caused by upstream diversion which increases the danger of a
major cholera epidemic' (21). Are these changes all in favour
of disease propagation? Is the change in water availability caused
by Farakka diversions significant? Special Studies does not say.
It is difficult to believe that the changes resulting from Farakka
diversions have a significant effect on either of these diseases.
If there has been a reduction in food and water available to the
people of the South-West Region, clearly their health will have
suffered as a result, but second-order disease effects cannot
reasonably be attributed to Farakka diversions in an area subject
normally to large climatic variation.
The authors of Special Studies would have us believe that even the
Bengal tigers are opposed to the Farakka diversions:
'The tigers in the Sundarbans will be adversely affected
by upstream withdrawals of Ganges water. The tigers'
inclination to attack humans is related to the availability
of food and fresh water...Saline intrusion resulting from
upstream diversion will cause deer to migrate to other
areas, and the tiger will follow the deer. The deer is
the tiger's principal food and he also needs fresh drinking
water. There is a theory that tiger ferocity is increased
by drinking brackish water, but this has not been
conclusively proved. Either of these reasons, or both,
will result from any increase in frequency, duration,
degree or extent of saline intrusion in the Sundarbans
because they will intensify human-tiger interactions
to the detriment of both.' (22)
It is not clear who will suffer most in these intensified human-tiger
interactions, but it is very clear that, whichever party it is, they
may blame the Farakka diversions.
CONCLUSIONS
According to the Bangladesh Government, diversion of water at Farakka
made navigation difficult or impossible in many of the river channels
of South West Bangladesh, and enforced the removal of several ferry
terminals. Special Studies provides support for the first claim and
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records the second.
The authors of Special Studies estimate that there was a reduction in
commercial navigation, attributable to Farakka diversions, of ten
million ton-miles, at a cost to the Bangladesh economy of three
million Taka (US $200,000). Most of this loss occurred as a result
of reduced water depths in the Ganges. There can be no doubt that
these lower water stages were a direct result of Indian withdrawals.
The Special Studies estimate of the loss appears to err on the side
of pessimism but the surveys of the Economist Intelligence Unit
suggest that the order of magnitude is correct.
The Bangladesh claim that expenditure of a further two million Taka
was incurred relocating ferry terminals is doubtful. The terminals
are designed to be mobile, to allow for seasonal and other natural
changes in the river's course.
The consequences of the Farakka Barrage on fish catches are less
easily identified. Bangladesh Fishery Directorate statistics record
a static annual national catch, but even the Indian Government accepts
that the catch of at least one fish, the Hilsa, is declining. However,
the- records of one fishery show fairly consistent monthly amounts
of Hilsa being caught until the dry season of 1975 when a sharp decline
took place. These records are confirmed by the statistics of Hilsa
transported from railway stations in the area, although these
quantities start to decline earlier.
The cause of this decline in the Hilsa catch has not been fully
identified. The Farakka Barrage itself may be interrupting fish
migration, or the reduction in water volume may be the cause. It is
impossible to wholly discount other explanations for the decline but
the most substantial intervention into the ecology of the Ganges in
recent years is the Farakka Barrage. There is a strong presumption
that it is this which has caused declining fisheries.
Finally, we have seen that the assertion of the Bangladesh Government
that there have been serious adverse consequences for the health of
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the people and the ecology of South West Bangladesh is poorly
supported by the available evidence. There may have been a shortage
of drinking water in parts of Bangladesh during parts of 1976 and 1977
but evidence of this hardship is not documented in Special Studies.
It is doubtful if changes in water flow and salinity will invariably
have increased disease propagation; in some cases these changes may
have brought reductions. There may be long term ecological and health
changes occurring as a result of the Farakka diversions but they may
be difficult to detect at this stage. And it is also possible that
the ecology of South West Bangladesh is more stable than Special
Studies implies. Certainly, on the evidence so far available, there
is little reason to sustain the Bangladesh claim of serious damage






The Ganges Waters Treaty of November 1977 set aside one major area of
dispute for settlement at a later date. The Joint Rivers Commission
was deputed to discuss and then to recommend to the Governments of
India and Bangladesh a project or projects for increasing the dry
season flow in the River Ganges. As has been described in Chapter
Nine of this thesis, the Commission's discussions had made little
progress by the beginning of 1980.
This section of the thesis investigates the technology and politics
of the two proposals on which the negotiations have so far focussed.
The Indian Government has proposed the construction of a canal to
carry water from the River Brahmaputra to the Ganges, whilst the
Government of Bangladesh has suggested that a large number of
reservoirs should be built to store the flood waters of the Ganges
for use later in the year. Chapters ih and 15 deal with these two
governmental proposals. (A number of other suggestions have been
made for the general direction which development of the Ganges
should take. Some of these suggestions are briefly explored in
Appendix D.)
The scheme chosen by the two governments may dominate development of
the Ganges and Brahmaputra for many decades to come. The choice
may thus be an important factor determining the future prosperity of
more than 350 million people, nearly a tenth of the world's population,
living in the two river basins. The two governments' proposals are
also likely to be very expensive to build. Indian Government
engineers estimate that their scheme will cost in excess of US $6,000
million. This is equivalent to the whole of Bangladesh's Gross
National Product for 1978 or to almost one tenth of India's for
1976. The Bangladesh Government's proposal is unlikely to be
significantly less costly.
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Although the Indo-Bangladesh talks have so far been slow to progress,
there is a growing body of opinion within both countries favouring
large scale development. For example, B G Verghese, a respected
former Indian newspaper editor and now a Gandhi Peace Foundation
Fellow, has urged:
'The fantastic potential of the Greater Ganga Basin
cannot be allowed to remain grossly under-utilised for
another long period of years by [ which time] costs will
have risen greatly and population pressures will have
multiplied...' (1)
In the opinion of Verghese, the 1977 Treaty 'unlocks the door' which
has hitherto barred access to the potential of the basin.
This section of the thesis is devoted to a discussion of the issues
involved in the choice of technology facing the two governments and
the way in which those issues have been presented. The 'fantastic
potential' of the Ganges and Brahmaputra cannot be tapped easily.
Considerable technical and political obstacles must be surmounted
before a choice can be made.
The nature of these technical and political obstacles can be
identified from an analysis of the two documents exchanged by India
and Bangladesh in March 1978. These two papers setting out the
considered intentions of each government are entitled as follows:
Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation,
Department of Irrigation,
Proposal for augmenting the dry season flow of Ganga,
New Delhi, March 1978;
Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry
of Power, Water Resources and Flood Control,
Proposal for the augmentation of the dry season flow
of the Ganges, Dacca, March 1978.
The two documents are henceforth referred to as the Indian Proposal
and the Bangladesh Proposal, respectively.
Maintenance of national sovereignty and competition for control of
a resource appear to be two of the more important political obstacles
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to the utilisation of the waters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra. It
will be argued in the following chapters that these are the underlying
objectives of the two governments in their conduct of the negotiations.
It will be shown, however, that these political objectives are almost
inextricably linked with the technical perceptions and technical
choices made by the authors of the two Proposals. The technique of
one side appears to the other to have political motives and mistaken
assumptions. The two Proposals present the cases for and against
the two governments' schemes largely in terms of technical rationality.
In some cases this technical rationality masks a political choice.
From a comparison of the two documents, for example, it is possible
to identify a few instances where technical uncertainties,
particularly in the estimation of quantities of water supply and
demand, are interpreted to suit the case for or against a politically
chosen option.
Ambiguities in the text of the Ganges Waters Treaty are also exploited
by the two governments in pursuit of their underlying political
objectives. In Chapter 9i certain limitations of the Treaty were
identified. The Treaty recognises a 'long-term problem of augmenting
the flows of the Ganga during the dry season' (Article VIII) and
commits the two governments to solve it, but it does not state what
'the problem' is: it does not define the purpose of augmentation nor
even the geographical limits within which it should take place.
It will be seen in the following chapters that this lack of definition
allows the two governments to choose schemes with widely differing
objectives. The differences can be understood by referring back to
the contrasting political ends of the two governments.
The implicit political ends of the two governments seem to be, as I
have said, maintenance of national sovereignty and competition for
control of a resource. The sovereignty under threat is Bangladesh's
rights and freedoms over the Brahmaputra, and the resource for which
the two governments are competing is the water flowing in that river.
Having experienced a dispute over the waters of the Ganges and, as a
result, having ceded a measure of control over that river to India,
29b
the Bangladesh Government wishes to avoid a similar situation arising
with the country's other major river. The Bangladesh Government does
not relish the prospect of India gaining physical control over the
Brahmaputra nor the suggestion that India should make use of a
substantial share of the Brahmaputra's waters. The former possibility
is viewed as a threat to the sovereignty of Bangladesh and the latter
as a danger to the country's economy and ecology. To avoid these
possibilities, Bangladesh suggests that water shortages in the Ganges
Basin can be augmented by schemes within the Basin. Bangladesh
believes that enough flood water can be stored in reservoirs within
the Ganges Basin to meet all the needs of the Basin. Such a scheme
would present less of a threat to Bangladesh's sovereignty. It also
evades India's claim to the Brahmaputra's waters.
The Indian Government's objective is, for perfectly laudable motives,
to increase the sum of water available for the development of India.
The Government of India perceives water shortages both within the
Ganges Basin and elsewhere in India. The waters of the Brahmaputra
can only be used to a limited extent in Assam, the Indian State
through which the river flows. If, however, some of the 'excess'
water could de diverted into the Ganges Basin, then water flowing
in the Ganges could be released either for use higher up in the basin
or transferred out of the basin for use in areas of perennial drought.
Bangladesh believes that water is best transferred over time; India
that it is best transferred over space. It is in each country's
national interest so to believe.
Even in their introductory summations of the 'problem', the
perceptions of the two governments can be seen to diverge. It is
national interest - the political ends of maintenance of national
sovereignty and resource competition - which explains this divergence.
In its Proposal, the Indian Governments refers to 'one big river
system, namely, the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna1 (2); whereas
Bangladesh is concerned only with the Ganges River and the Ganges
Basin. India provides statistics which describe the combined flow
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of the Meghna Estuary where it enters the sea; Bangladesh lists
statistics which refer only to the Ganges (3)- The two governments
are perceiving 'the problem' in the way which best suits their
national interests.
We shall see, in the following two chapters, that these political
objectives gain expression throughout in the assumptions, perceptions
and choices of a political battle waged in technical disguise (k).
This dispute, over alternative techniques for increasing the flow of
the Ganges, is the last of the many such disputes characteristic of
the development of the Ganges which will be discussed in this thesis.
The following two chapters are structured to provide first a
description of the Indian or Bangladesh scheme, followed by a summary
of the arguments for and against the scheme. At the end of each
chapter a conclusion reviews the political objectives of each proposal
and the ways in which ambiguities in the 1977 Treaty and technical




The Indian scheme for augmenting the dry season flow of the Ganges
consists of a barrage across the River Brahmaputra and a canal to
take water from that river to the Ganges at Farakka (see Figure 1^.1).
At a later stage the Indian Government intends to construct three
storage reservoirs in the Eastern foothills of the Himalayas to
supplement the dry season flow of the Brahmaputra. Each of these
five structures - the barrage, the canal and the three dams - is
large. The canal, for example, will be 200 miles (320 Km) long and
900 ft (270 m) wide, and the Brahmaputra barrage will supplant that
at Farakka as the world's largest. Altogether, the five structures
could cost in excess of US $6,000 million. (The cost estimates
contained in the Indian Proposal are reproduced here as Table 1^.1).
The Indian Government's justification for this scheme rests on a
number of inter-related points. First of all, the Government argues
that there is a shortage of water in the Ganges Basin which cannot be
overcome by schemes within that Basin. According to India, all
feasible reservoir sites within the Basin could not store enough water
for the needs of the two countries (three, if Nepal is taken into
account). Secondly, Indian planners assert that the needs of Indian
drought areas outside the Ganges Basin must be considered, and the
Ganges is the nearest source of water. Finally, the third Indian
point is that there is water available and unused in the Rivers
Brahmaputra and Meghna at times of year when the shortages in the
Ganges Basin are most acute.
It is clear from its Proposal that the Indian Government's perception
of the 'problem of augmenting the flows of the Ganga' is not bounded
by the watershed of the Ganges Basin. Both needs for water outside
the Basin and sources of water outside the Basin are considered. We
shall see in Chapter 15 that the Bangladesh Government contends that
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Table 1^.1: Approximate cost of the Indian Proposal at 1978 prices
COMPONENT COST
Rupees US Dollars
x 109 x 109
Barrage across the Brahmaputra at
Jogighopa and 150 MW power plant k.'y 0.5
Ganges-Brahmaputra link canal
including ancillary works 17-5 2
Dam across River Dihang, including
7,500 MW power plant 22.0 2.5
Dam across River Subansiri, including
1,800 MW power plant 10.7 1-2
Dam across River Barak with 660 MW
power plant 6-3 0.7
Source: Indian Proposal, p 83.
61.0 6.0
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The Indian Government's Proposal stakes a claim to the waters of the
River Brahmaputra. That claim is. made, however, not through an
outspoken assertion of rights and the power to implement those rights,
but with the painstaking construction of a case, based on technical
rationality, for a particular scheme of engineering works.
This chapter explores the Indian Government's case, the way in which
it is made, and some of the arguments which have been raised against
it. We shall see that technical uncertainties, and ambiguities in
the terms of reference for the discussion, provide the authors of
this Proposal (and also the authors of the Bangladesh Proposal) with a
useful political resource, providing a technical expression of
political aims.
The chapter is divided into four sections: (i) a description of the
engineering structures which India proposes shoult be built; (ii)
the arguments put by India in favour of this scheme; (iii) the
objections to' the scheme, and (.iv) a conclusion identifying the ways
in which technical perceptions, assumptions and choices coincide with
political objectives.
The- first two sections of the chapter are based on information
contained in India's Proposal. Section (iii) includes quotations
from interviews I had with Bangladesh officials, and from one
Bangladesh official's personal commentary upon the Indian Proposal.
This personal commentary I have dubbed the Insider's critique.
DESCRIPTION OF THE INDIAN PROPOSAL
The barrage
India proposes to build a barrage across the River Brahmaputra at
Jogighopa, in Assam, 70 miles downstream of the State's capital,
Gauhati. At one and a half miles long, the barrage will be slightly
longer than the Farakka Barrage, but in most respects it will be a
similar structure. Its purpose is the same as that of the Farakka
Barrage: to raise the river level so that water will flow by gravity
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into a canal.
Indian engineers chose the Jogighopa site partly because the river is
narrow and its bank stable at that point, but also in order to maximise
the benefits of the project to both countries (1). However, they did
not consider potential sites in Bangladesh.
The.canal
The Brahmaputra Barrage is intended to feed water into a 200 mile long
canal which will transport the water to the Ganges at a point just
upstream of the Farakka Barrage. The Indian Proposal suggests that
this Brahmaputra-Ganges Canal should have a capacity of 100,000 cusecs,
and a depth of 30 ft (2). In this case the width of the waterway
would be approximately 900 ft (3)-
According to Indian estimates, the canal would occupy 20,000 acres of
Bangladesh lahd and a further 950 acres in India (see Table 14.2).
As these estimates suggest, slightly more than two thirds of the
length of the canal would be through Indian territory.
The Dihang, Subansiri and Tipaimukh Dams
The River Brahmaputra rises in Tibet and for more than half the
river's length it flows East through that region of China. As the
river turns South and crosses into India the river falls through
about 7)500 ft in a distance of 200 miles. The hydroelectric
potential of this reach of the river is considerable (b). As the
river crosses into India, it takes the name Dihang. The Indian
Government proposes that a rock-fill dam should be built on this
river at a site 25 miles North of the Assam plain.
The dam would be 800 ft high and half a mile long, resting on hard
jointed Basalt foundations. Indian engineers estimate that the
reservoir behind the dam would have a gross storage capacity of
26-5 million acre-feet (MAF), making it four times larger than the
largest reservoir in India, and about the same size as the largest
in the USA. The live storage (that is, after allowing for eventual
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Table 14.2: Indian Government estimates of land areas
required for the Indian Proposal
COUNTRY AREA REQUIRED (acres)








Source: Indian Proposal. p69).
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siltation and the minimum head for power generation) of the reservoir
would be 17-2 HAP, and a hydroelectric power generation station
built at the dam could provide 7,500 MW (at 6QP/o load factor). India
estimates that this reservoir alone could store enough water to
augment the dry season flow of the Brahmaputra from 60,000 cusecs to
120,000 cusecs. However, the reservoir would flood 137 square miles,
in the midst of which is the town of Along.
India proposes a second dam on the River Subansiri, the first major
tributary to join the Brahmaputra in the plains of Assam. This
tributary also flows from the Tibetan Himalayas. India suggests a 700
ft high rock-fill dam, at a gorge kO miles North of the Assam town
of North Lakhimpur. The reservoir behind the dam could store 7-5 HAP
and augment the dry season flow of the Brahmaputra by 25,000 cusecs.
1,800 MW of electricity could be generated at the dam. Fortyone
square miles and a large village called Daporijo would be flooded.
An added benefit of these two reservoir projects is that they could
mitigate the flooding potential of the Brahmaputra. Indian
calculations suggest that a flood peak of 1-5 million cusecs at the
Dihang Dam site could be reduced to 1 million cusecs, and an
additional reduction could be made by reducing the flood peak of the
Subansiri River.
A third dam proposed by India, the Tipaimukh Dam on the River Barak,
is much smaller than the first two. This dam could provide live
storage of 6 MAF and 600 MW of hydroelectric power. India also
states that it could 'control flooding in the districts of Sylhet
and Dacca in Bangladesh and Cachar in India' (5)- The Indian
Proposal also mentions a number of other potential reservoir sites,
but detailed descriptions are not provided.
Level crossings
The Brahmaputra-Ganges Canal crosses a series of rivers in North West
Bangladesh and could disrupt the North-South flow of natural drainage.
In particular the canal crosses the Tista River at right angles, at a
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point North West of Rangpur. The Indian Proposal states:
'For major rivers it would be more convenient to have
level crossings which would permit navigation also
along the rivers being negotiated.' (6)
A four-way, river-canal junction, similar to a road junction is
envisaged for the Tista crossing and possibly also elsewhere. This
would be a major engineering project and, possibly, the largest such
'level crossing' in the world. Indian engineers believe that such a
crossing could be operated with one barrage across the river and one
regulator at the outfall of the canal (7).
THE CASE FOR THE INDIAN PROPOSAL
The Indian Proposal is a carefully written, well-reasoned document,
longer and more detailed than its Bangladesh counterpart. It sets
out the Indian case in three parts. First it outlines the context
in which India wishes the augmenting of the Ganges to be considered:
the needs of different parts of India for water and the problem of
flooding. Then, the Proposal explains India's reasons for rejecting
surface water storage in the Himalayan tributaries of the Ganges
as a satisfactory way of meeting the demands for water which India
perceives. Finally, the Proposal provides the central arguments
justifying the Indian scheme.
The context
The Indian Government's interpretation of why and where the water is
needed is given in the 'Problems, needs and opportunities' chapter,
which constitutes almost a third of their Proposal.
Surprisingly, perhaps, this chapter opens with a description of the
problem of floods in India and Bangladesh, leading to a summary of the
Indian experience with flood control measures. Deepening and
resectioning rivers has been found to be ineffective and prohibitively
costly, and doubts have been raised about the efficacy of embankments.
However, embankments used in conjunction with multi-purpose reservoirs
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have proved more effective. That presumably is the moral to be drawn:
reservoirs are good for flood control, and the Indian Government
consider that flooding is one of the problems which should be tackled
in the course of augmenting the flow in the Ganges.
The chapter goes on to describe a 'flood-drought-flood syndrome', a
perennial problem of Bangladesh and India:
'Floods and drought alternately bring havoc and tragedy
to a large number of people. Therefore, control of
floods and removal of drought are high priority problems
facing both countries.' (8)
The Bangladesh Government would not disagree. However, it would and
does disagree with India's enlargement of the geographical context.
The Indian Government thinks that discussion of the 'problem' of
augmenting the low flow of the Ganges should include consideration
of the needs of Indian drought areas outside the Ganges Basin:
'A major policy of the Government of India is to remove
to the maximum extent feasible, the regional disparities
with regard to irrigation development and water
availabilities. A national plan for the optimum
exploitation of the water resources of the country,
within a national policy framework of the accepted
social goal to remove the regional disparities, is
under formulation. Since the Ganga is the major source
of water within economic reach of the water-short areas
in the country, any perspective plan in the context of
the needs of the country as a whole cannot overlook the
possibilities of use of the Ganga waters for the drought
areas which lie outside this basin. All the indications
point to the need for a sizeable diversion of Ganga
waters, when they get augmented, for meeting the growing
needs of water-short areas in India, after taking due
consideration of the in-basin needs.' (9)
No estimate is provided by the Indian Proposal of the quantity of
water needed by the drought areas, when it is needed, nor even where
it is needed. However, some indication of what Indian engineers have
in mind can be obtained from investigation of the proposed National
Water Grid.
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The concept of having a system of canals across the length and breadth
of India, to provide navigation routes and equalise the supply of
water, has been studied by several agencies and seriously considered
by several Governments of India. The most detailed available study
is that carried out by a United Nations Development Programme team
in 1972 (10). This study concluded that the project was technically
feasible and that a flow of at least k0,000 cusecs could be transferred
from the Ganges to the South of India (11). However, the UNDP team
assumed that water transfers would only take place during the monsoon
season, the four to five month period starting in July when even
Bangladesh would agree that there is surplus Ganges water.
India's inclusion of the needs of drought areas in the discussion of
increasing the dry season flow of the Ganges suggests that transfer
of Ganges waters to drought areas during the dry season is contemplated.
This is not, however, explicitly stated.
Having introduced the question of transferring Ganges water to drought
areas, the Indian Proposal then proceeds to calculate each country's
demand for water without estimating the needs of Indian drought areas.
The' Proposal estimates that 150 million acres of the 213 million acres
of the Ganges Basin within India is cultivable. The area irrigated
in 1978 is estimated as 7+9 million acres. 'Projects in hand' will
irrigate a further 17 million acres from surface water and the
government is committed to irrigating a further 10 million acres
from that source. The Proposal estimates that 25 million acrea is
currently irrigated from groundwater and that it may be possible to
use groundwater for the irrigation of a total of 52 million acres,
but only if 85-100 million acres of surface water irrigation is
established (providing sufficient groundwater recharge).
At this point, the Indian Government's argument takes a leap from an
estimate that *+9 million acres is irrigated to an estimate that 135-150
million acres 'can easily be irrigated annually' (12). This estimate
implies the claim that the whole of the cultivable area of the Ganges
Basin in India can, and should, be irrigated. Then, without any
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indication of the steps in their calculations, the authors of the
Indian Proposal take a second leap. The estimate of potential future
irrigation is transformed into an estimate of India's demand for
Ganges water. India needs, according to the Proposal, 320,000 cusecs
in the Rabi season and 200,000 cusecs in summer (13)-
The Indian Proposal mentions, but does not estimate Nepal's need for
irrigation water. However, it does estimate Bangladesh's demand.
The Proposal assesses Bangladesh's priorities as follows: (i) flood
prevention and drainage; (ii) prevention of saline intrusion; and,
(iii) diversion for irrigation, counteracting saline intrusion, and
for navigation, fisheries and forestry. Bangladesh's own estimates
(given at a Joint Rivers Commission meeting) of irrigation demand,
and of water needed for the River Gorai, are cited by the Indian
Proposal. It is not specific in allotting water for other needs.
Table 1^.3 sets out the Indian estimate of demand for water.
Rejection of Alternatives
The next step in the Indian Government's argument is the dismissal of
alternative options - namely, storage of water in India or Nepal.
As far as storage in the Ganges Basin in India is concerned, the
Proposal states that reservoirs storing 20 MAP are in operation and
potential storage of a further 20 MAP is under construction or
investigation. These reservoirs will provide for the extension of
irrigation to new areas but:
'Considering the large and growing needs for improving
the water availability in the existing systems, and to
extend, where possible irrigation facilities the storages
in the Ganga basin in India are utterly inadequate for
meeting even the minimum local needs.' (1*0
The Proposal authors are also pessimistic about the possibilities of
storing water in Nepal. They mention four potential reservoir sites,
but estimate that the water from these reservoirs could only increase
the Ganges flow by 25,000 cusecs:
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Note: (a) This figure does not include any estimate
of diversion out of the Ganges Basin. The
Rabi season is from November to March/April.
Sources: Indian Proposal, pp ^7-9•
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'The four storages mentioned in Nepal can hardly meet
a small fraction of (India's) requirements. Besides,
the needs for Ganga waters are so urgent and so large
that any additional storages that may be created in
Nepal will not be able to effectively meet the requirements
in time as well as in quantum.' (15)
Other potential reservoir sites in Nepal are rejected with this
rather unconvincing argument:
'While all feasible sites in Nepal could advantageously
be exploited for multi-purpose benefits to Nepal and
the areas lower down, this would not provide a solution
to the augmentation of the flows of the Ganga in its
lower reaches at Farakka and down below as these are
located from 500 km to 1,300 km (300 to 800 miles)
away from storage sites and where the shortages have
already developed and are growing. No realistic scheme
can overlook the requirements of the areas lying
between the points at which the waters are being
augmented and the points where they are needed for use. (16)
If this argument, disqualifying distant reservoirs, has any validity
it can also be applied to disqualify India's proposed reservoirs on
the Brahmaputra, which are similarly distant from Indian drought areas.
That argument aside, the essence of India's rejection of reservoir
storage on the Himalayan tributaries of the Ganges rests on a
technical assessment of the quantity of water which can be stored.
India argues that these reservoirs cannot store enough water to meet
the demands of the three countries. We shall see in the following
chapter (Table 13-6) that Bangladesh's estimates of the volume of
water which can be stored are much higher.
The central arguments justifying India's preference
Having dismissed the possibility of storing water in the Ganges
Basin, the Indian Government then put the strong arguments in
favour of their preferred alternative: water transfer from the
Brahmaputra Basin.
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Firstly, the Indian Proposal demonstrates, with the table reproduced
here as Table 14.4, that both the Brahmaputra and the Meghna Rivers
have more water per unit of cultivable area and per head, than the
Ganges. This calculation is made on the basis of the average annual
flow, as estimated by India, reaching a given point.
The Indian Proposal argues not only that there is greater flow compared
to population or area in the Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers but also
that the flow is more useable in present circumstances because, even
without storage, in those rivers the flow is better regulated, that
is, the highest and lowest flows are less extreme. This is
attributed to the presence of large natural lakes in the upper reaches
of the Brahmaputra in Tibet.
The third and final point of substance in the Indian case is that
suitable sites are available where water from the Brahmaputra and
Meghna may be stored in huge volumes. Quite why suitable sites
should be available in the Eastern foothills of the Himalayas and
not in the Central and Western foothills is not made clear in the
Proposal.
The.case continues with a demonstration that the minimum flows in the
three rivers do not coincide, as shown in Figure 14.2. The
conclusion, presumably to be drawn from this being, again, that even
without reservoir storage the Brahmaputra and Meghna can offer
water to the Ganges basin. This is the second substantial argument,
and justifies the tentative schedule set out by the Indian government
which states that the Brahmaputra-Ganges canal should be built first,
without any reservoirs.
The Indian case is buttressed by several quotations from a World Bank
study (17) attesting to the technical feasibility of the Indian
proposals, and asserting that 100,000 cusecs may be diverted from
the Brahmaputra without causing 'excessive' salinity intrusion (18).
Then, the case is concluded with a list of the benefits potentially
accruing from the Indian scheme. This list can be summarised as
follows:
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Table *\b.k: India's estimate of the water resources of the
Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna Basins
BASIN MEAN POPULATION PER CULTIVABLE FLOW :
ANNUAL (1977) CAPITA AREA UNIT .
FLOW FLOW £
MAF million 105ft 5/yr 10 acres ft
Ganges 308 291 k6 . 160 1.9
Brahmaputra ^90 51 ^20 20 2b
Meghna 90 27 1L5 10 10
Source: Indian Proposal, p 26.
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FIGURE 14.2 Combined Average Monthly Flows of the Ganges Brahmputra and Meghna
1. Provision of irrigation water to an additional
20 million acres in India and Bangladesh, and
provision of the full quantity of water required
by Calcutta Port.
2. Nearly 10 GW of hydroelectric power at 60% load
factor can be provided.
3- The Indian scheme will give 'reasonable' flood
protection of 5 million acres, and 'substantial'
relief to an equal area suffering deep flooding.
k. Perennial navigation will be possible from Assam to
Calcutta.
5- Salinity in coastal areas of Bangladesh and India
can be mitigated. (19)
THE CASE AGAINST THE INDIAN PROPOSAL
Four categories of criticism can be made against the Indian scheme.
First it can be argued that India has inflated 'the problem' to its
maximum extent, exploiting the broad definition of the 1977 Treaty.
Then, secondly, the Bangladesh Government perceive that the political
and social implications of the Proposal present a serious obstacle.
Thirdly, there are 'technical objections' to the Indian scheme, and,
finally, it is possible to identify conflicting estimates of annual
river flows. These four categories are described in turn.
The limits of the problem
In the opinion of one Bangladesh official:
'they are trying to develop the whole of India with
water from the Ganges.' (20)
The inclusion in the Indian Proposal of the suggestion that drought
areas may be supplied from the Ganges Basin raises fears in the minds
of some Bangladesh officials. They are satisfied that the needs of
the population within the Basin can be met from the resources of the
Basin, but they anticipate that inter-basin transfers on the scale
implied by Indian discussions will pose a threat to Bangladesh's
development. The possibility of transfers out of the Ganges Basin,
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and the inclusion of the Brahmaputra and Meghna Basins in the
discussion on increasing the Ganges low flow should, in their view,
be ruled out. One Bangladesh official wrote in his Insider's
critique:
'The proposal of mass transfer of water from the natural
command of the Brahmaputra without considering the need
of its basin is against the principles of river basin
development. The report [India's Proposal ] has even
considered the whole of the drought areas of India
within the scope of irrigation possibilities by the
common water resources of the Ganges basin and
accentuated the Indian demand over the other co-basin
countries' needs.' (21)
Another Bangladesh official, in a more restrained mood, had this to
say:
'Our main point is that we must first see how much water
is needed within the basin. If there is surplus after
that, then ok, water transfers could be considered...
But surplus transfers must not be at the cost of the
basin...We do not deny their need for water, but I am
sure we can prove to them that the Ganges basin
requirements can be met from the basin itself.' (22)
The estimate of the needs which have to be met also sets limits to
the problem. The Indian Government's Proposal assumes that the whole
of the cultivable area of the Ganges basin is irrigable and should
be irrigated. As the Insider's Critique comments:
'The report apparently envisaged pump lifts in the
reverse direction for irrigation of areas that are not
actually commanded by gravity canal. It has assumed
bringing the whole drought area in Rajasthan and
[the] Northern peninsular slope including all the high
grounds that are difficult to command by gravity flow
in order to show a (possible) future demand on the
Ganges flow. It has included the whole of the Bardwan
Divisions of West Bengal in the list of the Ganges
command and conveniently ignored the requirement of
Bangladesh. No sensible authority would even
entertain the concept of bringing the whole of the
stated 60 million hectares of land in the Indian
territory - ^0 million from surface water and 20 million
from ground water, to be brought under intensive
irrigation at the expense of other co-basin countries." (23)
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Political and social implications
The political implications of the Indian Government's proposal may
be divided into those relating to its domestic impact and those
concerning Bangladesh's external relations. Taking the external
questions first, there appear to be two, of which the first is
considered, by many in Bangladesh, to be of overwhelming importance.
The Indian proposal represents a threat to the sovereignty of
Bangladesh (2h). Seen from this point of view, the Farakka barrage
gives India nearly complete control over the dry season flow of one
of Bangladesh's two major rivers; the proposed Brahmaputra barrage
could give India control over the other. The Insider's Critique has
this to say:
'No doubt, the provisions in the Agreement on the
sharing of the Ganges waters and augmenting its flows
oblige Bangladesh to put an equal priority on both
tha Bangladesh and the Indian proposals for the explicit
objectives stated in the Agreement. However, such
acquiescence does not oblige her to undertake
investigations for examining the feasibility of a
proposal that prima facie affect[s] her territorial
security...
This is perhaps an exaggerated view. Even though the barrage itself
would be well outside Bangladesh's territory, much of the canal, and
any control structures associated with the Teesta river crossing
would lie within Bangladesh. Consequently total control would not
devolve on India. However, control of the barrage in circumstances
when relations between the two countries had broken down and at
certain times of the year, could give India the ability to jeopardize
some irrigated crops.
The second political implication of the Indian scheme is the
involvement of China. On the one hand, the proposed Dihang and
Subansiri dams are located within an area of territory in dispute
between India and China (see Figure 1^.3), and, on the other, Chinese
development of the Brahmaputra (Tsangpo) could conflict with the
Indian proposal. Whilst, at the time of writing, neither of these
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their existence suggests China should play a greater role than has
so far been allowed.
Then there is a social implication of the Indian scheme - or, to
put it another way, a political question with domestic impact. A
considerable number of people will be uprooted by the Indian scheme.
Their resettlement would be problematic in such a densely populated
region. Estimates of the number involved vary widely. If the Indian
estimate of land required for the scheme is correct (Table 1^.2),
30-^0,000 people might be uprooted in Bangladesh and a further
100,000 in India (25). The Insider's Critique, however, estimates
that 300,000 would be evicted from 160,000 acres of land in
Bangladesh alone. This estimate implies that a swathe 3-75 miles
wide would be required for the Brahmaputra-Ganges canal, reflecting
the Bangladesh fear that the canal will cause serious waterlogging
of adjacent land.
'Technical objections'
Bangladesh officials argue that the proposed Dihang and Subansiri
dams are dangerously high at 7-800 ft for a seismically active zone.
At least ten earthquakes are thought to have occurred in the region
since 1869- After a major earthquake in 1950» disturbed sediment
caused a 10 ft rise in the bed of the Brahmaputra (26)- The Insider's
Critique comments:
'[An] Indian Geological survey report of 1972 on the
feasibility of building reservoirs across the Dihang
and Subansiri has cast strong doubt over it. It
established the age of the rocks at different alternate
locations of the dams across these two streams and declared
their unsuitability for foundation of high dams...In the
JRC deliberations the Indian counterparts spoke against
any possibilities of building any reservoirs of substantial
capacity at these sites...the Indian geological survey
highlighted the possibilities of large scale landslides
in the reservoir consequent upon the rise of water levels
and saturation of soil on hill slopes that are composed
of weak materials. Coupled with high incidence of
tremors arising out of intensive seismic activities in
the region and closeness of the epicentres of earthquakes
from the surface, the incidence of landslides may multiply
and thereby reduce the life of the reservoirs within a
few years of their completion.'
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Doubts have also been expressed about the feasibility of the 'level
crossing' proposed for the Tista River. The large sediment load of
the Tista could cause siltation problems. Generally, cross drainage
may present difficulties, particularly with a highly seasonal river,
like the Tista.
The environmental impact of the Indian scheme could be injurious to
Bangladesh. If. the 35iOOO cusec diversions at Farakka caused serious
damage, how much more would be caused by a 100,000 cusec diversion
from the Brahmaputra? The Insider's Critique has only generalities
to offer on this point: the Indian scheme will 'upset the delicate
ecological balance' and 'affect deleteriously the productivity of
these eco-systems'. This reflects the difficulty of predicting the
consequences of upstream diversions.
Conflicting estimates
Table 1^-5 lists some estimates which have been made of the annual
mean flow in the three rivers with which the Indian Proposal is
concerned. There is a range of estimates for the annual flow of
the Ganges. From this range the Indian Government have chosen the
lowest figure. The Bangladesh Government's chosen estimate is 20%
higher. Clearly it is advantagous, for the Indian Government's case,
for a low estimate to be given of the quantity of water in the Ganges.
This strengthens the argument that there is too little water in the
Ganges Basin. We shall see in Chapter 15, that a comparison of Indian
and Bangladesh estimates of water supply and demand in the Ganges
Basin (Table 1$.6) shows that Indian estimates of supply tend to be
lower than Bangladesh estimates, whereas, Indian estimates of demand
are higher than Bangladesh estimates.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has explored the Indian Government's scheme for increasing
the dry season flow of the Ganges. Firstly, the details of the
engineering works have been investigated. Then, the Indian argument
for this particular technical scheme has been outlined. Finally, the
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Table 1^.5: Comparison of annual mean flow statistics


















Note: Some statistics have been converted from the metric
equivalent
Sources: a) Indian Proposal, p 26
b) Bangladesh Proposal, p 9» Table IV, citing
Dr K L Rao's India's water wealth, Orient
Longman, Delhi, 1975) & 69
c) India, Report of the Irrigation Commission
1972, New Delhi, 1972, TTp ^6
d) UN ECAFE, Compendium of ma.jor rivers in the
ECAFE Region, Water Resource Series No 29,
1966
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chapter has described some of the arguments which have been made
against the Indian proposal. This concluding section summarises the
body of the chapter and then identifies some of the ways in which
political aims have found expression in a technical guise.
The Indian case consists of three propositions: that enough water
cannot be stored within the Ganges Basin; that the needs of the
Indian drought areas outside the Ganges Basin must be considered; and,
that there is surplus water in the Basins of the Rivers Brahmaputra
and Meghna. The first and last of these propositions are 'practical'
ones, dependent for their validity upon scientific and technical
estimates of water supply and demand. The second, or middle
proposition concerns a question of principle, or scope, left undefined
in the 1977 Ganges Waters Treaty.
This chapter has described the detailed Indian calculations which
form the basis of these three propositions. The Indian Government
estimates that, in the dry season, the two countries, India and
Bangladesh, need a flow of water in excess of 415,000 cusecs. This,
India argues, cannot be met from the potential reservoir storage
capacity of the Ganges Basin. The Indian Government's Proposal does
not- provide estimates of reservoir storage (supply) in a form which
can easily be compared with demand for water. It is noted that
25,000 cusecs might be available from 4 reservoirs in Nepal, but the
potential augmentation from Indian reservoirs is not estimated, only
a storage volume of 40 MAF. Other Indian sources (27) suggest that
storage reservoirs in the Ganges Basin as a whole could provide
80,000 cusecs of dry season flow. It is the disparity between a
need for 415,000 cusecs and an additional potential supply of 80,000
cusecs which forms the foundation for the first Indian proposition:
that enough water cannot be stored in the Ganges Basin.
In addition to the 415,000 cusecs needed within the Ganges Basin,
the Indian Government argues that drought areas outside the Basin
should also be supplied from the Ganges. The magnitude of this
additional demand is defined only as 'sizeable' in the Indian Proposal;
another document, cited in this chapter, suggests a transfer out of
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the Ganges Basin of the order of 40,000 cusecs, but during the
monsoon season when there is surplus water. The Ganges Waters
Treaty does not exclude, hor specifically include, consideration
of areas outside the Ganges Basin.
The last of the propositions forming the Indian case is that there
is excess water in the Brahmaputra and Meghna. This proposition is
established only to the extent that there is more water per head of
population and more water compared to cultivable area in the
Brahmaputra and Meghna than there is in the Ganges Basin. On the
basis of the figures provided in the Indian Proposal, there is nearly
ten times as much annual flow per capita in the Brahmaputra as there
is in the Ganges, and nearly thirteen times as much flow in terms of
cultivable area.
The objections to the Indian scheme which have been considered in the
this chapter have been grouped into three categories: the limits of
the problem; political implications; and technical objections.
It has been repeatedly shown that the Indian Government's Proposal
does not recognise the watershed of the Ganges as a geographical
limit for the augmentation of the Ganges. The Bangladesh Government
argues that the needs of the people living within the basin can, and
should be met from the resources of the basin.
Bangladesh's political objections to the scheme range from a fear
that it represents a threat to the 'territorial security' of the
country, through doubts about China's view of development in ah area
of disputed ownership, to fears that people displaced by the
construction of the Brahmaputra-Ganges Canal will have a strong sense
of grievance against the government which sanctioned that canal.
Finally, in this list of objections, there are technical doubts about
the Indian scheme. Bangladesh officials question whether large dams
can be constructed safely in an area of seismic activity. They also
fear the environmental impact of large diversions from the Brahmaputra.
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What can the case for the Indian proposal and the objections to it
tell us about the dicussion which is taking place? It is very clear
that it is a political discussion being carried on in technical
language. The Indian Proposal does not refer to questions of equity
or rights; it is concerned with practice and technical feasibility.
The Bangladesh scheme is dismissed by reference to technical opinion:
enough water cannot be stored within the Ganges Basin for the needs
of the three countries. The Indian scheme is justified not as the
most equitable way of sharing and developing the resources of the
region, but as the only feasible method by which all the needs (as
estimated by India) can be met. The scheme is legitimated not by
essentially political value judgements, but by reference to technical
expertise. Science or expertise is, in this way, being used to
authenticate one view of 'reality'. The Indian proposal is the only
feasible or 'realistic' option: the experts say so.
The Bangladesh Proposal, as we shall see in the following chapter,
is similarly reticent about 'political' questions, those where
negotiation is required. It is only in the informal comments of
Bangladesh officials (on which the case against the Indian proposal
has been based) that fundamental political feelings are expressed.
Those comments have to remain anonymous, possibly because such
political matters are more sensitive than technical questions.
The political questions, questions of equity and rights, do not
disappear just because the discussion is carried on in technical
language. They reappear in the assumptions and choices of each
government's scheme.
What are the assumptions and choices inherent in the Indian scheme
which express political questions? There are two areas where they
can be identified: in the debate over the scope of the discussion
and in the choice of uncertain observational data.
What is the scope of the discussion? What is 'the problem', and are
there any limits to its solution? India has assumed that the terms
of reference of the discussion are drawn very widely to include areas
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of water supply outside the Ganges Basin. This choice is justified
in terms of practice and rationality. It is argued, by the
Government of India, that the Ganges Basin is no more than a sub-basin
of the 'real' basin, that of the 'Ganga-Brahmaputra-Barak'. It is
argued that a solution is not possible within the Ganges Basin,
suitable reservoir sites are not available. India might have argued
that it would be more just to share the .resources of the subcontinent
equally between.the people living in the subcontinent. India might
also have argued that as the larger and militarily more powerful
state, and as the upper riparian state, she had the right to a larger
share of the rivers' waters and the means to enforce that right. The
Indian Proposal puts neither of these arguments. Instead, it uses the
resource of technical feasibility, arguing that the Indian scheme is,
according to the experts, more realistic.
The choice of an estimate for water supply appears to be another
instance where political choices are inherent in a technical statement.
The Indian caSe for transfer of water from the Brahmaputra is aided
by a low estimate of the annual mean flow in the Ganges. We find that
the Indian Proposal provides an estimate significantly lower than
that provided by Bangladesh. I suggest that the Indian Proposal is a
technical expression of an Indian political objective: the utilisation





The Bangladesh Government believes that the transfer of water from
the Brahmaputra is not the best way of increasing the dry season
flow of the Ganges. The Bangladesh Proposal (1) suggests, instead,
that the monsoon season flow of the tributaries of the Ganges should
be stored for use later in the year when it is most needed. Bangladesh
argues that enough water can be stored in reservoirs for the needs
of India, Nepal and Bangladesh.
The Bangladesh, Proposal identifies a total of 83 reservoir sites,
52 of them in India and 31 in Nepal (see Figure 15-1)- If does not
provide details of the design, operation or cost of these reservoirs,
but it presents an estimate of the additional dry season flow which
could be generated if all these reservoirs were built. The Proposal
concentrates on 12 major reservoirs in Nepal on the three main
trans-Himalayan river systems: the Karnali, Gandaki and Kosi systems.
For these 12 reservoirs the Proposal provides outline estimates of
the' volume of storage available. The Proposal also briefly mentions
a scheme to link the Rivers Gandak and Kosi to rivers in West Bengal
and Bangladesh with a navigable canal.
The Bangladesh Government argues that there is surplus water in the
Ganges Basin; enough of that water can be stored to meet the needs
of the three countries. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider
using water resources outside the Ganges Basin.
The Bangladesh Proposal implies that the water stored in reservoirs
to be built in Nepal should be allocated for the needs of Bangladesh
and of Calcutta Port. Until now, the development of Nepalese
reservoirs has been the subject of bilateral discussion between India
and Nepal. India has offered to provide finance for the construction
of some large dams, and to buy the hydroelectricity generated. In its
Proposal Bangladesh is stating its interest in Nepalese reservoirs.
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Table 15.1: List of Bangladesh's proposed reservoir sites
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Source: Bangladesh Proposal, exhibit 1
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This chapter investigates the Bangladesh case, the manner in which
it has been argued, and some of the objections which can be made
against it. Bangladesh estimates of water supply and demand are
compared with Indian estimates, and at the end of the chapter the
similar ways in which both countries use technical information are
identified.
THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL
The Bangladesh Proposal identifies 83 potential reservoir sites in
the Ganges Basin. From Bangladesh's map of the basin (Figure 15.1).
It can be seen that slightly more than half of the dams in India are
either completed or under execution. Construction has not been
started for any of the Nepalese dams. The Bangladesh Proposal
provides only the location of these reservoir sites; the dams are
not described, nor the areas they will flood.
The Bangladesli Proposal concentrates primarily on the calculation
of the flow which could be generated by the reservoirs. For the
12 major reservoirs in Nepal (as listed in Table 15-2), Bangladesh
engineers have made two estimates. Each of these dam sites has
already been investigated and a design proposed by a firm of Japanese
consulting engineers acting for the Nepalese Government (2).
Bangladesh engineers have used these designs, which were made with a
primary objective of hydroelectric power generation, for a first
estimate of the volume of dry season flow which could be generated.
A second estimate has been made, assuming that the height of the
dam could be increased. These two estimates are shown in Tables
15-2 and 15-3- Details of these calculations, and the assumptions
made about dam-site geology and the topography of the reservoir,
are not presented in the Proposal.
A similar calculation has been made, by Bangladesh, for the potential
and existing reservoir sites in the Ganges Basin in India. The
potential increase in the Ganges dry season flow from these reservoirs
is shown in Table 15-^-
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Table 15-2: Bangladesh's estimate of flow available from
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Sapt (5) Devghat 160
Gandaki (6) Kali
Basin Gandaki - I M80
(7) Kali






Sapt (11) Kothar 8,000
Kosi (12) Sun Kosi
High Dam 1,060
9,060 *4-0,202 699
Grand total: 32,260 113,758 2,*+89





Note: Arun should have large storage potential,
but not identified.
Source: Bangladesh Proposal, p 23-
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Table 15»3 Bangladesh's estimate of flow available from





















Sapt (5) Devghat 6oo
Gandaki (6) Kali
Gandaki - I 6,ooo
(7) Kali
Gandaki - II 2,000
(8) Burhi Gandaki 1,000
• (9) Marsyandi 2,000
(10) Seti 2,500
14,400 39,994 1,111
Sapt (11) Kothar 8,000
Kosi (12) Sun Kosi 2,500
10,400 40,202 810
Grand total: 62,400 113,758 3,641




Note: Arun and other rivers are known to have large
storage potential but no information is available
at present.
*
- Effective storage required for this case is
about 32,000 M cu m.
Source: Bangladesh Proposal, p 24.
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Table "15-41 Bangladesh's estimate of flow available from
potential reservoirs in India
Sub—basin




3. Gandak and other left
bank tributaries
4. Main Ganga
South of the Ganges Basin
5. Chambal
6. Yamuna




Water Storage Increase of
available capacity dry season












Source: Bangladesh Proposal Table VIII.
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The total of the two estimates - for Nepalese and Indian reservoirs -
suggests that 310,000 cusecs of additional flow could be made
available during the dry season. This estimate constitutes the
essence of the Bangladesh proposal.
In the closing paragraphs of the Bangladesh Proposal there is a three-
sentence description of a Nepal-Bangladesh link canal to provide a
connection between the Gandak and Kosi Rivers in Nepal, Mohananda in
West Bengal and the Karatoya in Bangladesh. This canal would have
the purpose of increasing the dry season flows in the latter two
rivers and providing Nepal with a navigable link to the sea. This
canal has been described in greater detail elsewhere (3)i but it
does not seem to be an integral part of the Bangladesh scheme.
THE CASE FOR THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL
The context of the Bangladesh scheme is set in the opening paragraph
of the Proposal:
'The dry season flows in the Ganges Basin have been
diminishing in the lower reach as diversions for
irrigation are taking place in the upper reaches. The
• low flows must not be allowed to decrease any further
and at the same time measures must be taken to increase
the dry season flow of the river to meet the present
and future needs of the riparian countries.' (k)
The Bangladesh Government is here concerned not with the threat of
the Farakka diversions, but by the threat posed by future irrigation
development in India. This introduction continues with a summary
of the Bangladesh argument:
'The minimum recorded discharge at Farakka was ^0,000
cusecs. It is much below the needs of India and
Bangladesh; in Bangladesh alone, there is about 9 million
acres of land dependent on the Ganges waters to feed
about 30 million people. However, looking at the Basin
as a whole, the average runoff at Farakka is about 372
MAF (1) (excluding the irrigation diversions upstream
already taking place). The utilisation of water in
India is planned up to the year 2,000 AD is 150 MAF
including existing diversions (2). It is, therefore,
evident that there is a considerable amount of water in
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the Ganges Basin which can be utilised to augment the
dry season flow of the river by storing its monsoon runoff.
Many potential large storage" sites are known to be
available in the tributaries of the Ganges in its upper
reaches. This proposal has been prepared for undertaking
studies of such potential in resolving the critical dry
season shortage of water in the Ganges Basin.1 (5)
The Bangladesh Government asserts that the Ganges has an annual flow
of 372 MAF, compared with which India will require only 150 MAF.
The Indian Government would disagree about the exact quantities
involved, but would probably agree that the surplus indicated by those
figures exists. There is a surplus, but can it be stored? We saw in
the last chapter that India argues that not enough of the surplus
can be stored to meet the needs of the three countries. If the
Bangladesh Proposal shows that the demand for water can be met with
water stored in the Ganges Basin, then the Bangladesh case is
established. To do this, Bangladesh engineers have presented an
outline water 'budget' for the Ganges Basin.
A water budget consists of a calculation of water supply and demand.
On the demand side, the Bangladesh Proposal calculates the land
resources and groundwater availability of the three countries. These
estimates of cultivable area, present irrigated area and groundwater
availability are presented here in columns 2-'+ of Table 15-5- From
these estimates, the three countries' demands for water are calculated,
as shown in column 5- The Bangladesh Proposal does not detail the
steps by which estimates of cultivable area, irrigated area and
groundwater availability are transformed into estimates of demand
for water in the year 2,000. If the demand estimates are indeed
calculated from the preceding consideration of land and groundwater
resources, the reader is not told how.
In Chapter 15 of this thesis, we saw that the Indian Proposal does
not detail the calculations which relate an estimate of cultivable
or irrigable area to an estimate of demand for water. In the
Bangladesh Proposal there is a very similar 'leap' in the calculations.
Estimates of demand are produced as from a conjuror's hat. It
should be noted that whilst the Indian demand estimate is made in
units of instantaneous flow (cusecs), the Bangladesh estimate is in
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Table 15-5: Bangladesh's estimates of the land and water
resources of the Ganges Basin






























Notes: (a) Present is taken to include projects 'under
investigation'. This formulation explains the
unexpectedly large figure for Bangladesh
(b) This figure is comparable with the estimate in
the Indian Proposal of 160 x 10 acres
(c) This is an estimate from the Government of India's
Irrigation Commission report of 1972
(d) This figure is also attributed to the Irrigation
Commission report
(e) No estimate is made of the groundwater potentially
available from South West Bangladesh but, as
with the Special Studies report, every possible
doubt is cast upon the usefulness of this source
of water
(f) By the year 2000
Source: Bangladesh Proposal, pp 3_19
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units of annual flow (MAF). The importance of this choice of units
will become clear in the conclusion of this chapter.
The figures in column 5 of Table 15-5 constitute the demand side
of the Bangladesh water budget. The supply side is provided by the
Bangladesh Proposal's estimate of the additional water which can
be generated from the 12 proposed reservoirs. This has been given
in Tables 15-2 to 15-^- In total, Bangladesh estimates that 180,000
cusecs can be generated by reservoir storage in India, and a further
130,000 cusecs from reservoirs in Nepal. This is the storage in
terms of instantaneous flow. It cannot readily be compared with the
total annual demand of 207 MAF calculated by Bangladesh (column 5
Table 15-5)- Tables 15-3 and 15-^ show that Bangladesh calculates
that 104 MAF can be stored, for use during the dry season. It is
also difficult to compare this estimate of additional supply during
the dry season, with an estimate of annual total demand. In other
words, the Bangladesh Proposal does not attempt to balance the water
budget. The Bangladesh Government considers that its case is made
by the demonstration that 310,000 cusecs of additional flow, or
10^ MAF of additional storage can be made available by the Bangladesh
scheme.
The Proposal concludes its discussion of the Bangladesh scheme with a
paragraph allocating the potential water availability to different
uses:
'The present dry season flow of the three major rivers
from Nepal has an average of 53iOOO cusec from November
to May, or 22.3 MAF, which should be sufficient to
irrigate the available land in the Terai area in Nepal
and in India under command of these rivers. In addition
to this, the existing flow of the rivers from the
Mahabharat range would continue to serve the areas.
Therefore most of the increased dry season flow from
storages in Nepal as shown above would be available
at Farakka and downstream in Bangladesh.' (6)
In this paragraph Bangladesh is claiming the water generated by
reservoirs in Nepal for its own use.
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THE CASE AGAINST THE BANGLADESH PROPOSAL
Verghese has summarised the Indian critique of the Bangladesh scheme
as follows:
'India is not favourably disposed towards this proposal
on the ground that there is no reason to involve Nepal,
a third country, in what should be a bilateral settlement.
It has, however, no objection to a joint examination of
the Bangladesh storage proposals in Nepal if the Nepalese
Government agrees. Nor is it averse to a navigation
route for Nepal to the sea. But the principal objection
is that India needs all the limited storage available on
the Ganga to satisfy its large unfulfilled irrigation
requirements within the populous Indian-Ganga basin and
that these needs cannot be satisfied from any other
source.
"There is only a limited Himalayan storage potential
because of the seasonality of the preponderant monsoon
discharge, a relative shortage of storage sites and the
meagre storage available even behind high dams on account
of the steep gradient. Consequently, only a small
fractiorl of the monsoon runoff can be harnessed. ' (7)
Verghese has raised three objections: a third country should not be
involved; India needs all the water that can be stored in the Ganges
Basin; only a small volume of water can be stored in the Ganges
Basin. Several other objections will be detailed in the following
paragraphs. The Indian Government believes the practicality of
Bangladesh's reservoirs is in doubt; it questions whether Nepal will
agree to such a large number of reservoirs, and it argues that the
Nepal-Bangladesh canal is outside the scope of the discussions.
These various objections will be dealt with under the same headings
as were used in the discussion of objections to the Indian scheme.
The limits of the problem
The Indian Government has not asserted that Nepalese projects are
outside the terms of reference for the discussions. It has, however,
opposed multilateral negotiations, arguing that the Nepalese Government
can be consulted but should not be given the right to participate
in the discussions. Since the Bangladesh Government has insisted
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that the projects in Nepal can only be investigated with the full
involvement of Nepal, discussion of the Bangladesh proposal cannot
proceed.
The Indian attitude to Bangladesh's request for Nepalese participation
can be seen in this quotation from a report by the government-owned
Press Trust of India:
'This stand of Bangladesh [requiring the participation
of Nepal] is seen here as an attempt to preempt the
very outcome of the study and politicise the issue
right from the beginning.' (8)
A second conflict over the scope of the discussion can be identified
in the Indian Government's doubts about the Nepal-Bangladesh canal.
The Press Trust of India report, quoted above, goes on to say that
this canal 'has nothing to do with the augmentation of the flow of
the Ganga...' (9)- A Ministry of External Affairs official made a
similar point .to me: he didn't think the canal came within the terms
of reference of the discussion (10).
Political implications
A second aspect of India's reluctance to accept Nepalese involvement
is the fear that Nepal and Bangladesh may unite as an alliance against
India. Verghese notes these fears as follows:
'[India apprehends] that multilateralism will slow down
progress. Bangladesh and Nepal will gang up against
India and will be encouraged to raise their demands at
India's cost by international forces.' (11)
A Ministry of External Affairs official commented to me that Nepalese
participation in the negotiations would complicate the existing
Indo-Nepalese discussions on four or five major reservoir projects,
most of which are included in the Bangladesh list. The official
argues:
'Those projects are important for India's development.
Bangladesh is not involved, except to create a locus
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standi..-both states are not confident in dealing with us
alone, but we wonder if this is not another way of doing
nothing, of making the whole thing very complicated.' (12)
This same official doubted that the Nepalese would agree to the
construction of 31 reservoirs in Nepal; India had been negotiating
for 20-25 years for hydroelectric projects in Nepal and one project,
but only one, was close to agreement. Certainly, Bangladesh's scheme
would flood a significant proportion of Nepal's scarce valley-bottom
land. The Bangladesh Proposal does not include an estimate of the
population which would be displaced, nor of the towns and areas of
agricultural land which would be submerged.
'Technical objections' and conflicting estimates
There is a serious disagreement between the Indian and Bangladesh
Governments about the quantities of water needed and the quantities
of water which can be stored in Nepalese and Indian reservoirs.
The Government of India argues that all the feasible reservoir
capacity of the Ganges Basin is going to be required for the needs
of India and Nepal. A Ministry of External Affairs official
emphasises this point in the following manner:
'The greatest problem with India about the Bangladesh
proposal is that all the known storage in India and
Nepal are not likely to give even a fraction of our
requirements [in the future].' (13)
This argument was put, as we saw in the last chapter, in the Indian
Proposal. In that document it was used as a reason for rejecting
schemes for storage in the Ganges Basin. Table 15-6 presents a
comparison of the estimates for water demand and supply contained in
the two governments' Proposals. From this comparison it is possible
to identify the wide difference between the two governments' estimates
of the storage potential within the Ganges Basin. Bangladesh estimates
that 10^ MAF can be stored, and that this volume can be used to
generate an additional flow of 310,000 cusecs. Indian estimates of
storage are incomplete but it is suggested that only 55-80,000 cusecs
eusecs could be generated. Neither Proposal explains the calculations
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Table 15-6: Comparison of some Bangladesh and Indian estimates





































Notes: (a) This is Bangladesh's estimate of current
demand
(b) This is India's estimate of irrigation demand
in the Rabi season, plus the demand for
Calcutta Port. It does not include any allowa
allowance for diversion out of the Ganges
Basin
(c) These estimates are of additional flows; that
is, excluding the existing dry season flow
(d) This is the estimate contained in the Indian
Proposal, p 56. However, a Press Trust of
India report of 18/7/78 quoted an estimate of
50,000 cusecs, a figure also suggested in my
interview with a Ministry of External Affairs
official
(e) This estimate is from my interview cited in.
(d)
Sources: Bangladesh and Indian Proposals, except where
indicated otherwise
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from which these estimates arise. It is not, therefore, possible to
identify the causes of this discrepancy between estimates of the
water potentially available from reservoir storage in the Ganges
Basin.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Indian Government is more
conservative than Bangladesh in assessing the feasibility of proposed
reservoirs in Nepal. One Indian engineer has commented that only six
of Bangladesh's proposed reservoirs have been 'investigated'; the
remaining 25 have only been 'reconnoitred' (14). The Bangladesh
Government does not deny this; it says that storage of water within
the Ganges Basin is a proposal put forward for investigation.
The Bangladesh Proposal leaves many questions unanswered. How much
will it cost? How high will the dams be (15)? Will there be a
conflict between the objectives of generating electrical power and
augmenting the dry season flow (16)? How much land will be flooded?
In leaving these questions unanswered, the Bangladesh Government seems
content to emphasise that their scheme is a proposal; its case will be
established, or proved, when investigations are undertaken.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined the Bangladesh scheme for augmenting the
dry season flow of the Ganges. We have seen what the scheme consists
of; this concluding section is an attempt to draw attention to the
similarities between the two Proposals and to identify some of the
assumptions and choices inherent in the Bangladesh document.
The Bangladesh Proposal, like its Indian counterpart, eschews questions
of equity and rights. The Bangladesh case is founded only upon
'reality', as attested by technical experts. The 'reality' perceived
by Bangladesh's experts is markedly different from that described
in the Indian Proposal. According to Bangladesh's calculations there
is plenty of water in the Ganges Basin and enough can be stored to
meet all parties' needs. Whilst the reality is different, the mode of
argument is identical: it is based on technical calculations and avoids
3^0
all politics.
A second similarity occurs in the explanation of calculations. The
Bangladesh Proposal's authors say they estimated the demand for water
from consideration of the cultivable area and potential irrigated
area, but they do not explain how that calculation was made. As was
noted in the previous chapter, India's experts are similarly Tfifcicent.
about how they arrived at their water demand estimate. Why are both
parties discreet about this matter? If so much depends on these
calculations, proof that they are based on sound estimates and
assumptions would significantly strengthen either side's case.
Perhaps the experts are discreet because the assumptions are
inadequate. More probably, both sides are reserving their negotiating
positions, their ability to manipulate the calculations in search of
the most partisan, believable answer.
A significant difference between the two Proposals is in their choice
of units. It can be seen, in Table 15-6, that the Bangladesh Proposal
measures demand for water in MAF per year, whereas the Indian
document uses cusecs.
A measurement of annual demand for water (such as MAF per year)
provides an estimate of the total demand for water. Bangladesh has
chosen to measure this total rather than the peak requirement for
water. India's choice of instantaneous demand (cusecs), on the other
hand, directs attention to the peak requirement. It can be seen
that each country's choice of unit corresponds to its political
interest in the negotiations. Bangladesh's interest lies in a
conservative estimate of demand, whereas it is in India's interest
to estimate demand generously. The case for the Indian proposal rests
on the assertion that 'enough' water cannot be stored within the
Ganges Basin; the Bangladesh case is founded on the belief that it
can. The notion of what is 'enough' thus becomes a focus of dispute,
with Bangladesh tending to reduce the estimate, and India tending to
increase it. The Bangladesh Government's choice of total annual
demand coincides with this tendency toward underestimation by ignoring
seasonal variation; India's choice of instantaneous demand similarly
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reflects a wish to draw attention to a generous estimate.
Politics appears to dictate not only the selection of units of
measurement, but also the measurements themselves. Where the
discretion of the two parties does not prevent comparison, it is
possible to identify a dramatic difference: India variously
estimates the foreseeable supply from reservoirs in the Ganges Basin
at 55-80,000 cusecs, whilst Bangladesh assesses the same quantity
as 3^0,000 cusecs, a figure nearly four times larger than the
highest Indian estimate. Again the variation in these 'technical'
calculations is in the direction which political considerations
would suggest. Bangladesh needs to prove the feasibility of storage
within the Ganges Basin; India's need is to cast doubt upon it.
The Bangladesh Proposal is, in the same manner as its Indian
counterpart, a technical document, the assumptions and calculations
of which are informed by political goals; it is also, from another
point of view, a political document argued in the language of
technical discourse.
The politics informing the Bangladesh Proposal is the national
interest as perceived by the authors of the document. That interest
appears to be defined primarily in terms of a single goal of
maximising the availability of dry season water. No doubt compromise
will, in the long term, be conceivable, but the Bangladesh interest
is initially identified with a claim to water which may be stored
in the Ganges Basin, and with opposition to the regulation of the
Brahmaputra. The Indian Proposal argues that it is in Bangladesh's
interest to regulate the Brahmaputra and thus reduce the flooding
caused by that river. In other political circumstances, and with a
scheme different to that described in the Indian Proposal, the
Bangladesh Government might well concur. If, as the Indian Proposal
implies, regulation of the Brahmaputra is associated with transfer
of water out of the Brahmaputra Basin and a reduced dry season flow,
and if there is no basis of 'trust' between the two countries, then
Bangladesh is willing to forgo the regulation of flooding: the







This thesis opened with five main questions about the conflict over
the River Ganges:
a) Why was the Farakka Barrage built?
b) What influenced the responses of Pakistan and
Bangladesh?
c) Why do India and Bangladesh have different approaches
to augmenting the Ganges?
d) How does the conduct of this dispute compare with
that of others elsewhere?
e) What does the study tell us about the interaction
between politics and expertise in a conflict of
this sort?
This chapter attempts to draw loose ends together by providing answers
to these questions. As has been made apparent in the body of the
thesis, some of these answers must remain sketchy and provisional
in character, until further evidence becomes available and further
research is undertaken.
The first three questions are answered only summarily because the
concluding sections of Parts I and II and of the chapters in Part III
have already elaborated answers. The fourth and fifth questions are
discussed at greater length; the fourth because it contains
comparative material not previously explored, and the fifth because
it is a summarising discussion of the various aspects of the
interaction between politics and expertise contained in this case
study. Before embarking upon these concluding discussions, it is
necessary to consider briefly the areas in which the conclusions of
this thesis might be said to rest upon incomplete data.
Secrecy and speculation
The study of current affairs, or contemporary history, and particularly
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of issues which governments define as sensitive, is problematic.
Information is a resource which governments husband carefully. It was
inevitable, therefore, that this investigation would prove an arduous
exercise in information gathering and predictable that this thesis
should be open to the criticism that its conclusions are founded on
incomplete knowledge and inadequate documentation. Criticism of this
kind was voiced in the course of my interviewing in South Asia. It
is a criticism to which response should be made.
Setting aside those areas where I have specifically indicated that
my conclusions are .speculative, and further research is required, I
believe that there are two places in this thesis where discussion
appears to rest on seriously incomplete information. I shall deal
with them in turn.
Firstly, the circumstances in which the decision to build the Farakka
Barrage was taken remain ill-documented. In particular, my discussion
of the contra'diction between the conclusions of the Indian and
Pakistani consultants (see Chapter 3)> and of the inadequacy of the
technical rationale of the project, is carried on in the absence
of Hensen's report, of the official technical literature and of the
subsequent studies of the Calcutta Port Hydraulic Study Department.
Any future investigation might start by attempting to obtain that
documentation; mine was hampered by the Indian Government's refusal
to grant research permission. Nevertheless, whilst my discussion
is based on slight documentation, that documentation is reliable,
emanating as it does from the relevant government. There can be
little doubt about the existence of technical ambiguity (1), although
the details of its origin require further exploration. But, did
Indian engineers realise that there was this ambiguity before the
decision to build the Farakka Barrage? This we do not know for
certain. If they did not know before the decision, they certainly
learnt soon afterwards from the protests of Pakistan.
The second area where the validity of my data may be questioned
concerns the technical 'talks' held between India and Pakistan
between i960 and 1970. The only direct evidence we have of these
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exchanges is the summary list of documents exchanged contained in
Appendix B. Otherwise, this account has relied on the secondhand or
polemical accounts provided by the governments involved and on
contemporary newspaper reporting. Can these talks be fairly
categorised as Indian attempts to stave off negotiation? Would a
less partisan account describe them as at least consultation, if not
substantive negotiation? When the minutes of these meetings are
released we shall be able to find definitive answers to those questions.
In the meantime, I consider that my categorisation of these talks as
part of a 'strategy of procrastination' is a reasonable inference
from incomplete evidence. The inference is, in addition, confirmed by
my interview with India's former Foreign Secretary, Rajeshwar Dayal.
I think the record suggests that Pakistan was remarkably cooperative
on this issue, in the face of indications that India was unwilling to
compromise.
Having dealt with those two areas of inadequate documentation, I
turn now to the first of the questions to which this chapter provides
summary answers.
Who initiated the Farakka Barrage Project, and with what motives?
The decision to build the Farakka Barrage seems to have been determined
primarily by anxiety: fears about the physical decline of the Hooghly,
about the decline of Calcutta's export and import trade, and about
the economic decline of West Bengal. In 1833i and intermittently
since then, the Bengal chambers of commerce have expressed their
anxiety about the deterioration of the Hooghly. In i960,
representatives of foreign shipping companies were sufficiently
concerned to issue an alarmist statement suggesting the port might
die within two years.
Anxiety prompted governmental action. A series of governmental
investigations were instigated, approximately one per decade for the
first sixty years of this century. The investigators were generally
unable to find conclusive evidence that the Hooghly was deteriorating.
Nevertheless, they favoured controlling the headwaters of the Hooghly
as a prophylactic measure. Thus, out of anxiety arose the idea for a
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Ganges barrage. The British rulers of India, however, do not appear
to have taken the idea seriously;, certainly there is no evidence to
suggest such a project had been sanctioned prior to Partition.
After Partition the Man Singh Committee found evidence sufficient to
satisfy itself that the Hooghly was deteriorating. But action did
not immediately follow the development of this degree of expert
consensus.
The fears of the business community and the opinions of the expert
investigators were articulated in the Indian parliament by West Bengal
MPs for several years before ministerial backing for the project could
be obtained. Only gradually were the MPs able to transform the central
government's perception of the project from that of a state
preoccupation to being a national priority.
The exact circumstances and timing of the Indian cabinet's decision
to build the Farakka Barrage remain shrouded in secrecy: a subject for
further research when the political sensitivity of the issue has
subsided. We have seen that there appears to have been some caucus-
building by MPs from North Eastern states attempting to persuade the
central government to back the projects they favoured. We have also
speculated that the Farakka Barrage may have appeared as a useful
'panacea' for the political leaders of West Bengal: the state had been
declining economically since independence, but diagnoses which located
the cause of decline in the structure of the economy threatened the
broad, nationalist base of the Congress parttf, whereas blaming the
Hooghly and demanding central government help threatened only Pakistan.
This is speculation, but speculation is needed to explain why the
Farakka Barrage was built. As we have seen the technical rationale
for the project was the subject of serious doubt and, with the benefit
of hindsight, the project does have many of the attributes of a 'white
elephant'. In addition to those two failings, a third, that the
project would create vigorous conflict with Pakistan must always have
been evident to the Indian leaders. In the light of these three
inadequacies, speculation is required to explain why the project was
built.
3^6
What alternatives were available?
Chapter Three describes five contemporary alternatives to the Farakka
Barrage Project: a ship canal; a barrage and ship canal; an alternative
port; dredging and the restoration of the 'flushing' action of the
Rivers Rupnarayan and Damodar. Without access to Calcutta Port
Commission archives, we cannot be certain of the degree to which
each of these alternatives was investigated. However, a brief
account by Framji, the director of the investigations, has been
published. From this account it would appear that only the first of
the alternatives, the Diamond Harbour ship canal, was assessed with
any zeal. Not one of the five alternatives can be proferred as a
certain solution to the problems faced by Calcutta Port; indeed, it
is probable that a sea port connected to the sea only by 125 miles
of winding, unpredictable river channel cannot economically be
rejuvenated to meet the requirements of twentieth century shipping.
These doubts do not absolve the Indian Government from its
responsibility to investigate the alternatives thoroughly. The
belief that the Farakka Barrage was not a sensible solution to the
decline of the Hooghly and that the alternatives had not been seriously
investigated is a belief which has lent acrimony to the arguments of
Pakistan and Bangladesh in the conflict over the Ganges.
What influenced the responses of the Pakistan and Bangladesh
Governments?
The most tangible factor motivating the opposition of the Pakistan
and Bangladesh Governments to the Farakka Barrage Project was and is
the fear of the project's downstream consequences. The full force of
these consequences was experienced by Bangladesh during the dry
season of 1976 and to a lesser extent 1977- Part III of this thesis
provides an assessment of the extent and depth of the effects.
The effect of India's Farakka diversions on the Ganges' flow in
Bangladesh is proved beyond reasonable doubt. During the dry season
months of March and April in 1976 and 1977, the flow in the river
was, on average, only half of what would have been expected. The
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flows in the two main distributaries of the Ganges, the Gorai-
Madhumati and Arial Khan, seem also to have been affected by the
Indian diversions. In the years in question, the flows in these two
rivers were unusually low, but these low flows cannot be irrefutably
blamed on the Farakka withdrawals. Since, in the case of the Gorai,
low flows had previously occurred naturally, some doubt remains as
to the cause of the low flows in 1976 and 1977- In the case of the
Arial Khan, there is an element of doubt because the river obtains
its water from the combined flow of the Brahmaputra and Ganges; it
is surprising that a change in the Ganges should have significantly
altered this somewhat larger flow. Nevertheless, the most likely
explanation for the low flows observed in both these rivers during
the dry seasons of 1976 and 1977 remains the Farakka diversions.
In areas within a few miles of these three rivers, the Ganges,
Arial Khan and Gorai, groundwater levels may also have been adversely
influenced by the Farakka diversions.
In the years of maximum Indian diversion, there was unprecedented
saline intrusion up the rivers of South West Bangladesh. However,
only in the central 'compartments' of the Nabaganga-Pussur and
Gorai-Madhumati estuaries is this plausibly attributable to the
reduced flows in the Ganges and Gorai Rivers. In particular, the
immediate area of Khulna, which by chance is also the main
industrial centre of Bangladesh, suffered an exceptional salinity
change. A quirk of river channel formation seems to have left
the area prone to large salinity changes as a consequence of
relatively small changes in river flow. In 1976 and 1977, therefore,
the industries in and around Khulna were forced to cope with either
increased salinity in their process water or the increased costs of
shipping fresh water many miles. The damage or increased costs
caused by the salinity changes can be reasonably attributed to
Indian withdrawals.
As a consequence of reduced river flows and increased river salinity,
agricultural production in South West Bangladesh was reduced.
"Undoubtedly, both the Bangladesh Government and the 'independent'
experts who wrote Special Studies have exaggerated the extent of the
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reduction. The effect on agricultural production is connected to
the Indian withdrawals of Ganges water only by a long and complex
chain of causation. The existence of the chain cannot reasonably
be doubted, but there is inadequate evidence to quantify the effect
on agriculture.
There is also a degree of uncertainty about the effect of the Farakka
diversions on the Sundarban mangrove forests of South West Bangladesh.
Potential natural causes for decline have not been irrefutably
eliminated by Special Studies, but the decline may be attributable
to the Farakka diversions.
There can be no doubt that the Farakka withdrawals made navigation
difficult or impossible on the Ganges and Gorai during the dry months
of March and April in 1976 and 1977- This was the consequence
predicted by Cotton in 1856 (see Chapter Two). The Indian Government's
claim that navigation 'practically ceases' during the dry months is
not supported1by the evidence of traffic surveys. The Ganges and
Gorai are not Bangladesh's most important waterways but there was
significant disruption of inland navigation.
It is difficult to attribute a general or widespread ecological
deterioration in South West Bangladesh to the Indian withdrawals.
There has been, however, a significant decline in catches of Hilsa
fish from the Ganges. The exact causes of this decline remain to be
identified but the Farakka Barrage, as a substantial intervention in
the ecology of the Ganges, must be a strong potential culprit.
In sum, therefore, the assessment of Part III casts doubt on both
governments' propaganda claims but, in the final analysis, it
concludes that there was an objective basis to the Bangladesh
Government's sense of grievance. The economy of Bangladesh did
suffer significant damage as a direct result of India's withdrawal
of Ganges water during the dry seasons of 1976 and 1977-
Economic damage and the fear of such damage were the most tangible
factors influencing the responses of the governments of Pakistan and
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Bangladesh to the Farakka Barrage Project. As we have seen in Parts
I and II of this thesis, however, they were not the only factors.
As we saw in Chapter Three, doubts about the efficacy of the Farakka
Barrage gave rise to a 'myth' about the sinister intentions of the
project, a myth which may have lent acrimony, distrust and
intransigence to the Pakistan and Bangladesh responses. On two
occasions after the independence of Bangladesh, the Ganges conflict
appears to have been given a symbolic national status such that it
could be promoted for political ends unconnected with the sharing of
the river. Thus, in Chapter Seven, it was speculated that the
failure to resolve the conflict during the period 1972 to 1975 may
be explained by the 'use' of the conflict in a struggle for the
leadership of Bangladesh. Similarly, in Chapter Eight, we saw that
one factor behind the Bangladesh Government's promotion of the
dispute was, apparently, its desire to build an internal, national
consensus and to improve the country's international image. In
both these cases, the conflict was seen as a symbol of Bangladesh's
national identity.
There is, of course, one final and very significant factor
conditioning the response of the Pakistan Government, and to a
lesser extent that of Bangladesh. This is a factor which has only
been touched upon in passing: Indo-Pakistan hostility. The complex
and contradictory explanations for this hostility have been
discussed elsewhere (2). The focus of this thesis is upon other
factors, but the general 'state of relations' between India and
Pakistan and India and Bangladesh has been used, herein, to identify
potential 'windows' when resolution of the conflict might have been
achievable.
Were opportunities for a settlement overlooked?
We have seen in Part II that there were 'windows' in the conflict
in i960 and again in the period 1972 to 1975- These two potential
opportunities to resolve the dispute were overlooked. Why?
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For a few months in 1960, as we saw in Chapter Five, convivial
relations held sway. In the euphoria following the successful
negotiation of the India-West Pakistan border demarcation and of
the sharing of the Indus River, a resolution of the embryonic
Farakka conflict might have been possible. The Indian High
Commissioner to Pakistan at that time has admitted, 'then, perhaps
we could have reached agreement'. Towards the end of the window,
and some months after India's announcement that the Farakka Barrage
would be built, the leaders of India and Pakistan met and made
arrangements for discussions to be held. This meeting, between
Ayub Khan and Nehru in March 1961, cannot, however, be interpreted
as an attempt to grasp the opportunity offered by the window in
relations. It was apparently little more than a casual encounter
(Ayub Khan does not bother to mention it in his memoirs); it took
place after Indian intentions had been made apparent, and relations
had already begun to deteriorate. The achievement of the meeting
was a vague, verbal understanding which confirmed the necessity
for the technical exchanges which had already commenced and held
out the prospect of ministerial negotiations at some future date.
Some time before the Nehru-Ayub meeting, Pakistan had apparently
offered to extend the principles of the Indus Waters Treaty to the
sharing of the Ganges. In 1961, the Pakistan Government also offered
to consider a joint barrage across the Ganges (see Chapter Six).
These are not the actions of an intransigently hostile state. India
was at this stage offered the option of opening substantive
negotiations with Pakistan; it did not do so. Instead a protracted,
intermittent and apparently trivial series of technical talks were
begun. We do not have documentary evidence of India's reasons for
ignoring the i960 window. We do have, nevertheless, strong
circumstanbial indications that a policy of procrastination was
started at about this time. These indications include, firstly, the
admission by a former foreign secretary of India that the opening
of negotiations would have led to an 'injunction' from Pakistan;
secondly, the several statements in the Indian parliament implying
or stating that the Farakka Project was a unilateral project. In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, these are good reasons for
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believing that this window in relations was consciously ignored by
the Indian Government. The needs, of Calcutta's export-import trade
took precedence over relations with Pakistan and the possibility of
a cooperative development of the Ganges.
For more than two years, between January 1972 and May 197^» relations
between India and Bangladesh were excellent or at least positive.
The. record of what happened during these years is confused. But
there is no doubt in the minds of participants on the Bangladesh side
that this was a period when negotiations were possible; nor is there
any doubt that progress was not made. At the end of the period, when
Sheik Mujibur Rahman met Indira Gandhi they found that the
negotiations were only just beginning. In Chapter Seven, we have
explored three possible explanations for this state of affairs: the
Bangladesh Government was too busy with other matters; the officials
responsible for the technical negotiations chose to follow a 'hard
line'; the Bangladesh water minister prolonged the dispute as part
of a struggle' for the leadership of the country. There is not
enough evidence to decide between these three explanations (or
indeed one of the many alternatives which could be imagined) but
the third is slightly the more plausible. Further research should
concentrate oh the deliberations of the members of the Joint Rivers
Commission, how their negotiations developed, and on the
circumstances in which their discussions ceased. Specifically, our
interpretation of the events would be aided by a knowledge of when,
how and with whose agreement the JRC negotiations were curtailed.
A third window in the relations between the parties to the conflict
occurred in the months after the victory of the Janata Party in the
Indian General Elections in 1977- The window led first to the
understanding of April 1977t then to the Ganges Waters Treaty of
November 1977* As has been suggested in Chapter Nine, this
opportunity was grasped because, in the words of an Indian civil
servant, 'the new government wanted to project an image of
having achieved success in foreign policy...'
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Why are India and Bangladesh proposing different means for
increasing dry season flow of the, Ganges?
In Part IV of this thesis, the Indian and Bangladesh Proposals for
augmenting the Ganges have been examined, and in Chapter Nine the
deadlock in the negotiation of augmentation has been described. What
we have seen is that a curious, stultified discussion is being
carried on. The implicit ground rules of this discussion debar
questions which might be deemed political. Rules or no rules,
politics not only finds its way into the discussion; we discover
that the two parties schemes are principally moulded by their
political objectives. A political discussion is hidden under the
technical language.
The central questions of this discussion are: Who shall control the
two rivers? How shall the water be shared? How will national
sovereignty be maintained? From the Bangladesh Government's point
of view, the 'Indian scheme expresses several threats to Bangladesh
and to Bangladesh's interests. The Indian Government is not
proposing the Brahmaputra-Ganges link canal in order to threaten
the sovereignty and resources of Bangladesh. That is nevertheless,
how the scheme is percSived. India's interests are similar to
those of Bangladesh: both countries want to maximise their command
over dry season water. This inevitably leads to a conflict of
interest, a conflict which is expressed in the divergence between
the two Proposals. The Bangladesh Proposal concentrates on the
possibilities for developing the Ganges; that way the whole dry
season flow of the Brahmaputra is left for Bangladesh and that way
Bangladesh expresses its demand for a share in the increased dry
season flow of the Ganges. There can be little doubt that, whatever
may happen in the Indo-Bangladesh negotiations, the dry season flow
in the Ganges will be enhanced even if only through the bilateral
efforts of India and Nepal. By neglecting that increase, the Indian
Government's Proposal serves to deny Bangladesh's rights in the
augmented flow of the Ganges. The Indian scheme focusses on the
Brahmaputra because India wishes to stake a claim (not an unreasonable
one, it must be noted) in the waters of that river.
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The experts of both countries doubtless have good reason to believe
that the arguments they have put forward are based in a thorough
and objective analysis of the alternative possibilities. The basis
for the choice which each government has made is, nevertheless,
political. The two Proposals are grounded in the 'national interest'
and shaped by the history of conflict and distrust.
How does this dispute compare with other water sharing disputes?
This thesis is primarily a case study. In order to fit the conduct
of this conflict into its historical context, however, it is
necessary to briefly compare this case study with the experience
of other water sharing disputes. I have chosen to make a comparison
with two other traditions: firstly, with India's inter-state water
disputes and, secondly, with the experience of other international
water disputes as embodied in the precedents and judgements of
contemporary international law.
India's inter-state river disputes
Most of India's major rivers cross state (or provincial) boundaries
and.there is a long history of inter-state disagreements over water.
As a consequence, a body of legislation has been created, notably
provision in the Government of India Act (1935)» "the Inter-State
Water Disputes Act (1956), and the River Boards Act (1956), and a
number of settlements or partial settlements have been made.
Superficially, it would seem that such a body of law and practice
could provide a useful comparison for the practice of international
river disputes. During the fifties and sixties, however, Indian
publicists and lawyers denied that the comparison was valid (3).
For example, Bains wrote, 'As international law is the product of
sovereign States, and..."restrictions of the independence of States
cannot be presumed", the rules of law dealing with the provinces or
federal units cannot be accepted as rules of international law' (^).
Be that as it may, there is a suggestion that at this time Indian
publicists were trying to maintain an outdated view of riparian
rights, one which contradicted both international practice and
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internal Indian practice. The analogy or comparison between national
and international decisions seems to be gaining the support of
lawyers (5) as well as having the advantage of being a common sense
view.
If the comparison is valid, what can be learnt from it? The main
difference between Indian inter-state practice and the conduct of
the Ganges water dispute relates to the principle of equitable
apportionment. In inter-state disputes this principle was accepted
many years before the Indian Government was willing to recognise its
relevance to the Ganges dispute.
Hassan, writing in the Harvard International Law Journal, has pointed
out that the principle of equitable distribution*was proclaimed as
early as 1862 by irrigation officers in the Punjab. The Irrigation
Commission of 1901 and the Rau Commission of 19^2 are also based on
this principle (6). Whilst the Inter-State River Disputes Act (1956)
does not specifically propose such a principle, it is clear that the
tribunals which it provides for would be unnecessary if a simpler
view of riparian rights prevailed. The Administrative Reforms
Commission'commented that whilst 'there is no codified law
prescribing rights...the notion of 'equity' has come to prevail
restraining the upper states from drawing such quantities of water
as would injure the lower states' (7)-
As we saw in Chapter Six, the Indian Government did not adopt the
principle of equitable distribution of waters in the Ganges dispute
until 1971 and the Bangladesh Government feared that they were going
to restate the principle of territorial sovereignty as late as 1976.
There was, therefore, an uncomfortable contradiction in the fifties
and sixties, between Indian national and international practice.
It is this, presumably, which led to the denials, by Indian
publicists, of the analogy between national and international
practice. In most other respects the practice and law of Indian
inter-state river disputes corresponds quite closely to international
law and to the conduct of the Ganges dispute.
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The two laws passed in 1956, the Inter-State Water Disputes Act and
the River Boards Act, have been used most sparingly. The first
provides for an informal tribunal to arbitrate in intractable
disputes. The second allows for a supra-State administration to
develop a river or a river basin (8). The two laws have been
described as a curative and a preventive measure, respectively, in
the settlement of inter-State river disputes (9)- The central
government has shown itself loathe to refer any river dispute to a
tribunal. Where this has been done, tribunals have in all cases
but one, been unsuccessful in settling disputes (10). The preventive
measures have been no more successful. No river boards have been
established, apparently because the idea is widely opposed by State
governments (even though the boards would have only advisory powers)
(11). The unwillingness of the Indian central jovernment to
intervene in these matters stems from a fundamental, and reasonable,
belief in the efficacy of negotiated agreements. In the words of
the Irrigation Commission (1972):
'Mutual accommodation and agreement go much further in
the direction of ensuring equity, of redressing
imbalances, and obtaining willing implementation, than
judical decisions, which more often than not, in spite
of the probity and impartiality of the judge or
'
arbitrator, have the effects of prolonging the agony
of the riparian States. That the scope of mutual
agreements often extends beyond what can be enforced
by judicial decisions, is borne out by the history of
successful negotiations in India, where compromise,
mutual accommodation and even a willing sacrifice of
interests to help solution, have led to many settlements.' (12)
The parallel between this reliance on negotiation in inter-State
disputes, is the bilateralism repeatedly espoused by India for the
settlement of the Ganges dispute. This is, however, only one
strand in the justification for bilateral negotiation.. Another is
that bilateral negotiations best suit the interests of an upper
riparian state. That state has the physical power to change river
flows. The lower riparian must rely upon the force of international
law and international opinion (and, rarely, also on the good faith
of the upper riparian) in order to obtain a reasonable share of the
water. For this reason, the involvement of third parties, in
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mediatory and conciliatory roles, is in the interest of the lower
riparian.
The conclusion of several writers and of the Indian Irrigation
Commission is that if, as seems to be the case, neither negotiation
nor arbitration are effective in a large number of inter-State
river disputes, then there must be river basin commissions and,
perhaps, a national water policy (13)- This recommendation can be
seen as a parallel to the establishment by India and Bangladesh
in 1972 of the Joint Rivers Commission, though that Commission is
rather more limited in its scope than is recommended, for example
by the Irrigation Commission.
The experience of other international water sharing disputes
Five legal principles applicable to the sharing of international
rivers were outlined in the introduction to this thesis under the
following headings:
(i) Absolute territorial sovereignty;
(ii) Absolute territorial integrity;
• (iii) Positivistic theory;
(iv) Jusnaturalistic theory; and
(v) Equitable utilisation theory (1*+).
Principles of territorial sovereignty have in the past been espoused
by upper riparian states, whereas theories of territorial integrity
have better suited the interests of lower riparians, and have,
therefore, been adopted by them. In recent years, however, the
principle of equitable utilisation has gained general acceptance.
It has been shown in Chapters Five and Six that the Indian Government
adopted a strategy, during the first two decades of the conflict,
which expressed the principle of territorial sovereignty. In the
blunt words attributed to Nehru: 'What India did with India's rivers
was India's business'. The question we have to answer is: Was India
out of step with the practice elsewhere in the world?
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One of the few authoritative, and now notorious, statements of
territorial sovereignty is the Harmon doctrine. In 1895i United
States Attorney General Harmon gave his opinion that the American
Government could appropriate the Rio Grande without considering
Mexico's needs. In 1961, a lengthy legal opinion supporting this
principle was reprinted in The Hindu, J S Bains wrote that:
'The Harmon doctrine has become a part of international
jurisprudence [and] has served as a sheet anchor of the
arguments of later writers and statesmen... even in
treaties the sanctity of territorial supremacy has been
reiterated... (15)
In fact, the Harmon doctrine had by that time fallen into disrepute.
Thus, Hassan comments:
'The legal positivists who rely on state practice in
support of this principle overlook the fundamental
fact that unilateral actions by upper riparians
affecting the flow of waters into lower riparians
have mos'tly, if not always, been protested by the
latter and as such are weak evidence of what they now
consider to be international water law.' (16)
Similarly, Glos writing in a Yale University doctoral thesis
published in 1961 could comment:
'It may be seen that the notion pursuant to which
a state because it exercised jurisdiction and physical
power over the waters within its territorial limits,
was therefore permitted by international law to do
whatever it pleased with the waters, has long been
abandoned. This was mainly because it has been realised
that the application of this notion was detrimental to
the interests of all riparians and that states could
gain much more by mutual co-operation.' (17)
Hassan also noted that the Harmon doctrine had been abandoned by
the United States:
'The limited force, if any, of such a partly accepted
rule, which has been abandoned by the very country which
gave birth to it, is obvious and needs no comment.' (18)
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A list of the dates of statements, adjudications and treaties which
eschewed territorial sovereignty in favour of the principle of
equitable utilisation clearly indicates that the latter principle
had been generally accepted by the middle of this century. These
are examples quoted by Lipper:
Chile/Bolivia, 1962
Israel/Arab states (Jordan River), 195^
River Oder case, 1929
Lake Lanoux, 1957
Equador/Peru, 19'+5
Afghanistan/Iran (Helmand River), 1872
Trail smelter Arbitration, 19^1
Kansas/Colorado, 1902
New Jersey/New York, 1931
Geneva Convention, 19^5
Niger Agreement, 19&3
Montevideo Declaration, 1933 (19)
In 1966, after lengthy discussions, the International Law Association
unanimously adopted a statement of international law which has
become known as the Helsinki Rules (20). The Indian delegate was
amongst those who voted in favour of the notion that:
'each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to
- a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses
of the waters of an international drainage basin.' (21)
If any further precedent is required, we may turn to the Indus
Waters Treaty which India signed in i960. Baxter notes that this
'effected an equitable apportionment of the waters of the Indus
system' (22). A clause was inserted, perhaps with the Ganges
dispute in mind, in this treaty stating that it does not constitute
a precedent, but the force of such a clause is doubtful (23).
Thus, it can be seen that the Indian conduct of the Ganges dispute
involved the adoption of principles of law abandoned by other states
and also abandoned by India herself when dealing with inter-state
rivers and with the Indus.
The subject and extent of the negotiations between India and
Pakistan in 1969 and 1970 suggests that India had begun to shift
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from reliance on territorial sovereignty as a guide to practice. But,
in 1976 "the legal advisors of the Bangladesh Government feared that
India would again make recourse to the doctrine. The Bangladesh
Government's White paper in the Ganges water dispute (2*0 contained
a page rebutting the Harmon doctrine. In the event, the Indian
case did not look for support to that principle; adequate support
could be provided within an interpretation of the complicated
practice of equitable sharing (25).
If India had accepted the theory of equitable sharing at an earlier
stage, would there have been a great difference in their conduct of
the dispute? The application of equity lacks the simplicity of
earlier principles, so there is considerable room for alternative
interpretations. The limits of this room for manoaevre can, however,
be reasonably established. It is clear that a lower riparian is
given some rights in the determination of the development of an
international river, but those rights do not go so far as a veto.
Stone writes that 'equality of rights implies that a nation will
have an equal right to claim a reasonable allotment of water...
consistent with the corresponding rights of others' (26). The joint
Indo-Bangladesh statements of 1972 and 1973 clearly lay the basis
for- an equitable sharing, providing as they do for a Joint Rivers
Commission, cooperation and for a mutually acceptable solution
before operation of the Farakka Barrage (see Chapter Seven). But
the conduct of the dispute up to that point is more questionable.
A United Nations publication lays down what appear to be the
absolute minimum requirements of cooperation:
'General international law places minimum requirements
on a State...to give notice, to provide the requisite
information and to provide affected States the
opportunity to be heard.' (27)
A less conservative interpretation of what is expected of an
upper riparian was agreed by participants to a seminar held at the
University of British Columbia in 1963- They said that, 'the essence
of this doctrine [of equitable apportionment J is sharing, based on
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a notion of good faith and respect for rights' (28).
By either of these interpretations, the Indian conduct of the dispute
during the sixties was inadequate. Notice of the intention to
build the barrage was given to Pakistan only after a final decision
had been made on the project and after the first moves toward
construction had been made. It is difficult to interpret the Indo-
Pakistan talks as giving Pakistan the opportunity to be heard, let
alone as negotiation in good faith.
Having compared the experience of the Ganges conflict with the
practice of Indian inter-state water disputes and with the conduct
of international water disputes as indicated by international law,
I turn now to the final question asked at the outset of the thesis:
What can this case study tell us about the role played by technical
experts, and the use made of expertise, in international political
disputes about technological innovation and resource sharing?
Politics and expertise
As previous chapters have amply shown the conflict over the sharing
and.development of the Ganges is rich in debates which straddle the
indistinct border between politics and science. Four principal
technical debates have been identified:
(i) Was the Hooghly progressively deteriorating?
(ii) Would diversion of water from the Ganges, that
is increased headwater supply, overcome the
deterioration of the Hooghly?
(iii) Did the diversion of a proportion of the Ganges'
dry season flow cause serious damage to
downstream areas?
(iv) By what means can the low flow of the Ganges best
be augmented?
The use of experts and expertise has not, however, been confined
to these debates focussed primarily on technical questions. 'Science'
is a resource which has also been mobilised throughout the more
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political aspects of the Ganges conflict. Experts and expertise
have influenced and been influenced by politics and politicians in
many and diverse ways. But it is clear that the 'rationality' or
'neutrality' of science, to which attention was drawn in the
introduction of this thesis, is a crucial attribute of expertise
providing much of its power within political debate. In this
summary discussion of the use of expertise within the Ganges conflict,
I want to focus first upon this depoliticising and legitimating
attribute of science.
Chapters and 15 have shown that the negotiations about augmenting
the Ganges (debate (iv) above) are political discussions using
technical language as a mode of discourse and of argument. This is
a straightforward example of the use of expertise or science to
depoliticise a discussion. We have seen that some of the technical
choices implicit in the two government's Proposals are in fact
expressions of political decisions. Similarly, questions of equity,
rights, power- and goals - political questions, that is, at the heart
of the negotiation - have been eschewed by the unspoken agreement of
the two parties. Articles IX and X of the Ganges Waters Treaty
do not specifically indicate that the negotiation shall be confined
to technical questions, but Article IX contains the following terms
of reference:
'The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission...shall
carry out investigation and study of schemes relating
to the augmentation of the dry season flows of the
Ganga...with a view to finding a solution which is
economical and feasible.' (29)
Political arguments are not specifically excluded, but equity is not
stated as a goal, nor are political or legal rights indicated.
However, the implicit agreement to depoliticise the negotiation has
proved in practice a hindrance to progress. The discussions have
become deadlocked as a result of the failure to resolve political
questions (see Chapter Nine).
A less straightforward and obvious use of expertise to depoliticise
debate seems to have occurred during the period 1961-1971- Part of
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India's strategy of procrastination was a recourse to technical
discussions and data exchanges. The Nehru-Ayub understanding of
March 1961 (see Chapter Five) established a dichotomy between 'facts'
and 'political' questions. Nehru told the Lok Sabha:
'I hope that after the next [technical] meeting...both
parties would be in possession of these facts. Then
the time will come...for ministers on both sides to
meet and discuss.' (30)
This formula provided India with a useful delaying tactic. Whenever
Pakistan called for political negotiations^ a meeting at ministerial
level, that is) India was able to parry the demand merely by saying
that insufficient data had been exchanged. This tactic enabled
India to ward off Pakistan's protests for a decade.
A similar but distinct use of science in the Ganges conflict is its
use to authenticate and substantiate choices, decisions and opinions.
Scattered throughout this thesis are occasions when an 'independent
group of experts' have been wielded to validate or verify. The
frequency with which this device is used leads one to muse whether
there might not be a steady state theory of experts: for each
independent expert an equal and opposite independent expert exists!
As we have seen in Chapter One, Two, Three and elsewhere, the
employment of expertise for legitimation sometimes involves a
simplification or misinterpretation of the expertise which amounts
to misuse. Thus, the venerable name of Sir Arthur Cotton is
deployed to support the contention that a barrage to divert water
into the Hooghly will reverse the deterioration of the lower Hooghly
(debate (ii)). In fact we find that Cotton's writings provide no
such support; Cotton wanted to build a barrage for other reasons
(see Chapter Two). The decision of a rather different sort of
expert, the partition line drawn by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, was, as
we saw in Chapter Five, also misinterpreted. Radcliffe did not
provide a detailed explanation of why he chose his line, but the
explanation he gave cannot be interpreted, as the Indian Government
have suggested, as uncomplicated support for a Farakka Barrage.
363
Examples of this tendency to misinterpret expertise in one's own
favour can be identified on both sides of many of the debates
associated with the Ganges conflict.
These, then, are two ways in which the inherent 'objectivity' of
science is used in a political debate: as a resource capable of
depoliticising or legitimating choices or beliefs. A third aspect
of the rationality of science can be identified in the fear or
belief, expressed at several occasions in this conflict, that
technical advisers may take a 'harder' line in negotiations. It
may be that the apparent objectivity of the procedures used by
experts imbues them with an 'overconfidence' not shared by more
'relativist' politicians.
For example, in Chapter Seven a close adviser of Mrs Gandhi is
quoted as suggesting that one explanation for the lack of progress
in the discussions during the early years of Bangladesh might be
that the techhical expert, B M Abbas, 'continued to treat it as a
technical question rather than political...' Kamal Hossein, the
former Bangladesh Foreign Minister, agrees that experts sometimes
take a harder line 'partly because technical people do attach
importance to things they think are technically important'. In
Chapter Nine, we saw that the fear of hardline advisers was bluntly
articulated to the US Embassy:
'Khan and Jagjivan met several times separately from
advisers...but were unable to reach [the] political
agreement which several Bangladeshis have hoped would
emerge from discussions not burdened by technical
personnel. The latter have been accused of splitting
cusecs so minutely as to be a hindrance to a solution.' (3^)
It is not possible to estimate to what extent this aspect of the
apparent objectivity of science may have impeded the negotiations
but it is a factor of which participants are conscious.
Having explored, briefly, these three ways in which the 'capacity
of science to authorise and certify facts' (32) has been utilised
in the Ganges conflict, I want now to turn to the notion of technical
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ambiguity and uncertainty.
In each of the four main technical debates of the Ganges conflict
there were uncertainties about the understanding of natural
processes or about the consequences of particular human interventions
in nature. In debate (ii), there was also a rather more profound
uncertainty, which I have referred to as a technical ambiguity:
there were two alternative theoretical models explaining a natural
process, and the data available apparently did not enable a
conclusive choice to be made between them.
These uncertainties and ambiguities both delayed the resolution of
the dispute and provided resources which the two sides could deploy
in argument. The resolution of the conflict was postponed because
uncertainties distorted the perceptions of both parties. In so
far as the dispute could be resolved by a negotiated and equitable
compromise, that compromise had to be founded in a clear mutual
perception of'both parties' interests; technical uncertainties and
ambiguity fogged that perception. At the same time the uncertainties
provided a resource which could be employed in the negotiations and
in public denunciations of the other party.
I wish to speculate that the utility of this resource, combined with
governmental power to control information flows, may have allowed
uncertainties to be prolonged beyond their 'natural' lives. The
examples which best illustrate this process of uncertainty
prolongation arise from the technical debates (ii) and (iii) as
defined above. Taking the more straightforward example first,
debate (iii) was over the seriousness of the downstream consequences
of the Farakka diversions. As we have seen in Part III of this
thesis, this debate was argued at length in the pamphlets both parties
produced before the 1976 UN presentations. India argued that the
consequences of the Ganges withdrawals were slight and insignificant.
Bangladesh, on the other hand presented evidence of serious damage.
In order to assess these conflicting claims recourse has been made,
in this thesis, to the World Bank-funded investigation of the
consequences known as Special Studies. Even this extensive and
365
detailed investigation did not succeed in dispelling uncertainty
entirely; it did, however, clarify several areas of dispute. But
Special Studies has not been widely distributed; quite the opposite.
In 1977 and 1978 and, as far as I know since, the Bangladesh
Government has striven to suppress the report. To my knowledge,
the Indian Government had not been shown the report by late 1978.
There may be several reasons for restricting the circulation of this
evidence, but two seem particularly likely: firstly, Special Studies
does not wholly substantiate Bangladesh's claims; it confirms some
damage but generally over a smaller area. Therefore, it casts doubt
upon aspects of the case Bangladesh presented to the UN. Bangladesh
may wish to suppress it for that reason: because it shows their
case in a critical light. Alternatively, the Bangladesh Government
may be delaying its circulation until a good opportunity arises for
its use. Perhaps it will be widely distributed if public
'internationalised' conflict recurs over the sharing of the water,
or if India attempts to renegotiate the 1977 Treaty. In either
case, Bangladesh is prolonging a technical uncertainty. Information
is available which could resolve some of the uncertainties in debate
(iii) but it is not in Bangladesh's interest to release that
information: it is within the government's power to suppress it.
The second example of uncertainty prolongation is rather more
speculative. It concerns technical debate (ii) and the technical
ambiguity present in that debate. We saw, in Chapter Three, that
there was in 1961 an ambiguity concerning the sedimentation
processes of the Hooghly. Pakistan's experts explained the
sedimentation as a salinity-related phenomenon, whilst experts
employed by India dismissed salinity as an insignificant variable.
We also saw in Chapter Three, that the Hydraulic Study Department
of Calcutta Port began investigation of related questions in 1962
or thereabouts. Presumably these investigations would have begun
to clarify or resolve the ambiguity over the next decade. Fourteen
years later, however, in 1976, the Bangladesh Government was still
able to deploy 'experts of repute' to question the 'very practicality
of the diversions' (33)- As far as Bangladesh was concerned, the
ambiguity remained. In this case it was in India's power, and
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apparently in India's interest to dispel that ambiguity, but that
has not been done. When India's Foreign Secretary replied to
Bangladesh's case in the Special Political Committee of the UN,
he did not refer to the investigations of the Hydraulic Study
Department but to the well-worn panoply of expert unanimity shored
up with pre-partition expertise from Sir Arthur Cotton onward .
The reports of the Hydraulic Study Department are, if anything, less
widely circulated than Bangladesh's Special Studies. Why India
should choose not to dispel the ambiguity concerning sedimentation
must remain something of a mystery. There is a general cloak of
confidentially covering most technical investigations of the
Hooghly and the Ganges. Does the data required to resolve the
ambiguity remain under this cloak by choice or by chance? If the
latter, we must presume that the Indian Government has some larger
purpose for the information. It is impossible to establish this
larger purpose without access to India's strategies. It can, however,
be plausibly speculated that data relevant to the sedimentation
process of the Hooghly may also be relevant to possible future
negotiations about the sharing of the Ganges. India may therefore
choose to retain control over that information to use it in future
negotiations, rather than use it to clarify the ambiguity.
This discussion is, as I have emphasised, speculative. It is
possible that India has submitted convincing data to Pakistan or
Bangladesh and that in 1976 Bangladesh chose to ignore it. These
speculations have, nevertheless, served to provide a second example
of uncertainty prolongation within an international context. There
are, I suggest, needs and interests in the dispute which hamper the
free flow of data required to clarify uncertainty and ambiguity.
There is a contradiction between the secrecy frequently considered
by diplomats to be desirable in the conduct of foreign policy, and
the openness, or free access to information, characteristic of most
scientific discussion. In any technical dispute, parties are likely
to suppress information harmful to their case. In a technical
dispute between governments the parties not only have the wish but
also unrivalled means to suppress information. In the Ganges conflict
these means have apparently been employed in the perpetuation of
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uncertainty.
Here, therefore, we have a characteristic which distinguishes
technical debates within the context of intergovernmental conflict
from technical debates between less weighty contenders. The means
to control information flows are available more in the former case
than in the later. This may allow a lengthening of the life of
technical uncertainty.
Another aspect of technical uncertainty and ambiguity should be
briefly mentioned. This is the tendency for 'scientifically-
certified' disagreement to give rise to myth. The best example of
this is the belief of Pakistan and Bangladesh participants that the
Farakka Barrage is the outcome of sinister Indian policy. This
'myth' arose because technical experts, Ippen and Wicker, had said
that the barrage would not assist navigation on the Hooghly (see
Chapter Three). The corollary of this weighty judgement was that
some other purpose for the barrage had to be . identified. Hostility
and a malign policy came to hand. This myth could be dismissed with
'common sense' but it persisted because it had the backing of
technical expertise.
Another example of this myth-generation process can be identified
in India's belief that the Farakka diversions could do little
damage to Bangladesh. Common sense might suggest that the diversion
of half the minimum flow of a river would significantly after the
ecology downstream of the diversion. This common sense view was
displaced by a 'myth' backed by technical expertise (Framji's report)
that there would be no injury.
Finally in this discussion of the interaction between politics and
expertise in the Ganges conflict, it may be helpful to return to
the six propositions about such interactions developed by Nelkin and
re-stated in the introduction to this thesis. How far does this case
study provide confirmation for these propositions?
Nelkin suggests that developers seek expertise to legitimize their
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plans and use their command of technical knowledge to justify their
autonomy. Many examples of the use of 'independent experts' have
been identified in this case, but it is less clear that national
governments have need to justify their autonomy. In a second
proposition Nelkin argues that whilst experts may clarify technical
constraints, they may also increase conflict. This surmise is
illustrated by the effect of the technical ambiguity defined by
Ippen and Wicker. This ambiguity served to reinforce the belief
of some Pakistani and Bangladeshi participants in the malign intent
of the Indian Government.
Ippen and Wicker, and Hensen come to mind when looking at Nelkin's
third proposition: the acceptance of technical advice depends less
on its validity and the competence of the expert, than on its
correspondence to existing positions. A fruitful line for future
enquiry might be the process by which India and Pakistan selected
their respective consultants. Did Pakistan consult Ippen and Wicker
on the basis -of their earlier work on salinity in estuaries? Was
Hensen employed by India because the Indian Government expected him
to confirm their choice of flood tide-caused sedimentation?
A clearer example of this third proposition is to be found in the
1905 debate, carried on in the Proceedings of the Institution of
Civil Engineers of London, between Vernon Harcourt and the two
officials of the Calcutta Port Commissioners. This debate is
described in Chapter One. We find that Petley and Palmer, the two
port officials, cast doubt both on Vernon Harcourt's methods and
his motives. Palmer said that Vernon Harcourt's paper was
'calculated to give shipowners a feeling of uneasiness', whilst
Petley said 'the mere study of annual charts...could be of little
real value'. Vernon Harcourt had, however, previously been employed
by the Commissioners as a consultant, and his method of comparing
patterns of sedimentation from year to year is used to this day.
Therefore, neither his competence nor the validity of his method
can be in doubt. Petley and Palmer were reacting to his conclusions,
to which the Commissioners were opposed. At that time, the
Commissioners did not want any suggestion of the Hooghly's
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deterioration to gain currency. They were therefore vociferous and
intemperate in criticising Vernon Harcourt. This brief confrontation
is an excellent example of the acceptance of advice depending on
the extent it reinforces existing opinion. Further illustration
of this proposition can be seen in Bangladesh's decision to
suppress the report of Chinese water experts (see Appendix D) and in
Bangladesh's failure to circulate Special Studies.
The fourth of Nelkin's propositions does not seem to apply in this
case. Nelkin suggested that those opposing a case need not muster
equal evidence. If the implication is that technical doubt may be
sufficient to have a development halted, then the evidence of the
Ganges conflict suggests otherwise. Nelkin writes:
'It is sufficient to raise questions which will undermine
the expertise of a developer whose power and legitimacy
rests on his monopoly of knowledge or claims of special
competence.' (35)
In the Ganges conflict, Pakistan's experts successfully undermined
the competence of India's, but the power and legitimacy of a national
government rests on more than just information control and
competence. Here we find another peculiarity of technical debate
in the context of intergovernmental dispute: there is no agreed
final arbiter to whom opponents of a development can appeal. There
are only the diffuse and weak powers of international 'public
opinion' and the severely constrained and generally indecisive
'judgements' of the United Nations. This is one reason why it was
helpful, but not 'sufficient', for Pakistan and Bangladesh to
undermine the expertise of the developer, India.
The fifth of Nelkin's propositions, that expert conflict reduces the
political impact of expertise is neither confirmed nor refuted by
this case study. There is, however, an illustration of the sixth,
that soft and hard experts play a similar role. We found in
Chapter Five that Sir Cyril Radcliffe's decision as an arbiter of
the boundary was deployed (erroneously) to legitimize the Farakka
Project. There can be few experts 'softer' than a lawyer.
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Two further propositions, suggested in another article by Nelkin
(36), are well illustrated by the Ganges conflict. Nelkin writes,
'a generalised mistrust of authority has compounded sensitivity to
the social and environmental impacts of technology'. In this case
we see that Bangladesh's mistrust of India enhanced its perception
of environmental damage (as was shown in Part III).
A more profound comment is contained in Nelkin's interpretation of
the politics of technical innovation as a 'dialectic between
efficiency and democratic ideology'. She attributes developers'
tendency to define decisions as technical to their concern for
efficiency. Part IV of this thesis showed the tendency writ large
in the negotiations over augmenting the Ganges. As developers,
India and Bangladesh promote their projects on pragmatic technical
grounds; as opponents both countries perceive the other's scheme
as political. Nelkin's comment is particularly opposite:
'As long' as the problem remains one of performing a
narrowly defined task there is no need to weigh
conflicting interests, but only the relative
effectiveness of various technical alternatives.
This situation is surely more comfortable and efficient
than the negotiation and compromise required in the
political arena.' (37)
This discussion of the interaction between politics and expertise
in the Ganges conflict suggests that there is a considerable area
of correspondence between technical debates carried on within the
context of intergovernmental dispute and the more common, lower
level technical debates subject to control by nation states. The
peculiarities of intergovernmental technical dispute seem to be
confined to the level of control which governments can exert. In
this sort of dispute there is no final arbiter, analogous to the
public inquiry, to which opponents of a development can appeal in,
for example,.Britain. Whilst smaller nations may be eclipsed in
power by multinational corporations, the nation state is, generally,
the most powerful institutional form on earth; few states have
significantly relinquished their autonomy or sovereignty to
international institutions. Thus, the importance of technical
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expertise may in this context be reduced. Doubt may be cast upon
a development, but without arbitration that doubt has only a
generalised rhetorical force. Governments, therefore, have greater
freedom of action than developers acting within the controlling
framework of a nation.
Governments can also exert greater control than most developers,
over the information at their disposal. This attribute may lead to
the perpetuation of technical ambiguities and uncertainties. The
exigencies of prosecuting a political dispute may prevail over the
requisites of technical debate, leaving technical questions
undetermined.
ENVOY
There are dangers in trying to generalise from the disparate
conclusions of this thesis. Many different fields have been entered
and different-analytical tools employed; the conclusions drawn are
of variable reliability, some based on pretty conclusive evidence,
some on reasonable inference and some are speculative. Accepting
that there are risks involved, it is perhaps incumbent upon a thesis-
writer to draft some policy guidelines however brief, flimsy or
tentative. These are mine:
o Major engineering projects embody profound political
assumptions and frequently initiate far-reaching
economic, political and ecological change. Many
studies before this have drawn that conclusion. But,
the mantle of 'science' confers upon technology and
expertise an aura of neutrality which is hard to
dispel. The conclusion bears repetition. Technology
needs to be assessed from a variety of political
perspectives.
o Whilst expertise carries an aura of neutrality, its
writ appears to be less strong in the international
arena than in the national. The absence of
authoritative international institutions, able to
impose their judgements on conflict, results in a
dilution of the utility of expertise as a means
of appealing against technological development.
Nonetheless, technology appears to provide an
equivocal language for political discourse between
nations; used in this dispute sometimes to mislead
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and delay, sometimes to defuse and thus advance
discussion. Those interested in technological
development and international conflict should be
sensitive to these different functions for which
expertise may be employed.
The analysis, in this thesis, of 'missed opportunities'
suggests that in the circumstances of the Indian
subcontinent 'windows' in intergovernmental relations
may be both brief and rare. It is, thus, in the
interest of the weaker party in the dispute to
recognise the existence of a window and to exploit it
fully and rapidly. The occurrence of a window appears,
not surprisingly, to be associated with governmental
change, that is, changes of ruling party or within
the ministerial ranks. No doubt other such 'cues'
could be identified by further investigation.
In a conversation with me, a Secretary of the Bangladesh
Government characterised the Ganges water sharing
conflict as 'an instrument for parties to remain in power'.
To the extent that the complex history of the dispute
can be distilled and oversimplified into a one-dimensional
explanation of what has happened, that blunt comment
is it. The Governments of India and Bangladesh are-
aware of the transformation of agricultural and
industrial productivity which could be brought about with
the aid of river development. Instead of developing
what could be, however, they squabble over the sharing
of what is. Expedient political choices triumph
over far-sighted ones. Only a change in the character
of South Asian governments will remedy this.
An exploration of the two governments' proposals for
augmenting the Ganges indicates that they are the
progeny of their historical and political parentage;
the marriage of conflict over water sharing with the
aspirations of governments fearful of threats to their
power and sovereignty, has produced children which
reflect those features. Are augmentation proposals
what is required? Should national interest be
transcended? The interest of the 300 million or
more poor people who inhabit the two basins will
be best served by coordinated, equitable and
comprehensive river development. Debate is required
to identify development proposals appropriate to
their needs rather than to the needs and perceptions
of the people now in power. That debate, however,
is unlikely to influence what happens unless it is
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control of the irrigation system will kill all
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hope of irrigation development in the Punjab.
Even the construction of the Bhakra Dam may be
affected.'
Mountbatten told Nehru that he would not be able to pass the
letter to Radcliffe, as Nehru had suggested, because to do so
would prejudice the Award (IOL record, L/P+J/10/117)•
(2^) Michel, op cit (4), p 193-
(25) This account is mostly based on Helmut Kulz's, 'Further water
disputes between India and Pakistan', International and
Comparative Law Qtly, vol 18, July 1969, pp 718-738.
(Kulz has provided a number of precedents of partition treaties
with clauses specifying joint control of common rivers.)
The story is also told in:
India, The Farakka Barrage Delhi, 1976;
Bangladesh, White Paper on the Ganges water dispute, Dacca, 1976;
Pakistan, India's Farakka Barrage and its consequences
for East Pakistan, 1970;
Bu.rke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, OUP, 1973; and in
Razvi, op cit (8).
(26) Bangladesh, White Paper, p 12.
(27) Lok Sabha Debates, 25/8/59, 'Indo-Pakistan talks on the
Gangetic Basin' S2, 33, Col ^32^-.
(28) See Appendix B which contains a summary of the data supplied
by India.
(29) The Hindu, 6/8/60, 'Talks on Eastern rivers' (Rawalpindi
dateline).
(30) Lok Sabha Debates, A-/9/59, 'Talks between President of
Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India', S2, j/+, Col 6^25.
Kuldip Nayar, Distant Neighbours, Vikas, Delhi, 1975, p 70.
(31) Lok Sabha Debates, 16/8/61, 'International situation', S2, 56,
Cols 2^05-2560.
See also The Hindu, 19/3/61, 'Nehru-Ayub talks on Kashmir'.
Ayub Khan's Friends not masters, OUP, London, 1967, does not
mention the March 1961 meeting. Khan refers to three meetings
with Nehru: May i960, London at the Commonwealth Prime
Minister's Conference, September 1st i960 at Delhi Airport,
and September 19-23 1960 in Karachi for the signing of the
Indus Treaty. However, they also met in March 1961 at the
next Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London. It
was at this meeting that the discussion of Farakka took place.
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(32) My interview with Dayal, 28/9/78.
(33) Ibid.
(3^) Nayar, op cit (30), p 75- Nayar does not give a date or source
for this information.
(33) Dayal, op cit (32).
(36) Debates, op cit (31).
Chapter 6: THE INDIAN POSITION AND THE PAKISTAN RESPONSE
(1) Lok Sabha Debates, 6/^/61, 'Indo-Pak talks on East-West
Bengal rivers', S2, 53, Col 9581.
Spokesman was Sadath Ali Khan, Parliamentary Sec'y, Ministry
of External Affairs. This occurred three weeks before the
third round of technical talks.
(2) Lok Sabha Debates, 19/8/61, 'The Farakka Barrage', S2, 56,
Col 3201.
(3) Ibid.
(k) Lok Sabha Debates, 30/11/61, 'Statement regarding delay in the
execution of the Farakka Barrage', S2, 59, Col 39^-
(5) Lok Sabha Debates, 21/8/61, 'Pakistani claim on water from
Ganges', S2, 57, Col 35^5.
(6) ' Lok Sabha Debates, 22/7/68, 'Farakka Barrage', S4, 1_8, Col 203«
(7) Lok Sabha Debates, 26/7/68, 'Visit of Pakistani experts to
Farakka Barrage site', S^f, _l8, Col 2080.
(8) Lok Sabha Debates, 17/12/69, 'Farakka Barrage talks', S^+, 35,
Col 299-
(9) Letter dated 6/7/61, quoted in Kulz, 'Further water disputes
between India and Pakistan', Intl and Comparative Law Qtly, 18,
July 1969, pp 718-38.
(10) Kulz, op cit;
Dawn, 3/5/61, 'Ayub's proposal on Eastern rivers';
Dawn, 23/5/61, 'Ayub replies to Nehru's letter';
Hindu, 3/6/61, 'Nehru rejects Ayub Khan's suggestion*.
(11) Dawn, 12/7/61, 'Pakistan proposal cold shouldered', (Dacca
dateline). It is not clear when the proposal was made. The
article may be referring to the talks held in Dacca in October
1960.
(12) Lok Sabha Debates, 20/11/68, 'Ministerial level talks on
Farakka Barrage', S^f, 21, Col 71.
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(13) See, for example, one document presented by Pakistan, 'Format
for information requested by the Indian delegation to assess
the effects of any projects on river conditions in East
Pakistan', Annex III, Water Investigation Divsion, EPWAPDA,
May 1961.




(14) The Ganges-Kobadak Project is a canal irrigation project
drawing water from the Ganges at Bheramara, near Kushtia.
The project planning was started under the UN Technical
Assistance Programme in 1951, and the Pakistan Government
gave their approval in 1954. The project has been dogged
both by technical difficulties and by its inappropriateness
to the fragmented land-holdings of Bangladesh and irrigation
did not start until the late sixties. However, unlike some
other projects which seem to have been hurried through in
order to establish Pakistan's rights to historic usage of
the water, the G-K project was sanctioned prior to the approval
of the Farakka Barrage. Its construction was started first,
and it started consuming water before the Farakka diversions.
(15) Interview with Arshad Hossein, Lahore, 14/9/78. Arshad Hossein
was Pakistan's High Commissioner to India 1963-68, then
Foreign Minister 1968-69.
'My first idea was to tell the delegate to bring
about a deadlock and break off negotiations, so
we would have an excuse to point out to the great
powers what had happened, so that they would pressure
India or help us to take the matter to the UN. On
the very last day - I could not take that decision
myself - I rang the President and I was told that
next day a new president was taking over.'
(16) Ibid. See S M Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, OUP, London
1973, P 382, for details of the UN speeches.
(17) Dawn, 16/7/68, 'India rejects Kosygin's suggestion on Farakka'.
(18) Only on three occasions has India accepted any course other
than bilaterial negotiation for the settlement of disputes.
The UN mediated in the Kashmir dispute in 1949 But reached
an impasse. The World Bank provided conciliation and mediation
for the Indus dispute, and some border disputes were settled
by an Arbitral Tribunal in 1948.
(19) Arshad Hossein, interview.
(20) Lok Sabha Debates, 31/3/69, 'Construction of barrage across
River Padma by Pakistan', S4, 26, Col 46.
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(21) Dawn, 11, 15 and 21/6/69,. 'The truth about Ganges waters'.
(22) Arshad Hossein told me:
'Purely as a tactical measure our experts were
considering [building the Ganges Barrage]. If
they do cut off the water, we will build a
barrage at Hardinge Bridge which will submerge
their project. We didn't officially tell them,
we threatened it privately and it caused much
concern in India. We initiated a technical study
because we knew that the information would reach
them eventually. And we could tell India, if
you are the upper riparian and you can do whatever
you like in your territory, then we, as the lower
riparian, can do what we like in ours.'
Two other participants interviewed in Lahore and Islamabad
confirmed this view of events. The technical studies referred
to were carried out by Tibbet, Abbot, McCarthy, Scratton of
USA and Assoc Cons Eng of Karachi.
(23) Bangladesh, White Paper, 1976, and other sources.
(2*0 Interviews with two participants from the Pakistan side
suggest that, during informal discussions, there was agreement
on quantity of water to be diverted at Farakka. There is
also a suggestion that Pakistan may have used or held in
reserve a bargaining 'counter': India would be allowed to
use the river channels of East Pakistan for the passage of
inland water transport linking Assam to West Bengal, in
return for a larger share of water going to Pakistan. Inland
water transport across East Pakistan had ceased in 1965-
(25) Water Investigation Directorate, EPWAPDA, Dacca. Also see
Dawn, 2/6/71, 'East wings water needs for Eastern Rivers
established', in which an aide-memoire sent to India is
published.
(26) Harvard University, Center for Population Studies, Bangladesh:
land, water and power studies. Final Report, Harvard, June
1972,fl.
(27) See E B Skolnikoff, S cience, technology and American foreign
policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 196?, pp 156-7-
(28) Interview with Professor Peter Rogers of Harvard University,
Delhi, 1978.
(29) Revelle and Lakshminarayana, 'The Ganges water machine',
Science, 9/5/75, pp 611-6.
"(30) My interview, Delhi, 1978.
(31) My interview, Delhi 28/9/78.
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(32) India. Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents,
'Awami League Manifesto', p 81, undated, New Delhi.
(33) Kulz details this incident in op cit (9)5 p 735-
(3^) A more specific, and better-documented, assertion has been
made by a former Bangladesh diplomat, S A Karim who has
written:
'In the early years [the Ganges conflict] was
never handled with the same sense of urgency or
import, as was the case with the Indus Waters
dispute, presumably because the question concerned
an area which did not carry much weight with decision¬
makers in Pakistan in those days. If one looks at
the chronology of the dispute, one cannot but be struck
by the fact that the issue was raised fitfully from
time to time to suit the political conveniences of
Pakistan Government at that time. During periods
when the sense of national integration was strong and
there was no need to revive the issue as a reminder
of Indian danger, the issue remained dormant. To
illustrate: in 19&31 Pakistan proposed to India the
holding of a meeting on Farakka issue. India did
not reply and for two years Pakistan did not even
send- a routine reminder. The reminder was sent in
May 1965 and India conveyed its agreement in August
1963 to hold a meeting. However, war between India
and Pakistan broke out in September that year and
the meeting was eventually held in March 1969-'
Internationalisation of the Ganges Waters issue...,
mimeo submitted to the Bangladesh Foreign Office,
June 1976, p 28.
Karim makes a sound point that the Pakistan Government pursued
the negotiations only fitfully. This dilatory policy cannot,
however, be seen as the primary cause of delay. From time to
time the Pakistan Government pursued.the negotiations with
vigour and its overall strategy appears strong, but neither
vigour nor strength influenced the Indian Government's
determination to complete the Farakka Barrage.
(35) My interview, Delhi, 26/9/78.
(36) My interview, Delhi, 28/9/78-
(37) My interview, Lahore, 1^/9/78.
(38) S A Karim, in his Internationalisation of the Ganges Waters
issue... , op cit (3*+) , comments as follows:
'In the Indus River settlement, India did not allow
its political differences with Pakistan on Kashmir
and on other issues to stand in the way of a
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settlement which was financially beneficial to the
two countries.' (p 30)
(39) A further factor may have been India's belief that the Farakka
diversions would not damage East Pakistan. Framji had
mistakenly advised the Indian Government that there would be
no ill-effects. The Indian Government may therefore have
believed that there was no conflict of interest. Such a
belief may partially explain, but cannot justify, a policy
of procrastination.
Chapter 7- THE SHEIK AND MRS GANDHI
(1) India. Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents,
'Awami League Manifesto', p 81, undated, New Delhi.
(2) B N Kureel, the Indian Government's Deputy Minister of
Irrigation and Power, in a written answer in the Lok Sabha
21/3/78. Lok Sabha Debates, XI, No 8, Col 86.
(3) The Hindu, 'Joint Indo-Bangla steps for flood control mooted',
23/1/72. Subsequent articles in 2^/1/72 and 29/1/72.
(4) Joint Statement on the talks between the prime ministers on
8/2/72 in Satish Kumar (Ed), Documents on India's Foreign
Policy 1972, Macmillan, Delhi, 1973•
(5) Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Peace between the
People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of India,
19/3/72, Article 6.
(6) Kumar, 1975i op cit C+), 'Joint Declaration on the Treaty of
Friendship...'
(7) The full text of the Statute is given in Appendix A.
(8) A senior Bangladesh civil servant who was present at the
signing of the Statute has confirmed, in an interview with
myself, that 'the Agreement encompassed, implicitly, the
right to deliberate on all rivers, including Farakka.' A
Bangladesh diplomat also told me, in an interview in Dacca in
1978, that the dispute was referred to the JRC in 1972.
(9) The Hindu, 1/5/72, 'Farakka: Bangla doubts cleared'.
Hindustan Times, 5/5/72, 'Eastern Horizons'.
Keesings Contemporary Archives, April 9-15 1972, p 25822, 'Indo-
Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission'.
(10) Press Note of 26/6/72 in Kumar, op cit (*f).
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(11) Hindustan Times, 5/6/72, 'A solid basis for hope'. Moulana
Bhashani, who died in 1978," was a populist, peasant leader;,
he founded the National Awami Party, and was a sometime
mentor of Sheik Mujibur Rahman and a longtime nationalist.
He had been held under house arrest in India during the
1971 struggle.
(12) Times of India, 2/8/72 and 15/8/72, 'Farakka will not hit
Bangla's interests: Dr Rao', and 'Bengal Chief Minister happy'.
(13) My interview in Oxford on 3/1/79 with Dr Kamal Hossein,
former Foreign Minister and Minister of Law in the Bangladesh
Government.
(14) M Maasland, Water development potentials of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basins, World Bank, Special Projects
Department, Washington, August 30 1972 (with revisions
February 12 1973)» P 1•
(15) Ibid, p 20.
(16) The 'Preliminary Draft' is dated July 25 1972, and entitled
Overall water resources potential of the lower Ganges
Brahmaputra Basin.
(17) Press release, 13/12/72 in Kumar, 1975? op cit (k).
(18) Taking the issues in order:
'Major river basins' could apply to the Brahmaputra, the Ganges
or, stretching the 'major', somewhat, to the Teesta. The
scarcity of dry season water is much less on the Brahmaputra.
The likelihood is that the press release is referring to the
Ganges, primarily.
'Development works of mutual interest' in the stretch of the
Ganges referred to, could be (i) the Farakka Barrage, (ii)
the Ganges-Kobadak project, or (iii) the proposed Ganges
Barrage.
'Basic data on works executed' might imply an exchange of
data on Farakka, the Ganges-Kobadak Project, or others.
(19) Times of India, 13/7/73 and 1V7/73-
(20) Times of India, 19/7/73) 'Farakka decision left to PMs'.
Also India News, 28/7/73-
(21) Hindustan Times, 18/7/73, 'Farakka issue left to PMs'.
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(22) Press release of 18/7/73 in S Kumar (ed), Documents on India's
Foreign Policy 19731 Macmillan, Delhi, 197^ See also Lok
Sabha Debates, XXXIX, 31/7/73, Col 127.
A cable sent from the US Embassy in Delhi to the American
Secretary of State, after this meeting, commented:
'Apparent failure of two sides to reach agreement is
being interpreted to mean decision on division of
Ganges waters.will be worked out only between two
countries' prime ministers. Knowledgeable MEA
official recently told emboff final decision would
have to be made at "highest level". Comment: The
GOI wanted to handle Farakka in the context of
broader talks on joint Indo-Bangladesh development
of water resources which would have permitted some
trade-offs. Bangladesh, however, has pushed for
the separate negotiation on Farakka. It is a
difficult issue to resolve in isolation, given the
importance Bangladesh attaches to the question and
the unlikelihood Bangladesh will settle for anything
less than Pakistan demanded in the past. Officials
with whom we have talked are not happy about this
confrontation which forces India to compromise
either in favour of Calcutta...or Bangladesh.'
Cable, New De 08*f26, July 1973i released in November
1979 to me as a result of a request made under the
US Freedom of Information Act.
(23) Times of India, 9/l/7*+5 'Indo-Bangladesh talks begin today'.
(2*0 Foreign Affairs Record, January 197*+, 'Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Press Statement', 12/1/7*+-
(25) Foreign Affairs Record, Feb "7*+» XX, p 3*+i 'Indo-Bangladesh
Joint Communique' of 15/2/7*+-
Lok Sabha Debates, 1*+/3/7*+, XXXVI, No 17, Col 65,
(26) Times of India, 21/2/7*+, 'Indo-Bangladesh Water Studies'.
(27) The Hindu, 23/3/7*+) ' Indo-Bangla stand on Farakka' (by
K Krishna Moorthy from Dacca). This intriguing article also
notes that Swaran Singh had said in Dacca in February that
friendship meant 'sharing the shortages equitably', that
the Farakka Barrage had been kept 'outside purview' of the
JRC and that the influence of hardliners, like B M Abbas,
was waning.
(28) These details emerge in K L Rao's autobiography, Cusecs
Candidate: Memoirs of an Engineer, Metropolitan, Delhi, 1978,
Chap 8.
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(29) Foreign Affairs Record, May 197*+: 'Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Declaration1 of 16/5/7*+» p 1551 also The Hindu, 17/5/7'+1
'India, Bangladesh sign, political, economic pacts'.
(30) Interview with me in Dacca in July 1978.
The report certainly exists; it is entitled Ganges River
Special Studies and was submitted to the Prime Minister in
November 197^+ - It is still highly confidential, partly
because it includes, apparently, the results of 'extra¬
territorial activities'.
(31) Interview with me in Delhi, 26/9/78.
(32) India. Lok Sabha Debates, 25/7/7*+: 'Accord between India and
Bangladesh on Farakka and enclaves', XLI, No k, col 52.
(33) India. Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents,
p 81. No ' grave and permanent damage' had been inflicted at
this stage - no Ganges diversions could have occurred because
the feeder canal connecting the Ganges to the Bhagirathi was
incomplete.
(3*0 Interview with me 3/1/79• Dr Kamal Hossein was asked why
there was so little progress in a period of improved relations.
The second part of his answer to the question was that a
concrete step was taken but elaborate political and technical
negotiations were required, 'we recognised it was an arduous
task, but we were on the track to move step by step to a
settlement'.
Kamal Hossein pointed out that Bangladesh started with nothing.
It was in the position, unusual even for a new government,
of having few of the political and physical attributes of
an independent state. On the side of foreign affairs, there
were few embassies and, for the first two and a half years,
international recognition was denied. It had an unprecedented
task of rehabilitating ten million refugees and providing
relief for a nation left in the grip of famine and the
devastation of war.
(35) Interview with me in Dacca, 3/7/78. Abdul Malek Ukil also
says, 'Farakka was not completed, so the question does not
arise. Only apprehension was there, the real problem cropped
up in 197*+—75 -1
(36) My interview with Bangladesh official, Dacca, 1978.
(37) Interview with me, Delhi, 2/9/78.
(38) Interview, op cit (3*+).
(39) Interview with me in Dacca, 10/7/78. Enayatullah Khan's
evidence is suspect because he was not a participant in the
negotiations.
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(4o) The Bangladesh Water Development Board is a semi-autonomous
agency under the direction of the Ministry of Power, Water
Resources and Flood Control.
(*+1) Interview op cit (39).
(42) In a despatch for the BBC on August 18 1972, (telex copy in
BBC's New Delhi office) Michael Charlton states that the
two prime ministers decided, at their meeting in March 1972,
to set aside the Farakka issue for decision at heads of
state level. The Joint Declaration issued after that meeting
does not mention the sharing of the Ganges. Foreign Affairs
Record, March 1972, pp 60-9«
If Charlton is, nevertheless, correct, what exactly was set
aside? Was the JRC detailed to establish the areas of
technical agreement and political disagreement? The evidence
is not clear, but it does suggest that if the JRC was asked
to look at the issue it was soon afterwards diverted onto
less significant discussions.
(43) Bangladesh, White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, Dacca,
September 1976, p 14.
(44) Interview op cit (34).
(45) Ibid.
S A- Karim who, in 1974, was a senior official in the Bangladesh
Foreign Office has written as follows:
'After liberation also, no sense of urgency was
displayed in finding a solution to the dispute.'
Internationalisation of the Ganges Waters issue...,
mimeo submitted to the Bangladesh Government, June
1976.
(46) This is what Moshtaque told Professor Talukder Maniruzzaman
of Dacca University in early 1976 - interview of
Maniruzzaman by myself in 1979; see also forthcoming book
by Maniruzzaman.
(47) Op cit (39).
(48) The coup a'etat is described and Khondakar Moshtaque Ahmed's
prior knowledge established in L Lifschultz, Bangladesh: the
unfinished revolution. Zed, London, 1979-
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Chapter 8: ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE
(1) Lok Sabha Debates, 2^/3/75, S5, L, 25, Col 61.
(2) The Hindu, 2'+/3/75, 'Farakka Barrage to be commissioned soon'.
This report was repudiated in a press note issued the following
day.
Holiday, 21/2/75, 'Farakka offers a foretaste', reported that
the barrage was being operated with noticeable effects in
Bangladesh.
Business Standard, 20/^/75, 'Serious threat to Farakka Barrage',
noted that the ponding of the reservoir behind the barrage had
been kept at a high level from the first week of April, in
readiness for an agreement.
(3) The Hindu, 17/V75, 'Short term solut ion to Ganga waters
problem'. Business Standard, 17/V75, 'Ministerial talks on
Farakka'.
(4) Bangladesh Observer, 19/V75, 'Bangladesh will get M+,000
cusecs in lean period'. See also The Hindu, 19/V75, 'Indo-
Bangladesh "short term" accord on Ganga waters'.
The Government of India usually publishes the texts of treaties
and agreements in the official Foreign Affairs Record; this
one was not. The text of the press release issued after the
meeting is the only statement of the 'understanding' to have
been published. It is reproduced here in Appendix A.
(5) M Franda, 'Indo-Bangladesh relations', American Universities
Fieldstaff Beports, South Asia Series, XIX, 16, September 1975,
p 10.
In a pamphlet issued for the opening ceremony the Indian Minister
of Shipping and Transport was rather guarded in his enthusiasm:
'We welcome the recent agreement...as a good initial
step in the right direction, though until a much larger
quantity of water reaches the Hooghly system, the basic
problem of Calcutta Port and the legitimate objective
of the Farakka Barrage are unlikely to be fulfilled.'
India, Souvenir: Farakka Barrage Project, 21/5/75-
(6) Bangladesh, White paper on the Ganges water dispute, Dacca,
1976, p 16.
(7) This discussion is described in detail in the Bangladesh White
Paper, op cit (6), pp 1^-16.
(8) My interviews with Indian and Bangladeshi members of the teams.
tfOI
(9) Subsequently a spokesman for the Calcutta Port Commissioners
said the surveys showed that Bangladesh would not be adversely
affected by the Farakka diversions (Statesman, 12/3/76) and
alleged that Bangladesh had refused to provide comparative data
(Hindustan Standard, 17/8/76).
(10) Much has been written about this period, and some of the best-
informed writing has appeared in the Far Eastern Economic
Review. See L Lifschultz, 'Bangladesh: a state of seige',
30/11/7^ and 'Sheik Mujib pays the ultimate price', 29/8/75;
also, a correspondent's 'The agony"of independence', 16/8/7^.
In the Asian Survey, T Maniruzzaman has written a number of
useful summary articles:
'Bangladesh in 197^: economic crisis and political polarisation',
XV, 2, February 1975;
'Bangladesh in 1975: the fall of the Mujib regime and its
aftermath', XVI, 2, February 1976.
'Bangladesh in 1976: the struggle for survival as an
Independent State', XVII, 2, February 1977-
The story of the coup d'etat and of the Ziaur Rahman government's
choice of the Capitalist road is told in L Lifschultz,
Bangladesh: the unfinished revolution, Zed, London, 1979-
(11) In a statement printed in The Hindu, 19/2/76, 'Ganga waters:
India refutes Bangla claim', an Indian Ministry of External
Affairs spokesman wrote:
'It is no secret from anyone that the Farakka
Barrage has been operating at near or optimum
capacity ^+0,000 cusecs since June 1975- '
(12) The statement indicated only that the Indian Government was
anxious about Bangladesh's treatment of Hindus in Bangladesh
and that Bangladesh had complained of guerrilla attacks from
India. Foreign Affairs Record, December 19751 'Indo-Bangladesh
Joint Statement' of December 8 19751 PP 3"I9_33-
(13) Keesings Contemporary Archives, 15/10/76, 'Bangladesh: the
Farakka dispute'. In an interview with myself, a member of
the Bangladesh observer team stationed at Farakka has claimed
that a protest was sent by that team on June 1st 19751 that
is at the end of the forty day understanding. The protest
apparently said that India had no right to continue withdrawals
after the end of May 1975- It seems that the note was not
ratified by the Bangladesh Government.
(11f) Foreign Affairs Record, January 1976, 'Official statment on
anti-Indian propaganda in the Bangladesh press', 30/1/76, p 1.
(15) Chief Martial Law Administrator Ziaur Rahman reportedly told a
Swedish newspaper that the Indians 'have sent several thousand
men across the border in the North. They are Bangladesh
citizens but are equipped and supported by the Indian Army'.
b02
Dawn, k/k/76, 'Indo-Bangladesh cold war'.
See also Far Eastern Economic Review, 13/2/76, 'Bangladesh;
trouble along the border!, and M Franda's 'Indo-Bangladesh
relations' in op cit (3)•
In an interview with me Mrs Gandhi has denied giving support
to these guerrillas but a Ministry of External Affairs official
has confirmed (also in an interview with myself) that at
least sanctuary was provided. The following year Prime Minister
Desai reportedly agreed to 'see that no shelter was given to
criminal elements from across the border, whatever might have
taken place under the previous regime', The Hindu, 11/6/77,
'Zia Happy over talks'.
(16) A telegram sent from Calcutta Consul Korn to the Embassy in
Delhi, and sent on to the Secretary of State, says:
'We have noticed few public comments by Indian press
or officials showing awareness that operations of
Farakka may be causing problems for Bangladesh...
Bangladesh Government apparently wants to publicise
the dispute. Bangladesh Deputy High Commission in
Calcutta issued press release on February 13 on
Abbas "interview" reported in Dacca 782. It has not
been"reported by any Calcutta paper. No doubt
indicating that authorities here do not want
Bangladesh Government's concern over Farakka offtake
discussed in the papers at this time.'
Telegram from Calcutta ^13, dated 17/2/76, repeated
in telegram from Delhi 2V?3 (copy obtained using
Freedom of Information Act).
(17) The Hindu, 19/2/76, 'India deprecates Bangla attitude on
Ganga talks', and 'Ganga waters: India rejects Bangla claim'.
Bangladesh Observer, 15/3/76, 'Talks meaningless unless India
stops withdrawal of water unilaterally' .
(18) Xinhua News Agency, 16/3/76, 'Indian precondition for talks on
Ganges waters rejected'. See also, The Hindu, 26/3/76, 'Delhi
gets Bangla's reply to call for talks'.
(19) G K Reddy, a generally reliable Indian journalist, described
this suggestion as follows:
'One of the fantastic suggestions being canvassed by
the hardliners in Dacca is for the creation of two
international commissions [for the Ganges and
Brahmaputra ] '.
The Hindu, 19/3/76, 'Bangla raises new extraneous
issues for talks on Farakka'.
^03
Admiral M H Khan told a press conference on March 22 that
Bangladesh had abandoned its demand for the cessation of
Ganges withdrawals as a precondition for talks. Telegram
from US Embassy Dacca to Washington, Dacca 1462, March 1976.
(20) The Hindu, 30/3/76, 'PM stresses Indo-Bangla amity in talks
with envoy'. The concession had previously been reported
in The Hindu, 28/3/76, 'Gesture to Bangla: India to reduce
withdrawal of Ganga water at Farakka'.
The statement is ambiguous: at what point would India decide
that there was insufficient water and Bangladesh should get
less than the March 15 level? A telegram from the US Embassy
in Delhi to Washington noted the Indian 'refusal to publicize
the extent to which it has reduced its offtake of Farakka
waters...'
Telegram, New Delhi 47591 March 1976.
Figure 8.1, later in this chapter, suggests one interpretation
of the statement, one which indicates the concession was not
generous.
(21) Foreign Affairs Record, April 1976, 'Official statement on Indo-
BD talks on Ganga waters' of 26/4/76.
(22) Foreign- Affairs Record, April 1976.
(23) Bangladesh Observer, 12/5/76, 'Indian figures do not tally with
actual observations'.
(24) Dawn, 20/4/76, 'Bhashani plans peaceful march on Farakka.'
Bangladesh Observer, 19/4/76, 'Bhashani plans silent march to
Farakka.'
According to the weekly paper published by Bhashani, the march
was first announced at a prayer meeting on April 18th, when
Bhashani said, 'If the people of the 635000 villages of
Bangladesh can remain united and fight for the cause, we will
be able to win support from the people of the whole world. We
can also expect justice from the 60 crore people in India. '
Haq Katha, 24/10/76, 'Basic Documents on Farakka Long March.'
This article is part of a 'Special international supplement on
Farakka', and contains some of the correspondence between
Mrs Gandhi and Moulana Bhashani at this time.
(25) Dawn, 17/5/76, '5 lakh people start trek to Indian border.'
New York Times, 17/5- Financial Times, 17/5- Le Monde, 20/5-
(26) Foreign Affairs Record, May 1976, 'Official statement on anti-
Indian Propaganda over Farakka'.
Far Eastern Economic Review, 28/5/76, 'Bhashani's march for
survival'.
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At one stage the march was to end at Farakka: Holiday, 16/5/76,
'Momentous people's march'.
(27) Bangladesh Observer, 19/5/76, 'Help excavate Gorai River'.
(28) Bangladesh Observer, 19/6/76, 'Stress on year round water
allocation'.
Keesings, 15/10/76, op cit C13)-
The Hindu, 6/9/76, said this was a reciprocal visit for.Abdus
Sattar's of December '75-
(29) Foreign Affairs Record, September 1976, 'Official Statements...'
of September k and 10.
The Hindu, 5/9/76, 'Delhi talks on Farakka fail'.
Statesman Weekly, 18/9/76, 'Delhi talks on Farakka fail'.
Bangladesh Observer, 12/9/76, 'Absurd Indian ideas thwart
Farakka issue'.
Holiday, 12/9/76, 'We want solution: Admiral Khan'.
(30) My interviews with Bangladesh diplomats, New York, May 1979-
After Khan's discussions in Delhi, the US Embassies in Dacca and
Delhi both sent telegrams to Washington giving their accredited
government's version of what transpired. These telegrams
apparently contain sensitive information: both were heavily
censored before being released to me.
The meeting between Khan and Gandhi was described a year later
in The Hindu, 25/9/77, 'Summit on Farakka possible'.
(31) Xinhua News Agency, op cit (18).
Financial Times, 5/3/76, 'Bangladesh seeks help in River Ganges
dispute'.
The Hindu, 28/2/76, 'Farakka: Bangladesh sticks to stand'.
(32) These nine courses of action are examined in a paper submitted
by Syed Anwarul Karim, formerly a senior official of the
Bangladesh Foreign Office, now seconded to the United Nations,
to his government in June 1976: Internationalisation of the
Ganges Waters issue with special reference to the United
Nations.
(33) Ibid, p 39.
Interestingly, a legal memorandum prepared by the US Department
of State also recommended the involvement of the World Bank
in an Indus-style approach to resolution of the dispute:
'Because both sides have an interest in settling the
issue peacefully, and India badly wants to keep it
out of the United Nations General Assembly, it would
be worthwhile to float the idea of establishing a
Ganges River Commission, constituted in a similar
fashion to that of the Indus Commission (one
technical expert from India, one from Bangladesh,
and one from the World Bank). Such an approach could
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be sold as essentially "bilateral" in nature (ie,
not involving any other states) and India might be
willing to participate in such a venture on the
condition that Bangladesh agrees to withdraw or not
to press the issue in the General Assembly this
session. The commission would be charged first with
resolving the immediate and short-term problem of the
oncoming dry season, and perhaps subsequently with
developing a long-term overall agreement between the
two countries on the uses of the waters of the entire
basin. However, the probability of the parties
agreeing to such an idea may be greater if the
commission's initial mandate is limited to fact-finding
and the development of technical recommendations to
allay Bangladesh's fear of shortages during the dry
season.
'This suggests that we consider exploring further the
possibilities of participation by the World Bank in
such a tripartite technical commission with Mr McNamara
in the very near future, and if he is receptive, to
propose the venture to India and Bangladesh through
the offices of an appropriate neutral third party.'
US £jtate Department Memorandum from L/NEA-Bill Rhodes,
Legal aspects of India-Bangladesh dispute over Farakka
Barrage, Washington, 2^/9/76, released to me in
response to a Freedom of Information Act request.
(3^+) India. Ministry of External Affairs, The Farakka Barrage,
several editions, undated, New Delhi (probably first
published late September 1976).
Bangladesh, White Paper on the Ganges water dispute, several
editions Dacca, September 1976, a summary of this pamphlet was
also published as Deadlock on the Ganges, Bangladesh Water
Development Board, September 1976, Dacca.
(35) UN Document (Summary Record), A/BUR/31/SR.1, pp 7-10 and 13-1^,
records this discussion. See also, The Hindu, 21/10/76, 'UN
panel postpones Farakka decision'.
A report, Review and assesment of progress in raising the
Farakka question at the UN, written by the Bangladesh Mission
to the UN noted:
'The formal inscription of the item and its allocation
to a broad-based Political Committee constituted a
significant victory for Bangladesh...However, in
analysing the implications of this achievement a
clear-cut distinction must be made at the outset between
what constitutes an essentially procedural outcome
and the substantive issue of deliberating the merits
of the Farakka dispute...'
Typescript, undated.
koG
(36) Foreign Affairs Record, November 1976, 'Foreign Secretary's
statement on Farakka issue', pp 321-8.
Bangladesh Mission to the UN Press Release, 'Statement by the
Chairman of the Bangladesh delegation...' 15/11/76, New York.
UN, Report of Special Political Committee, 29/11/76,
A/31/359, pp 66-8.
The consensus statement is reproduced in Appendix B.
(37) My interviews with a Bangladesh diplomat, New York, May 1979-
(38) This account is based on my interviews with Bangladesh diplomats
in New York and with a delegate to the Special Political
Committee who was present when the item was raised.
(39) The delegate to the Special Political Committee who I
interviewed concurred with this view. Interview, New York,
May 1979.
(ko) See statement reproduced in Appendix B.
C+1) My interview with civil servant, Delhi, August 1978.
C+2) My interview with Hossein, Oxford, 3/1/79•
C+3) Ibid. •
(kk) Rear Admiral Khan was apparently under a similar impression
that the agreement constituted a precedent. He suggested to
a Japanese economic delegation on 18/3/76 that India had
broken a 'gentleman's agreement' which was assumed to exist
following the forty day period. This is recorded in a
telegram from the US Embassy in Dacca to the US Government,
Dacca l'+22, March 1976.
S A Karim in his Internationalisation of the Ganges Waters
issue... op cit (32) notes:'Even after the barrage had been
completed the agreement that we signed was for a limited
period, with no provision made for our needs after the expiry
of the period', p 29-
(^5) 'In our view meaningful talks...can take place only after
experts of the two sides have been able to study and evaluate
all the relevant data.' op cit (21).
'It is acknowledged that existing reasonable use of water
by a riparian state should be taken into account when another
co-riparian state decides to utilise its own entitled share
of the water...But it is not necessary that a particular
use should be subject to prior consent by the other
co-riparians.' Permanent Mission of India to the UN, India
News, 'Statement by...Foreign Secretary, Government of India,
in the Special Political Committee...', 16/11/76, p 3-
^-07
06) 'Many experts of repute have questioned the very practicality
of the diversions for the purpose of removing silt. The need
for improving the navigability of the Hooghly could be met
in other ways...' Bangladesh Mission to the UN, Press Release,
'Statement by the Chairman of the Bangladesh delegation in the
Special Political Committee...', 15/11/76.
07) My interview with Indian Ministry of External Affairs official,
August 1978, Delhi.
(A-8) My interview with Khan in Dacca, 10/7/78, when he was Minister
for Petrol and Natural Gas.
(^9) My interview in Dacca, October 1978.
(50) A telegram from the US Embassy in Delhi to the US Government
commented:
'There are two possible reasons for the [Indian
Government's] refusal to publicise the extent to which
it has reduced its offtake of Farakka waters: (1)
the amount involved is so small as to be insignificant;
or (2) in the event that the reduction is substantial,
the [government] may be concerned about the possibility
of a strong reaction from West Bengal where Farakka
is etn important political issue.'
Telegram, New Delhi ^759, March 1976.
Chapter 9= THE GANGES WATERS TREATY
(1) The Hindu, 2^/1/77, 'No accord on Ganga: Bangla team leaves'.
See also The Hindu, 27/1/77, 'Bangla wants accord on its
own terms', in which an account of the Bangladesh negotiating
strategy is given. According to this account, the Bangladesh
team was unwilling to exceed the 15,000 cusecs to which the
Mujib Government had agreed. The issue of regeneration was
also re-introduced.
However other sources (see note (12) below) suggest that
Bangladesh was willing to go at least to 17,000 cusecs with
hints that 20,000 cusecs might be acceptable.
(2) Holiday, 30/1/77, 'After the talks what?'
(3) Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), V3/77, 'Talks meet a
watery grave'.
(4) A similar point is made in Holiday, 23/1/77, 'What prospect
for talks?', and a telegram from the US Embassy in Dacca to
the US Government noted:
'The Bangladesh Government appears to be trying to
minimise its failure to gain solution by exhortations
ko8
to greater sacrifice in the interests of "sovereignty"
and lack of dependence on others.'
Telegram, Dacca 0396, January 1977i released to me in response
to a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
Other accounts of the negotiations are to be found in Financial
Times, 2VV77 and The Hindu, 10/12/76, and 12, 1*+, 17 and
21/1/77.
(3) Telegram, Dacca 0272, January 1977.
(6) Speech by M H Khan reported by Dacca radio, 10/2/77 (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, Weekly Supplement, FE/W917/A/11,
23/2/77).
Khan was talking about three projects (i) labour intensive
clearance of rivers in South West Bangladesh, (ii) the old
Ganges Barrage project, perhaps again as a retaliatory threat
and, (iii) a temporary weir across the Ganges, presumably a
genuine attempt to divert water down the Gorai-Madhumati
River.
(7) Dawn, 10/1/77) 'China-Bangladesh relations' and 16/3/77)
'BD fully prepared to uphold its sovereignty'.
(8) Dawn, 12/3/77) 'BD chief explains Farakka issue to Shahanshah
of Iran'.
(9) Far Eastern Economic Review, k/j>/77, op cit and, Dawn, 15/V771
'Farakka again'.
(10) The Janata Party manifesto, Both bread and liberty, says:
'The Party will strive to resolve such outstanding
issues as remain with some of its neighbours and
will consciously promote a good neighbour policy.' (p 25)
(11) Far Eastern Economic Review, 6/5/77) 'As you were at the Ganges
talks'.
(12) The negotiation concentrated on the flow during the period
April 21-30, the ten days of lowest flow, and there was
agreement that the total flow in this period should be taken
as 55)000 cusecs, the 75% availability value.
The details of this period come from:
Financial Times, 27/^/77, 'Ganges water agreement near'.
The Hindu,15/^/77> 'Jagjivan to discuss other issues
besides Farakka',
The Hindu, 20/^/77) 'Concessions to Bangla over Ganga
waters'.
The Hindu, 26/A/77, 'Bengal Minister criticises Farakka
accord',
'+09
The Hindu, 5/9/77, 'Only a limited accord on Farakka says BD'.
The■Hindu, 24/1/77, op cit (1).
The Hindu, 27/1/77, op cit (l).
Far Eastern Economic Review, 6/5/77, op cit (9)«
Keesings, 29/7/77, 'Bangladesh: understanding on Farakka
dispute', p 28480.
Business Standard, 21/4/77, and,
Business Standard, 7/5/77, 'Farakka pact under friendly
pressure', which records that 'shipping circles believed
friendly governments had put pressure on India to make the
agreement.'
(13) The Hindu, 15/V77, op cit (10).
(14) This writer's interview with Indian participant in the
discussions.
One of Bangladesh's draft texts included the following:
'If necessary, the two governments may by agreement
invite outside experts for assisting in the process
of investigation and study.
'After this scheme has been agreed upon the two
governments may by agreement jointly approach any
international institution or other sources of
financing for assistance in implementing this scheme.'
(15) The Hindu, 11/5/77, 'Farakka talks hinge on techno-economic
aspects' by G K Reddy.
(16) Dawn, 12/5/77, 'Indo-BD talks on Ganges waters fail'.
(17) The Hindu, 12/5/77, 'Bangla stance on Farakka raises doubts'.
(18) The Hindu, 11/6/77, 'Zia happy over talks'.
(19) The Hindu, 16/7/77, 'Farakka: India's thinking on a long term
solution' by G K Reddy.
(20) The Hindu, 27/7/77, 'Cong MPs fear Farakka sellout'.
(21) Blitz (Delhi), 18/6/77, 'Operation betrayal of Bangladesh'.
(22) Foreign Affairs Record, 6/8/77, 'Talks on Farakka'.
(23) The Hindu, 9/8/77, 'Farakka talks make little headway' by
G K Reddy.
(24) The Hindu, 30/8/77, 'India may settle for less water with
Dacca' .
Statesman Weekly, 3/9/77, 'Change in China's attitude says
Ram' .
410
(2.5) Statesman Weekly, 10/9/77, Editorial: 'Writ in water'. See
also The Times (London), 8/9/77, 'Political outcry in West
Bengal at prospect of concessions by India in Ganges water
dispute'.
(26) The Hindu, 15/9/77, 'Farakka water: Bengal team's plea to
centre'.
(27) The Hindu, 5/9/77, 'Only a limited accord on Farakka says BD'.
(28) The Hindu, 16/9/77, 'India, Bangla drifting apart?'
See also, The Hindu, 11/9/77, 'Farakka: Bangla rejects India's
proposals' which reports that. Dacca insisted that the Farakka
Barrage should be taken out of service pending a long-term
solution.
(29) The Hindu, 25/9/77, 'Summit on Farakka possible' by G K Reddy.
This article also reports the snub a year earlier of Admiral
M H Khan by Mrs Gandhi and says, 'the big problem now is how
to bring President Zia more directly into these negotiations
without further offending MH Khan'.
(30) On the morning of Wednesday September 28th, a full meeting of
Ziaur Rahman's Council of Advisors was discussing the final
instructions to be given to B M Abbas before he returned to
Delhi. ' They were interrupted by the news that a hijacked
Japan Air Lines plane was asking permission to land in Dacca
(Sunday (Delhi), October 1977, 'The coup coup land'). In the
subsequent chaos caused by the hijack, two rebellions were
attempted one in Dacca and one in Bogra. Neither succeeded
and though, few people were killed in the attempts, several
hundred people were executed later (Amnesty International,
Report of a mission to Bangladesh, February, 1978; EPW,
25/3/78 'Murder in Dacca: Ziaur Rahman's second round').
Despite all this, the instructions were given to B M Abbas
and he got back to Delhi in time to initial the treaty on the
30th.
(31) The Hindu, 27/9/77, 'Bangla team awaits word from Dacca'.
(32) The Hindu, 30/9/77, 'Agreement on Farakka' by Reddy and
The Hindu, 28/9/77, 'Farakka: Dacca summons Abbas for fresh
briefing'.
(33) Ibid.
(3^) The Hindu, 6/11/77, 'Farakka pact, best India can get in
present circumstances' by Reddy.
See also:
Dawn, 5/10/77, 'The Farakka Agreement'.
Financial Times, 7 and 8/11/77, 'Taking the Ganges waters
on trust' and 'Agreement on the Ganges',
and, Economist (London), 8/10/77, 'Troubled waters'.
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(35) G K Reddy wrote in The Hindu, 30/9/77? 'Agreement on Farakka',
that the exchange of letters specified that the JRG was to
complete feasibility studies of alternative augmentation
proposals within three years. The letters may also include
agreement on the minimum water India is allowed to divert
down the Bhagirathi during floods. Such agreement might be
kept confidential to avoid opposition in West Bengal.
(36) Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 8/10/77? 'Chambers not happy over
Farakka accord',
Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 30/9/77? 'Calcutta Port let down:
Basu1 and 'Accord wont achieve aims' (by Debes Mookerjea),
Business Standard, 6/5/77? 'Calcutta Port shutdown feared',
Business Standard, 17/12/77? 'Exports attack Farakka pact'
which reports a symposium organised by the Bengal National
Chamber of Commerce, and,
Guardian, 1/10/77? 'Farakka accord seals Calcutta's fate'.
See also, J K Ray (Centenary Professor of International
Relations at Calcutta University), 'The Farakka Agreement',
International Studies, 17? 2, April-June 1978, pp 235-2^6.
Unfortunately, this article is full of errors and incorrect
assertions. Ray allows his nationalism full reign, even to
the extent of attributing statements wrongly. (See note (20),
Chapter Five).
(37) Foreign Affairs Record, November 1977? 'Official statements
on sharing of Ganga waters at Farakka'.
(38) Asafoduwlah, the Chairman of the Bangladesh Water Development
Board, who had been closely associated with the negotiations
since the formation of Bangladesh, was demoted two weeks
prior to the signing of the Agreement. He is a member of
the elite corps, Civil Service of Pakistan, and therefore
managed to retain his employment. He is now director of
a small cultural centre in Dacca and, apparently believes
that he was demoted because of his insistence that Bangladesh
should get the full 'historic' flow.
(39) Hassan In Harvard, Intl Law Jl, 19? 2, 1978, p 717-
(kO) The Hindu, 20/12/77? 'Zia's fruitful talks with PM'.
(V) The Hindu, 13/5/79? 'India's gesture to Bangla...'.
(if2) USIA Delhi, 'Toward our common goals: texts of remarks and
speeches...', Delhi, 1978? p 18.
(V3) Financial Times, *f, 6, and 7/1/78,
The Hindu, 7/1/78, 'Callaghan gets warm welcome',
The Times, 17/1/78, 'PM reports his tour of Indian subcontinent:
good prospects for British firms to increase trade', and
The Times, 5 and 7/1/78.
VI2
EPW, 28/1 - 4/2/78, 'Harnessing Ganga and Brahmaputra:
implications of Anglo-American move', pp 129-130.
(44) The Economist, 8/12/79, 'Back to the Indira Raj'.
05) The Hindu Intl Edn, 2/2/80, 'Bangla President's cordial talks
in Delhi' .
(46) The Hindu Intl Edn, 8/3/80, 'Delay tactics won't do, Bangla
told'.
(47) The Hindu Intl Edn, 29/3/80, 'Ganga water accord: minister
blames Janata Govt'.
(48) The Hindu Intl Edn, 29/3/80, 'Farakka: India warns Bangladesh'.
(49) The Hindu Intl Edn, 10/5/80, 'Ganga water talks fail'.
(50) The Hindu Intl Edn, 19/7/80, 'Ganga water talks yield no result
(51) Interview with me in Delhi, September 1978.
(52) Interview with Bangladesh diplomat, New York, May 1979-
(53) Interview, op cit (51)-
INTR0DUCTI0N TO PART III
(1) External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi, undated, presumed September
1976.
(2) Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, September
1976. A summary, Deadlock on the Ganges, was published in the
same month. Figures reproduced here are generally from this
latter document because they reproduce more clearly.
(3) People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Water Development
Board, International Engineering Co Ltd (San Francisco and
Dacca) and Special Studies Directorate of the BWDB, September
1977- A senior official of the Water Development Board has
claimed that the world bank first gave an outright grant of
/600,000 for a study of the effects of Farakka, and that this
grant was subsequently increased. According to the report
itself, the work was done under the terms of an agreement
between IEC0 and Bangladesh Water Development Board signed on
January 20 1977, and
'The study costs were financed by the International
Development Association, a component of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
under the provisions of Technical Assistance Credit
622-BD to the People's Republic of Bangladesh.'
Chapter I, p 1-1, Special Studies.
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(if) These four questions are not unproblematic: what, for example,
is meant by 'well designed' or 'well described'? These
concepts imply a notion of good and bad science which is not
explored in these pages. Nevertheless, the questions provide
useful means of making a subjective judgement slightly more
systematic.
(5) The three are Daryl B Simons, Ray Linsley and Wayne D
Criddle. They contribute a signed letter addressed to the
Chairman of the Water Development Board as a preface to
Special Studies. It contains this paragraph:
'In general, we find that the report accurately
summarizes the work performed and the data
assembled and analysed during the study and that it
presents a good starting point and guide for future
studies necessary to implement effective water
management in the Southwest region of Bangladesh.
Since low flows in the Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers
are probably necessary to meet the needs in their
own service areas and since costs of diversion
from the Brahmaputra appear to be exorbitant, it
cannot be overstressed that for the foreseeable
future Bangladesh must rely on the Ganges River alone
to serve the Study area.'
(6) Government officials have an interest in providing resources
for their government's negotiating policy. IECO have a
similar interest because they wish to receive future contracts
from the Bangladesh Government.
Chapter 10: REDUCED FLOWS
(1) Bagchi, K, The Ganges Delta , Calcutta UP, '\9kk.
(2) Comparison of land areas in Noakhali published in Dacca
University Studies, reference mislaid.
(3) Nafis Ahmad, An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, OUP,
London, 1968, p 15•
(if) Not used.
(5) There is little reliable data on rates of erosion in Nepal,
and almost none on changes in erosion in recent years, but
there is general agreement that there has been an increase.
The best study available is Peter Laban's Field Measurements
on Erosion and Sedimentation in Nepal, September 1978*
FAO, Govt of Nepal and UNDP, Integrated Watershed Management
Project.
if
(6) East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority, Water
Supply Paper - Gk, Gauge and discharge observations for the
Gorai-Madhumati River at Gorai Railway Bridge, Hydrology
Directorate, Dacca, January 1962.
(7) Table III-8, Special Studies, reproduced here as Tables 10.1
to 10.6.
(8) An assumption is made that there are no withdrawals in
November. This assumption will be reasonable if the diversions
at Farakka plus the water allowed through the Jangipur Barrage
are equivalent to the total of water which would 'normally'
have flowed into the River Bhagirathi in November. It is a
difficult assumption to check. Having made that assumption,
the team then calculate the parameters by multiple regression
analysis.
(9) The Hindu, 19/2/76, 'Ganga waters: India refutes Bangla claim'
In 19771 Provash Roy, the West Bengal Irrigation Minister told
a press conference that Farakka diversions had been in the
range 35-38,000 cusecs in 1976. Business Standard, 18/9/77,
'Farakka study team report on Monday'.
(10) A comparison of Figure III-28B, the monthly rainfall at Khulna
in recent years, with Table II-1, the average rainfall at
Khulna, and Table II-2, the variation of monthly rainfall at
Khulna, (all these from Special Studies) indicates that:
- the rainfall in the period January-April 1976
was about 2.5 inches compared with an average (for
the period of record 193^-69) of ^.5 inches.
- in the same months in 1977, the rainfall was about
5.5 inches.
- the monthly rainfall figures appear to fall into
the following frequency distribution categories:
Month 1976 1977
Jan lower quartile to median lq to median
Feb lower quartile to median lq to median
Mar upper quartile to maximum uq to max
Apr minimum to lower quartile minimum to lq.
(11) These conditions may be modified if the aquifer is confined.
(12) White Paper, p 8.
(13) In the words of Special Studies:
'The flow pattern between surface water and groundwater
is extremely complex. The direction of flow is
not consistent along the length of many rivers,
on opposite sides of the same river, or at different
seasons. Flow tends to be from the rivers into the
groundwater in the northern part of the area and
from the groundwater into the rivers near the Bay of
^15
Bengal. The rivers tend to gain groundwater on the
northern or northeastern banks and lose groundwater
on the southern or southwestern banks. Flow during
the wet season tends to be from the groundwater into
the rivers.'
'...The contours indicate that groundwater flows
toward the Mohananda River, the Ganges River above
Hardinge Bridge, the Baral River, the Gorai River
below Kamarkhali, and the Nabaganga River below a
point.about 20 miles West of Magura.'
Vol B, p V-19. In a subsequent paragraph the report also says
'Direct infiltration of rainwater probably constitutes most
of the natural groundwater recharge of the study area'..
(1^) SS, Vol B, pp V-33 and 3b.
(15) SS, Vol B, p V-3b.
(16) Ibid, pp V-9-1 and bZ.
(17) Feris, J G (1963), 'Cyclical water level fluctuations as a
basis for determining aquifer transmissibility', US Geological
Survey, Water Supply Paper 1536-1, pp 305-318.
(18) For the Brahmaputra see, Coleman, J M, 'Brahmaputra River:
Channel Processes and sedimentation', Sedimentary Geology, 3.,
1969, PP 129-239; and,
North West Hydraulic Consultants Ltd, Edmonton, Vancouver,
'An appraisal of flooding and sediment problems within the
Ganges-Brahmaputra river basins', a report submitted to the
Canadian International Development Agency, Ottawa, June 1976.
For the Ganges itself, see, Rahman, K S, A Study of the
erosion of the River Padma, MSc thesis, Bangladesh University
of Engineering and Technology, June 1978. Rahman concludes
that the meeting point of the Brahmaputra and Ganges moved
upstream 10.5 miles between 1968 and 1976. In the same period,
the width at this confluence increased from 1.5 to 7«5 miles.
(19) As has been noticed by the inhabitants of many villages on the
Indian side of the border who have been displaced by erosion
apparently induced by Farakka. See Patranabis, T R 'Farakka
Project...', Economic and Political Weekly, March 29, 1975*
(20) See Table A III-9 of EPWAPDA, Master Plan, Supplement A.
From this it can be calculated that, for the years 1958-62,
95% of the sediment load passing Hardinge Bridge was
transported during the months of July, August, September and
October, the months of flood flow.
(21) SS, Vol B, Chapter IV, para, b.b.b.
(22) Ibid.
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Chapter 11: SALINITY INTRUSION IN BANGLADESH
(1) Leedshill-De Leuw Engineers (for East Pakistan Water and Power
Development Authority), Coastal Embankment Project Engineering
and Economic Evaluation, 1,p 73* Dacca,December 1968.
(2) Derived from 250 parts per million suggested as the potable
limit in Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organisation, Basic
Development Plan, Calcutta, 1966, p 19-
(3) Bangladesh, White Paper on the Ganges Water Dispute, September
1976, p 7. ""
(k) India, The Farakka Barrage, New Delhi 1976.
(5) Harvard University, Center for Population Studies, Bangladesh
Land, Water and Power Study, Final Report (Draft), June 1972,
pages VII.19 to VIII.2b. The results of this study are
briefly discussed in note (17) below.
(6) World Bank (IBRD/IDA), in nine volumes, Report PS-13,
Washington, May 15 1972. The Indian Government is probably
referring to Technical Report 20, Vol VIII, pp
(7) IECO/Special Studies Directorate, Special Studies, Bangladesh
Water Development Board, September 19771 C., Chapter VI,
para 6.1, p 1.
(8) Ibid, p 20, para 6.5•
(9) Ibid.
(10) A rather different interpretation of the same conclusion is
given in the overall summary of the four volume report, in
Volume A. There,.the relevant paragraph reads:
'The salinity patterns in the study area east of the
Madhumati river is dependent on the combined flow
of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. The rapid
penetration and retreat of high salinity in the
Shahbazpur-Tentulia estuary at Ilsaghat in 1976 and
1977 occurred in conjunction with the reduced flows
in these estuaries.'
(p 1-15, para 1.7.^)
Other paragraphs are reproduced from volume C almost without
alteration. Even the paragraph quoted in volume C appears to
have been subject to last minute changes, the phrase 'was in
conjunction' appears to have replaced an earlier, longer
formulation.
(11) Ibid, (3, Chapter VI, p 26, para 6.5.3-
(12) Ibid, p 23, para 6.5.2.
^17
(13) Ibid.
(14) Ibid, p 23-24.
(15) Ibid, p 25
(16) Ibid, p 25-
(17) The Harvard report (op cit) draws the following conclusion
from their salinity studies:
'The intrusion of the 2,000 micromhof^uS] salinity
front with no flow through the Gorai river is not
significant when compared with the salinity front
of March 23 1966. Therefore the model should be
investigated further in order to determine the
sensitivity of the movement of the 2,000 micromho
salinity front. There are practically no hydraulic
data and very little salinity data in the prototype
along the areas through which the 2,000 micromho
salinity lines are passing, as shown in Figure VII.12.
The study of the sensitivity of the movement of the
salinity front will require detailed hydraulic and
salinity data from the critical area.'
pp VIII.22 to VIII.24.
It was this inadequacy of data which proved the undoing of
the Harvard predictions. They predicted an advance of the
2,000 micromhos salinity front of only a kilometer or two
in the Khulna region, under the influence of zero flow in
the Gorai. The observed advance in 1976 appears to be more
than 25km (Drwg VI-4, Special Studies).
(18) Special Studies, C, Chapter VI, p VI-34.
(19) Bangladesh, White Paper, op cit, p9-
(20) India, The Farakka Barrage, op cit, p 2.
(21) Special Studies, op cit, (?, Chapter VI, pp 37-8.
(22) A prudent industrialist might have anticipated salinity changes.
Relatively high salinities had been recorded within a few miles
of Khulna in earlier years. In the early 1970s, the Canadian
Government provided aid enabling the Bangladesh Government to
start modifying a power station in the South West to accept
cooling water with a higher salinity. (My interview with
official of Canadian High Commission, Dacca, 1978.) Whether
this work was completed or proved adequate to the 1976
conditions is not known.
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Chapter 12: AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
(1) Bangladesh, Planning Commission, The Two Year Plan 1978-80,
Dacca, March 1978, p 71-
(2) B L C Johnson, Bangladesh, Heineman, 1975, P 33-
(3) Raisuddin Ahmed, Foodgrain production in Bangladesh, Bangladesh
Agricultural Research Council, Dacca, December 1977» p 1-
(k) World Bank, Bangladesh: Country trends and development issues,
March 19791 country data p 2.
(5) Two Year Plan, op cit, p 105.
(6) Bangladesh, White Paper, Dacca, 1976, p 6.
(7) Ibid, pp 7 & 8.
(8) The document is signed by 'Moslehuddin Ahmed, Director of
Agril. (E & M) In-charge, Bangladesh', and by 'M A Kasem,
Director, Special Studies, BWDB, Bangladesh', and dated 19/2/77-
(9) Bangladesh, White Paper, op cit note (6), p 9-
(10) India, The Farakka Barrage, p 10.
(11) Ibid, p 15.
(12) Special Studies, C, p VIII-1.
(13) Bangladesh claimed in 1976 that the G-K project was seriously
effected by the Farakka diversions because, firstly, the water
level was too low for the water intake of the power station
at Bheramara, so power was unavailable for the G-K pumps and,
secondly, because the water level was too low for the G-K
pumps to operate. Both these claims are probably correct but
such conditions probably did not prevail for the whole of the
dry season, and they were not wholly unprecedented. In
several previous years, the G-K pumps had been rendered
partially inoperative by silting of the intake channel.
According to the G-K Project Engineer's figures, 53)361 acres
were irrigated in 1975~6 and 5^202 acres in 1976-7. These
areas are slightly above the average for the period 1972-3 to
197^-5• Irrigat ion may have been delayed and crops damaged
as a result, but an average area was irrigated.
Superintending Engineer, G-K Project, Phase I, Kushtia,
Synopsis on Ganges-Kobadak Project Kushtia Unit, Kushtia,
15/3/77-
^1-19
World Bank, Proposals for an Action program, Washington,
1970, p 102.
J W Thomas, Development Institutions, Projects and Aid in
the water development program of East Pakistan, Development
Advisory Service, Harvard University, March 1972, pp 14-17-
(14) See also, E R Jordens and M Rahman, Relationship between soil
moisture characteristics of some Gangetic soils and the growth
of wheat under non-irrigated conditions, Department of Soil
Survey, Ministry of Agriculture,. Dacca, 1978.
(15) Special Studies (SS) , C_, Para 7-7.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1979 statistical yearbook
of Bangladesh, Dacca, 19791 P 166.
(18) SS_, p X—1, The Sundarbans species appear to be segregated
according to long term salinity patterns.
(19) Ibid, p X-12 to X-13. The Gewa tree, which competes better
under conditions of slightly increased salinity, appears
to be replacing the Sundri tree in areas of deterioration.
(20) Ibid, p X-19.
(21) Ibid, p X-23 and Curtis S J, 1933i Working Plan for the forest
of the Subdarbans Division...1931-57i Bengal Government Press,
Calcutta.
(22) SS, p X-26.
(23) Ibid, and Blascoe F, The mangroves of India, Inst Francois de
Pondichery, Pondichery, 1975; C Adams Williams, History of the
rivers of the Gangetic delta, 19191 reprinted NEDECO, Holland,
1966.
(24) SS, section 10.4.1.
Chapter 13: NAVIGATION, FISHERIES AND ECOLOGY
(1) B L C Johnson, Bangladesh, Heinemann, 1975* P 90-
(2) Bangladesh, The Two Year Plan, Dacca, 1978, p 92.
(3) Bangladesh, White Paper..■, Dacca, 1976, p 9-
(4) India, The Farakka Barrage, Delhi, 1976.
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(5) Special Studies (SS), p XI-2.
The location of the places refered to is as follows:
Raita - Right bank, Ganges, 10 mile upstream Hardinge Br.
Talbaria - Right bank, Ganges, at Gorai offtake
Satbaria - Left bank, Ganges, midway between Gorai offtake
and Ganges-Brahmaputra confluence.
Shilaidah - ?
Daulatdia - at confluence of Ganges and Brahmaputra
Tepurakandi - Right bank, Ganges, 14 miles downstream of
confluence.
(6) The Farakka Barrage, op cit, p 9-
(7) East Pakistan Inland Water Transport Authority/Netherlands
Engineering Consultants (NEDECO), Surveys of Inland Waterways
and Ports - 1963-67, July 1967, Hague, Plate 5*
SS, op cit note (5)i Drwg XI-1.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in association with Scott,
Wilson and Kirkpatrick, Bangladesh Transport Survey, November
1974, Table C.2.
(10) Ibid, Table C.20.
This table itemises the major commodity flows by mechanised
vessel in 1972-73 by origin and destination. The only
commodities which appear to have been carried on the Ganges
by this means are 'public sector foodgrains' of which 37,000
tons were carried to Rajshahi and 13,000 tons to Pabna in
that year.
(11) SS, p XI-3.
(12) White Paper, op cit, pp 8 and 9- Hilsa fish, according to
the statistics of the Fisheries Directorate, constitute more
than 50% of annual inland water fish catches.
(13) The Farakka Barrage, op cit, pp 14 and 15.
(1*0 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book of
Bangladesh 1978, Dacca, December 1977, pp 173 and 174.
(15) SS_, op cit, Chapter IX, Section 9.4.
(16) Ibid.
(17) SS, Vol A, Sect 1.7.8, p 1-19.
(18) White Paper, op cit, p 10.
(19) The Farakka Barrage, op cit, p 16.
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(20) SS, p VIII-2.
(21) Ibid, p VIII-18.
(22) Ibid, p VUI-kS.
INTRODUCTION TO PART IV
(1). B G Verghese, Gift of the Greater Ganga: an approach to the
integrated development of the Ganga-Brahmaputra Basin,
Coromandel Lecture 8, 12/12/77i New Delhi, p 32.
(2) Indian Proposal, p 7-
(3) Bangladesh Proposal, p 1.
0+) In an unpublished World Bank document Maasland has identified
'three modes of possible irrigation development' in the lower
Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin. These three are (i) tributary
development, with surface storage for river regulation; (ii)
exploitation of the basin's groundwater potential; and (iii)
diversion of the Brahmaputra water into the Ganges Basin.
These three categories are essentially technical. The two
governments' Proposals select from Maasland1s categories (i)
and (iii) .
Maasland, Special Projects Department, Water development
potentials of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basins,
World Bank, Washington, August J>0 1972 (with revisions
February 12 1973)•
Chapter 1*K A BIG CANAL?
(1) Indian Government, Proposal for augmenting the dry season flow
of Ganga. duplicated, New Delhi, March 1978, p 6k\
(2) Ibid, p 68.
(3) The depth and discharge are given; the slope appears to be
similar to that of the Farakka Barrage feeder canal. The
cross sectional area and width can therefore be calculated.
(^) Maasland has calculated that the power potential of the
unregulated minimum flow in this region is 30 GW at 60% load
factor. Water development potentials of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna Basins, World Bank, Washington, 19731 P 20.
(5) Indian Proposal, op cit (l), p 80.
(6) Ibid, p 67.
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(7) My interview with C C Patel, Secretary for Irrigation, New
Delhi, 28/9/78.
(8) Indian Proposal, p 33-
(9) Ibid, p 39-
UNDP, India: the National Water Grid, New York, 1972.
Ibid, p kj>.




















Ibid, p 63. The references are not cited in the Proposal but
they are: World Bank, Bangladesh: land and water resources
sector study, Washington 1972, VII, technical report 22,
pp 6 and 15.
This quotation is probably from the same World Bank study cited
in note (17) but I have been unable to trace the exact source.
Indian Proposal, pp 84-5-
My interview with a Bangladesh official of the Water .
Investigation Directorate, Dacca, 1978.
The Insider's critique is one Bangladesh official's personal
commentary upon the Indian Proposal. It was written in March
or April 1978.
My interview, op cit (20).
Op cit (22).
'Sovereign. 1. Adj. (of power) supreme and exempt from external
control...' Pocket Oxford Dictionary.
The population density in this area of Bangladesh is 1,000
to 1,300 persons per square mile, and less in Assam and West
Bengal.
V J Galay, Augmentation of the dry season flow of the Ganges,
typescript North West Hydraulic Consultants, Dacca, June 1978.
(27) A Press Trust of India report of 18/7/78, said that storage
in Nepal could provide 50,000 cusecs. My interview with a
senior official in the Ministry of External Affairs revealed
that storage in India could be expected, by India's estimate
to provide 30,000 cusecs.
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Chapter 13: A FEW DAMS
(1) Bangladesh. Ministry of Power, Water Resources and Flood
Control, Proposal for the augmentation of the dry season
flow of the Ganges, Dacca, March 1978.
(2) Nippon Koei and Co for Government of Nepal, Master Plan
of Hydro-electric Development in Nepal, Kathmandu, 197*+-
(3). The project is described in Far Eastern Economic Review,
7/^/78, 'Letter from Dacca', an article which appears to have
been written by someone with access to the Bangladesh Proposal.
See also the Economist, 28/1/78, 'Water, water everywhere'.
(*+) Bangladesh Proposal, op cit (1), p 1.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid, p 26
(7) B G Verghese, 'An integrated approach to the Ganga-Brahmaputra
Basin development', in A symposium on Ganga-Brahmaputra Basin's
Potential, Delhi, 1979, P 103.-
(8) Press Trust of India, Delhi, 18/7/78.
(9) Ibid.
(10) My interview with Indian civil servant, Delhi, September 1978.
(11) Verghese, op cit (7), P 106.
(12) Interview, op cit (10).
(13) Ibid.
(1*0 My interview with engineer in Department of Irrigation,
September 1978.
(15) The Chisapani Dam appears to be a high dam even for the first
estimate of storage. The Norconsult/Electrowatt Main report,
Kathmandu, 1973, for the feasibility study on this dam
suggests a 200m dam.
Bangladesh's estimate requires that the Chisapani reservoir
store 2.5 times as much water. The dam height will not rise
in direct proportion, but it will rise significantly.
(16) Norconsult/Electrowatt Main report, ibid, estimates the
additional monthly flow available after the needs of
electricity generation have been met. This suggests that
16,000 cusecs of additional flow would be available in the
driest month of April. This corresponds approximately with
the Bangladesh estimate (in Table 15-2) possibly indicating
that there will not be a serious conflict.
Chapter 16: REVIEW AND COMPARISON
(1) The Indian parliament's discussions in 1975 provide further
confirmation of the existence of unresolved technical
questions. India. Lok Sabha, Public Accounts Committee,
196th Report, The Farakka Barrage, Delhi, 1976, pp 111-2.
(2) K P Misra (ed), Studies in Indian foreign policy, Vikas,
Delhi, 1969;
S M Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign
policy, Minnesota U P, Minneapolis, 1974.
M S Rajan, India's foreign relations in the Nehru era, Asia
Publishing House, Bombay, 1976.
(3) Tariq Hassan, 'Ganges waters treaty'', Harvard Intl Law Jl,
19, 2, p 721, note (89).
(4) J S Bains, 'Equitable solution for water disputes', The Hindu,
16/9/61. This is presumably a summary of the article cited
by Hassan (Indian JI Intl Law, 38, i960).
(5) Hassan, op cit.
(6) Ibid, pp 719-20.
(7) Quoted in Sid Guatam, 'Inter-state water disputes: a case
study of India', Water Resources Bulletin (Am Wat Res Assn),
12, 5, October 76, pp 1061-9.
(8) India, Report of the Irrigation Commission, Delhi, 1972,
Vol I, Chapter XV.
(9) Guatam, op cit, p 1064.
(10) Ibid, p 1065.
The dispute between five states over the sharing of the River
Godaveri was resolved by a tribunal in December 1979- Hindu
Intl Edn, 8/l2/79«
(11) Ibid, p 1064.
(12) Irrigation Commission, op cit, Vol I, p 3^9-
(13) Irrigation Commission, op cit, pp 354-357; Guatam, op cit,
pp 1067-70;
K L Rao, India's water wealth, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1975,
p 214 and Chapter XIV.
Siddeshwar Prasad, 'Water resources development: a few aspects
of inter-state problems', Ind JI of Power arid River Valley
Development, Jan 1970, pp 9—13-
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(19) D A Caponera, Report on the Kosi revised agreement..., mimeo,
1966.
J Lipper, 'Equitable utilisation' in A H Garreton et al,




















Bains, op cit (9).
Hassan, op cit (3), p 723-
Glos, International rivers: a policy-oriented perspective,
University of Malaya, Singapore, 1961, pp 299-5-
Hassan, op cit (3), P 722.
Lipper, op cit (13)-
The Rules are reproduced in UN, Management of international
water resources: institutional and legal aspects, New York,
1975-
Ibid, article IV.
Baxter, 'The Indus Basin' in Garretson et al, op cit (19).
Ibid.
Dacca, 1976, p 18.
India, The Farakka Barrage, Delhi, 1976.
P J Stone, A methodology to provide analytical information
for coordinated water resource use in international river
basin development, PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, May 1977, P 78.
UN, op cit (20), pp 99-5-
J D Chapman (ed), The international river basin, University
of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1963, pp 22-3. The Indian
Government was represented at this seminar by an observer,
East Pakistan by a participant.
See Appendix A.
Lok Sabha Debates, 16/8/61, 'International situation', S2,
56, cols 2905-560.
Telegram from US Embassy in Dacca to Washington, dated January
1977, number Dacca 0272.
Y Ezrahi, 'The political resources of science', in Barnes (ed),
The sociology of science, Penguin, Middlesex, 1975-
926
(33) Bangladesh Mission to the UN, Press Release, 'Statement...in
the-Special Political Committee...', November 15 1976*
(3*0 India News, issued by Indian Mission to UN, 'Statement by his
excellency...', November 16 1976, p 6.
(35) Nelkin, 'The political impact of technical expertise', Social
studies of science, 5., 1975, P 53-
(36) Nelkin, 'The technological imperative vs public interests',






Agreements between India and Bangladesh
on river waters
1. Statute of the Indo-Bangladesh Joint
Rivers Commission, 24th November 1972.
2. Published details of the 1975 interim
agreement, April 18th 1975-
5- Indo-Bangladesh agreement on sharing of
Ganga waters at Farakka, November 5th 1977-
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Pursuant to the relations of friendship and co-operation
that exist between India and Bangladesh,
Desirous of working together in harnessing the rivers common
to both countries for the benefit":of the peoples of the two
countries,
Desirous of specifying some questions relating to these
matters,
WE HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Chapter II
Article 1
There shall be established an Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers
Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
Article 2
(i) The Commission shall be constituted by each participating
government appointing a chairman and three members; of
these two shall be engineers. The Chairman and three
members shall ordinarily hold office for a period of
three years.
(ii) Each participating government may also appoint such
experts and advisors as it desires.
Article 3
The Chairmanship of the Commission shall be held annually
in turn by Bangladesh and India.
Article 4
(i) The Commission shall have the following functions in
particular:
a) to maintain liason between the participating countries
in order to ensure the most effective joint efforts in
maximising the benefits from common river systems to
both countries.
b) to formulate flood control works and to recommend
implementation of joint projects.
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c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance floor warnings,
flood forecasting and cyclone warnings,
d) to study flood control and irrigation projects so that
the water resources of the region can be utilised on an
equitable basis for the mutual benefit of the peoples
of the two countries, and
e) to formulate proposals for carrying out co-ordinated
research on problems of flood control affecting both
the countries.
(ii.) The Commission shall also perform such other functions
as the two governments may, by mutual agreement, direct it
to do.
Chapter III SUPPORTING STAFF AND SECRETARIAT ASSISTANCE
Article 5
Each government will provide appropriate supporting staff
and secretariat assistance to its representatives in the




(i) subject to the provisions of this statute, the Commission
shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
(ii) Meetings may generally take place alternatively in the
two countries, subject to the convenience of the two
governments.
(iii)Special meetings of Working Groups or Ad-Hoc Expert
Groups duly nominated by the respective governments
may be arranged, as required, by mutual consultation
of the Members.
Chapter V RULES OF PROCEDURE
(iv) The ordinary session of the Commission shall be held
as often as necessary, generally four times a year. In
addition special meetings may be convened any time at
the request of either government.
Article 7
All meetings shall be closed meetings unless the Commission
desires otherwise.
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Chapter VI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 8
The Commission shall submit confirmed minutes of all meetings
to the two governments. The Commission shall also submit its
annual reports by the thirtyfirst of January, next year.
Article 9
Decisions of the Commission shall be unanimous. If any
differences arise in the interpretation of this Statute
they shall be referred to the two governments to be dealt
with on a bilateral basis in a spirit of mutual respect and
understanding.
Done in Dacca on the 24th day of November, Nineteen Hundred
and Seventy-Two.















for India in Bangladesh.
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1975 FORTY DAY UNDERSTANDING
JOINT INDIA-BANGLADESH PRESS RELEASE
EMBARGO: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED/BROADCAST/TELECAST
BEFORE 1700 HOURS. IST/1730 HOURS EST
ON 18TH APRIL, 1975.
DACCA/NEW DELHI, APRIL, 18:
The delegation from India led by His Excelllency Shri Jagjivan Ram,
Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation and the delegation from
Bangladesh led by His Excellency Mr Abdur Rab Serneabat, Minister
for Flood Control Water Resources and Power met in Dacca from
the 16th to 18th April, 1975- The talks were held in a cordial
atmosphere and were characterised by mutual understanding that
exists between the two friendly countries.
The Indian side pointed out that while discussions regarding
allocation of fair weather flows of the Ganga during lean months
in terms of the Prime Ministers' declaration of May, 197^ are
continuing, it is essential to run the feeder canal of the
Farakka Barrage during the current lean period. It is agreed
that this operation may be carried out with varying discharges
in ten-day periods during the months April and May, 1975 as
shown below ensuring the continuance of the remaining flows for
Bangladesh.











Joint teams consisting of experts of two Governments shall
observe at the appropriate places in both the countries the
effects of the agreed withdrawals at Farakka, in Bangladesh
and on the Hooghly river for the benefit of Calcutta Port.
A joint team will also be stationed at Farakka to record the
discharges into the feeder canal and the remaining flows
for Bangladesh. The teams will submit their reports to both
the Governments for consideration.
April 18, 1975.
k3Z
Indo-Bangladesh Agreement on Sharing of Ganga Waters at Farakka
The following is the text of agreement between the Government of the
Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh on sharing of the Ganga waters at Farakka and on
augmenting its flows signed in Dacca by Shri Surjit Singh Barnala,
for the Government of the Republic of India and Rear Admiral Musharraf
Hussain Khan, for the Government of the People's Republic of
Bangladesh on November 5i 1977;
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH,
DETERMINED to promote and strengthen their relations of friendship
and good neighbourliness,
INSPIRED by the common desire of promoting the well-being of their
peoples,
BEING desirous of sharing by mutual agreement the waters of the
international rivers flowing through the territories of the two
countries and of making the optimum utilisation of the water
resources of their region by joint efforts,
RECOGNISING that the need of making an interim arrangement for
sharing of the Ganga waters at Farakka in a spirit of mutual
accommodation and the need for a solution of the long-term problem
of augmenting the flows of the Ganga are in the mutual interests of
the people's of the two countries,
BEING desirous of finding a fair solution of the question before them,
without affecting the rights and entitlements of either country other
than those covered by this Agreement, or establishing any general
principles of law or precedent,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
A. Arrangements for sharing of the waters of the Ganga at Farakka.
ARTICLE I
The quantum of waters agreed to be released by India to Bangladesh
will be at Farakka.
ARTICLE II
(i) The sharing between India and Bangladesh of the Ganga waters
at Farakka from the 1st January to the 31st May every year will be
with reference to the quantum shown in column 2 of the Schedule
annexed hereto which is based on 75 per cent availability calculated
"from the recorded flows of the Ganga at Farakka from 19^8 to 1973-
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(ii) India shall release to Bangladesh waters by 10-day periods in
quantum shown in column k of the Schedule:
Provided that if the actual availability at Farakka of the Ganga
waters during a 10 day period is higher or lower than the quantum
shown in column 2 of the Schedule it shall be shared in the proportion
applicable to that period;
Provided further that if during a particular 10-day period, the
Ganga flows at Farakka come down to such a level that the share of
Bangladesh is lower than 80 per cent of the value shown in column
the release of waters to Bangladesh during that 10-day period shall
not fall below 80 per cent of the value shown in column
ARTICLE III
The waters released to Bangladesh at Farakka under Article 1 shall
not be reduced below Farakka except for reasonable uses of waters,
not exceeding 200 cusecs, by India between Farakka and the point
on the Ganga where both its banks are in Bangladesh.
ARTICLE IV
A Committee consisting of the representatives nominated by the two
Governments (hereinafter called the Joint Committee) shall be
constituted. The Joint Committee shall set up suitable teams at
Farakka and Hardinge Bridge to observe and record at Farakka the
daily flows below Farakka Barrage and in the Feeder Canal, as well
as at Hardinge Bridge.
ARTICLE V
The Joint Committee shall decide its own procedure and method of
functioning.
ARTICLE VI
The Joint Committee shall submit to the two Governments all data
collected by it and shall also submit a yearly report to both the
Governments.
ARTICLE VII
The Joint Committee shall be responsible for implementing the
arrangements contained in this part of the Agreement and examining
any difficulty arising out of the implementation of the above
arrangements and of the operation of Farakka Barrage. Any difference
or dispute arising in this regard, if not resolved by the Joint
Committee, shall be referred to a panel of an equal number of Indian
and Bangladeshi experts nominated by the two Governments. If the
difference or dispute still remains unresolved, it shall be referred
to the two Governments which shall meet urgently at the appropriate
level to resolve it by mutual discussion and failing that by such
other arrangements as they may mutually agree upon.
B. Long-Term Arrangements
ARTICLE VIII
The two Governments recognise the need to cooperate with each other
in finding a solution to the long-term problem of augmenting the
flows of the Ganga during the dry season.
ARTICLE IX
The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission established by the two
Governments in 1^72 shall carry out investigation and study of
schemes relating to the augmentation of the dry season flows of the
Ganga, proposed or to be proposed by either Government with a view
to finding a solution which is economical and feasible. It shall
submit its recommendations to the two Governments within a period
of three years.
ARTICLE X
The two Governments shall consider and agree upon a scheme or schemes,
taking into account the recommendations of the Joint Rivers Commission,
and take necessary measures to implement it or them as speedily as
possible.
ARTICLE XI
Any difficulty, difference or dispute arising from or with regard
to this part of the Agreement, if not resolved by the Joint Rivers
Commission, shall be referred to the two Governments which shall
meet urgently at the appropriate level to resolve it by mutual
discussion.
C. Review and Duration
ARTICLE XII
The provisions of this Agreement will be implemented by both parties
in good faith. During the period for which the Agreement continues
to be in force in accordance with Article 15 of the Agreement, the
quantum of waters agreed to be released to Bangladesh at Farakka in
accordance with this Agreement shall not be reduced.
ARTICLE XIII
The Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the expiry
of three years from the date of coming into force of this Agreement.
Further reviews shall take place six months before the expiry of this
Agreement or as may be agreed upon between the two Governments.
ARTICLE XIV
The review or reviews referred to in Article 13 shall entail
consideration of the working, impact, implementation and progress of
the arrangements contained in parts A and B of this Agreement.
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ARTICLE XV
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain
in force for a period of five years from the date of its coming into
force. It may be extended further for a specified period by mutual
agreement in the light of the reviews referred to in Article 13.
IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by
the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Dacca on November 5j 1977 in the Hindi, Bengali
and English languages. In the event of any conflict between the




SHARING OF WATERS AT FARAKKA BETWEEN THE 1ST JANUARY AND THE 31ST MAY
EVERY YEAR
1 2 3 4
Period Flows reaching Withdrawal Release ti
Farakka (based by India Bangladesi





January 1-10 98,300 40,000 58,500
11-20 89,750 38,500 51,250
21-31 82,500 35,000 47,500
February 1-10 79,250 33,000 46,250
11-20 74,000 31,500 42,500
21-28/29 70,000 30,750 39,250
March 1-10 65,250 26,750 38,500
11-20 63,500 25,500 38,000
21-31 61,000 25,000 36,000
April 1-10 59,000 24,000 35,000
11-20 55,500 20,750 34,750
21-30 55,000 20,500 34,500
May 1-10 56,500 21,500 35,000
11-20 59,250 24,000 35,250




1. Text of the consensus statement adopted at the
United Nations, November 1976.
2. List of data supplied to Pakistan by India.
3- Hag Katha, 27/8/76, 'Why apathetic in accepting
the Chinese suggestion for flood control?'
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CONSENSUS STATEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 1976
1. The parties affirmed their adherence to the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation amond States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and stressed,
in this regard, their unalterable commitment to strengthen
their bilateral relations by applying these principles
in the settlement of disputes.
2. The parties recognised the urgency of the situation,
particularly with the onset of another dry season.
3- Both parties agreed that the situation callled for an
urgent solution and, to that end, have decided to meet
urgently at Dacca at the ministerial level for negotiations
with a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious
settlement.
k. The parties asserted that the prime objective of such
intensified contact was to promote the well-being of
their peoples and agreed to facilitate the establishment
of an atmosphere conducive to the successful outcome of
the negotiations.
5- The parties undertook to give due consideration to the
most appropriate ways of utilizing the capacity of the
United Nations system.
6. It is open to either party to report to the General
Assembly at its thirty-second session on the progress
achieved in the settlement of the problem.
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LIST OF DATA SUPPLIED BY INDIA, JUNE i960 TO JULY 1970
This is a summary of a typed document prepared by the










Project report for the Preservation of
the Port of Calcutta;
Data format for the Preservation of the
Port of Calcutta;
Ganga gauge discharge data 1958-60;
Data format, Tista.
Four vols gauge data at Rajmahal,
1910-60; Notes on littoral drift and
interference by estuarine closure;
Supplementary list of errors in
EPWAPDA WSP No 2.






Pilot experiment of radioactive tracer
study;
[Large quantity of additional material
- list takes up 15 pages].






Replies to 'Statement of data
outstanding from India'.
Continuing hydrological data.
[Between this and the next meeting,
India :sent a number of requests for
more data and an exchange took place
through the Deputy High Commission,
Dacca on 3/3/69- Daily discharge
data for 1960s for Farakka, Hardinge,
Paksey. Earlier, 2^/1/69, India
had requested data for the 'gains








Gaps in data on the Ganges Barrage
Project; 'Note on the comparison of
interpolated data of Farakka and
and Hardinge Bridge by the Indian
statistical method and by the Pakistan
modified Stout method';
'Preliminary Indian comments on the
Pakistan delegation's study on gains
and losses in the Ganges River between
Farakka and Hardinge Bridge';
'Preliminary Indian comments on the
Associated Consulting Engineers Ganges
Barrage report';
Comments on the condition of soil
moisture in pre monsoon and
post-monsoon periods in project area
of Ganges Barrage.
1 Indian comments on the Ganges
Barrage Project - July 1969;
2 Gains and losses in the Ganga/
Padma between Farakka and Hardinge
Bridge (An interim study by the
Indian delegation) - July 1969-
Documents given by Pakistan:
a) Observations on Indian gains and
losses report of last meeting;
b) Preliminary observations by
Pakistan delegation on
reconciliation of flood data at
Farakka and Hardinge Bridge as
given by the Indian delegation;
c) Preliminary observations on
interpolated data report of 2nd
Sec. level meeting ((b) below);
d).Clarification on a previous note
on gains and losses.
Documents furnished by India:
a) Reconciliation of flow data at
Farakka and Hardinge Bridge;
b) Interpolated data on 2 methods




1 Comments on dependability;
2 More on reconciliation of flow data;
3 Comments by India on Pakistan's
note on gains and losses;
k 'Consideration of inland navigation
and salinity intrusion in East
Pakistan and the Farakka Barrage
Project.'
5 Comments on Amla Agricultural Farm.
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Hag Katha, 27/8/76, 'Why apathetic in accepting Chinese suggestion
for flood control?'
Although the People's China expressed their profound eagerness to
save Bangladesh from the adverse effects of Farakka and also for
flood control and the development of water resourses. Still the
Bangladesh Government is not yet to take any decision regarding
this issue, because there have been some dirty tricks by a section
of bureaucrats.
According to the report, People's China, unlike capitalist countries,
is not willing to come forward with cash 'aids'. They want
Bangladesh to be self-reliant in this regard. The Chinese experts
are of a very strong opinion that Bangladesh in fact needs no
foreign aids at all for the development of her water resources. If
she uses her manpower in a well-arranged and very planned way then
this problem would be solved within a few days. The Chinese experts
have even opined that Bangladesh needs not to be afraid of the
Farakka Barrage. The source of the water is plentiful here. The
only solution lies in a planned storing and a proper distribution.
They think that if Bangladesh can solve this complicated problem
without any foreign aids then it will help the nation to regain its
self-confidence.
It is known that a particular section of the bureaucrats are anxious
to spirit away this Chinese move. Actually, the suggestion does
not help their personal interests, as this would not give any
facilities of foreign shopping. So, they are trying to prove the
Chinese suggestion is hypothetical. Yet everyone knows that the
Chinese had proved its reality long ago in their own country.
However, any sign of acceptance of the Chinese suggestion is still
out of sight. On the other hand the rainy season is almost over.
We must solve this alarming problem before the next dry season.'
(Translated from Bengali by Mamoon Ahmed).
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APPENDIX C
THE HOOGHLY AFTER FARAKKA
Chapter One described the deterioration of the Hooghly, and Chapters
Two and Three recounted how the Farakka Barrage was seen, despite
controversy, as the answer to this deterioration. Has it in practice
proved effective? Has the navigability of the Hooghly improved? The
available data is inconclusive, but it seems probable that it has.
Proof of the efficacy of the Farakka diversions would be provided by
a clear indication that river depths are increasing over the major
bars in the lower Hooghly. To show that these increases were not
caused by other factors, a series of figures covering, say, twenty
years, would have to be provided. If the figures showed that changes
in depth coincided with Farakka diversions and are roughly proportional
proportional to the quantity of diverted water, than it might be
agreed that the Farakka diversions were doing what was expected of
them. Unfortunately, such evidence is not available. In Table C.1
selected draught figures are provided for 1975 and 1976. A comparison
of only two years is, however, quite inadequate. The effects may
have been more significant in subsequent years.
Two alternative criteria for judging the efficacy of the diversions
have been suggested by P C Mitra, who was Chairman of the Port Trust
from 1973 to 1978, having been employed at the port since 19^9- He
told me that the success of the diversions could be measured from the
influence on ebb and flood tide durations and on channel stability
(1).
These two indicators correspond to Indian engineers' understanding
of the processes of river deterioration. The 'flood orientation'
of the lower Hooghly has long been identified as a cause of
siltation. The incoming flood tide is faster, and therefore capable
of carrying more sediment, than the outgoing ebb tide. The greater
velocity of the flood tide can be seen in its shorter duration, and the
power of this tide can be seen in its ability to cut the deepest
channel during the dry season. In many years the deepest channel
changes with the seasons: during the wet season, when freshets are
coming from the Ganges, there is a predominant ebb channel created
by the scouring action of the ebb tide. In the dry season, that
channel is abandoned as the deepest path of the river, to be replaced
by a flood-tide scoured channel (2). Mitra argues that maintenance
of the stability of the ebb channel throughout the dry season would
be proof of the effectiveness of the Farakka diversions. In 1978
he told me that the channel of the lower Hooghly had that year
remained stable for the fourth year in succession (3)«
A second index of success is the ratio of ebb and flood tide
durations. If these durations have been equalised then the
Velocities and sediment carrying capacities of the two tides will
have become closer. Tide tables are published annually by the Port
Trust and since lives and ships depend on the information they
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Table C.1 NAVIGABLE DRAUGHT OF HOOGHLY IN 1973 AND 1976
MONTH RANGE OF DRAUGHT (metres)
1975 1976
January 5-5 - 7.8 5.6 - 7.6
February 5.3 - 7-7 5.5 - 7.6
March 5-8 - 8.0 5.6 - 7.8
April4 6.5 - 8.2 6.0 - 8.0
May 6.5 - 8.2 6.^ - 8.2
June 6.8 - 8.3 6.8 - 8.1
July 6.9 - 9.^ 6.5 - 8.6
August 6-9 - 8.8 6.if - 8.5
September 6.3 - 8.7 6.3 - 8.7
October 6.3 - 8.5 -
November 5.6 - 8.3 -
December 5.6 - 7.7 -
Source: Paper distributed by Bangladesh delegation at
the United Nations, September 1976, which
quotes official information issued by the
Calcutta Port Commissioners.
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contain there is reason to believe it is reliable. Comparison of the
tide table for 1973 and 1979 C+) before and after the Farakka
diversions does not indicate any significant equalisation of the
flood and ebb tide durations.
Nevertheless, Mitra says that 'if there had been no Farakka Barrage,
by now the port would probably be dead...' (5)• He reports that in
197^ a 26ft draught was available on only 53 days of the year, and
in 1977-78 that draught was available for 130-1^0 days. He further
comments that the silt coagulation and deposition at the interface of
saline and fresh water, which had concerned Ippen and Wicker (see
Chapter Three), has not proved a serious problem, but one which can
be tackled with dredging.
In an interview with me, a senior administrator of the Farakka
Project suggested that the evidence was less conclusive:
'It is difficult to say [ how effective it will bej.
There is a team studying the effectiveness [but] their
reports are classified. [ The diversions have] arrested
further siltation, but as to deepending we will have
to see how far it is effective.' (6)
Until the return of Mrs Gandhi, most newspaper reports suggested that
the Hooghly was improving (7)- Since that time it has frequently
been suggested, as the Indian Irrigation Minister did in July 1980,
that India is being allowed too little water to maintain the
navigation of the Hooghly (8).
There seems to be no doubt that one consequence of the Farakka
diversions has been reduced salinity in the Hooghly in the vicinity
of Calcutta's water supply intake. Since even Ippen and Wicker
did not doubt that such an effect would be observed, there seems no
reason to question claims that it has taken place.
Two further, less beneficial consequences of the Farakka Barrage have
been noted on the Indian side of the border: erosion of the bank of
the Ganges downstream of the barrage and flooding upstream of the
barrage. According to one report (9) » 8*f villages in Murshidabad
District have been lost to erosion by the Ganges, and as a result
50,000 people have been made homeless. An inquiry set up by the
West Bengal Assembly was unable to establish that the erosion was
definitely caused by the barrage (10), and a Lok Sabha committee
hearing accepted expert opinion that the Farakka Barrage was not the
cause (11). There has almost certainly been flooding upstream of
the barrage, but these effects are thought to be neither severe nor
insuperable.
In sum, although the evidence is inconclusive, there is a strong
presumption that the Farakka diversions are beginning to have the
required influence on the problem of the Hooghly, but the barrage
-itself may also be causing severe erosion of the banks of the Ganges.
Appendix C: NOTES AND REFERENCES
(1) Interview in Calcutta, 17/10/78.
(2) This explanation of the rivers operation is given by Longridge,
Vernon-Harcourt and the Man Singh Expert Committee (see
Chapter One).
(3) Interview with this writer, Calcutta 17/10/78.
See also Business Standard, 6/5/771 'Calcutta Port shutdown
feared', a report of a press conference given by Mitra
(anticipating the Ganges Waters Treaty?) in which he said,
'Since the Farakka water started flowing in 1975 [the ebb]
channel was deepened and in 1976 the flood [tide] waters flowed
through the same channel.'
(4) Director of Marine, Port of Calcutta, Tide tables for the
Hooghly River 1973 i and Tide tables for the Hugli River 1979-
Spring tides at Garden Reach when the moon was at perigree
show similar durations:
Date flood ebb
hrs min hrs min
9/3/73 3 17 9 6
26/2/79 3 19 9 11
(5) Interview, op cit (l).
(6) Interview, October 1978.
The membership of this team is given in Bus Std, 18/9/775
'Farakka study team report on Monday' but nothing more is
heard of them after that.
In this report the outspoken Irrigation Minister of West
Bengal, Provash Roy, is reported as having told a press
conference that in 1976 the Farakka diversions were in the
range 35,000-38,000 cusecs (confirming the estimate of
Special Studies of 36,000 cusecs, Table 10.8, Chapter 10)
which produced a marked improvement in the Hooghly.
According to Roy, the diversions in 1977 were 28,000-33,000
cusecs and there was a marked deterioration in the
navigability of the Hooghly.
(7) For example, as early as 1976, 'an improvement 25% more than
anticipated' was reported (Statesman, 12/3/76, 'Port officials
want supply of Farakka water assured').
Later in the year, teams studying the river reported that
1936 conditions could be restored in about seven years
(Hind Std, 17/8/76, 'Farakka water must keep flowing').
kk6
(8) The Hindu Intl Edn, 19/7/80, 'Ganga water talks yield no
results'.
(9) T R Patranabis, 'Farakka Project: Calcutta Port's fate in the
balance', Economic and Political Weekly, 29/3/75> P 558.
(10) West Bengal Legislative Assembly, Committee on Government
Assurances, Seventh Report (Regarding checking of erosion at
Farakka), Calcutta, 197^+1 p 1.
(11) Lok Sabha, Public Accounts Committee, 196th Report, Farakka
Barrage Project, Delhi, January 1976, p 1*f1.
J+47
APPENDIX D
A 'THIRD WAY' OF DEVELOPING THE RIVERS?
Not thus far discussed in this thesis is the question: what sort of
water resource development would be appropriate to the needs of the
people of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Basins? In addition to the two
governmental schemes, described in Chapters and 15, many other
basin-wide or national development proposals have been made. India's #
grandiose National Water Grid has already been mentioned in Chapter
1^. In this appendix, three rather different suggestions are
described. Two of these suggestions, one for the delta area of the
lower basins, and one for the upper basin, involve popular
mobilisations to build small-scale decentralised projects; whilst
the third is a basin-wide scheme founded on high-technology and
large capital investment. As we have seen in Chapters 1^+ and 15,
large engineering proposals tend to express the political priorities
of their designers. The suggestions described here, particularly
the first two, probably do not reflect the priorities of the present
leaderships in South Asia. It is likely therefore that they would
only be seriously attempted under different political and economic
circumstances.
A self-reliant water policy for Bangladesh
At different stages in the Ganges Water sharing dispute, particularly
when Bangladesh has been unable to influence Indian decisions,
leaders of Bangladesh have begun to articulate independent water
development policies. The so-called Ganges Barrage is one example
of such thinking. At times it has been proposed as a threat of
retaliation against India, and at other times it has seriously been
considered as a way of storing dry season water. No doubt somewhere
in the archives of the Bangladesh Government there is a detailed
plan for autarkic water resource development, prepared ready for the
possibility that negotiation with India might break down irretrievably.
What is such a plan likely to contain?
Two sources can provide some clues. In 1975 or 1976 a team of
Chinese agriculture and water experts visited Bangladesh. Their
report has remained confidential, but what little is known about
it is suggestive. A second source of ideas is provided by the
thinking of Colonel Abu Taher, Bangladesh's martyred revolutionary
leader.
According to the Bengali newspaper Haq Katha, the Chinese advisers
proposed a policy of self-reliance:
'China does not want to come forward with a fat purse of
assistance like the capitalist world. It wants
Bangladesh to be self-reliant in this matter.' (1)
-It seems that the Chinese proposed land terracing, as a means of
accomodating to floods, and water storage within Bangladesh to provide
irrigation water during the dry season. Terracing is an unusual
suggestion for a country as flat as Bangladesh, but it is possible
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that land levels could be raised permanently in some areas where
higher yielding varieties of rice could be grown, while elsewhere
lower yielding but more flood-tolerant varieties could be sown. In
the period 195^-70, flood losses approached 10% of rice production
in two years and 5% in a further five years (2). Already villagers
adjust their lives, houses, agricultural methods and crop storage
utensils to minimise the threat from flooding (3)- Possibly
terracing could be used to improve this accommodation.
It is accepted wisdom that the flatness of Bangladesh makes it
unsuitable for large scale water storage. However, Bangladesh has
a tradition of small-scale and decentralised, but nevertheless
substantial water storage. The countryside is dotted with 'tanks',
small man-made ponds used to provide washing, drinking and sometimes
irrigation water. This important national resource has declined as
a result of land fragmentation and the construction during the
colonial period of flood control embankments, and it is generally
overlooked. However, statistics from a plot enumeration survey
carried out in 19^-5 suggest that the combined area of Bangladesh's
tanks then approached 500,000 acres (4). Assuming that these tanks
could be rejuvenated and deepened to an average depth of 8 ft, and
taking into account evaporation losses, as much as 2.5 MAP could be
stored. Such a volume is not sufficient to provide all Bangladesh's
irrigation needs, but it could be a significant contribution.
Colonel Abu Taher believed (5) that the severity of flooding in
Bangladesh has increased since British conquest as a consequence of
a decline in channel maintenance and of the construction of roads
and railways across natural drainage paths. Prior to British rule
there were societies with a greater concern for agriculture and water
control (6). Taher argued that during the Moghul period drainage
channels were improved during each winter but that this tradition
declined under the British Raj and ceased after partition. There
is little doubt that channel improvement could ameliorate flooding
in Bangladesh (7)- Taher proposed labour mobilisation to carry out
this work and also the building of a Brahmaputra-Ganges link canal
wholly within Bangladesh. The flow from this canal, he thought,
would be adequate with revived and rationalised river channels to
prevent saline water intrusion and provide irrigation water.
The four measures here described - terracing, tank water storage,
river channel maintenance and an intra-Bangladesh link canal- do not
constitute a coherent water development policy, but they are ideas
worthy of further investigation.
Deforestation in the Himalayas and the Chipko movement.
Erosion of the Himalayas contributes a heavy silt load to the Ganges,
causing river channel deterioration and flooding in the lower reaches.
Deforestation and erosion also tend to increase run-off during the
monsoon season, thereby exacerbating floods and at the same time
reducing the recharge of groundwater and thus reducing dry season
flows. Laban (8) has estimated that human interference has raised
annual erosion rates in Nepal from 1-10 tons/ha to average rates of
between 20 and 50 tons/ha with local rates as high as 200-500 tons/ha.
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Deforestation without replanting, roadbuilding with inadequate
drainage and increasing demand for firewood are amongst the factors
which have increased erosion rates.
In the Indian Himalayas, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, a popular
movement arose in 1973 "to oppose indiscriminate felling by commercial
timber companies. The movement took the name Chipko (from the verb
to hug, cling to, or embrace) from an early civil disobedience
organised by village women, when they took spontaneous action to
physically prevent felling (9)- Governmental control of deforestation
has not been noticeably effective in South Asia. Concievably, a
spontaneous popular mobilisation, like the Chipko movement, could make
a significant contribution to water resource development.
The Pugwash proposal: a Ganges Water Machine
The origins of the Harvard University, Center for Population Studies'
research into the water resources of the Ganges Basin have been
described in Chapter Six. From that research arose the proposal for
a scheme to:
'lower the normal groundwater in the basin by heavy
pumping along the rivers during the low flow season so
that monsoon flows are stored by induced groundwater
recharge.' (10)
The scheme is imaginative in its conception and possibly revolutionary
in its consequences. The Harvard researchers are perhaps optimistic
in believing that this one measure will solve floods, drought, food
shortage, population problems and provide the foundation for rapid
economic growth (11). On the basis of their calculations, possibly
as much as 15% or J>QP/o of the total annual flow of the Ganges could
be stored as rechargeable groundwater (12). Two of the researchers,
Revelle and Lakshminarayana, see the problem in these terms:
'Deeply embedded cultural, social, and economic problems
inhibit modernisation of agriculture and fuller utilisation
of water resources...'
and the solution as:
'the introduction of technological changes on the required
scale might break the chains of tradition and injustice
that now bind the people in misery and poverty.' (13)
The technological changes they propose are the machines required for,
and the processes of, increasing groundwater storage. To do this,
fallow land would be contoured to delay rainwater run-off, and a
lower water table would reduce evaporation from the ground water, but
the most significant new source of water would be percolation from
purpose built canals into which river water would be diverted during
the monsoon season, with pumping from well-fields to retrieve this
water during the dry season.
The Harvard articles note various engineering problems which they
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have already identified but believe can be overcome. However, the
Indian Government has not so far been receptive to this scheme.
The Central Water Commission is studying it, but it has been left
to Pakistan to initiate major field trials (1*0. The cost of the
scheme would be large. Harvard researchers have estimated that
the 170,000 large tubewells required would alone cost US #1,700
million. The costs of canals, diversion structures arid of generating
and transmitting 3i000 MW of electricity would be additional to this.
A number of criticisms.have been made of the Harvard scheme (15)- In
particular, it has been suggested that it would increase the control
of central government in the Ganges Basin, and the dependency of the
countries of the Basin on foreign aid and foreign technology (16).
Nevertheless, the scheme offers an imaginative and daring approach
which, if it works, could store more water than either government's
proposal.
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Appendix D: NOTES AND REFERENCES
(1) Haq Katha, 27/8/76, 'Why apathetic in accepting the Chinese
suggestion for flood control?' The report was widely
republished by Indian newspapers a day or two later.
(2) World Bank, Report PS-13, Land and water resources sector
study, Bangladesh, VIII, TR 2k, Table 5-
(3) Kathleen'A Ralph, Perception and adjustment to flood in the
Meghna flood plain, MA thesis, University of Hawaii, 1975i
pp 76-88.
(k) D V Smith, 'Opportunity for village development: the tanks
of Bangladesh', Bangladesh Economic Review, _1_, 3i July 1973i
pp 297-308. ~ " ~
(5) For this account of Taher's thinking on water resource
development I am indebted to Lawrence Lifschultz, who held
long conversations on the subject with Taher. The story of
Taher is told in Lifschultz's book, Bangladesh: the unfinished
revolution, Zed, London, 1979-
(6) See, fpr example, K L Rao, India's water wealth, pp 11^-5,
Orient Longman, Delhi, 1975*
(7) World Bank, op cit (2), VIII, TR 2k, p 16.
(8) Laban, 'Field measurements on erosion and sedimentation in
Nepal', Gov't of Nepal/FAO/UNDP Integrated Watershed Management
Program, IWM/WP/05, Sep 1978, p 1.
(9) Guardian, 7/1/80, 'Hugging trees'.
A Lopatin, unpublished note on Chipko movement, Rochester
University, USA.
(10) M C Chaturvedi, R Revelle, and V K Srivastava, 'Ganga water
machine II - induced groundwater recharge', p 196 in Water
for Human Needs, Second World Congress on Water Resources,
Delhi, 1975, Vol III.
See also Revelle and V Lakshminarayana, 'The Ganges water
machine', Science, 9 Way 1975) 188, pp 6l11-6l6.
(11) Chaturvedi et al, op cit, p 196-
Revelle et al, op cit, p 611.
(12) Chaturvedi et al, op cit, pp 196-7.
Revelle et al, op cit, Table 1, p 612.
(13) Revelle et al, op cit, p 611.
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(l*f) Writer's interviews with Rogers, now of the Department of City
and Regional Planning, Harvard University.
(15) 'Harnessing Ganga and Brahmaputra: implications of Anglo-
American move', in Economic and Political Weekly, 13, 28 Jan -
k Feb 1978, pp 129-30.
In an interview with a civil servant of the Ministry of
External Affairs of India, I was told that a paper giving the
following criticisms of the Harvard scheme was being circulated
in the Ministry:
1. It is experimental and untried, why try it in
India?
2. Why try it on the Ganga? Other river basins
in India have water shortages.
3. Technical problems, a) The ground must be porous,
even then pores may be blocked by sediment. b)
If the water level is lowered, irrigation based
on shallow tubewells will have to be abandoned.
c) What will happen to vegetation during the three
months when the water table is lowered by
pumping? d) Will lowering of the table cause
subsidence and collapse? e) Recharging the
groundwater may introduce pollution.
*
(16) EPW, op cit (27).
Some of these criticisms can also be levelled at the two
government's proposals. But, it is the lowering of the water
table which is the unique detrimental feature of the Harvard
scheme. Quite suddenly, one year, many of the hundreds of
thousands of hand pumps in the Ganges basin, providing
household water as well as irrigation water, would become
unusable. Many traditional water lifting devices might also
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